Ex Libris
C. K. OGDEN

THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

THE

WORKS

Of the late

Right REVEREND and LEARNED

r. *FRANCIS HARE*,

LORD BISHOP of

HICHESTER.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

inted by E. OWEN in *Amen-Corner*.

MDCCXLVI.

BX
5133
H322W
v.2

THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

THE *Difficulties and Discouragements which attend the Study of the Scriptures, in the Way of private Judgment, represented in a Young Letter to a Clergyman: In order to show, that, since such a Study of the Scriptures is Men's indispensable Duty, it concerns all Christian Societies to remove (as much as possible) those Discouragements.* Page 1.

Scripture vindicated from the Misinterpretations of the Lord Bishop of Bangor: *In his Answer*

1967872

Answer to the Dean of Worcester's *Visitation-Sermon concerning Church-Authority.* Page 45.

Epistola Critica ad Eruditissimum Virum H. B. S. E. I. In qua omnes doctissimi Bentleii in Phædrum Notæ atque Emendationes expenduntur. Page 285

THE

Difficulties and *Diſcouragements*

Which attend the

Study of the SCRIPTURES, in the Way of PRIVATE JUDGMENT, repreſented in a LETTER to a *Young Clergyman:* In order to ſhow, That, ſince ſuch a *Study of the* SCRIPTURES is Mens indiſpenſable Duty, it concerns all Chriſtian SOCIETIES to remove (as much as poſſible) thoſe *Diſcouragements*.

SIR,

I Do not wonder at the *Surprize* with which you received, when we were laſt together, the *Advice* I ventured to give you in relation to the *Study of the Scriptures*. For one, who is a *Clergyman* himſelf, to ſeem to ſuade *thoſe of his own Order* from a Study that s ſo many Arguments to recommend it; and ich, in the Opinion of *all good* Men, ought to their *chief* Buſineſs; has, I confeſs, the Ap-

pearance of a ſtrange *Paradox*, and that of the *worſt* Sort. It looks like *Popery* and *Prieſtcraft*; and therefore young and tender Minds may eaſily be forgiven, if they ſtartle at the firſt Propoſal of it: Thoſe eſpecially who have a juſt Senſe of the *Excellency* and *Inſpiration* of the *Scriptures*, and are eagerly bent on the Purſuit of ſuch Truths, as more immediately tend to the Advancement of *Virtue and Religion*. As *You* are of that Number, and went into Orders with no other View, but that you might the better ſtudy the *Scriptures* yourſelf, and advance the Knowledge of them in the World; it was not to be expected you ſhould preſently come into other Sentiments. Which I am ſo far from taking amiſs, that I think it to your Commendation, that neither the *Affection* nor *Eſteem* you ſo often expreſs for an old Friend, could prevail with you to act a Part that might have the Appearance of Levity in a Matter of ſo much Conſequence. Nor is it leſs for your Credit, that you can retain your Opinion, without loſing your Temper, or ſhewing a Backwardneſs to hear what is to be ſaid againſt it. Moſt Tempers run into Extremes; they are either too volatile to be fixed, or elſe ſo fixed, that no Force of Argument can move them. But it is *your* Happineſs, that you can adhere without Obſtinacy, and change without Levity; and therefore I ſhall think it no Trouble to reſume the Subject, and lay before you, in the beſt Manner I can, the Reaſons that *ſeem* to make *againſt the Study of the Scriptures in the Way of private Judgment*; which I hope will not, upon cooler Thoughts, appear ſo ſtrange to you.

you. You will consider they come from one, who is not more a Friend to *You*, than he is to the *Church*: And, if Examples be of any Weight, I can assure you this Side of the Question is by no means destitute of Proselytes; and that, when you come to know the World more, you will find this Study *neglected* to a Degree you little imagined: But it is *Reasons*, not *Examples*, will determine you. To come therefore to them; let me in the

I. First Place observe to you, that the *Study of the Scriptures*, such a *thorough* Study of them I mean, as you aim at, is extremely *difficult*, and not to be successfully pursued, without a very great and constant *Application*, and a previous Knowledge of many other Parts of useful Learning. The *New Testament* cannot be understood without the *Old*; the Truths, revealed in one, are grounded on the *Prophecies* contained in the other: Which makes the Study of the *whole Scriptures* necessary to him, that would understand thoroughly a *Part* of them. Nor can the *Apocryphal Books*, how much soever they are generally slighted, be safely neglected; there being a great Chasm of Five Hundred Years between the End of the *Prophets*, and the Beginning of the *Gospel*; which Period is of the *greatest* Use for the Understanding of the *New Testament*, and yet is the least known. But now, if the *Old Testament* must be well studied, a good Knowledge of the *Oriental Tongues* is absolutely necessary. No Man can be ignorant, who knows any thing of Letters, that no Versions of old Books can be thoroughly depended on; the

Mistakes are so many, and sometimes of great Moment; especially the Versions of Books writ in a Language *little understood*, and many Parts of it in a Style extremely *figurative*, and those Figures such as these Parts of the World are almost wholly Strangers to. But, put the Case *these Difficulties* were less than they are, it is no easy Matter to add to *Greek* and *Latin* the Knowledge of so many *other Languages?* Do not *they Two* alone find Work enough for most Scholars? What *Pains* then must a Man take, if he will study so many *others* besides? And, if the Knowledge of the *Old Testament* could be dispensed with, give me Leave to tell you, that the Language even of the *New Testament* is not to be understood with so *little Pains* as is commonly imagined. It is learnt indeed in Schools, and from hence thought to be the easiest *Greek* that can be read; but they, who have read it in another Manner than School-boys, know it to be quite otherwise. Not to mention the Difficulties peculiar to St. *Paul*, whose Epistles are a very great Part of the *New Testament*; *Plato* and *Demosthenes* are in many Respects not so hard, as even the *easier* Books. The Style indeed, in the *Historical* Books, is plain and simple; but, for all that, even those Parts have their Difficulty: And the Whole is writ in a Language peculiar to the *Jews*: The Idiom is *Hebrew* or *Syriac*, though the Words be *Greek*; which makes some Knowledge of *those* Languages still necessary.

Again, though it were not necessary to read the *Old Testament* in the *Original*, yet the *Greek Version* of it must be read, and that carefully; it being often-

oftentimes the beſt, if not the only Help, to explain the Language of the *New*; beſides that, all Citations in the *New* are generally made from it: But now, how *laborious* a Thing muſt it be, to ſtudy an ill Verſion of a very hard Book, which we cannot read in the Original? I call it an *ill Verſion*: For though it be indeed a very good one, conſidering the Time it was writ it in, yet, as a Verſion, it muſt be allowed by thoſe who can judge of it, to be far from being exact or true. A Man need only conſult it on ſome hard Places in the *Pentateuch*, as well as in the Poetick or Prophetick Books, to be convinced of this. It was certainly far from perfect *at firſt*, and is made much *worſe* by the Corruptions it has ſuffered in handing down to us: So that I may venture to affirm, that, ſhould any body now a-days make a Verſion ſo imperfect, inſtead of Admiration and Eſteem, his Work would be much deſpiſed by moſt of our modern Criticks.

I might to theſe add many *other Difficulties* that attend a ſerious Study of the *New Teſtament*. It requires a good Knowledge of the *Jewiſh* State at the Time of our Saviour's Coming; a Knowledge of their Government, Sanhedrim, Synagogues, Cuſtoms, Traditions, Opinions, Sects; the Kinds of Learning received among them; what they borrowed from the *Greeks*; when their Myſtical and Allegorical Manner of expounding the Scriptures began, and on what Grounds; what their particular Expectations were in relation to the Meſſiah, and what they taught, and on what Grounds,

in relation to Angels, Dæmons, Poſſeſſions, Oracles, Miracles, *&c.*

But it is in vain, you ſay, to tell you of *Difficulties:* You are reſolved not to be deterred: You have Time before you, good Eyes, a ſtrong Conſtitution, a Mind prepared for Fatigue, a reaſonable Degree of Skill in the Languages, and are furniſhed with a competent Knowledge in all the Parts of uſeful Learning that, are preparatory to this Study: So that *Difficulties* animate rather than diſhearten you: And I am not unwilling ſo far to agree with you, that were there no Objection againſt this Study, but the *Difficulty*, this alone ſhould not deter one who is ſo well prepared for it. But, if you are able to go through ſo *laborious* a Study, I preſume you are not fond of Difficulties for Difficulties Sake, You cannot think it reaſonable to take ſo much Pains, unleſs it will turn to *ſome good Account*. I ſhall therefore in the

II. Second Place take Leave to ask, *Cui Bono?* What *Good* can come of ſo much Pains? For it may ſeem that a *free*, *ſerious*, *impartial*, and *laborious* Study of the *Scriptures* will be of no great Service, for the following Reaſons:

1*ſt*, Becauſe it is plain the *Orthodox Faith* is not founded on a nice and critical Knowledge of the Scriptures. Many of the ancient Chriſtians, it will be allowed, were not great Criticks, but argued very much in a myſtical Way. *Origen* in particular, who was the greateſt Scholar Chriſtianity had bred to that Time, perpetually turns the Letter of Scripture into Allegory. From whence

we

we may reasonably conclude, that the Knowledge of the bare *literal* Sense was, in the Judgment of many even in those Times, thought to be of little Use.

But, 2*dly*, it is certain that the *Original Language* of the *Old Testament* was known to very few for the first *Six* Centuries, in which those *General Councils* were held, wherein all the Articles of the *Orthodox Faith* were *settled*. They governed themselves, and determined all their controverted Points by the *Greek* Version; and those who knew *Hebrew* best, whether they took to the mystical or literal Way, had the Misfortune to be *least Orthodox*. So it was with *Origen*, who knew the Scriptures so well, that he had them all by Heart. And *Eusebius* and others, who studied and understood the literal Sense of the Scriptures *best* in the next Ages, succeeded little better: So that this Study seems to have been of little Use to the *Establishment* of the *Orthodox Faith*. Now, if an exact and critical Knowledge of the *Scriptures* was not necessary to the *Settling* of the Faith, it cannot be necessary to the *Understanding* of it, or to the Understanding *those who have writ best* in the Explication and Defense of it. On the contrary, such a Knowledge tends to *lessen* our Esteem for the *Fathers* of the Church, by discovering their Mistakes; and may weaken our Regard to the Decisions of *Councils*, by exposing the *Falseness of the Ground* they seem to be built on. A Man, well skilled in the literal Sense of the Scriptures, will often find, in the *Fathers and Councils*, Texts of Scripture urged very *insufficiently*; and great Stress

laid upon Paſſages, which, when critically explained, *prove nothing*, or perhaps make *againſt* them. Which ſuggeſts to me a *third* Reaſon, why it may ſeem that ſuch a Study can do no Good. And that is,

3dly, Becauſe the *Orthodox Faith* does not depend upon the *Scriptures* conſidered abſolutely in *themſelves*, but as *explained by Catholick Tradition*. The Faith was preſerved in *Creeds*, and handed down from one Orthodox Biſhop to another, whoſe Buſineſs it was to keep this ſacred *Depoſitum* pure and undefiled, and to deliver it to his Succeſſor entire as he received it. It was *by this Tradition* the *main* Articles of Faith were preſerved in the Church, and not from any particular *Study of the Scriptures*. The *Ground* therefore of theſe Articles muſt carefully be diſtinguiſhed from the Scriptures that have been brought in *Proof* of them; Theſe Proofs may be weak and inconcluſive, but the Truth ſtands independent of them. It is the Faith they have *received*; and, if at any Time they argue *weakly* for it from the Scriptures, it is an Argument indeed againſt their *Learning*, but none againſt their *Orthodoxy*.

This therefore may *ſeem* another good Argument to prove, that an *exact and careful Study of the Scriptures* is not *a ſafe and profitable Study*. It is a much *ſafer*, as well as a more *compendious* Way to make a Man *Orthodox*, to ſtudy the *Tradition of the Church*.

But you will ſay, that to ſend you from *Scripture* to *Tradition* is to turn you out of Paradiſe, the Garden of God, into a vaſt confuſed bewil-

dered

dered Wood; and that this is ſo far from mending the Matter, that it is ten Times more *laborious* than the Study I would diſſuade you from: And ſo, I confeſs, it is, if all the Eccleſiaſtical Writers were to be carefully read, in order to know the *Catholick Tradition*. But that is not my Meaning: The *Subſtance of Catholick Tradition* lies in much leſs Compaſs: The *Eſtabliſhed Church*, you will allow, is *Orthodox* in all neceſſary Points. If therefore you know the Senſe of the *Eſtabliſhed Church*, you have in Epitome the *Church Catholick*; and therefore you need only ſtudy *her* Opinions to make your *Orthodox*: And this the moſt illiterate Man may find in the *Liturgy and Articles*. This, I truſt you will allow, is as *ſhort* a Way, as could be wiſhed of knowing all that is neceſſary to be known. A very little Time will ſerve a Man to read, in his Mother Tongue, Things which all together would not fill a moderate Volume; and he will be *Orthodox* enough, and have a great deal of Time to ſpare for other Studies, that will turn to *more Account*. Beſides that, it is of great Advantage to go in a Way that is *ſafe* as well as *ſhort*; and will lead you into the Knowledge of all uſeful Truths, without the Hazard of falling into any dangerous Opinion.

4thly, But if you will inſiſt that it is *Scripture* and not *Tradition*, that the Faith is founded on; there is one Thing farther I muſt put you in Mind of, which may ſeem to prove, that a *profound and laborious Study of the Scriptures* will not make you at all more *Orthodox*. It is a fundamental Principle amongſt Proteſtants, that whatever is *neceſ-*

ſary

sary to be believed, is *plainly and clearly* revealed in the Scriptures; and consequently what is *not plainly and clearly revealed* in them, cannot be *necessary*. Now if what is *plain and clear* in Scripture is the only Part that is *necessary* to be known, then a *laborious* Search into the *obscurer* Parts may seem *unnecessary* to the Obtaining a true Orthodox Faith. You will say perhaps, that notwithstanding this Declaration of Protestants, it may and has been urged against them by their Adversaries, that they *do* believe, and *maintain* as *necessary*, Articles that *cannot be proved* by *plain* and *clear* Passages of Scripture. This, I confess, has been urged, and may possibly be true of all Parties of them, except the *Established Church*: But, if it be, it proves only that they are not true to their Principle; not that the Principle is not in itself true and good. And he surely must be allowed to be the best Protestant, who adheres best to the Principle on which the Reformation was founded.

5thly, Once more: Supposing the Study of the Scriptures as necessary as you please; in the *last* Place, I say, and I am sure the World will say it with me, that they have been *sufficiently studied already*; and, if any Parts remain still obscure, *who* can hope to clear up Passages that have puzzled so many great Men? Or will presume in disputable Points to set up his *Private Judgment*, against them that were Men of more Learning, of abler Parts, of greater Application, and better acquainted with the *Tradition of the Church*, than any one will now be allowed to be? And (which is the best Guide in Knowledge of Religion) they were

were moreover Men of moſt exemplary Piety, Devotion, and Humility; Virtues, of which very little Foot-ſteps are to be found in the learned Men of our Times.

Muſt not now a Man have a ſtrong Bent of Mind indeed, who cannot, by all theſe Reaſons, be diſſuaded from giving himſelf up to a *Study*, that may by many be thought as *unprofitable* as it is *laborious?* but will go on, in Defiance of all that has been ſaid to convince him that he waſtes himſelf in vain, and that there will be *no Fruits* of all his Labour, but to know he knows *nothing?* I call that *nothing*, which will turn to *no Account*.

But, to ſhew you I am diſpoſed to make all poſſible Conceſſions, I will grant that even this Objection might be got over, were this the worſt of it: But I have one Argument ſtill in Reſerve, that I am perſuaded will be deciſive. My

III. Third Argument then is this: That a *painful*, *exact*, *impartial Study of the Scriptures* will by ſome be thought not only to do *no Good*, but alſo *a great deal of Hurt*, both to the *Publick*, and to *yourſelf*.

1ſt, It will do Hurt to the *Publick*. It will diſturb the *Peace of the Church*, and that cannot but have a malignant Influence on the State.

It is certain that *Diſputes* in the *Church* diſturb the *Peace* of it: And it is as certain theſe Diſputes have been generally raiſed by Men pretending to a ſuperior Knowledge of the Scriptures, and to Diſcoveries that have eſcaped others. The *Scriptures* have always been made this Uſe of by the *Hereticks* of old; and it is the Character of the

great

great Hereticks of this and the last Age, who have set up for a *free and impartial Search into the literal Sense of the Scriptures* above the rest of the Christian World. But with what Success? They have purchased their pretended Knowledge of the Scriptures at the Expence of their *Reputation*, and their Study has destroyed their *Orthodoxy*. And were not their Books and Opinions carefully suppressed, and their Persons rendered odious to the People, who knows what *Disturbances* they might have created to the Church? On the other hand, the *Peace* the Church has enjoyed for many Years, among its own Members, seems to be owing to no one Thing more, than to a general *Neglect* of this Study; and the Dangers, that at present threaten its Tranquillity, come wholly from Men, who have endeavoured to revive a Study that has so often proved pernicious to its Peace.

Nor can it well be otherwise: For what Security has a Man that sets out in this Way; that attempts to *study the Scriptures* in a free and impartial Manner, laying aside all Prepossessions and previous Notions, resolving to see with his own Eyes, and judge for himself, and to believe nothing that he is not upon his own Search convinced is clearly contained in them? What Security has such a Man, that he shall not fall into some *Opinions* that have been *already condemned* as erroneous and heretical, or which may interfere with those that are commonly received; which, if they do not immediately strike at any Fundamental Point, yet will be *thought* to do so; and may have a Tendency to put Scruples into weak Minds,

and

and to disturb the *Peace of the Church*, by raising Doubts about the Meaning or Truth of some Articles, or by asserting that an explicite Belief of them is not necessary? It is so natural for curious and inquisitive Minds to deviate from the common Road, and the Examples are so many, that it is odds but *You* do so too, unless you had more Lead in your Constitution, or a more refined Understanding, than any curious Man ever had yet; otherwise you cannot be sure, that you shall not study yourself into Doubts at least, if not into opposite Opinions concerning some *received* Notions. You will doubt perhaps of the *Authority* or *Author* of some Canonical Book, and think perhaps that some Passages are *interpolated*, or that some celebrated Texts are *not genuine*, or should be *otherwise read*, or have not been *rightly understood*, or do not *prove the Point they are commonly brought for*. You may fall into Notions that will be thought tending to *Arianism*, or the like: You may reject *Arguments* brought from the *Old Testament*, to prove the *Trinity*, as trifling, and proving nothing but the Ignorance of those that make Use of them. You may think a *Prophecy* has a *literal* Meaning, where commonly the *Mystical* is thought the only one. You may think that *many Texts* in the *New Testament*, which are strong against the *Socinians*, do not prove against the *Arian* Notion. That the Title, *Son of God*, has not always one uniform Meaning in the Gospel; and that that single Expression, of itself, is no Proof of any Thing in God analogous to *Generation* in Men. That the *Identical Consubstantiality* of

of the *Son*, the *Eternal Procession* of the *Spirit*; and many other Notions relating to the *Trinity*, though they may be true in themselves, are not so in virtue of the *Texts* alledged for them. These Notions *learned* Men have fallen into; and from thence it is to be presumed, *you* will not easily keep clear of them. I chuse to instance chiefly in Matters relating to the *Trinity*, because it is the Controversy now on foot: But the like may be said on many *other* Articles; in each of which the Truth is but one, but the Errors infinite: And there is hardly any Notion, with respect to any of them, which some learned Man, by following his own *private Judgment*, instead of taking the *Doctrine of the Church* for his Guide, has not fallen into.

Now if you should study yourself into any new Opinions, or into *old* ones that have been condemned, What will you do? Will you keep them to yourself, or publish them? Or shall I rather say, It is no Question. The Authors of new Notions are apt to be very fond of them: They think it barbarous and cruel, to stifle the Infant in its Birth. There is a secret Pleasure in Singularity: To differ from the Vulgar is, in Appearance, to be *above* them; and to be *distinguished* from the Herd, is too great a Temptation to be easily resisted. But, had you Prudence enough to govern your *Ambition*, *Conscience* may come in here, and make you do what *Ambition* could not. The Truths, you think you have discovered, either are, or will be thought by you, of too much *Importance* to the Honour of God and the Good of Religion,

Religion, to be concealed. You will look on them as the *Bleſſings of God* on your Studies; and think it a capital Crime to extinguiſh the Light, and ſuppreſs the Knowledge he has imparted to you. In ſhort, you will think yourſelf under the *higheſt Obligation* not to diſſemble in Religious Matters, and conceal, from the Church of God, Opinions which you are convinced are not only true, but of great Service to it. Let me then conclude, that the novel or revived Opinions, which your *Study* leads you into, will be publiſhed to the World: What now will be the Conſequence? Certain Miſchief, but no certain Good at all. No Good, I ſay; for poſſibly your Notions may be wrong, or not of Conſequence; and, whether they are or not, the *Preſumption* againſt you will be ſo ſtrong, that your Notions will not be *received*, and perhaps not *examined*: They will be *condemned* as novel Notions, or as exploded ones: And, whatever you advance, it will be thought a certain Proof of its being of no Conſequence, that in ſo many Ages it has never been *received*. There is no Room therefore to expect, that what you advance ſhould be *received*, or do any *Good*. But the *Miſchief* is ſure and certain: It will raiſe *Scruples* in weak unſtable Minds, ſap the Foundations of the Orthodox Faith, and give a Handle to Sceptical Men; who, becauſe ſome Things are called into Doubt (though incidental Matters only, and of little Conſequence) will think they have a Right from thence to queſtion every Thing. Thus the Church and *Eſtabliſhed Faith* will ſuffer by the *Scruples* put into its Friends, and the

the *Handle* given to its *Enemies*. And, when Religious Diſputes are begun, *deſigning Men* know how to intermix Affairs of State with them; and then nobody knows where they will end, or what Miſchiefs they may not do. Whereas if you can be content to go in the *beaten Road*; if you will *implicitely* ſubmit to the *received Notions*, and humbly think the *Judgment of the Church*, where it is not the ſame, better than *your own*, you will be out of *Harm*'s Way, and neither hurt the *Church*, nor *yourſelf*.

2. I add *yourſelf*, as another Motive that ought to have great Weight with you in this Queſtion: For you cannot diſturb the *Peace of the Church*, without being greatly a Sufferer *yourſelf*. If you *really do not diſturb its Peace*, it is all one, you will be *interpreted* to do it, and that will bring on you more Evils than I would wiſh to my greateſt Enemy. In a Word, you will be thought a *Heretick*; a Term, which there is a ſtrange *Magick* in, though it has *no determinate Meaning* in the Mouth of the People, nor any *ill Meaning* in itſelf. It is ſuppoſed to include in it every Thing that is bad; it makes every Thing appear odious and deformed; it diſſolves all Friendſhips, extinguiſhes all former kind Sentiments, however juſt and well deſerved; and, from the Time a Man is deemed a *Heretick*, it is Charity to act againſt all Rules of Charity; and, the more they violate the Laws of God in dealing with him, it is, in their Opinion, doing God the greater Service.

That you may not think this is ſaid at Random, purely to frighten you into a Compliance with

me;

me; let me desire you to consider seriously the natural Consequences of being under the Imputation of *Heresy*. And the first I would observe is, that, from the Moment your People have this Opinion of you, you are incapacitated from working much Good upon them; and that, I am sure, so good a Man as you are, must think to be a great Evil. While they think you *Orthodox*, your virtuous and inoffensive Behaviour, your strict Sobriety and Temperance, your affable and familiar Manner of conversing with them, your generous and charitable Regard to those who are sick or in Distress; these good Qualities, joined to your plain and easy, but affectionate and moving Manner of instructing them, have a mighty Influence, and you may lead them as you please: They admire and endeavour to imitate your good Example: Your virtuous Conduct is a constant, though tacit, Reproof when they do amiss: The very Sight of you is a Lecture of Virtue to them; and the Influence you have already had, in the little Time you have been among them, is too visible in be denied. But, from the Time you are called *Heretick*, much of the Good, you could have done, is at at an End. Those, who before had a secret Veneration of you, think it their Duty to *defame* and *injure* you: Your Virtue they call Hypocrisy, your Humility Spiritual Pride: They look on you as an abandoned Wretch; that God has withdrawn his Grace, and that the Devil is at the Bottom of all you have been doing; that nothing can better testify their *Orthodoxy*, than to throw off all Regard both to your Doctrine and

Example; and, for Fear they should seem to be infected with your Errors, they will return to the Vices you had persuaded them to leave; and, for the Future, will take effectual Care not to be the better for you.

Nobody can do much Good, whom the People do not think a good Man; and that cannot be expected, when so much Reproach and Infamy will, right or wrong, be heaped on you, if you do not continue *Orthodox*. And this you cannot doubt, if you will but reflect on what passes under your own Eyes: And therefore it is in vain to fancy your *Virtue* will protect you. No, the most *conspicuous Virtue* will not be believed. If you are guilty of no open Vices, secret ones will be imputed to you: Your Enquiries will be called *vain*, *curious*, and *forbidden* Studies. Pride and Ambition will be said to be the secret Springs of them: A *Search after Truth* will be called a *Love of Novelty:* The Doubting of a single Text will be *Scepticism*; the Denial of an Argument, a *Renouncing of the Faith*. To say what the Scriptures have said, and in the very same Words too, if not explained in the common Way, will be *Blasphemy*; and the most sincere Concern for the Honour of Almighty God, you cannot be sure, will not be interpreted *downright Atheism*. Every Thing you say, or do, will have a wrong Turn given it. A Slip of Memory shall be made wilful Prevarication: A Mistake in a Citation shall be Forgery and Corruption: An Error, in an incidental Point of Learning, shall be a good Proof that you *know nothing*. Every inaccurate Expression shall be

pressed

preſſed into a Crime: Any little Warmth of Temper ſhall be aggravated into Pride and Poſitiveneſs, into a Contempt of Authority and ill Manners. In ſhort, all the Indiſcretions of a Man's former Life ſhall be ript up; and nothing forgiven, that can be remembered or ſtrained to his Diſadvantage. And where is the Man that can be fond of ſuch Uſage? For my Part, I am free to declare, I am afraid I ſhould not have Virtue or Courage enough to undergo ſuch a fiery Tryal.

Now all this a Man will draw upon himſelf, that brings himſelf under the Imputation of *Hereſy*. Whereas the *Orthodox* Man lives quiet and at Eaſe, unmoleſted and unenvied. His Faults (and who has not ſome?) ſhall be extenuated or excuſed, if not quite buried in Oblivion: His Want of Temper ſhall be a commendable Zeal; his Indiſcretion good Nature; his Miſtakes ſhall be imputed to Haſte or Inadvertency; and, when they cannot be defended, it will be argued in his Favour, that the greateſt Men ſometimes err, and the Writers of the firſt Rank are not always in the Right; or perhaps a Miſtake ſhall turn to his Advantage: It will be ſhewn to be an Error on the right Side, and that a good Cauſe drew him into it. His Learning, on the other Hand, ſhall be magnified beyond Meaſure; every body will be full of his good Qualities, and his Virtues ſhall be ſet in the beſt Light to ſhow themſelves and cover his Faults. In a Word, *Orthodoxy* attones for all *Vices*, and *Hereſy* extinguiſhes all *Virtues*.

That this is nothing but the bare Truth, I appeal to what you every Day hear and ſee yourſelf.

There are, you know, *two Clergymen* of the Town, who have ſtudied themſelves into *Hereſy*, or at leaſt into a *Suſpicion* of it: Both of them, Men of *fair unblemiſhed Characters: One* has all his Life been cultivating Piety, and Virtue, and good Learning. Rigidly conſtant *himſelf* in the publick and private Duties of Religion; and always promoting in *others* Virtue and ſuch Learning as he thought would conduce moſt to the Honour of God, by manifeſting the Greatneſs and Wiſdom of his Works. He has given the World ſufficient Proofs that he has not miſpent his Time, by very uſeful Works of *Philoſophy* and *Mathematicks:* He has applied *one* to the Explication of the *other*, and endeavoured by *both* to diſplay the Glory of the Great Creator. And to his Study of Nature, he early joined the Study of the *Scriptures*; and his Attempts, whatever the Succeſs be, were at leaſt well meant; and, conſidering the Difficulty of the Subjects he has engaged in, it muſt be allowed that in the main they are *well aimed:* And, if he has not ſucceeded, no more have others who have meddled with the ſame Subjects. Nor is he more to be blamed than they. To be *blamed*, did I ſay, I ſhould have ſaid, not leſs to be *commended*. For ſure it is a *commendable* Deſign, to explain Scripture-Difficulties, and to remove the Objections of profane Men, by ſhewing there is nothing in the Sacred Writings, but what is true and rational.

But

But what does a Life, thus ſpent, avail? To what Purpoſe ſo many watchful Nights, and weary Days? So much Piety and Devotion? So much Mortification and Self-denial? Such a Zeal to do Good, and to be uſeful to the World? So many noble Specimens of a great Genius, and of a fine Imagination? It is the poor Man's Misfortune (for *poor* he is, and like to be, not having the leaſt Preferment) to have a warm Head, and to be very zealous in what he thinks the Cauſe of God. He thinks Prudence the worldly Wiſdom condemned by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, and that it is groſs Prevarication and Hypocriſy to conceal the Diſcoveries he conceives he has made. This Heat of Temper betrays him into ſome indiſcreet Expreſſions and haſty Aſſertions: Deſigning to hurt nobody, he fancies nobody deſigns to hurt *him*; and is ſimple enough to expect the ſame favourable Allowances will be made to *him*, that he ſees made to thoſe who write againſt him. As to his Learning, it is his Misfortune that he is not ſkilled enough in the learned Languages to be a great Critick in them, and yet ſeems not to be ſenſible of his Deficiency in this Reſpect. And what Advantage is taken of this, that he has not *leſs Heat* and *more Criticiſm?* His *Learning* is treated in that Manner, that you would think he did not know the firſt Elements of *Greek*; though, even in that, he is much ſuperior to moſt of thoſe who make ſo free with him: And you every Day hear his Performances run down as Whimſies and Chimera's, by Men who never *read* them, and, if they did, could not *underſtand* them. Nor does his

Warmth of Temper come off better: It is all over *Obstinacy*, *Pride*, and *heretical Pravity*; a Want of *Modesty* and due *Deference* to just Authority: They, that speak most favourably, look upon him as *crazed*, and little better than a *Madman*. This is the poor Man's Character; and, low as he is, they cannot be content to leave him quiet in his Poverty: Whereas, had he not been early possessed with a passionate Love for the *Scripture* and *Philosophy*; had he not thought it his Duty above all Things to promote the *Glory of God*, and been persuaded that could no Way be so well done as by the Study of his *Word* and *Works*; it is more than probable he had, at this Time, been *Orthodox*: And then, instead of his present Treatment, his Faults would have been overlooked; the Learning, he excells in, would have been extolled, and no Defect would have been found in other Parts of it. He would have been cried up as an Ornament of the Age, and no Preferment would have been denied or envied him.

This you know to be the Case with *one* of the *new Hereticks*; the *other* is so prudent in his Conduct, that he comes under but a *Suspicion* of favouring the same Notions. How now is *he* treated? *Prudence* in *him* is as great a Crime as the *Want of it* in the *other*. The *imprudent* Man is treated as a Madman, and a rank *Arian*: The *prudent* one is *less a Heretick*, but *more dangerous*: *Sobrius accessit ad evertendam Ecclesiam*; and therefore the greater Alarm must be raised against *him*. And what has he done? Why, he has, with a great deal of Pains, brought together, in the best

Manner

Manner he could, all the Paſſages in the *New Teſtament* relating to the Doctrine of the *Trinity*. And ſo far his Work is what thoſe, who differ from him, *ſhould* be pleaſed with, ſince he has brought the *Materials* together to enable Men to form a right Judgment of the Queſtion in Diſpute; and has put into their Hands, if he be in the Wrong, the beſt Weapons againſt himſelf. But he has *interpreted ſome Texts* in a Manner that is not liked: It is true, he has ſo; but not once, that I remember, has he given an Interpretation that is purely *of his own Head*. He brings *great Vouchers*, and, if he errs, it is always in *good Company*. This is his Offence: He has maintained, with many others, particularly the late Dean of St. *Paul*'s, in Oppoſition to *Sabellianiſm*, that the *Three Perſons of the Trinity* are *Three real diſtinct Beings*; and the Belief of Three really diſtinct Beings *perfectly equal* he maintains with Dr. *South* to be *Tritheiſm*; and, that there *muſt* therefore be a *Subordination*. Now whether this Notion be right, or not; if he cannot eſcape *ill Treatment*, give me Leave to ſay, that, if your Study ſhould lead you into any Opinions contrary to what is generally received, *you* can with no Reaſon expect *better Quarter*. He is a Man, who has *all the good Qualities* that can meet together to recommend him: He is poſſeſſed of *all* the Parts of *Learning* that are valuable in a Clergyman, in a Degree that few poſſeſs any *ſingle one*: He has joined to a good Skill in the *three learned Languages* a great Compaſs of the beſt *Philoſophy* and *Mathematicks*; as appears by his *Latin* Works; and his *Engliſh* ones

are ſuch a Proof of his own *Piety*, and of his *Knowledge in Divinity*, and have done ſo much *Service to Religion*, as would make any other Man, that was not under the Suſpicion of *Hereſy*, ſecure of the Friendſhip and Eſteem of all good Churchmen, eſpecially of the Clergy. And to all this *Piety* and *Learning*, and the good Uſe that has been made of it, is added a *Temper* happy beyond Expreſſion: A ſweet, eaſy, modeſt, inoffenſive, obliging Behaviour adorns all his Actions; and no Paſſion, Vanity, Inſolence, or Oſtentation, appear either in what he writes or ſays; and yet theſe Faults are often incident to the beſt Men, in the Freedom of Converſation, and in writing againſt impertinent and unreaſonable Adverſaries, eſpecially ſuch as ſtrike at the Foundations of Virtue and Religion. This is the *Learning*, this the *Temper* of the Man, whoſe *Study of the Scriptures* has betrayed him into a *Suſpicion* of ſome heretical Opinions: And, becauſe it has, he muſt be *blacked* and *defamed*; he muſt be worried out of the great and clear Reputation he is poſſeſſed of: And he, that has ſo many ſhining Qualities, muſt be inſulted by every *worthleſs Wretch*, as if he had as little Learning and Virtue as the loweſt of thoſe who are againſt him. What Protection now can *you* promiſe yourſelf from your Virtue, when a Man of *ſuch* a Character cannot be ſafe in his good Name? Whatever therefore you do, be *Orthodox: Orthodoxy* will cover a *Multitude of Sins*, but a *Cloud of Virtues* cannot cover the Want of the minuteſt Particle of *Orthodoxy*.

It is expected, no Matter how unreaſonably, that a Man ſhould always adhere to the Party he has

has once taken. It is the Opinion of the World, that he is all his Life bound by the Subſcriptions he made in his firſt Years; as if a Man were as wiſe at Twenty-four, and knew as much of the Scripture and Antiquity, and could judge as well of them, as he can at Fifty. And yet, if a Man *will be ſtudying* theſe Things, he cannot be ſure he ſhall continue a Year together in the *ſame Sentiments:* And, if he ſhould not, he muſt either ſtifle his Perſuaſion, againſt the Dictates of his Conſcience, or be expoſed to the worſt Treatment, to be called a *Renegado*, a *falſe Brother*, a *Heretick*, or any Thing that *Malice* can ſuggeſt.

But I have not yet done. This is not the worſt of it. This perhaps you may pretend to deſpiſe, and not care what the World ſays of you, ſo long as your *Conſcience* cannot reproach you. Well, let then all Concern for Reputation go. Can you be proof againſt *one farther Conſequence* of lying under the Imputation of *Hereſy*? Can you bear to ſee yourſelf, your Wife and Children, ruined and undone? This, I ſee, ſtartles you,—— But you ask, *What Danger can there be in that?* An *Engliſhman*, you ſay, is out of the Reach of *Perſecution* or an *Inquiſition:* That Spirit, God be thanked, is baniſhed the Land; and even *convict Hereticks* are protected from the *Flames.* Very true, The Spirit of *Perſecution* is either gone, or is diſarmed; and that I look on as one of the invaluable Bleſſings of the Revolution: But can you be ſure it will not return? And ſuppoſe it will not; Are you therefore ſecure, that an Imputation of *Hereſy* will not end in the Ruin of yourſelf and Family? You and your Children will not be burnt indeed

indeed; but you may be as effectually ruined, as if you were. You may be *excommunicated*; and in Virtue of That be thrown into a Jail, to rot there, while your Family are ſtarving. And (which cannot be too well conſidered) when once you come into thoſe Circumſtances, what is there can deliver you? Your Puniſhment will laſt and be the ſame, as long as you continue in the ſame Mind. A Rule of Puniſhment, peculiar to the *Eccleſiaſtick* State. In *Civil* Caſes, the Offender, if his Crime be not Capital, ſuffers a *Temporary* Puniſhment, proportioned to the Fault he has committed; and, when he has undergone that, nothing further is required of him, except in ſome Caſes to find Security for his good Behaviour for the Future. But in Caſes of *Hereſy*, there is no Regard to the *Degree* of the Offence, in the Puniſhment inflicted. Nor is there any *End* of it. It is not enough to have ſuffered the *ſevereſt* Puniſhment, though for the *ſmalleſt Offence*; it is not enough to give Security of not offending for the Future. The innocent Offender muſt declare (what it is oftentimes *impoſſible* he ſhould declare) that he has changed his Sentiments, and is become *Orthodox*; and This, though perhaps no Methods of *Conviction* have been uſed, except that of *Puniſhment* be one. This is the miſerable Condition of a *convict Heretick*: The Puniſhment, which fell on him for *expreſſing* Thoughts *heretical*, he muſt *continue* to endure for *barely Thinking*; which is a Thing not in his own Power, but depends on the *Evidence* that appears to him: He muſt for ever (cruel Juſtice!) for ever ſuffer for his *private Thoughts* (though they go not beyond his own Heart) the Puniſhment

ment which ſome Overt-Act has once drawn upon him. To puniſh *toties quoties*, as often as theſe Overt-Acts are repeated, will not ſatisfy the *Holy Office:* Nor can a Forbearance of ſuch Acts avail any Thing, or a Promiſe of Silence for the Future; which yet is all that is in a Man's Power. No, he muſt *recant*, whether he can or not; and generally it is required to be done in Words drawn up for him. So that, if he do not ſee Reaſon to change his Opinion; and will not ſay he has changed, when has not; he is in for Life, and his Puniſhment can only end with it.

Indeed, on every Suppoſition, a Man excommunicated for *Hereſy* has a ſad Time of it. For, if he *does not* recant, he is (as I have ſaid) in Priſon for Life, and his Family muſt ſtarve; And, if he *does* recant, What does he get by it? His Liberty indeed, but what elſe? Will People believe he is ſincere? Will they not think his Recantation looſely drawn in Favour of him, to make it a Recantation in *Appearance* only? Or, if it be in the ſtrongeſt Words, Will he not, if he ſubmit to it, be ſuſpected to *equivocate?* Will they not expect the *Reaſons* of his Change? Will they not aſk (if he ſays no more for the *Orthodox* Side than has been ſaid before) why, if theſe Reaſons are convincing now, he did not think them ſo before? Will they not conclude, that *to him* they are inconcluſive ſtill, unleſs he can find better Reaſons than the beſt that had been offered him? Which I take to be a Contradiction. And will it not be argued from thence, that he is not changed? That it is the Puniſhment only, and not his Opinions, he would leave? So that, if he *continues* in

his

his Opinions, he will lie under all the Infamy and Punishment of *Heresy*; and, if he does *not*, yet it will be supposed he does. He is punished for acting *according to his Conscience*; and, if he would leave the *Heresy* imputed to him, he will be said to act *against his Conscience*; and perhaps be reputed a *worse* Men than he was before. This in all Events: Once a *Heretick*, and always miserable. The Reputation (change, or not) is never to be retrieved; no Preferment or Employment to be hoped for. He will always be suspected of *Heresy*, who is once guilty; and his Wife and Children must see him the perpetual Subject of Reproach and Obloquy; and feel it too: Feel it in their Character, feel it in their Maintenance; as if the Children of an *Heretick* were a Brood of Monsters, a Nusance to the Commonwealth, and infected the very Air they breathe in.

These Misfortunes a Man of the most *unblemished Life* may draw upon himself and Family, if he will be meddling with so *dangerous* a Study, and cannot in *Conscience* dissemble the Result of it. Misfortunes, which the *vilest*, *lewdest*, most *immoral* Wretch upon Earth is in no Danger of. The greatest Immoralities, nay, a long *Course* of them, shall oftentimes escape unpunished; epecially if a Man be very *Orthodox:* But, if they do not, the Punishment extends only to the *Person* of the Offender. It derives no *Infamy* on *himself* if he reforms, nor on his Children if he do not. They are rather *pitied* for having such a Father, and every body is willing to be kind to them. Who now, after this, can be fond of a Study that may bring

on

on him, let him be never ſo innocent, ſuch a Load of Miſery and Infamy, a Load without Meaſure, and without End? And if this will be the Conſequence of *Excommunication*, tell me how much better it is than *Perſecution?*

But you will ſay, that it is poſſible a Man's Studies *may not* lead him into any *heretical* Opinion; and if they ſhould, yet it is not very eaſy to *convict* a *Heretick*, or to ſay *what is Hereſy*. To the *firſt*, I have already ſaid enough; as to the *other*, I confeſs it is not very eaſy to *convict* a Man of *Hereſy*. The Law ſeems to be *deficient* in this Point: But who knows how ſoon this Defect may be ſupplied by a *new Law?* And, in the mean Time, it may be *difficult* indeed to convict a Man of *Hereſy*; but perhaps it may be found not to be *impoſſible*. And if it ſhould, it is but changing the Word, and the Offender may be come upon eaſy enough. If, through a Defect in the Laws, he cannot be convicted of *Hereſy*, he may however be convicted of Writing or Speaking *againſt* the eſtabliſhed Doctrine of the Church; and that will draw on him all the ſame Conſequences, that *Hereſy would* do. For *Hereſy* is the Oppoſing the Doctrine of the *Catholick* Church; but the Doctrine of the *eſtabliſhed* Church will readily be *ſuppoſed* to be the Doctrine of the *Catholick* Church; and therefore to oppoſe the Doctrine of one is in effect to oppoſe both. So that a Man ſhall be deemed a *Heretick* to all Intents and Purpoſes, and ſentenced to the ſame Puniſhment; though in the Sentence itſelf, for his Comfort, the Word *Hereſy* may be left out.

But

But you are willing to think the *Temper* of the *English* Clergy more moderate, and the Generality of them averse to every Thing that looks like the *Spirit of Popery*; as the Ruining of a good Man, meerly for Matters of Opinion, must be allowed to do. I wish you may find it so, if ever there should be Occasion. I confess there has appeared a *good Spirit*, a very *Human* and *Christian* Temper in some late Writings, where perhaps it was not much expected; but, for all that, I must beg Leave to differ from you. If indeed no one would *judge* in a Cause he did not understand; if no one were allowed to understand a Cause of *Heresy*, but who was a good Judge of the *Sense of Scripture* and of *Primitive Antiquity*; if no one were esteemed to know Scripture and Antiquity, but those who had *studied them well*, who had read them carefully with *their own Eyes*, and did not take the Sense of them *upon Trust* from Modern Writers; if the *Arguments* for his Opinion were to be *examined*, before his Opinion were condemned; if a Man, before he gave his Vote, were to lay his Hand upon his Heart, and declare himself thus qualified to judge; that he had considered the Matter, and would speak nothing but what he thought: On these Suppositions, I am apt to think, a Number of Judges would not very easily be found; and when they were, it may reasonably be presumed, that they would not be very forward to condemn. They would be sensible there was Room for honest Minds to be mis-led from what they had read and observed themselves; they would know that there is more to be said on the

the other Side, than the Generality at all dream of; they would be careful how they diſcouraged Learning, by diſcouraging the Enquiries of learned Men. They would be very unwilling a Man ſhould ſuffer by their Sentence, whoſe Life they are ſure is innocent and virtuous, but whoſe Opinions they cannot be ſo ſure are falſe and dangerous. They know Diſcouragements in Learning and Virtue to be of ſuch ill Conſequence, that a Man's Opinions muſt be very bad indeed, to make it neceſſary to come to ſuch Extremities. But give me Leave to ſay, you have no Reaſon to expect ſuch Judges, or ſuch a Backwardneſs to judge. It is always *ſuppoſed*, that the Doctrine of the Church you are of, is right; that it is the Doctrine of Scripture and Antiquity. And this, every body thinks, he underſtands. So that little Learning or Reading is neceſſary, to make any Clergyman a Judge over the learnedeſt Man alive.

Another Thing, I take Leave to tell you, is, that moſt Men think they can do *conſcientiouſly* whatever they can do *legally*. Men of *refined and exalted Underſtandings*, who have a large Compaſs of Thought, and have looked into the Principles of Things, know that *written Laws* are but Deductions of the *Law of Nature*, which is *prior* to all *human Inſtitutions:* That theſe ſometimes deviate from that *unwritten Law*; and, when they do, are of no real intrinſick Authority. They know that a Thing is not *juſt and reaſonable*, becauſe it is *enacted*, but, in good Governments, is *enacted*, becauſe it is *juſt and reaſonable*. They know that *Laws* are ſometimes obtained by Surprize

prize or Corruption, by Party-management, by Craft or Superſtition. They know that Penal Laws, in Matters of Religion, are ſeldom adviſeable. They would not eaſily contribute to the making them; and, when they are made, would be glad to have them generally lie dormant. They know that no *Authority of Man* can alter the *Nature of Things*, or juſtify a *cruel* or *unjuſt* Sentence in the Sight of God. They are ſure, that, if to puniſh Men for their Opinions be not *very right*, there is no Medium, it muſt be *very wrong*. It is publick Robbery or Murder, to deprive a Man of his Life or Goods for his Religion; if it be not *juſt in itſelf* to do ſo, as well as *legal*.

Some perhaps may think in this Manner; but theſe muſt be Men of refined and exalted Underſtandings; and therefore muſt be very *few*. The *Generality* think they may do *juſtly*, whatever they can do *legally*. And it is, no doubt, for *them*, a good Rule. They cannot judge of the Nature of Things for *themſelves*; and therefore *the Law* is the moſt proper Guide and Direction *they* can have. As long therefore as there are Laws to puniſh the Aſſerters of *heretical Opinions*, or ſuch as *oppoſe the eſtabliſhed Doctrines*; you may depend on it, they will not be ſuffered to lie dormant.

There will never be wanting great Numbers, who will call aloud to have them put in Execution; and they will think their Zeal, in this Matter, the *beſt* Service they can do the Church.

This is human *Nature*: Thus it has been in all Times. And no Experience of the Miſchief done

to

to Christianity, by a Forwardness to pronounce Anathema's on those who dissent from the *received* Opinions, will make us wiser. It may, I doubt not, be *demonstrated* with the greatest Evidence, that *all Christian Churches* have suffered more by their *Zeal* for *Orthodoxy*, and by the violent Methods taken to promote it, than from the utmost Efforts of their *greatest Enemies*. But, for all that, the World will still think the same Methods necessary. The same *Zeal* will prompt to the same *Persecutions* or *Prosecutions* (call them which you will) without considering the *same Matter* must necessarily produce, at long run, the *same fatal Consequences*.

Let me therefore intreat you, not to fancy the World is altered in this Point. Do not think your Opinions *cannot* ruin you, because it is *not reasonable* they should. Do not flatter yourself, that *Temper*, *Prudence*, and *Moderation* can, in Religious Controversies, get the better of *indiscreet Zeal*, *Bigotry* and *Superstition*. In short, be not hasty in espousing of Opinions, which can have no other Effect, but to lay the *best Men* at the Mercy of the *worst*. Every *mean Person*, who has nothing to recommend him but his *Orthodoxy*, and owes that perhaps wholly to his *Ignorance*, will think he has a Right to trample on you with Contempt; to asperse your Character with virulent Reflections; to run down your Writings as mean and pitiful Performances, and give *hard Names* to Opinions he *does not understand*; which you must bear, without the least Hopes of being heard a Word in your Defence.

Let me observe one Thing more, that it is the Misfortune of a *Clergyman* that he is confined to *one Profession*. Other Men, if they cannot live in *one* Way, are at Liberty to try *another:* But a Man, who has once the *indelible* Character, must live by the *one* Profession he has made his Choice. If therefore that Livelihood be taken from him, it is in vain he has *Learning*, *Parts*, *Industry*, and *Application*. He will not be allowed to take *any other Course* to repair the Loss he suffers by his Opinions as a Clergyman. His Time, and Fortunes, and Studies have been spent to make him useful in that *one* Profession; and, if he had Abilities to maintain himself in *any other*, it is too late: He has made his Choice, and must abide by it. This then is the unhappy Dilemma a *reputed Heretick* is reduced to; he will neither be suffered to *keep* the Profession, nor to *leave* it; he shall neither live *in it*, nor *out of it*. So that, notwithstanding his *Learning*, *Parts*, *Virtue*, and *Industry*; though he could make a good *Lawyer*, *Physician*, *Merchant*, or *Mechanick*; if he be not *Orthodox*, all Possibilities of living comfortably, at least, and reputably, are taken from him. Go now, and think, if you can, that the Advice I give you is not the Advice of a Friend. It is the Advice of one who loves Virtue and Learning, who is a Friend to all good Men, and is in particular greatly concerned for *your* Success and Advancement in the World: It is Advice seconded by the Examples of the greatest Men: For name me any one of the Men most famed for Learning in this or the last Age, who have seriously turned themselves

ſelves to the *Study of the Scriptures.* I might name to you the moſt eminent Men down from *Scaliger* and *Caſaubon* to the preſent Time. *Capellus* indeed, and the excellent *Grotius*, are Exceptions; but they met with ſuch *Uſage*, that one has little Encouragement from their Examples. But not to go beyond our own Country: Who are the Men that have excelled moſt (excepting always Sir *Iſaac Newton*) in Philoſophy, Aſtronomy, and Mathematicks? Have they not been *Clergymen?* And was not their Skill, in theſe Sciences, the Effect of their great and conſtant Application to them? Was not that Time ſpent in *theſe Studies*, that *you* think ſhould have been applied to the *Study of the Scriptures?* On the other hand, take out two or three from ſo great a Body; and where is there a Clergyman of a great Genius, and that has made a chief Figure in the learned World, that has writ upon the *Scriptures*, at leaſt with any maſterly Skill in Critick?

And *what* is it that all this can be imputed to? Did theſe learned Men decline this Study, becauſe they wanted the *Abilities* proper for it? Surely that will not be ſaid of Men of their confeſſed Learning: Or was there Want of *Inclination* and *Good-will* to it? No, they were Men of *Virtue*, and *good Proteſtants*, as well as Scholars and Men of Letters. What then? Did they, who have taken ſo much Pains upon *other* Books, and with ſo much Succeſs, think *the Scriptures* the only ones that *needed not* their Help? Neither can that be pretended. They ſaw the ſacred Books, through the *Injury of Time* and the *Ignorance of Scribes*, had

suffered as well as others; and much *more* by *false and absurd Interpretations*. To be plain: The *one Thing*, that turned them from so noble and necessary a Study, was the *Want of Liberty*, which, in *this Study only*, is denied Men. They found it was *dangerous* to examine *impartially*, and speak *freely*; that they must write *without Liberty*, or with *no Safety*; that it would be expected of them, to strain all their Wit and Learning, to *patronize* and *palliate* gross Errors, instead of *exposing* or *mending* of them; and to support the *received Interpretations*, however absurd, instead of such as *Reason* and *Learning* convinced them were the *only true ones*. But this was a Task, which Men of *ingenuous Minds*, whose *Integrity and Love of Truth* was equal to their Penetration and great Abilities, could not submit to. For Men to have Eyes and Understandings of their own, and yet not see or understand, but as they were bid, and that by Men who could not see or understand themselves; ὃς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμα! To make such a blind Use of their Learning and Abilities was, they thought, to pervert the very End of them, and really to dishonour God, whose Service they were given for. Since therefore they could not bear the Thoughts of studying the Scriptures *on these Terms*, no Part was left Men who could not be idle, but to *turn to some other Study*, in which, without Fear of Danger or Offence, they might freely go whither *Truth* and *Reason* led. The Consequence of which, besides the Improvements made in Arts and Sciences, has been, that many of them have separately made more good Emendations, and happily explained more Difficulties in the *smallest*

Pagan

Pagan Writer, than they have done, take them all together, in two hundred Years, upon the *whole Body of the Scriptures.* —

What then I would adviſe you is, to follow ſuch Examples. Turn yourſelf to the Study of the *Heathen Hiſtorians*, *Poets*, *Orators*, and *Philoſophers*. Spend *ten* or *twelve Years* upon *Horace* or *Terence*. To illuſtrate a *Billet-doux*, or a *Drunken Catch*; to explain an *obſcene Jeſt*; to make a *happy Emendation* on a Paſſage, that a modeſt Man would *bluſh* at, will do you more Credit, and be of greater Service to you, than the moſt uſeful Employment of your Time upon the *Scriptures*, unleſs you can reſolve to conceal your Sentiments, and ſpeak always with the Vulgar. You ſee a preſent Example in the great *Bentley*: What a Reputation has he acquired by the noble Edition he has given us of *Horace*? How are his Abilities confeſſed and admired by all? But had the ſame Genius, the ſame Sagacity and Labour, been applied to the Study of the *Scriptures*, to ſettle the Texts in doubtful Places, to mend corrupted ones, explain hard ones, fix the Meaning of obſcure ones, and to trace out the literal Senſe where it can be done; ſhould he, I ſay, have attempted a Work of this Kind; inſtead of Thanks and Applauſe, it is more than probable he would have been treated as a raſh Man, of no Judgment, of little Learning, and leſs Religion; and, if his Works had been ſentenced to the Flames, a Majority would have been for throwing him in after them.

Conſider well therefore, how you engage where there is no Retreat, no Repentance, no Room for

Pardon, if you once offend. You have *two* Ways before you: *One* will enable you to be useful in the World, without great Trouble to yourself; it will crown your Labours with Success; it will bring you to Reputation and Esteem; it will put you into a Way of making a decent Provision for your Family, and giving a good Education to those two fine Children God has blessed you with, and you may have many more. The *other* will itself fatigue you with many Difficulties, and expose you to the most fatal Consequences: It will draw on you an insupportable Load of Infamy, as a Disturber of the *Church*, and an Enemy to the *Orthodox Faith*, and, in all Probability, end in the extreme Poverty and Ruin of yourself and Family. Which God forbid should ever be the Case of one who has no other Views but to dedicate his Life to God's Service. I am,

SIR,

Your faithful humble Servant.

The CONCLUSION.

AFTER all that has been said in this long Letter, I am persuaded that many Readers will still think what is here advanced, a strange Paradox; or perhaps be scandalized at it as a very wicked one; and will on no Terms allow, that Clergymen

Clergymen ſhould lay aſide what *ought* to be their *chief Study*. And, to be ingenuous, I will confeſs I am *intirely of the ſame Mind*. I am as unwilling as *they* can be, to admit the Concluſion, that the *Study of the Scriptures* ſhould be *deſerted*; and yet cannot deny, but, humanly ſpeaking, this muſt be the Conſequence from theſe Premiſſes. If therefore we will not allow the *Concluſion*, we muſt ſhew the *Premiſſes* to be untrue, and that this Study will *not* be attended with *ſo much Danger*. But this we in vain attempt, if we do not *our* Parts at leaſt, that theſe may *not* be the *Conſequences*. For, as long as they are, the *Study of the Scriptures* will *certainly* continue to be *neglected*, as it now is; and all Men who *contribute* to theſe *Conſequences*, in any Degree, do ſo far *diſcourage* the *Study of the Scriptures*, whatever they pretend.

In Truth, there is nothing more abſurd, than to ſay the glorious Things we do daily of the Scriptures; and, at the ſame Time, make the Study of them, to Men of ſincere and honeſt Minds, ſo extremely *hazardous* and *inconvenient*. If then we would not be guilty of *diſcouraging* a Study, which we acknowledge to be the great *Duty* of the Clergy, as we are *Chriſtians*; if we would be true to the *fundamental Principles* of the *Reformation*, as *Proteſtants*, that the *Scriptures are the only Rule of Faith*; let us uſe our beſt Endeavours to *remove* the *great Obſtacles* that lie againſt the Study of them; let us do what we can, that learned Men may have *full Liberty* to ſtudy the Scriptures *freely and impartially*; good *Encouragement* given them

to go through the *Labour and Difficulties* of such a Study, not slightly and superficially, but with such Application and Diligence as the Nature of the Thing requires; and have *Leave* to speak their Sense with all Manner of *Safety*: That their *Opinions* may be *examined fairly*, and with *Temper*: That their *Names* be not unjustly loaded with *Calumny and Slander*; that their Words and Actions may be interpreted with the same *Candour*, as is shewn to those that differ from them: That, if what they advance be *right*, it may be *received*; if *wrong*, their Errors may be *refuted*, as the *Mistakes of learned Men* on *other* Subjects: If *doubtful*, and the Scriptures say so little, or speak so obscurely, that nothing can certainly be decided either Way; that then nobody may be *obliged* to take *either Side as necessary*: That, whether their *Notions* be right or wrong, their *Persons* may, in all Events, be safe, and their Maintenance not affected by it: That, as long as they *live virtuously*, and *write* with all due *Modesty* and *good Manners*, and advance nothing that breaks in upon *Morality and Government*, they may be treated in all Respects as those are or ought to be, who employ themselves in any other Part of useful Learning.

I must add, let them be never so much in the *wrong*, I can apprehend no *Danger* from it to the *Church*; or that the Errors of a few Men can have any considerable Influence in Opposition to a great Body of a vigilant and learned Clergy, who will be always able and ready to *defend* the *received* Notions, if they *can be* defended; and, if they

they *cannot*, it muſt be allowed they *ought not*. But, if *ſome Inconveniences would* ariſe from the Liberty I contend for, they are *nothing in Compariſon* of thoſe that muſt follow from the Want it.

Till there is ſuch a Liberty allowed to Clergymen; till there is ſuch a Security for their Reputations, Fortunes, and Perſons; I fear I muſt add, till ſo difficult a Study meets with proportionable *Encouragement*; it is impoſſible a *ſincere*, *impartial*, and *laborious Application* to it ſhould generally prevail: And, till it does, it is as impoſſible the *Scriptures* ſhould be *well underſtood*: And, till they are, they are a Rule of Faith *in Name* only. For it is not the *Words* of Scripture, but the *Senſe*, which is the *Rule*; and, ſo far as *that* is not *underſtood*, ſo far the *Scriptures* are *not our Rule*, whatever we pretend; but the *Senſe that Men have put on them*; Men *fallible* as ourſelves, and who were by no Means ſo well *furniſhed*, as the Learned at preſent are, with the proper Helps to find out the true Meaning of *Scripture*. And while we take the Senſe of the Scriptures in this Manner *upon Content*, and ſee not with our own Eyes, we inſenſibly relapſe into the *Principles of Popery*, and give up the *only Ground* on which we can juſtify our Separation from the Church of *Rome*. It was a *Right to ſtudy and judge of the Scriptures for themſelves*, that our *firſt Reformers* aſſerted with ſo good Effect; and their *Succeſſors* can defend their Adherence to them, on *no other* Principle.

If then we are *concerned* for the Study of the Scriptures,

Scriptures, farther than *in Words*; if we in earnest *think* them the *only Rule of Faith*; let us *act* as if we thought so: Let us heartily encourage a *free and impartial Study* of them; let us lay aside that *malignant, arbitrary, persecuting, Popish* Spirit; let us put no Fetters on Men's Understandings, nor any other Bounds to their Enquiries, but what *God and Truth* have set. Let us, if we would not give up the *Protestant Principle*, that *the Scriptures are plain and clear in the necessary Articles*, declare *nothing* to be *necessary*, but what is *clearly revealed* in them.

Then may we hope to see the Study of these Divine Books so happily cultivated by the united Labours of the Learned, when under no Discouragements; that all may, in the main, agree in the true Meaning of them. Places, that *can be understood*, they will agree in understanding alike; such at least as are of *Consequence* to the Faith. And, for such as are *too obscure to be cleared up with any Certainty*, those likewise they will agree about, and unanimously confess they are such as *no Article of Faith can be grounded upon, or proved from*. Next to the understanding a Text of Scripture, is to know it cannot be certainly understood. When the clear and dark Parts of Scripture are thus distinguished, an *Unity* may then reasonably be hoped for among *Protestants* in *necessary Points*; and a *Difference of Opinion*, in such as are *not necessary*, can have no *Manner of ill Consequence*, nor any Way disturb the Peace of the Church; since there will then be nothing left in its Doctrines, to *inflame* Men's *Passions*, or *feed* their *corrupt Interests*,

when

when we are all *agreed* about what is *eſſential* to Religion; and what is *not eſſential* is looked on as *indifferent*, ſo that a Man may take *one* Side, or the *other*, or *neither*, or may *change*, as he ſees Reaſon, without Offence.

Upon the Whole, a *free and impartial Study of the Scriptures* either *ought* to be encouraged, or it *ought not*. There is *no Medium*; and therefore thoſe who are *againſt one Side*, which ever it be, are neceſſarily *Eſpouſers of* the other. Thoſe, who think it *ought not* to be encouraged, will, I hope, think it no Injury to be thought to defend their Opinion upon *ſuch Reaſons* as have been here brought for it, till they give *better*. On the other hand, thoſe who think theſe Reaſons inconcluſive, and cannot find better, will find themſelves obliged to confeſs, that ſuch a Study *ought* to be encouraged; and conſequently muſt take Care how they are acceſſory to ſuch Practices, as in their natural Conſequence cannot but tend to its Diſcouragement; leſt they come into the Condemnation of thoſe *who love Darkneſs rather than Light*, and, for their Puniſhment, be finally adjudged to it: There is, in this Caſe, no other Medium between *Encouraging* and *Diſcouraging*, but what there is between *Light* and *Darkneſs*. Every Degree of Darkneſs is a Want of ſo much Light; and all Want of Light is a certain Degree of Darkneſs. To refuſe then a greater Degree of Light, where it can be had, is, in Truth, to prefer Darkneſs: Which, in my humble Opinion, can never be reaſonable or excuſable. Thoſe, who are of another

ther Mind, plainly *distrust themselves* or *their Cause*. Which if it can *bear* the *Light*, Why should it not be shown in it? But, if it cannot, it is not the Cause of *God*, or of the *Son of God*: For *God is Light, and in him is no Darkness*; and the *Son of God* is the *true Light, which lighteth every Man that cometh into the World.*

SCRIPTURE Vindicated

FROM THE

MISINTERPRETATIONS of the Lord Biſhop of *Bangor:* In his Anſwer to the Dean of *Worceſter*'s Viſitation-Sermon concerning CHURCH-AUTHORITY.

The PREFACE.

SOON after the Biſhop of *Bangor*'s *Anſwer* came out, the Attention of the Town was ſo wholly turned from Books to Matters of another Nature, and ſtill is ſo; that the Reader, I believe, will be more apt to ask, why I *reply* at all, than, why I have not done it ſooner. Inſtead, therefore, of troubling him with the Reaſons of my not doing it before, I will only ſay, that I write now, becauſe I promiſed, in the Poſtſcript to my *Sermon*, I would, more than for any other Reaſon; otherwiſe I ſhould have choſen to be ſtill ſilent, rather than help to the Revival of a Controverſy, that ſeemed

ſeemed to be dead, and buried in the vaſt Abyſs, that has ſwallowed up almoſt every Thing elſe.

To the Buſineſs, therefore, without more Apology. And here I might, after the Example of the Biſhop, but with much greater Reaſon, endeavour to excite the Compaſſion of the tender-hearted Reader, with long and loud Complaints of his unkind Uſage of me, who, beſides all the other Arts of an unfair Adverſary, has many peculiar to himſelf, which the World are now ſo well acquainted with, that no Reader can be a Stranger to them; but I have ſo little Occaſion for ſuch Artifices, that I ſhall begin with returning his Lordſhip my moſt hearty Thanks, for thoſe very Things which are the juſteſt Matter of Complaint.

And, firſt, I thank his Lordſhip for ſetting out in the very *Preface* of his *Anſwer*, with one of the moſt palpable Inſtances of *Inſincerity* a Man can well be guilty of. I had ſaid, "I could not think "it equitable in the Governors of the Church, to "call in the ſecular Arm, to oppreſs and cruſh "under its Weight *virtuous* and *learned* Men, for "the Miſtakes their diſintereſted Purſuits of Truth "and Knowledge may happen to lead them in-"to." The Senſe of this Paſſage is ſo plain, that nobody can miſtake it, who does not do ſo wilfully. The Oppoſites to *Virtuous* and *Learned* are the *Vicious* and *Ignorant*. I ask no Favour for the Writings of the *Learned*, if they are not *virtuous*; nor for thoſe of others, who are not *learned*; for what Buſineſs have the *Ignorant* and *Unlearned* to write in Controverſies of Religion? And if *learned* Men write

write in Oppoſition to the Eſtabliſhed Religion, who are not confeſſedly Perſons of *Integrity* and *Virtue*, there may be juſt Reaſon to ſuſpect, that, under the Colour of Conſcience, and a pretended Love of Truth, they ſerve ſome Party-Views, and deſign either to promote Impiety and Irreligion, or to diſturb the Peace and Welfare of the State. The Advancing novel, or the Oppoſing the received Doctrines in Religion, have generally that malignant Influence on the Civil Government, that the Magiſtrate cannot have too watchful an Eye upon them, though his Care were confined to the Affairs of Civil Life, and he had as little Zeal for the Honour of God, or as little Obligation to ſuch a Zeal, as has been, of late, ſo publickly contended for. Indulgence, therefore, in my humble Opinion, is then only due in theſe Matters, not when Men write with great Confidence and little Reaſon on their Side, but when their Modeſty and Diffidence of themſelves, and Deference to Authority, are great and viſible; and the Reaſons they give for their Opinions are ſolid and ſtrong, and ſuch as ſhew they have well conſidered their Argument; that is, they muſt be *virtuous* and *learned* Men, otherwiſe they will want either the good Qualities, or the Abilities they ought to have. And this, one would think, is ſo very reaſonable, that, if it could not procure his Lordſhip's Concurrence, it might, at leaſt, have eſcaped his Cenſure. But his Lordſhip is ſo much out of Humour, that *Virtuous* and *Vicious* are Terms that paſs for nothing with him; and I am repreſented as claiming Favour only for the *Learned*;

ed; but, for the *Ignorant* and *Unlearned*, perſecute them who will, I have nothing to ſay againſt it. So groſs a Miſrepreſentation, at the very Entrance, is a Warning to every impartial Reader, to let him ſee, that nothing fair or candid is to be expected from ſuch an Adverſary; and that the Struggle is not for Truth, but Victory.

Another Thing, for which his Lordſhip has my Thanks, is, that he has, in ſeveral Places of his *Anſwer*, declared himſelf a profeſſed Enemy to *Learning*; and makes it a Crime in the Dean, "That he has been pleaſed to give a Privilege to "the *Errors* of the *Learned*, though in Truth "more inexcuſable than the *Errors* of the *Unlearned*;" and thinks himſelf, "That St. *Paul* "would not have had the leaſt Regard to ſuch a "*Qualification*, unleſs as it might *aggravate their* "*Crimes*, p. 157." Which reminds me of what he ſays, in his *Anſwer* to the *Committee*, p. 98. That "what is called *Learning*, is ſo far from be-"ing the moſt neceſſary, or the moſt uſeful Qua-"lification in this Caſe (of judging in Matters "of Religion) that there is nothing which has "been ſeen to adminiſter ſo many Doubts, and "ſo many Differences, as *that*; nor are any, in "Experience, ſeen to be leſs ſecure from Error, "than *learned* Men. For this, look out into the "*Popiſh Countries*, and ſee whether one *illiterate* "*honeſt Man* be not as capable of judging for "himſelf in *Religion*, as all their *learned Men* "united; even ſuppoſing them met together in "a *General Council*, with all poſſible Marks of "Solemnity and Grandeur." Had his Lordſhip added,

added, *and with all poſſible Freedom and Sincerity*, it had been a finiſhed Sentence, and every Way worthy of its Author. But what makes his Lordſhip ſuch an Enemy to *Learning?* Do the *Illiterate* owe nothing to it? Whence have they the *Scriptures* laid open to them in the vulgar Tongue? Does the *Reformation*, for which his Lordſhip expreſſes ſo much Zeal, owe nothing to *Learning?* What, but the Revival of *Learning*, opened the Eyes of People to ſee the Corruptions of the Church of *Rome?* What, but *Learning*, enabled the *Reformed* to defend the Separation they had made? What, but *Learning*, diſcovered the Impoſtures, the Forgeries, the lying Wonders, the Innovations in Doctrine, Diſcipline, and Worſhip, the Uſurpations and Tyranny of the *Papacy?* What could juſtify a Separation, but their being able to aſſign theſe Cauſes for it? And what could do that, but *Learning*, great and conſummate *Learning?* Theſe Conſiderations, I ſhould have hoped, would have prevailed with his Lordſhip to be leſs ſevere in his Cenſures of it. But, laſtly, I may ask in Favour of *Learning*, Does his Lordſhip owe nothing to it? I am ſure ſome of his Friends, at leaſt, do; and, for their Sake, methinks, both *Learning* and *learned Men* might have met with better Quarter from him. For my own Part, I think myſelf extremely obliged to his Lordſhip for ſo frank a Declaration; and ſhall always rejoice to have ſuch Adverſaries, who, at the ſame Time, declare themſelves Enemies to *Learning*, provided they do it with Sincerity. When that is the Caſe, I ſhall flatter myſelf, that

I have a good Cauſe, and our Readers, even the moſt *Unlearned*, will be apt to think ſo too. And it is, indeed, no ſmall Satisfaction to think, that whoever attacks *Learning*, if he does it weakly, does it no Hurt; and, if he does it well, his own Performance is a good Argument againſt him; while he ſhews thereby its Uſefulneſs, as well as his own Ingratitude. But I muſt do his Lordſhip the Juſtice to acknowledge he is fair in this, that he has not attacked *Learning* with Weapons borrowed from it.

A third Thing, for which I thank his Lordſhip, is, that he, who has ſo long affected the Guiſe of great Meekneſs, and of the moſt Chriſtian Patience, has at laſt thrown off the Mask, and ſhewn he can be very *angry*. Which is the more extraordinary, becauſe it is not only certain that I had given him as little Provocation as a Man could well do, that preſumes to differ from him; but that he might, from ſeveral Circumſtances, have ſeen Reaſon for a more than uſual Moderation of his Reſentments, on this Occaſion, inſtead of letting them looſe, in ſo extraordinary a Manner. For, I am perſuaded, he does not think I liked the Notions of his Sermon, at the firſt Appearance of it, more than I do now; and, from thence, he might reaſonably have imputed my Silence, for Years together, to Cauſes that gave me a Right to a better Treatment. But I do not complain, I am pleaſed; his Lordſhip has now quitted the only Advantage he had over his Adverſaries; that Appearance of Humanity and Tenderneſs, of a patient and forgiving Temper, which has hitherto done

done him so much Service, and has so often moved the Pity of his Readers, and made those, who could not judge of the Merit of the Cause, think he had been really injured. His Lordship's Anger now is open and undisguised, and his Words will no longer have more Weight with his Readers than they have Reason in them, which his Anger may take something from, but can add nothing to. This, therefore, is another Thing, for which his Lordship has my hearty Thanks. I do not love to engage with one who kills with good Words, and gives a mortal Wound, in the Shape of a charitable Prayer. I am glad, when an Adversary shews his Resentment. When a Man's Anger is his Interpreter, we fear no latent Reserves; and his Words, how pointed soever, will do but little Hurt; and others will think it no small Sign of an ill Cause, whatever he may think himself; especially when it is so unprovoked, that nobody, who is not in the Secret, is able to assign a Reason for it. For my own Part, I am sure no good one can be given, none that is adequate, or, in any Measure, proportioned to it. These several Marks and Effects of his Lordship's Displeasure, being really all of them so many Prejudices in my Favour, I accept them as such, and, instead of Expostulations and Complaints, make him this humble Tender of my Thanks for them.

As to the Charge of my favouring the *Persecution* of *innocent* but *ignorant* People, I have already expressed my Sense of that Matter, in the Postscript beforementioned; and have there said, that *Negative Discouragements* are not included in

my Notion of *Perſecution*; in which, that I am not ſingular, I might ſhew from many modern Authorities, and ſuch as were Friends to *Toleration*; not only from ſingle Writers of great Note, but from the Conceſſions in the famous Conference between the two Houſes of Parliament upon the *Occaſional Bill* in the laſt Reign. I might defend the Lawfulneſs of them, even from his Lordſhip himſelf, who has made it the great Foundation of his *Preſervative*, that the *State* has a Right to all Means for its own Defence; that is, for the Defence of its Conſtitution, of which the *Eſtabliſhed Church* is, as yet, a Part, and I truſt in God, ſo long as we can preſerve the *Proteſtant Succeſſion*, always will be. But, if the *State* has a Right to all Means of Self-defence, then to *Negative Diſcouragements* among others. But I will content myſelf with telling his Lordſhip what was thought *Perſecution*, in the Fourth Century, not by *Eccleſiaſticks*, whom his Lordſhip may think incompetent Judges in this Caſe, nor by ſuch *Emperors* as he may, perhaps, ſuſpect were under the Influence of *Churchmen:* I will give him the Opinion of no leſs a Perſon than the Emperor *Julian*, who, had he not been ſeduced by vain Philoſophy from the *Chriſtian* Faith, was, in other Reſpects, a moſt accompliſhed Prince, for Learning, Virtue, and Humanity; and who thought Perſecution, meerly for Religion, ſo unreaſonable, that, immediately upon his Acceſſion to the Empire, he recalled from Baniſhment all that had been exiled by the Influence of the *Arian* Faction under *Conſtantius*, and cauſed Reſtitution to be made

made to ſuch whoſe Goods had been confiſcated, on that Account. Of this we have a very full Declaration in his fifty-ſecond Epiſtle, where he ſhews how much more the *Chriſtians* were obliged to him than to his Predeceſſor: Συνέβη γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν ἐκείνου τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῶν φυγαδευθῆναι, καὶ διωχθῆναι, καὶ δεσμευθῆναι· πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη καὶ σφαγῆναι πλήθη τῶν λεγομένων αἱρετικῶν.— ἐπ' ἐμοῦ δὲ τοὐναντίον· οἵτε γὰρ ἐξορισθέντες ἀφέθησαν· καὶ οἱ δημευθέντες ἀπολαμβάνειν τὰ σφέτερα ἅπαντα νόμῳ παρ' ἡμῶν ἔλαβον. And, in the ſame Epiſtle, he declares it is his Opinion, that thoſe, who are in Error through Ignorance, rather than Deſign, ſhould be wrought on by Perſuaſion and Inſtruction, not by Force; and, therefore, moſt earneſtly recommends it to thoſe of his own Religion, not to injure, or aſſault, or offer any Violence to the *Chriſtians*, either to their Perſons or Houſes: Λόγῳ πείθεσθαι χρή, καὶ διδάσκεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, οὐ πληγαῖς, οὐδὲ ὕβρέσιν, οὐδὲ αἰκισμῷ τοῦ σώματος. αὖθίς τε καὶ πολλάκις παραινῶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ θεοσέβειαν ὁρμωμένοις μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν τῶν Γαλιλαίων τὰ πλήθη, μηδὲ ἐπιτίθεσθαι, μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν εἰς αὐτοὺς· ἐλεεῖν δὲ χρὴ μᾶλλον ἢ μισεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις πράττοντας κακῶς. To the ſame Purpoſe he expreſſes himſelf very fully in other Places, particularly in his forty-third Epiſtle, which begins thus: Ἐγὼ μὲν κέκρικα τοῖς Γαλιλαίοις ἅπασιν οὕτω πρᾴως καὶ φιλανθρώπως [χρῆσθαι] ὥστε μηδένα μηδαμοῦ βίαν ὑπομένειν, μηδὲ εἰς ἱερὸν ἕλκεσθαι, μηδ' εἰς ἄλλό τι τοιοῦτον ἐπηρεάζεσθαι παρὰ τὴν οἰκείαν πρόθεσιν. And the laſt Words of the preceding Epiſtle, are, ſpeaking of the *Chriſtians*, καὶ γὰρ, οἶμαι, διδάσκειν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κολάζειν χρὴ τοὺς ἀνοήτους.

Thus averſe was *Julian* to all Force, in Matters of Religion, and to every Thing that is, in common Language, underſtood by *Perſecution.* But did he think it was inconſiſtent with Juſtice, or his Humanity, not to employ them in his Government, and beſtow Favours on them? By no Means. He thought there was a great deal of Difference between not Perſecuting, and not Favouring. Hear him, in his ſeventh Epiſtle: Ἐγὼ μὴ τὸς θεὸς ὅτε κλείνειν τὸς Γαλιλαίους, ὅτε τύπτειν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὅτ' ἀλλὸ τι πάσχειν κακὸν βόλομαι· σφοδρῶς μέν τι τὸς θεοσεβεῖς καὶ πάνυ φημὶ δεῖν. The *Chriſtians* he would not have killed, or beat, or, any Way, injured; but thoſe of his own Religion he thinks ſhould have the Preference, and the Favours of his Government. This was the Senſe of *Julian*, and I have never heard of any wiſe, or, indeed, of any weak Government, before or ſince his Time, who thought that thoſe, who diſſented from the Publick Religion, had a Right, a natural inherent Right, to Places and Favours. And I am perſuaded, all Governments will ever be of the ſame Mind, that it is within their own Breaſt to determine, how far, and under what Limitations, to indulge thoſe who diſſent from the Eſtabliſhed Worſhip; and that they will not, by the novel Schemes of private Writers, ever ſuffer this invaluable Prerogative to be wreſted from them.

It has, indeed, been argued in a late Sermon, *That the Civil Magiſtrate has nothing to do, in Matters of Religion, and that* Abſolute Liberty, *in all ſuch, is every Man's juſt Right*; but with what Succeſs? No Law of God in the Old Teſtament,

no

no Precept of our Saviour or his Apoſtles in the New, can be produced to juſtify this Notion; no Precedent or Example for it can be found in Scripture, either with Reſpect to *Jewiſh*, or any other Governors; no Inſtance can be brought from any Hiſtory to ſupport this Conceit, either before or ſince our Saviour's Time, though we look as far back as the *Egyptians*, *Chaldeans*, *Perſians*: Let us ſearch to the Ends of the Earth, from Pole to Pole, from the Riſing to the Setting of the Sun, through all the Revolutions and Ages of the World, we ſhall not find any one civilized Government weak enough to give up ſo valuable a Right. On the contrary, though, by ſome modern Schemiſts, Governments, as well as Worlds, can be framed without a God, all wiſe Governors have ever founded their Government in Religion; and, as they looked on themſelves as God's Vicegerents, have thought it their Duty to take Care of his Honour, in the firſt Place; this, indeed, they thought not only their Duty, but their Intereſt; that the Stability of their Government depended on the Piety of their People, and that their Laws had their greateſt Force, from whence themſelves derived their Power, from God; and, therefore, Religion had always the firſt Place in their Laws, both on Account of its own Dignity, and for the Influence it would naturally diffuſe through them. No Inſtance is brought on the other Side, but of one *Gallio*, an inferior Governor of a Province in the Reign of *Claudius*; though the *Sermon*, indeed, would make one think it was in the Reign of *Auguſtus*. For, in Explication of

his Text, the Preacher tells us, *Gallio was the* Roman *Prefect of* Achaia, *a Conſular Province under* Auguſtus; and ſo ſays *Grotius* upon the Place. But *Grotius* does not ſtop there; what he ſays is, that, in the Diviſion of Provinces between the Senate and the Emperor, made by *Auguſtus*, *Achaia* fell to the Senate's Lot, and was a *Proconſular* Province: But Provinces did not continue always according to that Diviſion; for *Auguſtus* made ſome Changes himſelf; and this Province of *Achaia*, *Grotius* obſerves, was by the very next Emperor made an Imperial one. But what *Tiberius* did, *Claudius* undid, and reſtored it to the Senate. I obſerve this only to ſhew, how little this Preacher attended to what was before him; who could not have fallen into ſuch a Miſtake, but through great Careleſneſs and Inattention.

But let us ſee what this Inſtance of *Gallio* amounts to. The Caſe, as repreſented in the *Acts*, Chap. xviii. 12——18. is this: The *Jews* ſeized St. *Paul* in a tumultuous Manner, and brought him before *Gallio*, for teaching Doctrines contrary to their Law. *Gallio*, when he ſaw what the Matter was, would not meddle with it, but drove them all away [ἀπήλασε] from the *Judgment-Seat*, or out of Court. Upon this the *Greeks* (thoſe of *Gallio*'s Religion) took the Chief Ruler of the *Jewiſh* Synagogue, and beat him before *Gallio*'s Face; *but* Gallio, ſays the Text, *cared for none of theſe Things*. I cannot ſee any Reaſon, why *Gallio*'s Example ſhould be of any Authority for other Governors; but, if it ought, why do we pick and chooſe? Let us take the Whole of it; and

and then here is an admirable Pattern for Magistrates; they ought not only not to take upon them to judge, in *Religious* Matters, but to suffer Assaults to be made, and the Peace broken with Impunity in open Court, and before their Face. I would gladly know, why one Preacher may not recommend to Magistrates the latter Part of this Example, as well as another has done the first. But his Example, even in the first Part of it, upon Consideration, will be found to be nothing to the Purpose, The Preacher, indeed, says, that the Crime, laid against St. *Paul*, was *Blasphemy* against the *Religion established by Law*, which *Gallio* declared did not fall under his Cognizance. Upon which I cannot but observe, first, that *Blasphemy* was not laid to his Charge; and secondly, that *Gallio* does not declare that the Case did not belong to his Cognizance; but that he *would* not meddle with it: Κριτὴς γὰρ ἐγὼ τούτων οὐ βούλομαι εἶναι, I *will* not be judge of these Things; not, because they were *Religious*, not *Civil* Matters, as is pretended in the next Page; but either, because *Gallio* despised them, looked on them as Trifles about which he would not concern himself; or because the *Jewish* Law was no Rule to him, he was no Way concerned to inforce the Observance of it. But thirdly, what is most extraordinary in this Sentence is, the unfair Insinuation there is in saying, that St. *Paul*'s Crime was his Opposing the Religion *established by the Law*. Had it been said *their* Law, it would then presently have appeared, that what *Gallio* did, in this Case, was nothing to the Preacher's Purpose; but as the Words are, *established*

tabliſhed by the Law, I doubt it led his Hearers, as well as his unlearned Readers, to believe, that the Caſe of St. *Paul*, brought before *Gallio*, is parallel to that of a Man who ſhould now be brought before the Civil Magiſtrate, for oppoſing the Religion *eſtabliſhed* by Law, in this, or any other Chriſtian Country; and that, from this Inſtance, they are to learn their Duty, and to declare to all the World, that ſuch Caſes do not belong to their Cognizance.

But, with great Submiſſion, I conceive nothing can be wider from the Point it is aimed at, than this Inſtance is from the Application it is drawn to. For, in the firſt Place, *Gallio* was but an inferior Magiſtrate, and was to govern according to Law; and, if St. *Paul* had broken none of the Laws in Force in that Province, *Gallio* could have nothing to ſay to him; otherwiſe he might have entered into the Charge againſt him, had he ſo pleaſed, as well as *Felix*, or *Feſtus*, or other *Roman* Governors did in *Judæa*, where, after it was reduced into a *Roman* Province, the *Jewiſh* Laws, under certain Reſtrictions, were permitted by the Emperors to remain in Force. Nothing, therefore, from *Gallio*'s Example, can be concluded to affect other Governors; much leſs can it be inferred, from the Inſtance of an inferior Magiſtrate, that the Emperor, or any other ſupreme Power, could not juſtly make Laws about Religious Matters, for the Direction of Judges and Magiſtrates, when ſuch Caſes ſhould come before them. Nor is there any Thing in Fact more certain, than that the *Roman*, as well as other Governments, did think the

the Affairs of Religion were within their Cognizance, and did, from Time to Time, make such Laws about them, as they judged proper. In the next Place, it is evident St. *Paul* is not accused of acting in Violation of what was the *established* Religion by the *Roman* Law; but of acting against a Religion that was not so *established*, against that of the *Jews*, about which the *Romans* troubled not themselves. Had it been otherwise, had St. *Paul* been accused of Blasphemy against the National Religion, I believe *Gallio*, as indolent as he seems to have been, would have acted another Part; and would have been obnoxious to the Laws, and false to his Trust, if he had not. In Truth, the Case is much the same, as it would be, if the *Jews* settled here, upon a *Schism* breaking out among them, should prosecute any Member of their Synagogue in *Westminster-Hall*; where the Judge might dismiss the Cause, as *Gallio* did, without any Prejudice to his Authority, or Breach of his Duty, in what regards the *Established* Religion. The Prosecutor is concerned in the Defence of the Religion *Established by the Law*; and so likewise is the Judge for the Religion *Established by the Law*. But are they the same Religions, or are the same Laws meant in both Expressions? No, they are as wide as can be; as different as *Christianity* and *Judaism*; and nobody, with any Truth or Sincerity, could call the Religion Established by the *Jewish* Law, *the Religion Established by Law*. But such Shifts are Men driven to, so shamefully do they pervert Scripture, when they set up for new Schemes in Religion, that have no

Foundation

Foundation either in the Laws of Nations, or the Law of God.

I might go on, and ſhew the ſame Unfairneſs and weak Reaſoning through almoſt every Paragraph of this Sermon, in which there is ſo much Aſſurance, and ſo little Argument, that, upon theſe Accounts, as well as its Inſult on the Eſtabliſhment, it is, I think, without a Parallel. Its grand Principle is, that the Civil Magiſtrate can of Right puniſh nothing, but as it prejudices Men's Civil Intereſts; and, in Virtue of this, common Swearing, Blaſphemy, Inceſt, and other the moſt deteſtable Crimes, have a Right to Impunity; and that for this weighty Reaſon, among others, becauſe *ſecret Intentions of Wickedneſs, and treaſonable Thoughts*, and the like, *are not liable to Civil Puniſhments*. That is, the Magiſtrate cannot puniſh what he cannot come to the Knowledge of: But does it follow, he may not puniſh where he can? *Curſe not the King, no not in thy Thought* (ſays *Solomon*;) *for a Bird of the Air ſhall carry the Voice, and that which hath Wings ſhall tell the Matter*. But, others having profeſſedly written againſt the Notions advanced in this Sermon, I ſhall enter enter no farther into the Conſideration of it, preſuming (for I have not yet ſeen the Anſwers to it) that they have not only anticipated all I could think neceſſary to be obſerved of it, but have very probably ſaid a great deal more. Nor ſhould I have taken even this Notice of it, but for the Relation it has to the Diſpute between the Biſhop of *B.* and me; for the Sermon owns in plain Terms, and at large, what the Biſhop was by

every

every body ſuppoſed to mean, but what he himſelf would not acknowledge he had ſaid. This made it proper for me juſt to take Notice of a Diſcourſe that has made ſo much Noiſe, and given ſo juſt Offence. But I ſay no more, having no Deſire to expoſe the Author, but the Argument; nor would I have ſaid thus much, in this Place, but that the following Papers were drawn up, while I was at *Worceſter*, long before I had ſeen this Sermon; and I was not willing to be at the Trouble of making an Alteration in them, having ſo little Inclination to this barren Controverſy, that they have lain by me four Months untouched.

I ſhall, therefore, take Leave of this Sermon, with obſerving, that, were the Example of *Gallio* ever ſo pertinent to what it is alledged for, yet it would not prove that the Magiſtrate has not a Right to favour one Religion above another, though he will not be a Judge in Religious Controverſies; or that the Legiſlature may not eſtabliſh, as the Publick Religion, what they think the beſt, and confine to the Profeſſion of it all Places of Power and Truſt for its greater Defence and Security againſt the reſtleſs Spirit of Enthuſiaſm, and the Cunning of thoſe who know how to make the Madneſs of a deluded People ſubſervient to their own Ends. *Gallio* might prefer, and, indeed, could not but prefer thoſe of the Eſtabliſhed Religion to all Places in his Government, excluſive either of *Jews* or *Chriſtians*, as their Conſtitution then ſtood. But if even this could be concluded from *Gallio*'s Example, that *Negative Diſcouragements*

ments might not be uſed in Preference of one Religion before another, purely as ſuch, yet *Religious* and *Civil* Affairs are ſo inſeparably interwoven and blended together, and Religion is ſo often made a Pretence to diſturb the State, that the Care of it neceſſarily comes within the Sphere of the Civil Power, purely as ſuch; ſince it is impoſſible to preſerve the Peace and Quiet of the State, if the Magiſtrate renounces all Right to meddle in Matters of Religion. But, if the Magiſtrate has ſuch a Right, it is of little Importance to enquire, on what Foot he has it; whether *directly*, as it is a Matter of Religion; or *indirectly*, as it affects the Welfare of the State *Civil*. Which ever Way it be, if he has ſuch a Right, he has it; and whoever takes it from him, is injurious both to God and his Vicegerent: He proſtitutes the Honour of God, and weakens the Hands of the Government. It is pretended, indeed, *That God has infinite Ways of maintaining and taking Care of his own Honour, without being beholden to the Secular Arm.* And has he not as many Ways of maintaining the Peace of Society? But ſure it would be a ſtrange Inference, to conclude from thence, that there is no Occaſion for any Civil Government. And it is juſt as ſtrange, to infer from the ſame Premiſſes, that there is no Occaſion for the Magiſtrate's doing any Thing to maintain the Honour of God, and the Obedience due to him. Government is the great Inſtrument of Providence in all the Affairs of this World; and it will be always true, that God ordinarily works by the ſtated Means of ſecond Cauſes, though he has infinite Ways of acting

ing without them, if he pleaſe; for who can ſet Bounds to a Power we acknowledge to be infinite? Such a Way of arguing appears to me ſo trifling and ludicrous, or rather ſo profane, that I ſhould think it ſo intended, did I not know the Author, who, I verily believe, was far from any ſuch Deſign. As to the Government, that the Denying it this Right is Weakening the Hands of it, is ſo manifeſt, that no Principle in Mathematicks is more certain, or more evident. I wiſh we had not ſo ſure a Proof of it, as we have from the Effect the barely Advancing this novel Notion, in ſo publick a Manner, has already had, by the inflaming Men's Minds, and increaſing that Diſaffection, in which the Enemies of the Government place their chief Hopes.

But to return to *Julian*; it will be asked, Was not he a Perſecutor of the Chriſtians? I anſwer, No otherwiſe than by purſuing ſuch Methods as the Biſhop thinks moſt for the Good of their Religion; which were chiefly theſe three. Firſt, he withdrew from them the Revenues and Favours, Immunities, Privileges, and Rights, which his Predeceſſors had granted to them; by which they were reduced to their primitive State, that happy and perfect State which the Biſhop ſeems to be ſo extremely fond of; and that for the ſame Reaſon that *Julian* gave, that they might be leſs incumbered in their Journey to the Kingdom of Heaven, ἵνα πινόμφοι, σωφρονῶσι καὶ μὴ περιθῶσιν, ἧς ἐπ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐφανὶς βασιλείας. A ſecond Way he took to weaken them was to keep them ignorant, by help of a pretty Dilemma, that all Teachers ſhould act conſcientiouſly

conſcientiouſly and ſincerely, and ſhould not teach what they did not think right, and true, and good. Thoſe, therefore, that did not like the Religion and Gods of *Homer*, *Heſiod*, *Demoſthenes*, *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, *Iſocrates*, *&c.* ſhould not teach ſuch Books; or, if they will teach their Books, they ſhould profeſs their Religion. And, by this Argument, the Children of *Chriſtians* were ordered to be ſent where they ſhould be taught nothing, but *Matthew* and *Luke*, and what others of the ſame Religion had writ. And this, I conceive, does not differ much from his Lordſhip's Notions, who ſeems to think it an Advantage to be *illiterate*; at leaſt ſo far as the Belief and Practice of Religion, as taught in the Scriptures, are concerned. A third Way *Julian* took, to weaken the *Chriſtian* Cauſe, was not only not to perſecute, but to indulge an *abſolute and univerſal Liberty* to all Sects of them: What his Lordſhip thinks the moſt proper Courſe to preſerve Religion, *Julian* thought the moſt effectual Way to ruin it. The Remark of *Ammianus Marcellinus*, on this Occaſion, a very judicious Writer, and a great Admirer of *Julian*, is ſo very remarkable, that I cannot forbear tranſcribing it: *Ut diſpoſitorum roboraret effectum, diſſidentes* Chriſtianorum *antiſtites cum plebe diſciſſa in palatium intromiſſos monebat, ut civilibus diſcordiis conſopitis quiſque nullo vetante religioni ſuæ ſerviret intrepidus. Quod agebat ideo obſtinate, ut diſſenſiones augente licentia non timeret unanimantem poſtea plebem: nullas infeſtas hominibus beſtias, ut ſunt ſibi ferales plerique Chriſtianorum, expertus.* Lib. 22. c. 5. The beſt Chriſtian Writers have expreſſed their Senſe of his Indulgence

gence to the ſame Effect, *Eo modo putans* (to uſe the Words of St. *Auguſtin*, cited by *Valeſius* on the Place) *Chriſtianum nomen poſſe perire de terris, ſi unitati Eccleſiæ de qua lapſus fuerat, invideret, & ſacrilegas diſſenſiones liberas eſſe permitteret.* In theſe Ways was *Julian* a Perſecutor of the Church, little differing from thoſe the Biſhop thinks moſt proper for its Defence.

But to proceed; in the next Place, his Lordſhip takes Notice of what I had ſaid relating to *Eſtabliſhments*; and the Sum of his Remarks is, 1. That he does not know certainly what I mean by an *Eſtabliſhment*. 2. That if I mean, by *Eſtabliſhments*, any Thing *conſiſtent with the* common Right *of Mankind to judge for themſelves, as well as to enjoy the Privileges of* human Society, *and with the* Liberty *with which Chriſt himſelf has made us free*, he *has ſaid nothing that can be conſtrued againſt them:* But, 3. That he cannot join with me, in ſupporting Eſtabliſhments by ſuch Arguments as I have uſed. Now to put his Lordſhip out of his Doubts, as to the firſt, I mean, by *Eſtabliſhments*, ſuch as the World has always meant by them, ſuch as that is we enjoy in this Nation, as to its Nature and Kind, though not as to every particular Circumſtance and Part of it. As to the ſecond, I cannot but be very much ſurpriſed, to find his Lordſhip ſaying, that he has ſaid nothing againſt *Eſtabliſhments* under certain Reſtrictions; for I think I have read large Books of his, that are, from Beginning to End, againſt all Eſtabliſhments, if by *Eſtabliſhment* be meant the Encouraging and Giving by Laws a Preference to one

Religion above another. For the Encouraging of one is neceſſarily the Diſcouragement of another, and conſequently is Applying human and worldly Engines to Matters not of this World, and tends to promote Hypocriſy, and to deſtroy Sincerity, which his Lordſhip has made to be all in all. Which Principles tend to deſtroy all the Eſtabliſhments I have ever heard of, except that may deſerve the Name of one, that I have lately met with in the *Fundamental Conſtitutions of* Carolina, ſaid to be writ by Mr. *Lock*, and publiſhed in a Collection of *Pieces* under his Name; but which, I ſuppoſe, he only drew up into Form as the Senſe of the Lord *Shaftsbury*, rather than his own; the Care of that Affair having, by the Duke of *Albemarle*, and the other Proprietors, been recommended to that Lord, to whom Mr. *Lock* was Secretary. But, however that be, Mr. *Lock* was then but young, about thirty, and had not that Knowledge of human Nature, he acquired in his riper Years, nor had turned his Thoughts to ſo ſerious and thorough a Conſideration of the *Chriſtian* Inſtitution, as his Writings ſhew he did, for many Years before his Death. In theſe *Conſtitutions*, to gain the Affections of the Natives, and encourage others to come and ſettle in this Country, it is ordained, *That any* ſeven *Perſons, agreeing in any Religion, ſhall conſtitute a* Church. And to ſuch a Church no Profeſſion of any Part of the *Chriſtian* Faith is made neceſſary; only to acknowledge the Being of a God, and that he is publickly to be worſhiped. So that any Man, who could ſeduce ſix more (and he has ill Luck who

who in a populous Country cannot) might ſet up a Church, in which may be profeſſed any, or all the *Hereſies* and Superſtitions that ever were, or can be invented: None are excluded from this Privilege, but downright *Atheiſts*, ſuch as the impious Author of the *Pantheiſticon* *, and a few ſuch *Infidels*, who are either too ſtupid to underſtand an Argument, or too thoughtleſs to attend to one, or too vicious to give a practical Aſſent.

There is, indeed, Proviſion made by one of theſe *Conſtitutions*, as the Country comes to be ſufficiently planted, *for the Building of Churches*, and the *publick Maintenance of Divines, to be employed in the Exerciſe of* Religion, *according to the Church of* England. But this Article, the *Editor* obſerves, was inſerted afterwards, by ſome of the chief of the Proprietors, againſt Mr. *Lock*'s Judgment; and, indeed, the Series of the Conſtitutions ſhews as much, that this was not originally a Part of them. Till I ſaw theſe Conſtitutions, I could not imagine what Sort of Eſtabliſhments it was his Lordſhip could, upon his Principles, allow; but this has cleared up my Doubts, and I ſhall ſuppoſe this is, in the Main, what he would have,

* This Atheiſtick Writer, not content with what he has dared to print in this profane Piece, has inſerted a Prayer, the following Copy of which, I can aſſure the Reader, is from an Original:

Omnipotens & ſempiterne BACCHE, *qui humanam ſocietatem maxume in bibendo conſtituiſti; concede propitius, ut iſtorum capita, qui heſterna compotatione gravantur, hodierna leventur: idque fiat per* pocula poculorum. Amen.

Thus prays this *Pantheiſt*, whoſe impudent Blaſphemies loudly call for the Animadverſions of the Civil Power.

till I am better informed. As for his Lordſhip's Limitations, if he does not include, in the Eſtabments he allows, that of our *own Church*, he does then, in Effect, declare, that it is inconſiſtent with the *common Rights* of Mankind, and the *Privileges of human Society*, and with *Chriſtian Liberty:* A heavy Charge! but which has been ſo often and ſo fully anſwered, that I think it needleſs to ſay more here. I will only add, I know no common Rights of Men in Society, but legal Rights, and the Laws are the Rule and Meaſure of them, and all Nations have thought *Religious* Eſtabliſhments conſiſtent with them. And as to *Chriſtian Liberty*, I deſire his Lordſhip would define it firſt, and ſettle the true Goſpel Notion of it, and then I dare ſay that he will never more object that to us.

But in the laſt Place, if his Lordſhip and I were agreed upon an Eſtabliſhment, he could not do it upon my Reaſons; *firſt, Becauſe they turn the Eyes of* Chriſtians *from the Conduct of Almighty God in the* Chriſtian Religion, *which was*, I ſuppoſe his Lordſhip means, *is*) *not of this World, to what it pleaſed him to ordain in the* Jewiſh, *which was of this World.* What a pretty *Antitheſis* is here? Who can ſtand out againſt the convincing Force of it? *was of this World* —— *was* not *of this World! Thus Sounds perſuade as well as Senſe.* But, ſtrip the Argument of this Jingle, and it is this: The *Jews* being *one* People, God did not only give them a Syſtem of Religion, but likewiſe a Form of Government; which Government had the Cognizance of all Matters, whether *Civil* or *Religious*,

Religious, under the Direction of such Laws as he thought fit to give to them; so that they were a Sort of *Theocracy*. But, with respect to the *Christian* Religion, that being not to be confined to one People, but to be propagated to all Nations in which Governments were already settled, he sent his Son, not to make any Alterations in them, much less to pull down one and set up another, but to promote only the Religious Interests of Mankind, to call them to Repentance by preaching the Doctrines of the Gospel, and to do what was necessary, on God's Part, for their Redemption. And, in Virtue of this Mission, *Christ*, by his Apostles, gathered to himself, out of all Nations, *a People zealous of good Works*: But, with respect to the Governments in the several Nations, his Gospel left all Things in the State it found them. So that they, who embraced the Faith of *Christ*, neither were by any Appointment from him, nor for a While, in the Nature of Things, could be under any other Direction, as *Christians*, but that of his Apostles, and those who laboured with them in the Ministry, or were appointed to succeed them in it, acting in his Name, and under such Rules as the Gospel has prescribed to them. This now being the Case, does it from thence follow, by any good Consequence, that when whole Nations shall be converted to the Faith, when Kings and Emperors are become *Christian*, that they may not, for the Establishing of this Religion, look to the Conduct of God in his Government of the *Jews*? Or that they may not imitate the Examples of those good and religious Princes,

who, in Virtue of God's Laws, uſed all their Power and Authority to procure Obedience to that Worſhip and Religion he had inſtituted? Is the Conduct of God contrary to and inconſiſtent with itſelf? Can he do what is unrighteous or unreaſonable; what is *malum in ſe?* Was his Conduct no where fit to be imitated out of one little Corner of the World? Is an Eſtabliſhment more inconſiſtent with Sincerity and true Religion now, than it was then? Or, Was there no Sincerity and true Religion among the *Jews?* Is it not as reaſonable that a *Chriſtian* Prince ſhould ſtudy the Law of Chriſt, as it was for a *Jewiſh* one to ſtudy that of *Moſes?* Or, Does his Lordſhip think, that the Prince was commanded to ſtudy it, as a private Man only, and not in his princely Capacity, as he was to make it the Meaſure of his Government? Was it commendable, and for the eternal Honour of *David*, *Hezekiah*, and *Joſiah*, to be zealous for the Honour of God, and in Defence of his Religion; and ſhall it be abſurd, and criminal, and impious, for *Chriſtian* Princes to ſhew the like Zeal, and take the ſame Care? Whatever his Lordſhip may think, the *Chriſtian* World has always been of another Mind. The Conduct of God, in his Inſtitution of the *Jewiſh* Government, cannot but be a proper Subject for all Governments to conſider well, and, in many Caſes, to form themſelves upon; and to ſay otherwiſe is to have leſs Regard to God than is uſually paid to any wiſe Law-maker among mere Men. But farther, Was the Conduct of God, in inſtituting the Religion he ordained by *Moſes*, any other than

the

the Conduct of the ſame God, in the Covenant he made with *Abraham?* Did he not appoint *Circumciſion* under the like Sanctions? Did he not expect the Covenant, he had made with him, ſhould be punctually obſerved, both by himſelf, and by his Children and Servants, by all either *born in his Houſe*, or *bought with his Money*, all Perſons without Exception, under his Authority and Government? *I know him*, ſays God, *Gen.* xviii. 19. *that he will command his Children, and his Houſhold after him, and they ſhall keep the Way of the Lord to do Juſtice and Judgment; that the Lord may bring upon* Abraham *that which he hath ſpoken of him.* Did God require this of *Abraham*, the *Father of the Faithful*, as Father of his Family, and did he not expect the ſame of all Fathers of Families among *Chriſtians*? Or, Is it poſſible he ſhould expect leſs of Princes, than of them? Shall Parents and Maſters be obliged to uſe their Authority to promote the Belief and Practice of true Religion in their Families? And ſhall Princes be ſo far from being under any Obligation to uſe the Authority with which God has inveſted them, in the ſame Manner and to the ſame good Ends, that to attempt it ſhall be a Crime in them? Shall it be interpreted to be an Abuſe of their Authority? Shall they be told, it is *Turning their Eyes from God —— to God*; from God, now well informed in the Nature of Religion; to God, while as yet he was not? For the Objection, in Effect, comes to this, or there is no Senſe in it. As to the *Antitheſis, was of this World*, and *was not of this World*; it is of the *Jewiſh*

and *Chriſtian* Religion equally true, that neither of them *were of this World*; they were both of them from above, and came down from Heaven. Nor was the *Jewiſh* to be propagated by Rebellion and the Force of Arms, any more than the *Chriſtian*. For, as to the Extirpation of the Seven Nations, that was in Virtue of a particular Command, and grounded upon particular Reaſons. But as this Expreſſion, *not of this World*, is applied by his Lordſhip to the *Chriſtian* Religion, and vaſt Conſequences are made to hang upon it; I have, in the following Papers, fully ſhewn, what is meant by the *Kingdom*, that *is not of this World*; and, therefore, ſhall content myſelf to refer the Reader thither, where he will find, that, when it is rightly underſtood, that can have no Place in this Argument.

The ſecond Objection his Lordſhip makes, for not agreeing to my Reaſons, is, that they reflect Shame upon *Proteſtantiſm*, and the *Church of England* itſelf, by making *all* its Security to conſiſt in *human Laws*, as having no *laſting* Force againſt *Popery*, but from theſe. Here his Lordſhip puts upon me the Fallacy he often puts upon himſelf, by which *one* Thing is made *every* Thing; I ſay, our legal Eſtabliſhment is the *great* Support of the *Proteſtant Religion*, his Lordſhip makes me ſay it is *all* its Support; that *all* its Security conſiſts in *human Laws*. Though one Thing may be the great Support of it, ſurely ſeveral other Things may be alſo neceſſary to the ſame End. We have a *good Cauſe*, and we may hope for a Bleſſing on it from the Providence of God:

God: But how? Not by Miracles, but in the ordinary Way, upon our Endeavours in its Defence. It is the Goodneſs of God that has raiſed up *learned* Men to write in its Defence; and it is the ſame Providence that has turned the Hearts of our *Kings*, and given our *Senators* Wiſdom to ſupport the Profeſſion of his Truth by wiſe and good Laws. And, therefore, I muſt take Leave ſtill to be of Opinion, "That the *Proteſtant* Religion, "unleſs it had the Gift of Miracles, could no "more defend itſelf without an Eſtabliſhment "againſt the united Strength and Zeal of *Popery* "than a diſconcerted Rabble could ſtand againſt "a well diſciplined Army." *Julian*, who was no Fool, I have already obſerved, thought he could not ruin *Chriſtianity* more effectually than by an *unlimited* Toleration of all Sects, without the Eſtabliſhment of any; and, had God ſuffered him to reign any Length of Time, who can doubt but he would have obtained his End, unleſs the Gift of Miracles had been revived? For, when *Chriſtians* had been without Power, and without Union, and by infinite Factions and Diviſions crumbled into nothing, who can think it poſſible for a Religion, however good, to ſubſiſt in ſuch miſerable Circumſtances againſt the Learning, and Power, and exaſperated Zeal of *Paganiſm*, under a Prince, whoſe Virtue was an Ornament to his Religion? Who forced no body, but by his Favours invited all he thought worth it, and reformed his Religion both by the Spirituality of the new *Platoniſm*, and by tranſcribing into it what he ſaw moſt excellent in the practical Part of the *Chriſtian* Inſtitution?

ſtitution? But, not to inſiſt any longer on this Caſe, What does his Lordſhip think of the State of the *Proteſtant* Religion in the *Empire?* How long would it ſubſiſt, if the *Weſtphalian* Treaty were aboliſhed? Who ſees not, how it labours to ſubſiſt, notwithſtanding the Protection is has from it, and that ſo many powerful Princes are watchful in Defence of it? Who ſees not, how it loſes Ground, and what Dangers daily threaten it? If the Goodneſs of a Cauſe could preſerve it without human Help, how came *Mahometaniſm* to triumph, as it does, over *Chriſtianity* in ſo great a Part of the World? What is become of the once flouriſhing Churches of *Aſia*, *Syria*, *Egypt*, and *Africa?* Let his Lordſhip reconſider theſe Caſes, and then tell us, an Eſtabliſhment is not neceſſary to preſerve the *Proteſtant* Religion againſt *Popery*; whoſe Learning, and Power, and Zeal are always implacably bent upon its Extirpation. For I believe his Lordſhip is not ſo ſanguine as to think, that, if the *Proteſtants* of this Nation ſhould be in the Humour of making the *Experiment*, and come into his Scheme, the *Popiſh* Countries would follow the Example.

His Lordſhip's third Objection, againſt my Reaſons for *Eſtabliſhments*, is, That they make him ſuſpect I mean by *Eſtabliſhments*, at leaſt, *moderate Perſecution* of the *Unlearned* and *Ignorant*. To this, if it be needful to ſay more, let me ask his Lordſhip theſe two Queſtions, *Firſt*, Whether, in his Opinion, the main Body of the Members of the Church of *England* are more for the *Perſecution* of *Diſſenters* than he thinks I am, or leſs? If more,

(and

(and I am perſuaded he is of that Mind) then I would ask, in the ſecond Place, Which is the likelieſt Way to bring the Minds of the People off from ſuch a Spirit, and induce them to be eaſy and pleaſed with a reaſonable Indulgence to tender Conſciences? To run directly counter to them, and ſhew yourſelf as contrary to their Sentiments as poſſible, or to make ſome Advances, and meet them half Way? That is, Are People who are the Majority to be driven, or led? To be gained by a rigid and abſolute Oppoſition to them, or by Softneſs and making ſome Conceſſions, and treating the Notions of thoſe you would convince, as if they had, indeed, ſome Reaſon in them, but were puſhed too far? Are People ever like to meet and be reconciled, while both Sides affect to be in the Extremes; or by mutually receding from them, and approaching to a Medium? I know his Lordſhip will be againſt me, by the Part he has taken in his *Preſervative*, which I fear never did, nor ever will make one Convert to the Government, however he may have pleaſed ſome who never were its Enemies. But moſt Men, I doubt not, will be of another Mind, and allow, that the likelieſt Way to convince People, and overcome their Prejudices, is not to keep at the greateſt Diſtance from them, and affect an unneceſſary Oppoſition to their Principles or Notions, but to ſhew a Diſpoſition to come to ſome Temper, and make what Approaches you can towards them.

This Conſideration might have made his Lordſhip leſs ſevere upon what he calls *moderate Perſecution*. But I lay no Claim to it. *Diſſenſions* in Religion,

Religion, when under no Reſtraint from Laws, are oftentimes of infinite ill Conſequence. The Spirit of *Superſtition* and *Enthuſiaſm* is naturally turbulent, and Sedition frequently lurks under the Cover of them; and, therefore, I am not aſhamed to own myſelf of Opinion, that ſevere Laws, to curb and check the firſt Beginnings of Diſorders from them, are not only lawful, but often neceſſary; every Government has a Right to make, execute, ſuſpend, abrogate, and renew ſuch Laws, when and as often as they think fit. The Laws of this Kind that are, or ever were in Force in this Nation, were none of them deſigned to put any Hardſhips upon truly tender Conſciences, but were all of them extorted from the Government, which is naturally mild and extremely tender of the People's Rights, in Defence of the Conſtitution, againſt the factious and ſeditious Attempts, Conſpiracies, and Rebellions that were carried on under the ſpecious Name of *Conſcience*; and were intended to prevent Offences of that Nature, rather than to puniſh them; much leſs to aggrieve honeſt well-meaning People, ſo long as no Danger is apprehended from the Party they are of. It is plainly for this Reaſon, that very ſevere Laws are ſtill in Force againſt *Papiſts*, though no one feels the Rigour of them, while he lives quiet, and gives no Offence. This the *Legiſlature* has judged neceſſary, from the Experience it has had of the implacable and reſtleſs Spirit of that Religion, which obliges its Votaries upon Principle to be Enemies to our Conſtitution, and diſpenſes with all the Ties of Faith and Honour, by which they

can

can pledge their Duty and Allegiance; ſo that that they cannot give ſufficient Security for their acting like good Subjects, if they would: This has made it neceſſary to keep them always under the Reſtraint of ſevere Laws. Other *Diſſenters* are not ſuch ſworn Enemies of our Conſtitution; they are not liſted under any foreign Head, they have no Doctrines that can diſpenſe with ſolemn Oaths, much leſs are they taught, that there is any Merit in breaking the Faith once given to the Government. The Government, therefore, has proportioned the making or executing ſevere Laws, with Regard to them, according to the Temper and Behaviour of them from Time to Time. At preſent, there being no Reaſon to queſtion their Affection to the Government, all Laws of that Kind have been ſuſpended, or repealed, and will, no doubt, continue ſo, till another Behaviour calls for another Treatment. If ever this Rule has not been obſerved, and any Sort of Diſſenters have been treated with an unreaſonable Severity, that is not chargeable on the *Church of England*, but on *Popiſh* Meaſures, which were ſecretly contriving both their and our Deſtruction, as is now to every body well known. The Eſtabliſhment itſelf ſtands clear of every Thing that can, with Juſtice, be brought under the odious Name of *Perſecution*.

I cannot forbear, upon this Subject of *Eſtabliſhments*, taking Notice of a Paſſage of Mr. *Chillingworth* in his ſecond Sermon; where ſpeaking of our *Reformation*, "The whole Doctrine, ſays he, "of *Chriſtian* Faith is reſtored to the primitive

"Luſtre

" Luſtre and Integrity; nay, more (which is a " greater Happineſs than God ever created [grant-] " ed] to thoſe his choſen Servants, which lived in " the Infancy of the Church) the Profeſſion of a " pure unſpotted Religion is ſo far from being " dangerous, or infamous, that we have the Sword " of the Civil Magiſtrate, the Power and Enforce- " ment of the Laws and Statutes, to maintain " this our precious Faith without Stain and unde- " filed againſt all *heretical* and *ſchiſmatical* Op- " pugners thereof." I had once intended to have ſupported many Things, in the following Papers, by Paſſages of this Writer, but they ſwelled ſo much beyond what I deſigned, that I was forced to lay that Thought aſide; which I at firſt took up, not becauſe I think him the *beſt* Defender of the *Reformation*, but becauſe ſome other Perſons have expreſſed ſo great a Veneration for him, from whom, were he alive, I am perſuaded, by many Places in his Writings, he would ſhew himſelf to differ extremely; and particularly from this in his ſeventh Sermon, where " he declares he dare " not take upon him ſo much to gratify the *Pa-* " *piſts*, as to lay this for a Ground of ſtating Con- " troverſies between us and the Church of *Rome*, " *That that is to be acknowledged for the Doctrine* " *of thoſe* Reformed *Churches*, *which is moſt op-* " *poſite and contradictory to the Church of* Rome." Whether ſome of his greateſt Admirers do not come under this Cenſure; nay, whether, what is much worſe, they do not firſt miſrepreſent *Popery*, and then make it a certain Mark of being in the Right, to expoſe what they think the contrary, I leave

leave the Reader to judge. As to Mr. *Chillingworth*, he is confeſſedly an excellent Writer; but it may, I think, with great Truth be ſaid, that he was much abler at pulling down than building up; towards which little can be expected of a Man who is, by his own Arguments, puſhed ſo home in the Defence he would make of *Proteſtantiſm*, that he has nothing left, but to cry out the *BIBLE*. The *Bible*, I ſay, the *Bible* is the Religion of *Proteſtants*; and ſo ſay all the *Hereticks* and *Schiſmaticks* that ever were. Agreeably to which Principle Mr. *Chillingworth* in another Place (N° 23. of his Preface) expreſſes himſelf this: "We do not "renounce your Communion totally and abſolute-"ly, but only leave communicating with you in "the Practice and Profeſſion of your Errors." Then follows, "The Trial whereof will be to pro-"poſe ſome Form of Worſhiping God, *taken* "*wholly out of Scripture*; and herein, if we refuſe "to join with you, you may juſtly ſay, we have "utterly and abſolutely abandoned your Com-"munion." Upon which Paſſage Archbiſhop *Bramhal* very judiciouſly obſerves, in his Vindication of *Grotius*, &c. p. 637. "That this might "ſerve for a Coverſew to hide the Flame of our "Contentions from breaking out, whilſt we are "at our Devotions; but it hath nothing of Re-"conciliation in it, and hath as little Probability "of a Pacification.—— By being *taken wholly out* "*of Scripture*, either it is intended, that it ſhall "be all in the Words and Phraſe of Scripture; "that will weigh little (I have never obſerved any "Thing more repugnant to the true Senſe of "Scripture,

" Scripture, than ſome Things which have been " expreſſed altogether in the Phraſe of Scripture) " or it is intended, that the Matter of the Liturgy " ſhall be taken wholly out of Scripture; but " this hath ſo little of an Expedient in it, that it " will leave the Controverſy where it is. Both " Parties do already contend, that their reſpec- " tive Forms are taken out of the Scriptures.

Thus far this very learned and judicious Writer, who, I hope I may ſay without Offence, has defended the *Reformation* with a maſterly Skill, with a thorough Knowledge of every Part of the Argument, and in perfect Conſiſtency with our own Eſtabliſhment. This Author has, in the ſame Chapter) conſidered ſeveral other Paſſages of Mr. *Chillingworth* upon upon the ſame Point (the Reconciling our Religious Differences) in Anſwer to Mr. *Baxter*, of whom I cannot but obſerve he ſays, *He has his Fears and Jealouſies that he will never prove a good Architect in this Kind* (of propoſing Ways of Reconciliation) *becauſe he never found any Man yet who was given to Innovation, but his Genius was ten Times apter for pulling down than for building up.* But this is ſaid of Mr. *Baxter*, not of Mr. *Chillingworth*, who is certainly a very good Reaſoner, and may be read with great Advantage: But I fear the Reading of him by young Divines has had one great Inconvenience; they ſee little Shew of *Reading* in him, and from thence are induced to think, there is no Neceſſity of Learning to make a good Divine; nay, that, if he had been more a Scholar, he had been a worſe Reaſoner; and, therefore, not to ſtudy the ancient Writers

Writers of the Church is one Step to the being *Chillingworths* themſelves. I fear, I ſay, the Reading Mr. *Chillingworth*, in their firſt Years, has had this Influence, to make them think, that good Parts and good Senſe would do without Learning, and that Learning is rather a Prejudice than an Improvement of them. But it is a great Miſtake to judge of a Man's Learning, by the Shew that is made of it: Mr. *Chillingworth* had ſtudied hard, and digeſted well what he read, and ſo muſt they who hope to write as well, and be as much eſteemed. It will be always true and good Advice, that Archbiſhop *Brambal* ſays, in the Place before-mentioned, * Dr. *Ward* gave him, when he was a young Student in Theology; *when he told him, that it was impoſſible that the preſent Controverſies of the Church ſhould be rightly determined or reconciled, without a Deep Inſight into the Doctrine of the Primitive Fathers, and a competent Skill in School Theology. The former affords us a right Pattern, and the ſecond ſmootheth it over, and plaineth away the Knots.* The Opinion of two ſuch good Judges may, I hope, be of ſome Weight, to check that Contempt of Learning, which is become ſo faſhionable; not from a Prevalence of good Senſe above our Predeceſſors, but from a Want of their Diligence; and to convince young Students, that, though good Senſe and a Knowledge of the World may make a Man, it is Learning, and the Knowledge of what is in Books, that muſt make a *Divine*.

---

* *Then Maſter of* Sidn. *and* Marg. *Profeſſor.*

Nothing remains in his Lordſhip's Preface, that calls for any Anſwer. For, as to what he ſays of Mr. *Rogers*'s Diſcourſe of the *viſible and inviſible Church*, the ingenious Author is very able to ſpeak for himſelf; and the ſame Temper, Learning, and good Senſe, that have appeared in that Piece, ſhew themſelves, I doubt not, in his Review; which, for ſome Reaſons, I ſhall deny myſelf the Pleaſure of Reading, till I have finiſhed my own Papers. In which I hope there is nothing wants much Excuſe, as to the Manner of it, or that is very unbecoming one, who profeſſes to have no other Difference with his Lordſhip, but what ariſes from his ill Treatment of the Clergy of all Churches in general, and of the Conſtitution of our own Church in particular. So long as he is in that Spirit, as a Clergyman and a Member of the Church of *England*, I muſt always differ from him. But, whenever his Lordſhip takes another Part, when he ſhall think fit to treat the *Clergy* with Candor, Decency, or common Juſtice, and ſhew himſelf a Friend to the *Church* of *England*, to which he is obliged by the moſt ſacred Ties, I ſhall be among the firſt to pay his Lordſhip all the Reſpect due to his ſuperior Merit, and to wiſh he may long adorn the Station he is in.

March 15, 1720-21.

SCRIPTURE vindicated, &c.

BEING A

REPLY

TO THE

Lord Biſhop of BANGOR.

IF I ſhould conſider the Biſhop of *Bangor*'s *Anſwer*, as minutely as he has done my *Sermon*, this Diſpute would be drawn into ſuch an exceſſive Length, as would tire the moſt patient Reader. I perſuade myſelf, therefore, I ſhall eaſily have both his Lordſhip's and the Reader's Pardon, if I take a ſhorter Method, and, paſſing over ſuch Parts of the *Anſwer*, as I think may be ſafely truſted to the Judgment of every honeſt *Engliſhman*, who has any Degree of Candor and good Senſe, I confine myſelf to the Conſideration of thoſe that cover themſelves under a Shew of Learning, and by Colour of it may impoſe on the *Illiterate*, by being thought to have ſomething in them, for no other Reaſon, but becauſe they are not underſtood. In this View, I

paſs over the eight firſt Pages, in which, if the Reader thinks there is any Thing, upon comparing them with the few Lines they are an Anſwer to, I am content; and ſo paſs to the Ninth, where his Lordſhip begins to conſider the Explication I have given of my Text: *Obey them that have the Rule over you, and ſubmit yourſelves.* Theſe Words I have ſhewn to be the proper Rendering of the Original, πείθεσθε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, καὶ ὑπείκετε; and conſequently to be a clear Proof, that there is a real *Authority* veſted by *Chriſt* in thoſe who have the Care of his *Church*, who are properly *Governors*, and have a Right to the Obedience of thoſe whoſe Governors they are. This is preciſely what I inferred from this Text, and many other Places of *Scripture*, that there is *a real Authority veſted in Church-Governors*; not, what that Authority is, or in what Particulars, or to what Degrees it might rightfully exert itſelf: That was to be enquired, in the ſecond Place. The firſt Thing to be proved was, that Church-Governors have really and truly ſome Authority. And this, I thought, was proving ſomething againſt his Lordſhip and thoſe who have written on that Side, who are apprehended by the Friends of the Church, and allowed by their own, to have denied all Church-Authority, in all Inſtances and Degrees of it; however they may ſometimes, for Reaſons of Convenience, retain the Word. This has been ſo often and ſo fully proved by other Hands, that there is, I think, no Need of ſaying more, to make the Charge good.

Having, in the firſt Part of my *Sermon*, laid my Foundation too firmly to be ſhaken by the Church's

Church's Enemies, and proved the *Reality* of an *Authority* vested in its Governors; I then endeavoured to shew, who the Persons were that had this Authority, what Powers they had a Right to by it, and what Degree of Submission and Obedience is due to them, particularly with respect to Matters of *Faith*, and the Interpretation of the *Scriptures*. This, with Answers to the most considerable Objections that have been made against Church-Authority, is the Substance of what I undertook, in that *Sermon*; in which, how ill soever the several Parts be executed, of which the Reader must judge, the Method, I hope, will be allowed to be regular and natural. Which, if the Reader will keep in Mind, that alone will shew him, how unfair an Adversary the Bishop is, and how much he shoots besides the Mark, at the very first Setting out, spending no less than twelve Pages, to prove, that *Rulers* does not signify *Rulers*, and that to *obey* is not to *obey*. For that, in Effect, he does, in endeavouring to prove this not to be the Meaning of the Words in the Original, ἡγέμωσι and πειθεσθε; the Sense of which is as certain, and determinate, and well known to those who have any Knowledge of the *Greek* Tongue, as the Sense of the *English* Words is to those who understand *English*.

As to the first of them, ἡγέμωσι, I observed, in my *Sermon*, that it was used in Scripture, and in the best Writers, to express Governors of all Kinds, even those in whom the supreme Authority is lodged; that, therefore, nothing can be inferred to the Diminution of Church-Authority from the

Apoſtle's making Uſe of this Term to expreſs Superiors in the Church, rather than any other. The Biſhop confeſſes the Word to be thus uſed, but denies the Inference I make from it, which he is the more offended with, becauſe he thinks it levelled againſt what himſelf had, in his *Anſwer to the Committee*, obſerved upon the ſame Word; and upon this Suppoſition tells me, *I have intirely miſtaken the Obſervation I intended to confront.* This is a Fallacy his Lordſhip very often puts upon himſelf, in thinking he is meant where he is not; and that is the Caſe here: For I was ſo far from intending to oppoſe any Obſervation of his Lordſhip's upon this Word, that I had not the leaſt Knowledge or Remembrance he had made any. I did, indeed, when the Biſhop's *Anſwer to the Committee* firſt came out, run it over; but it was as I read other Books of the ſame Kind, in a very curſory Manner, and without looking into it a ſecond Time, having no Intention ever to intermeddle in the *Controverſy*, which was in very good Hands. And what was ſo haſtily read, as it commonly happens, was as eaſily forgot. Nor, when I made my *Sermon*, had I that Book by me, or any other the Biſhop has writ in this Controverſy. So far was I from intending, either in the Choice of my Text, or in my Explication of it, to oppoſe any Thing he had any where ſaid of it. Had I had any ſuch Intention, I ſhould have thought myſelf obliged to have carefully conſidered his Lordſhip's Obſervations upon it, being intirely of his Opinion, that *whoever is above the low Task of reading the Works of thoſe he diſlikes, ought likewiſe*

likewiſe to be above the much lower Task of writing againſt them; for which Reaſon, his Lordſhip is ſecure of never having me again for an Adverſary.

This being the Truth of the Caſe, his Lordſhip's Charge againſt me, as oppoſing and miſtaking his Obſervation, is pure Miſtake in himſelf, and the Offence taken at it perfectly groundleſs. But, that his Obſervation may no no longer be neglected, though he tells us not what Book it is in, or where it may be found, I have been at the Pains to look it out, and it is this: "That the "Phraſe, *to rule over them*, tends to raiſe a very "different Idea in the Mind, from what the ori- "ginal Word carries along with it. The Sound "of the *Engliſh* Word RULERS would make "one ſuppoſe, that the Word in the Original was "Κυριεύοντες, whereas it is Ἡγεμόνοι. The former "ſignifies *Lords*, and *Rulers* over *Slaves*, or *Sub-* "*jects* bound by their Laws. The latter ſignifies "*Guides*, or *Leaders*, whoſe Buſineſs it is, *&c.*" This is the Obſervation, as it ſtands in the *Anſwer to the Committee*, p. 60. Which is now changed into this: "That there is a great deal "of Difference between this Word, uſed of Ec- "cleſiaſtical Teachers, and ſome other Words "which never were uſed of them; and that the "Word *RULERS*, in our *Engliſh* Tranſlation, "carries a greater Sound with it in our Language, "than this Word has in the *Greek*." In Explication of the firſt Part of this Obſervation, the Biſhop tells us, "that, though the Term ἡγεμόνοι "be uſed of abſolute Princes, yet it deſcribes

" them not as ſuch; but is really *diminutive*, in " Compariſon with ſome others; that it is of a " *ſofter* Signification, and far from denoting any " of the Power which the other Words Κύριοι and " Βασιλεῖς denote. That Civil Governors are " called, indeed, ἡγούμενοι, and deſcribed by other " *ſoft* Names, to ſignify their Duty. That Ec- " cleſiaſtical Superiors are not poſſeſſed, in Scrip- " ture, of any ſuch *harder* and *higher* Titles; but " are ſolely deſcribed by the *ſofter* and *better* " Names, whilſt the others are denied them. " That, ſuch *ſoft* and *low* Words alone being uſed " of Eccleſiaſtical Superiors, and the others abſo- " lutely rejected, their Authority can be no more " than is implied in thoſe *ſoft* and *low* Words." Thus his Lordſhip; in which he has proved nothing, but that he has uſed a very ſoft and low Argument.

For, 1, ἡγούμενοι and the *Verb* ἡγεῖσθαι, are not really diminitive, in Compariſon of the others he mentions; they properly ſignify *preſiding*, *governing*, and being *at the Head* of thoſe Perſons or Affairs, with Reſpect to which they are uſed; and are by the beſt Writers uſed of Emperors themſelves, and other Perſons of ſupreme Authority, and that, when they would magnify their Office, and ſay the higheſt Things of them; for what does his Lordſhip thing of this Expreſſion in a very elegant Writer, Πλὴν ἀλλὰ βασίλευε καὶ ἡγοῦ, &c.? Does he think the Words ill placed, and that the latter is a Diminution of what is implied in the former? But, 2. he himſelf allows, that *nothing can be inferred, merely from the Uſe of this diminutive*

tive Word ἡγέμονοι, *to the Diminution of Civil Governors.* But, becauſe this looks like giving up the Point, and is the very Obſervation I have made of Eccleſiaſtical Governors, his Lordſhip adds, *whilſt they are called by other Names, as* Κύριοι and Βασιλεῖς, and the like. But, with Submiſſion, this is not the Reaſon that makes the Obſervation true; it is ſo from the Nature and Uſage of the Word, which is applicable to all Degrees of Power, and therefore nothing can be inferred, in any Caſe, merely from the Uſe of it, to the Diminution of the Power of any Perſons it is applied to, which is all I contended for. As to his Lordſhip's *Salvo*'s of, *whilſt they are called by other Names*, and, *but then at the ſame Time they are called* κύριοι, βασιλεῖς, *Lords, Kings, and the like*; if, by *whilſt* and at the *ſame Time*, he means in the ſame Breath, or in the ſame Diſcourſe, nothing is more falſe. But, if he means that Civil Governors, who are ſometimes called Ἡγέμονοι, have a Right likewiſe to the Titles of Κύριοι, Βασιλεῖς, and the like; this, if it were true, would only ſhew that theſe are not convertible Terms. Κύριοι and Βασιλεῖς are Ἡγέμονοι, but Ἡγέμονοι are not neceſſarily Κύριοι or Βασιλεῖς. That is, every King is a Governor, but every Governor is not a King. A notable Obſervation! But here it may be proper to put his Lordſhip in Mind, that Κύριοι is not a Name or Species of Civil Governors, but an honourable Appellation only, when given to them; and that, in the *Greek* Writers, it has not the Senſe he thinks it has; for it is not the proper Rendering of *DOMINUS*, a Title the beſt Emperors rejected

jected with Indignation, and which was not assumed, except by one or two very bad ones, till the Decline of the Empire, *but* Δεσπότης. And, as to the Title Βασιλεὺς, though the *Greeks* usually rendered by that the Word *Emperor*, it is well known, that *King* is originally a higher Title than that of *Emperor*, and that the Emperors, therefore, would not either assume the Title of *REGES* themselves, or suffer it to be given them. But, for the Meaning and Use of both these Titles, I refer his Lordship to the most learned *Spanheim de Numism.* As to Ἡγέμονοι, it is frequently used not only, in an absolute Manner, to express Governors in general, but to admonish their Subjects of their Duty to them. Thus in *Clem. Rom.* ὑποτασσόμενοι τοῖς ἡγουμένοις ὑμῶν; and in *Clem. Alex.* ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πειθωμεν τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἔχοντων. It is, therefore, 3. false to say, that Civil Governors are called Ἡγέμονοι, and by other *soft* Names to denote their Duty. Neither the Duty nor Authority of Governors is to be learnt from the Softness or Hardness of Names. There is no softer Name than *PATER*, or *Father*; and yet it is certain, the *Patria Potestas*, till restrained by Laws, was a very great Power. And such an Obedience is due to Parents, that *Children* are, in Scripture, commanded to *be obedient to them in all Things*. But that is a Text his Lordship seems not to think of, but to prove from it *a Right to Disobedience*. As for Ἡγέμονοι, Duty is not so much implied in the Word, as Pre-eminence, or Superiority; and, if it were, is it not as true of almost all other Names of Magistrates and Governors, as it is supposed to

be

be of this? What does his Lordſhip think of *PRÆTOR*, *CONSUL*, and *CENSOR* among the *Romans?* Words, which in the Origin of them, denote no Power, but Duty rather; but, if any one ſhould ſay they were not Names of great Power, he would betray extreme Ignorance. Even the Word *KING*, which his Lordſhip calls a *high* and *hard* Name, in the *Latin*, with its Verb *rego*, is thought to ſignify merely Duty, and is very probably derived by the learned *Bochart* from a Word, which, in *Hebrew*, is to *feed*, that is, to do the Office of a Shepherd; and of like Import are ἄναξ and βασιλεύς, ſo far as we can judge of the true *Etymology* of them; and his Lordſhip might know, that the laſt Word is is ſo far from being a *hard* one, that it is uſed in Oppoſition to a hard one, τύραννος, which fell into Diſuſe from the harſh and odious Ideas that were in common Acceptation by the *Greeks* annexed to it. 4. His Lordſhip's Diviſion of Names into *hard* and *high*, and *ſofter* and *better*, is intirely Miſtake, and without Foundation. The firſt and chief End of all Power is the Good of the Perſons governed; and the Names of all Officers, ſo far as we can diſcover the firſt Senſe of them, denote ſome Part of their Duty or Office, and none have, in their original Meaning, any Thing harſh or hard in them. The very Suppoſition is ridiculous, that Governors or their People would chooſe ſuch Names as are odious and hard, and imply Slavery and Oppreſſion. The Names, expreſſive of ſeveral Forms of Government, may ſeem odious to thoſe who live under other Governments, or who

have

have been oppreſſed by them; as *King* may be thought a hard and odious Title to a *Republican*; and ſo is the Name of a *Democracy*, or *Commonwealth*, to one who loves *Monarchy*; but neither Words are ſo to the Subjects of the reſpective Governments. The Word *King* is ſo far from being a diſagreeable Word to the Friends of *Kingly* Government, that they will readily tell a *Republican* boaſting of his Liberty,

Nunquam Libertas gratior extat,
Quam ſub rege pio.———

I would aſk his Lordſhip which Name he thinks is moſt acceptable to the People of *England*, that of *King*, or that of *Protector?* Though nothing can be a ſofter and better Name than the latter, and the other his Lordſhip thinks a *hard* one; yet nothing is more certain, than that this ſoft Name is moſt deteſtable to the People of this Nation, whilſt that of *King* is, of all others, the moſt lovely and endearing: Which may ſhew his Lordſhip, that the Softneſs or Hardneſs of Names is not to be known from their *Etymology*, or Derivation, but from the Ideas annexed to them in the common Uſe and Acceptation of them. But, 5. ſuppoſing this Obſervation were true of *hard* and *ſoft* Names, that is not the Reaſon why thoſe, his Lordſhip calls *hard* ones, are not given, in Scripture, to Eccleſiaſtical Governors, but the ſofter and better Names; but becauſe they denote a certain Peculiarity, or Quality, that does not belong to the Power they are inveſted with, and, therefore, they cannot, conſiſtently with Truth, be applied to them, or not without great Impropriety.

For

For Κύριοι and Βασιλεῖς, as the firſt is equivalent to Δεσπόται, ſignify a Property of the Governors in the Perſons governed, and that they govern in their own Name; for which Reaſon, neither of theſe Titles could be given to *Joſeph*, though *Pharaoh* made him Governor over *Egypt*, *and all his Houſe*; but he is called Ἡγέμονα. Κατέστησεν αὐτὸν Ἡγέμονα ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου καὶ ὅλου τοῦ οἴκου αὐτοῦ. *Acts* vii. 10. For this Reaſon, I ſay, he is called here Ἡγέμονα, and not becauſe it is a ſoft or low Name, as may appear from two well known Paſſages. *The Sceptre ſhall not depart from Judah*, nor Ἡγέμονα from between his Feet, till *Shilo* come, who is himſelf deſcribed by the ſame Word: *Out of thee ſhall come* Ἡγέμονα, *that ſhall rule my People Iſrael.* Mic. v. 2. and *Mat.* ii. 6. And, for the ſame Reaſon, thoſe and the like Titles could not be applied to Church Governors, whoſe Power, whatever be the Degree of it, is *Vicarial* only, they govern by Commiſſion from Chriſt, and in his Name, not in their own; which is as true of the higheſt as of the loweſt Officer in the *Chriſtian* Church, and is as readily acknowledged by them. Thus it is evident, that every one of his Lordſhip's Obſervations concerning theſe Words is falſe, and that the Degrees of Power and Authority cannot be deduced from the Hardneſs or Softneſs of them; and it will be always true, that Nothing can be argued to the Diminution of Church-Authority, from the Governors of it being called Ἡγέμονοι. *Q. E. D.*

Nor is there more Truth, in the ſecond Part of his Lordſhip's Obſervation, that the Word *RULERS*,

LERS, in our *Engliſh* Tranſlation, carries a greater Sound with it, in our Language, than the *Greek* Word does, as ſignifying *MASTER*, or *LORD*; in which Senſe St. *Paul*, he ſays, "in "the Name of all the Apoſtles, renounces the "the Word, 2 *Cor.* iv. 5. *We preach not ourſelves* "*but* Chriſt Jeſus *the Lord, and ourſelves your Ser-* "*vants for* Jeſus *Sake:* That is, ſays the Biſhop, "we proclaim not ourſelves your Maſters, but "*Chriſt Jeſus* your Lord or Maſter; and our- "ſelves your Servants for *Jeſus* Sake, in order to "bring you to *him*, as your ſole *Lord* and *Ma-* "*ſter*." I ſhall not ſpend Time to ſhew, that his Lordſhip does not enter intirely into St. *Paul*'s Thought, and that St. *Paul* does not here ſpeak in the Name of the Apoſtles; but muſt obſerve the great Moderation his Lordſhip has ſhewn on this Occaſion, when he had ſo fine an Opportunity, ſo plain and clear a *Text* to prove, that the Miniſters of *Chriſt*, even the Apoſtles themſelves, were ſo far from being κύριοι, or *Lords*, that they were no better than δοῦλοι, *Servants*, and not barely Servants, but *Slaves*; for, as his Lordſhip and his Friends have elaborately proved, *Servants* in thoſe Days were *Slaves*. And from thence does it not undeniably follow, that the *Clergy*, in all future Times, are the People's Slaves, and, inſtead of governing, ſhould, in Strictneſs, be governed by them, and that in a *deſpotick* and arbitrary Manner? His Lordſhip has ſeldom proved any Thing from Scripture ſo ſtrongly, as he might have done this: This, therefore, is ſuch an Inſtance of his Lordſhip's Favour to the *Clergy*, as

deſerves

deſerves their Thanks. But to return to the Word *Ruler*; his Lordſhip thinks, it would make one ſuppoſe that the Word, in the Original, was κυειδ'οντες. Why his Lordſhip ſhould have ſuch an Averſion to this Word, I cannot imagine, or why he thinks κυειδ'ειν the proper *Greek* for it; there being nothing, in the Sound or Senſe of the Word, that can give Offence; nor has it that Peculiarity in it, κυειδ'οντες has, to denote Property or Dominion, as that Word means abſolute or arbitrary Government; ſo that to one, who knows any Thing of Words (and his Lordſhip ſays, *he does a little*) to *rule over*, or be a *Ruler*, muſt ſeem to be the Rendering of ἡγεῖς much more properly than of κυειδ'ειν; and the Tranſlators of the *New Teſtament*, who were Men of great Learning and Skill in Languages, were ſo much of this Opinion, that they have made the Word *Rule*, or to be a *Ruler*, the Interpretation of any Word denoting Government, rather than of κυειδ'ειν, which his Lordſhip thinks ſo proper for it. I will give only one Inſtance where the Word *Rule* ſeems to me to have a very agreeable Sound: *He that* ruleth *over Men muſt be juſt*, ruling *in the Fear of God*, 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 3.

But his Lordſhip will have it, that the proper Senſe of the Word Ἡγέμονοι is *Guides*, or *Leaders*; by the firſt of which I had obſerved it was rendered in the Margin, without expreſſing any Like of it, much leſs preferring it before the other. However, his Lordſhip greedily catches at it, and thinks, by this *little Word Guides*, all the Authority contended for vaniſhes into nothing; and

" that

" that the Submiſſion required dwindles into ſuch " a Submiſſion as is due to a Guide, whom a Man " takes for his Aſſiſtance and Direction, without " putting out his own Eyes." But, 1. *Guides* is not ſo proper a Rendering as the other; for a Tranſlation, to be juſt, muſt be of the ſame Extent as the Word it renders, otherwiſe the Tranſlator chooſes for us, and gives us his Senſe, and not the Senſe of the Original; unleſs it be very evident, that, of the ſeveral Senſes the Original admits, one only will agree to the Place. But, 2. Suppoſe *Guides* were the proper Rendering, and the original Word were not Ἡγεμόνας, but Ὁδηγοὶ: How comes his Lordſhip to think this ſo *little a Word*, and that it carries in it no Authority? St. *Paul* was of another Mind, when he repreſents the Boaſting of the *Jew*, *Rom.* ii. 19. in theſe Words —— *Thou art confident that thou art* a Guide *of the Blind*, a Light *to them that are in Darkneſs*, an Inſtructor *of the Fooliſh*, a Teacher *of Babes*. Upon which, if a Comment be needful, hear *Grotius*: Judæis *hic aſcribuntur, ex ipſorum judicio, tituli* magnificentiſſimi; *moſt magnificent* and *little!* ſo different are *Grotius* and his Lordſhip. I need not add, how often to *guide* or *lead* is aſcribed even to God himſelf. But his Lordſhip has great Comfort in the Word *Guides*, becauſe *it does not oblige Men to put out their Eyes, or to follow them into the Sea, or down a Precipice.* His Lordſhip's Argument is this: We are not obliged to follow *Guides* into the Sea, or down a Precipice, or to put out our Eyes in Compliment to them: But Eccleſiaſtical Governors are Guides: *Ergo* we are not obliged

to

to follow them blindly into the Sea, &c. Suppose now we should say, our Ecclesiastical Governors are *Rulers*: Is there any *Charm* in the Word *Rulers*, that, at the very Sound of it, People are struck *blind?* Or, Do our Civil Governors, in Virtue of this, or, indeed, of any other Title, require such an Obedience from their Subjects? Why then must we be charged with claiming such a Kind of Obedience to Church-Governors, by giving them the Title of *Rulers* rather than of *Guides?* When his Lordship can infer such an absurd Submission from the Names of the Civil Magistrate, we will be content to be thought capable of inferring the Like from our Rendering of the Word Ἡγούμενοι. But it is his Lordship's perpetual Practice to render his Adversaries (I may say the whole Body of the *Clergy*) as odious to the People as he can; for the whole Body of the *Clergy*, in the present Dispute, differ from him. A few Examples to the contrary, most of them young Men, are not a sufficient Exception, to say the Body are not against him.

But I must farther observe to his Lordship, that these *Ecclesiastical Guides* are not such *unauthoritative Leaders* as he takes them for; they are an *Order*, not of Man's Choosing, that he may take them, or lay them aside at Pleasure, they are of God's and *Christ*'s Appointment; and to reject the Ministers of Christ, acting as such, is to reject him. In Truth, his Lordship's arguing, from the Word *Guide* or *Leader*, to the Power of Church-Governors, is as ridiculous as it would be to argue, from the same Word, to the Power of the *General* of

an Army, in order to ſhew he has none. A *General* is the *Guide* or *Leader* of his Army, he is ἡγεμὼν στρατοῦ, and ἡγεῖται στρατῷ; but this *General*, when he marches in the Night, or through unknown Ways, takes ſome Peaſant of the Country for his Guide, to lead the Army the right Way, and this Peaſant may likewiſe properly be ſaid, ἡγεῖσθαι στρατῷ, as well as the General:

Οἱ γὰρ βλέποντες τοῖς τυφλοῖς ἡγέμεθα.

But ſhall we argue, that the *General* has no Power, becauſe the *Peaſant* has none? Shall we ſink the *General* into ſuch an *unauthoritative* Leader as the other is, or raiſe the *Peaſant* to the Authority of a *General*, becauſe the ſame Word is applicable to both; and, which is his Lordſhip's favourite Obſervation, neither have Authority to *lead into the Sea, or down a Precipice?* I hope this Inſtance will convince even his Lordſhip of the Ambiguity of the Words he is ſo fond of, and let him ſee, no Argument can be drawn from them to prove, that no Authority belongs to the Perſons deſigned by them. But enough of this; it is a Pain to one to think there ſhould be any Need of arguing ſo plain a Point with a Perſon of ſo much Learning.

His Lordſhip's next Attack is upon my Explication of the Word πειθαρχὸς, which, I ſaid, was very juſtly rendered *to obey*; which, indeed, needed no Proof; but, knowing what low Adverſaries we have to deal with, I obſerved, that the Word was ſo uſed, in other Places of the *New Teſtament*; for Example, twice together in the fifth of the *Acts*,

of

of those who followed *Theudas* and *Judas* of *Galilee*, two Ringleaders of Rebellion among the *Jews*; and, to obviate the poor Cavil that might be made against it, because Men are capable of being wrought upon by Persuasion, I added another Instance from St. *James*, that was not liable to this Evasion, where it is used even of *Horses*. To this the good Bishop, who is never at a Loss for an Answer, says, that "πείθω has two Senses; "a proper one, which is, to be *persuaded*; and "an improper figurative one, which is, to *obey*; "that it is to be taken, in the first Sense, when "used of rational Agents; and, when it is used "of others, *if we will speak accurately, and with a "critical Exactness*, the Word loses nothing of "its primary Signification, but is only figurately "used of Creatures uncapable of Persuasion, and "then signifies that they act as if they were persuaded by us. And, that I am very unfortunate "in my Attempt to prove my Sense of it, because "the Followers of *Theudas* and *Judas* did not do "so out of Necessity, but Choice, and were at "Liberty to leave them, when they would."

This is the Substance of his Lordship's Answer, which is another Proof, *he knows a little of Words*: Had he known a little more, he would scarce have made these Remarks, nothing being more certain, that that πείθω, in this Construction, does ordinarily signify *parere*, *obedire*, *morem gerere*, as every *Lexicon* will inform him; there is not, I believe, one Writer, from *Homer* downwards, in whom there may not be found several Instances of

this Use of it. Thus we have πείθεσθαι θεῷ, ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότῃ, κελεύουσι, ὑπιτάττεσθαι, and the like, in which his *proper* Sense of the Word can have no Place. His Lordship will make strange Work of *Greek* Books, if this be his Rule of interpreting, to *English* Words in the *Passive* Form from the Sense they have in the *Active*, instead of consulting the Use of Words, as they are found in the best Authors; which, if he had done, he would have found, that πείθεσθαι is to *obey*, as truly when used of Men as Horses; and that it is no more unaccurate or figurative, when used of them than Man; but that to *obey* is the familiar, common, well known Acceptation of the Word, in all Writers. His Lordship indeed thinks this Sense of the Word as figurative as that of *audire* in that of *Virgil, nec audit currus habenas*; which noble *Hemistick*, in which every Word is a Figure, I dare say, was never so abused before. It is a proper Instance to shew, that the *Simple* is sometimes used for the *Compound*, *audire* for *obedire*; but what is that to πείθεσθαι, or to St. *James*, whose Style is too low and familiar to want to be explained by the Diction of an *Epic Poet?*

That the Expression, in St. *James*, is very just and proper, his Lordship may learn from the best Pattern we have of good Writing in the low Style, I mean *Xenophon*, who in his little Piece, *De Re Equestri*, hath the same Expression three or four Times. But nothing can explain this Word better than a Passage in the same Author, that every School-boy is acquainted with; it is his admirable Introduction to his *Cyropædia*, where he observes,

That

That all Creatures are governed more easily than Men, and uses this Word no less than five Times: That those Masters, who have but few Servants, cannot have even them *obedient* to them; οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τούτοις δυναμένους χρῆσθαι πειθομένοις τοὺς δεσπότας—— That Flocks and Herds of all Kinds were more *obedient* to those that have the Care of them, than Men to their Governors; πάσας τοίνυν ταύτας τὰς ἀγέλας ἐδοκοῦμεν ὁρᾶν μᾶλλον ἐθελούσας πείθεσθαι τοῖς νομεῦσιν, ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοῖς ἄρχουσι—— That he never observed any of them conspiring against those that have the Care of them, either that they might not *obey* them, or—— ἔτι τοίνυν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἀγέλην ᾐσθόμεθα συστᾶσαν ἐπὶ τοὺς νομέας, οὔτε ὡς μὴ πείθεσθαι —— But that he altered his Mind, when he observed how easily *CYRUS* governed great Multitudes, not only of Men, but Nations, who were *obedient* to him; ὃς παμπόλλους μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐκτήσατο πειθομένους αὐτῷ—— We know, *says he*, some People were willing to obey him, who had never seen him; nay, who knew they never should see him: Κύρῳ γοῦν ἴσμεν ἐθελήσαντας πείθεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν οὐδ' ἑωρακότας πώποτε αὐτὸν —— καὶ ὅμως ἤθελον αὐτῷ ὑπακούειν. If any one can still doubt, whether πείθεσθαι be not properly to *obey*, let him translate these Passages in the Bishop's Way; and, if the Sense of one Translation will not satisfy him, I leave him to be convinced by the Absurdity of the other. *Xenophon* then proceeds to reckon up the several People that *Cyrus* governed; which Enumeration he begins thus, ἑκόντων μὲν ἡγήσατο Μήδων —— first he governed the *Medes*, who willingly submitted to him, So that we have the Authority of *Xenophon* for the Sense of

both the Words that are now in Dispute. I might add to *Xenophon* several Examples from *Aristophanes*, who, being a Writer of *Comedy*, writes in the familiar Style. But it is trifling to multiply Instances, in so plain a Case; let me only observe, that it is properly used even of unwilling Obedience; witness that Passage in his *Lysistrata*, οὐδέποθ' ἑκοῦσα τ' ἀνδρὶ τῷ 'μῷ πείσομαι, and, for a Conclusion, add one other Verse of his in the *Vespæ*, where he redoubles the Word;

πιθοῦ, πιθοῦ λόγοισι μηδ' ἀφρων γένῃ.

It is with equal Judgment his Lordship objects against the Instance I gave in the Followers of *Theudas* and *Judas*, as if, in popular Insurrections, none listed under a Rebel-Leader, but by his Persuasion and Arguments; or as if even those, that did, were not, when listed, as much under their Command, as those who bore Arms against them, on the Side of the Government,; the late Rebellion is too fresh to be forgot. Another Word in the Text, denoting Submission, is ὑπείκειν, about the Meaning of which, I have said, there could be no Dispute: For that it can signify Nothing but to *submit, or yield Obedience*. His Lordship does not give us any other *English* for ὑπείκετε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, and yet wonders I should affirm this, because it often signifies a Compliance of *Equals* towards *Equals*, and sometimes to *Inferiors*. As if Submission were not Submission, or Yielding not Yielding, because it is voluntary; and might not be paid, because it cannot be demanded. *Theophylact*

phylact was ſo much of another Opinion from his Lordſhip, that his Obſervation here upon the Word ὑπείκειν is, τὴν ἐπιτεταμένην πειθὼ διὰ τοῦ ὑπείκετε δηλοῖ. The Apoſtle uſed this Word to expreſs the Intenſeneſs of the Obedience here required.

His Lordſhip concludes this Section with complaining, that, if all I had ſaid were true, we are not advanced one Step towards knowing, what this Obedience is that is claimed by us. But, why ſo haſty, my Lord? To ſettle Things, we muſt firſt ſettle the Senſe of Words; and it is advancing ſomething, to prove that ſome Authority is due to Church-Governors; this is naturally the firſt Step in the Diſpute between us. But, if it were otherwiſe, his Lordſhip is the laſt Man that ſhould, in this Caſe, complain of others, who has, for theſe three or four Years, been called on to explain himſelf, and tell the World, whether he allows any Authority to be veſted by Chriſt in the Governors of his Church; and, if any, what it is? But hitherto to no Purpoſe. He intrenches himſelf in *Abſolutes and Properlies*, and chooſes to lie under the Imputation of denying all Church-Authority, rather than to be explicit, and diſtinctly acknowledge any; in which, no Doubt, his Lordſhip acts very prudently, for, were it to be ſhewn, it would have the meagre Appearance of a *Skeleton*; he muſt fetch it from the Grave, wherein he ſeems to have long ſince buried it.

By this Taſte of his Skill in *Critic*, his Lordſhip prepares us for the Scene that opens in the 20th Page, and is continued through many Sections; in which he examines the other Texts of

Scripture relating to this Subject, according to his Promise in his *Title-Page*; which I must own, I was not ill pleased to see, as remembering the Expectation he had given us, in a former Book, of doing this, when he had an Opportunity. His Words are these, I *shall, I hope, find another Opportunity of examining distinctly every Text of the* New Testament, *relating in any Sort to this* Subject. *Answer to Com. p.* 62. The Opinion I have of his Lordship's Abilities, in explaining Scripture, made me rejoice, in having had the good Fortune to furnish him with this wished for Opportunity: It is not a little Satisfaction to me, that I have been the Occasion of his Lordship's quitting his Intrenchments, and coming into the open Field, where his great Genius has ample Room to display all its Forces to the utmost Advantage;

——*hic specimen specitur, hic certamen cernitur.*[1]

Now we may expect a thorough Examination of many Texts, which I could but just touch upon; and the clearing up of many Difficulties, that have, hitherto divided the learned World; here we may expect to see *Priestcraft* driven out of all its Subterfuges, and from the Sanctuary it has so long taken, in the Abuse of *Scripture*; and the Bounds of Obedience to our Ecclesiastical Governors, distinctly and exactly set out, and unalterably fixed on a sure Foot. What less could be expected as the Result of his Lordship's matureſt Thoughts upon a Subject he has so much at Heart? But, to be serious, I expected nothing less; instead of a distinct

distinct Examination, and Clearing of Difficulties, and Setting Bounds, I expected nothing, but Confusion, the Raising Doubts in the plainest Points, and Unsettling every Thing; I remembered, how his Lordship had used the Texts relating to the Obedience due to the Civil Powers, and, therefore, hoped for nothing more satisfactory from his Examination of those that concern the Authority of our Spiritual Governors. The Result of his Examination of the Texts of both Sorts is, that nothing certain can be concluded from them. How much soever, therefore, others may be disappointed, I confess I am not; his Lordship has perfectly answered my Expectation. He has spent thirty Pages in considering such Expressions of Scripture as are supposed to concern the Office, Power, and Acts of Spiritual Governors, and the Duty of those under them; in all which, if he has cleared any one Difficulty, or thrown any new Light upon any one Text, I am content to give up the whose Cause.

His Lordship set out under a great Mistake, as I have already observed, that I had undertaken to prove, from my Text, the *Degree* of Authority I supposed to be vested in Church-Governors; when all I designed was to prove that some, and that not an inconsiderable Authority, did really belong to them. And the same Mistake runs through all this Part of his Performance, the Substance of which, in the main, is this:—— (for it would be an endless Task to follow his Lordship Step by Step through so many tedious Pages) "That none of the Expressions, I have taken

"Notice

" Notice of, prove Church-Governors to have a " Right to ſuch an Authority, as takes from *In-* " *feriors* all *Right* to *judge* for themſelves, in " Matters of Religion; nor that any ſuch Sub- " miſſion was due to them, as was deſigned to " *blind* the Eyes of all Chriſtians; that they do " not imply in them any Thing inconſiſtent with " the *Right* of Conſideration and Examination; " that they do not imply, that the People are " not to ſee with their own Eyes, to truſt their " own Senſes, and conſult their own Underſtand- " ings. This, *ſays his Lordſhip*, is the only Au- " thority that has been denied; and, if the Peo- " ple are ſtill left to conſult the Goſpel, and to " be conducted by the beſt Judgment they can " make, with all the Helps God affords them, " then he would beg to know, what Authority " the Dean has gained for thoſe whoſe Advocate " he would appear to be, which others are not " as ready to agree to as himſelf." This is the Burden of the Song; we have it, in almoſt every Page. This then is his Lordſhip's Argument; none of the Expreſſions, the *Dean* has brought from *Scripture*, prove a Right in Church-Governors to an abſolute and arbitrary Power over their Flocks, nor any Obligation upon the People to yield an implicit and blind Obedience to them, therefore, they do not prove the Point they are brought for; but only ſuch a Power in one, and ſuch a Submiſſion in the other, as his Lordſhip has never denied; ſuch as he is as willing to allow as I can be. Extremely well argued! But, not to obſerve, how much better his Lordſhip has

now

now expreſſed himſelf, Does he really believe, that thoſe who have oppoſed him, or rather, whom he has oppoſed (for I deſire it may be remembered, he began the Attack unprovoked, and, therefore, is anſwerable for all the unhappy Conſequences of this Diſpute) Does he, I ſay, really believe they contend for ſuch a wild Authority in Church-Governors, for ſuch a ſtupid Submiſſion in the People? Does he not certainly know the contrary? That it is not the Uſurpations of the *Papacy*, and the blind Obedience practiſed in the *Romiſh* Church, but the modeſt, and moderate, and juſt Authority of the Church of *England*, we are defending? Is he not conſcious to himſelf, that it is the *Engliſh* Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitution he attacks? Is it not clear as the Light, that his Adverſaries maintain no other Church-Authority, than ſuch as the Church *eſtabliſhed* in this Nation is poſſeſſed of? And that this Church claims no ſuch abſurd Authority, as is here ſo pompouſly denied? Why then all this Oppoſition to what no body defends? Why all this Pains to render the Conſtitution and the Clergy odious, by ſuppoſing them to teach, and practiſe, and aſſert Doctrines they abhor the Thoughts of? It is either falſe to ſay, he has oppoſed no other Authority, but what is abſolute and arbitrary, or true to ſay, the Church claims no Authority he ought to oppoſe; and that, therefore, he has cauſleſly, and without Grounds, ſet the Kingdom in a Flame, by making a terrible Outcry, when there was no Danger. And yet his Lordſhip gravely ſays, he has denied no Authority, but what every *Proteſtant* denies as well as himſelf;

himſelf; than which Aſſertion nothing can be more untrue, as is plain to a Demonſtration from this very Book, and the Part I am now conſidering: It is moſt evident from this ſhort Argument. If his Lordſhip denies to the Governors of the Church only ſuch an *arbitrary* and *abſolute* Authority, as requires a *blind* Obedience from the People, then he allows them all other Authority; and conſequently ſuch an Authority as the *Apoſtles* had in Church-matters; unleſs he will ſay the Apoſtles had an unlimited arbitrary Power, and a Right to ſuch a Submiſſion from the People, as excluded all Liberty of conſidering, examining, and judging for themſelves: But his Lordſhip does not pretend the *Apoſtles* had ſuch a Power; nay, he often tells us, they had not, and yet, at the ſame Time, denies that their Authority was continued to their Succeſſors; therefore, he denies to Church-Governors ſome other Authority, beſides what is abſolute and arbitrary; therefore, not only ſuch, directly contrary to his own repeated Aſſertions. Nay farther, his Lordſhip denies to Church-Governors not only abſolute Authority; not only ſuch as the *Apoſtles* had, but even ſuch as *they* exerciſed who were immediately commiſſioned by them, as *Timothy* and *Titus* were; and, in doing this, denies all the Authority for which either Example or Precept can be brought from *Scripture*; and yet, in the very ſame Pages, declares over and over, that he denies only abſolute Authority, and expects to be believed. For his whole Buſineſs, for thirty Pages together, is to ſhew, firſt that the Scripture-Expreſſions do not prove an *abſolute* Authority,

thority, or a Right to a *blind* Submiſſion: And, in the next Place, that the Authority they carry in them belongs either to the *Apoſtles*, or to Perſons commiſſioned by them, of whom they had a good Knowledge. From whence the Concluſion is, that no Authority of Church-Governors, in After-times, can be proved from what they had then. By which Way of arguing, his Lordſhip might with equal Force prove, that no Miniſter has now any Right to *preach the Goſpel*, or *adminiſter the Sacraments*, our *Saviour*'s Commiſſion to do ſo being immediately given to the *Apoſtles* only; which ſufficiently ſhews the Abſurdity of ſuch Reaſoning. That ſome Things were peculiar to the *Apoſtles*, is denied by none; but the ordinary Powers they exerciſed themſelves, and committed to others, for the Well-governing of the Church, and the Preſervation of its *Unity* and *Faith*, againſt *Hereſy* and *Schiſm*, as they would always be neceſſary for the ſame Ends; ſo have they, in all Times, been acknowledged to have been continued to their Succeſſors; and nothing more, that I know of, has been contended for by his Lordſhip's Adverſaries: So that, if he pleaſed, he might ſoon have put an End to this Diſpute, by pointing out the Particulars in which he thinks our Church, or her *Clergy* in her Behalf, have exceeded their Commiſſion, and uſurped Powers they have no Right to. How his Lordſhip, who is always charging Contradictions upon others, could ſo flatly contradict himſelf, ſo often as he does, in the Compaſs of a few Pages, as to deny that the Authority of the *Apoſtles* was derived down to

their

their Succeſſors, and yet to affirm, that he has denied to their Succeſſors no Authority, but ſuch as the Apoſtles had not themſelves, I cannot comprehend; unleſs it be, that, in the firſt, he ſpake his own Senſe, and intermixed the other, for Convenience.

As for myſelf, as I brought not the Paſſages of Scripture now in Debate, to aſſert to the Governors of the Church an *arbitrary* Authority, or the Duty of a *blind* Submiſſion to them; ſo all his Lordſhip has ſaid upon them proves nothing againſt me, but that he has miſtaken the Queſtion; unleſs he can ſhew they carry in them no Authority at all, or that no Degree of Obedience to Church-Governors can be proved from them. This, indeed, his Lordſhip has endeavoured, as I have already obſerved, but in ſuch a Manner as to deſtroy all Uſe of Words, and make it impoſſible any Thing ſhould ever be proved from them. For, 1. He tells us, that Words, implying Authority or Submiſſion, do not certainly and neceſſarily do ſo, becauſe, in their firſt and original Senſe, they have not that Signification. Thus, for Example, if we ſay πρεσβύτερος is a Name of Dignity and Authority: No, ſays his Lordſhip, it originally ſignifies an *elder* Perſon; therefore, when it denotes an Office, it does not imply Authority; a pretty Concluſion! From whence his Lordſhip may infer, that the *Elders*, that is, the *Ancients* or old Men, in the *Old Teſtament*, and *Senators* among the *Romans*, were Names of Age only. But, how ridiculous this is, his Lordſhip may ſee in Mr. *Selden de Syn.* who has exhauſted this Subject. So ἐπίσκο-

πος

ἐπίσκοπος primarily ſignifies Duty only, that of inſpecting or overſeeing; therefore, it is not a Name of Dignity and Power, when uſed to denote the chief Eccleſiaſtical Governors in the *Chriſtian* Church. And, by the ſame good Argument, it is not a Name of Dignity, when St. *Peter* uſes the Abſtract ἐπισκοπή, to expreſs the *Apoſtleſhip* from which *Judas* fell; or when he calls our Saviour the *Biſhop* of our Souls; it is not a Name of Authority, in that memorable Speech of *Conſtantine* the Great to the *Nicene* Fathers, when he gives himſelf the Title of being ἐπίσκοπος τῶν ἔξω. So again ποιμὴν, his Lordſhip tells us, denotes the Duty of the Perſon who has that Title, more than the Dignity; to *feed*, and not *lord it over* the Flock. Very well; therefore it does not imply Authority and Power, when given to our *Saviour* by St. *Peter* and St. *Paul*, after his own Example, who declares himſelf to be the *true Shepherd*; or when it is given to God, as it often is in *Scripture*. Who knows not thoſe Places in the *Pſalms*, *The Lord is my Shepherd*; and, *Hear, O thou Shepherd of* Iſrael, *thou that leadeſt* Joſeph *like a Sheep*; to ſay nothing of the Uſe of this Word, in profane Authors, where it is a Title of the higheſt Dignity; and from thence often given by *Homer* to *Agamemnon*. But does it not properly ſignify a Keeper of Sheep? Yes; but ſuch an one as *governs* them alſo. And, if we muſt adhere to the firſt and literal Senſe of the Word, his Lordſhip ſhould infer from it, that the People are really Sheep, and that it is the Duty of their Shepherds to lead them to Paſture and to Water, and the like

like neceſſary Conſequences. His Lordſhip might juſt as well ſay this, as pretend this Word does not mean Authority and Government, when uſed of Men, in which Senſe only, it is applicable to them.

But here this great Aſſertor of the People's Liberty, thoſe poor Sheep who by their Paſtors are ſo hardly uſed, thinks it neceſſary to put in his Caution, and warn the *Clergy*, that they are not, in Virtue of this Name of *Shepherds*, empowered *to fleece the People*, or *carry them to Market*, or *drive them down a Precipice*. And this important Admonition he inculcates with great Care, not only here, but in his other Books. Good God! what Villains, what Monſters muſt he take the *Clergy* to be, to think ſuch Cautions neceſſary? If they really want to be thus admoniſhed, the People cannot ſufficiently abhor them; they ought to be looked on as *Cyclopſes* and *Cannibals*; and what Thanks are due to this *Guardian-Angel*, that takes ſuch wonderful Care of theſe diſtreſſed Sheep, in their extreme Danger!

But how does this good tender-hearted Biſhop think our *Saviour* came to omit theſe wholſome Inſtructions, when he ſo often charged St. *Peter* to *feed his Sheep?* Shall we impute an Omiſſion of important and neceſſary Advice to infinite Wiſdom? Or ſhall we not rather think it Blaſphemy, to put ſuch Advice into our *Saviour*'s Mouth, to think him capable of giving ſuch Inſtructions to St. *Peter*, as cannot be reaſonable and proper, without ſuppoſing the Perſon, they are given to, a Monſter;

Monſter; a Monſter of Stupidity and Cruelty, equally fooliſh and inhuman?

How much more pertinent had it been for his Lordſhip to have obſerved, on this Occaſion, that it was the Duty of theſe Shepherds, in Virtue of their Title, to defend their Flocks from thoſe *Wolves*, which, it was foretold, *ſhould creep in amongſt them in Sheep's Cloathing, and bring in damnable Hereſies?* This had been a very proper Intimation, in this licentious Age, agreeable to the Inſtructions given us both by our *Saviour* and his *Apoſtles*. Very remarkable are thoſe Words of St. *Paul* to the Paſtors of the *Aſiatick* Churches aſſembled at *Epheſus*, Acts xx. *Take heed to the Flock over which the Holy Ghoſt hath made you Overſeers* (ἐπισκόπους) *to* feed *the Church of God: For I know that grievous Wolves ſhall enter in among you, not ſparing the Flock. Alſo of your ownſelves ſhall Men ariſe ſpeaking perverſe Things to draw away Diſciples after them.* But, had St. *Paul* warned them not to *fleece* their Flock, or *carry them to Market*, or *drive them down a Precipice*, what a ſtrange Opinion muſt they have had of him, to find him capable of entertaining ſo abſurd a Thought of them? Theſe are Beauties of Speech, and a Species of *Monitions* peculiar to his Lordſhip. But it is Time to leave this Word; I will only add, that ποιμαίνειν, when uſed of Men, is much better rendered *governing* than *feeding*; and accordingly, in the Place of the *Acts* now cited, it is in the *Vulgate* not *paſcere*, but *regere*; and, that any Kind of Government will come under this Word, his Lordſhip may know, from its being ſaid of our

Snviour, that he ſhall *rule* (ποιμανεῖ) *my People Iſrael*, Mat. ii. 6. and *govern the Nations* (ποιμανεῖ) *with a Rod of Iron*, Apoc. ii. 27.

This is his Lordſhip's firſt Way of eluding all Arguments, that may be drawn from the Names and Titles given, in Scripture, to the Miniſters of the Goſpel, and Governors of the Church: A happy Way by which a Man may confound all Language, but will never well explain any; which is not to be done by adhering to the firſt or original Senſe of Words, but by attending to the Force Uſe has given them, and to the Acceptation of them in good Writers: By his Lordſhip's Method, if he had pleaſed, he might have proved juſt as well, that ἀπόστολος and ἄγγελος, *Apoſtle* and *Angel*, are not Names of Dignity, ſince both, in their firſt Senſe, are *Meſſengers* only, or Perſons ſent. And, beſides, Angels are expreſly ſaid to be *Miniſters*, and *miniſtring* Spirits. He that would ſee the Abſurdity of this Way of arguing, from the literal Senſe of the Names of Officers and Magiſtrates, more amply confuted and expoſed, may conſult the learned *Petavius*, in his *Eccleſ. Hier. l. 3. c. 8.*

A ſecond Way, his Lordſhip uſes to evade all Arguments from the Words uſed in the New Teſtament, is, not to deny that the Word has ſuch or ſuch a Senſe, but that it does not *neceſſarily* carry that Senſe in it; becauſe it is, by Alluſion, applied ſometimes to Perſons, to whom, in the ſtrict Senſe, it is not applicable. Thus ὑποτάσσεσθαι, which is as ſtrong a Word as can be uſed to ſignify Submiſſion, does not neceſſarily ſignify ſo, when

when St. *Peter* commands Subjection to the *Presbyters*, 1 *Ep.* v. 5. becauſe, in the next Words, he bids them be *ſubject to one another*; which is juſt as if he had argued, that nothing can be inferred, from the ſame Apoſtle's requiring us to *honour* the King, becauſe, in the ſame Verſe, he exhorts us to *honour* all Men, 1. *Ep.* ii. 17. I might tell his Lordſhip, that as good Commentators will inform him that, by this Precept *to honour all Men*, is meant all to whom Honour is due; ſo will they that, in this Place, where *Chriſtians* are exhorted to *be ſubject one to another*, is meant, that all Inferiors ſhould ſubmit to all Superiors, in ſuch Degree as is due to them; as when, in the like Manner of Expreſſion, *Chriſtians* are directed by St. *James*, V. 16. to *confeſs their Faults one to another*, the Context ſhews it is meant, that the *Sick* ſhould confeſs to the *Whole*, not the *Whole* to the *Sick*. But I inſiſt not on this, but allow ἀλλήλοις to be meant reciprocally. But ſure it is abſurd to argue againſt the ordinary and proper Uſe of a Word, becauſe it is, in the ſame Sentence, uſed in a leſs proper Senſe, and by Way of Alluſion only to the proper one immediately preceding; and that when the Circumſtances of the Place make it impoſſible to miſtake its Meaning.

A third Way, his Lordſhip takes to defeat the Uſe I make of ſome Scripture-expreſſions, is to except againſt them as not certainly relating to *Eccleſiaſtical* Perſons, but others: As for Example, with Reſpect to the laſt Place mentioned from St. *Peter* to prove the Duty of Submiſſion to the *Presbyters*; ſome Doubt, he obſerves, may be

made, whether πρεσβύτεροι there mean Church-Elders, or old and aged Perſons: IT DOES NOT UNDOUBTEDLY APPEAR, ſays his Lordſhip, *that Eccleſiaſtical Perſons are here meant*, and IT IS NOT WHOLLY UNREASONABLE *to underſtand it of old Perſons*; for which he gives two ſtrong Reaſons. He acknowledges, "That the ſame "Word being uſed here, V. 5. as is uſed V. 1. "it is not unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that they are "the ſame Perſons of whom the *Apoſtle* ſpake "before; but, 1. it is a very common Thing for "the Sacred Writers to paſs abruptly from one "Subject to another, and from one peculiar Sig-"nification of a Word, to a more common and "general one." (I wiſh his Lordſhip had given us ſome Inſtances he thinks parallel to this.) And, 2. he obſerves, that "St. *Peter*, having called "the *Paſtors Elders*, in the firſt Verſe, does not "continue to ſpeak to them under that Idea, but "under that of *Feeders of a Flock*, throughout "the three Verſes following: So that, the firſt "Word πρεσβύτεροι being almoſt *ſwallowed up* "in the other Figure, he might [in the very "next Words] the more eaſily uſe it in the "common Acceptation." This Obſervation would have been equally pertinent, if theſe *Preſbyters* had been called *Biſhops*, or by any other Title, except that of Paſtors or Shepherds, and might as juſtly be applied to St. *Paul*'s Speech to the *Presbyters* at *Epheſus*, Acts xx. whom he charges to take Heed to his *Flock*, and *feed* the Church. But I dare ſay his Lordſhip is the firſt Man that ever thought there was any Repugnancy in theſe Ideas,

Ideas, or that one was ſwallowed up in the other; and cannot but wiſh his Lordſhip would try his Skill, and ſee, if he can give his *Presbyters* a Charge which ſhall carry the Idea of old Age all through it, and, at the ſame Time, ſpeak pertinently. The Truth is, when *Presbyter* is a Name of Office, the Idea of Age is not at all attended to, as every body's Experience will tell him, in the Uſe of the ſame Word among ourſelves, or in that of the Word *Alderman*, which, in its Origin, is of the ſame Import; and it is ridiculous to argue, that, in a Charge of three or four Lines given to either, their Names would be ſwallowed up, if the Idea of *old Age*, which is perfectly obſolete and worn out, were not alluded to, in every Expreſſion; which if it were, the Speech itſelf would thereby become ridiculous. But what ſhews, how ill theſe Obſervations are applied to this Place, is, that the fifth Verſe begins with the Word ὁμοίως, *likewiſe ye* YOUNGER *ſubmit yourſelves* πρεσβυτέροις, which plainly ſhews that what he here enjoins to the *Younger*, is relative to what he had before enjoined the *Elders*. His Lordſhip makes a further Objection, from the Word νεώτερος; to which a great deal might be ſaid, to ſhew how much he is miſtaken; but that would carry me too far, and, ſince the Thing I was to prove is already made ſo plain, there is no Occaſion for it.

But, perhaps, his Lordſhip is more in the Right, when he obſerves, that the other Place I referred to, 1 *Cor.* xvi. 16. to ſhew that Obedience was due to the Miniſters of the Goſpel, is not

ſpoken of ſuch. St. *Paul*'s Words are theſe: *That ye ſubmit yourſelves unto ſuch, and to every one that helpeth with us and laboureth.* Who the *ſuch* are, we are told in the preceding Verſe, the Houſe of *Stephanas, who were the Firſt-fruits of* Achaia, *and had addicted themſelves to the* Miniſtry *of the Saints.* "Which Words, it is evident to his "Lordſhip, do not mean their being *Miniſters* "*of the Word*, but their *Miniſtring to the Saints* "*in a temporal Senſe*, and furniſhing Neceſſaries to "ſuch as wanted; that the *Dean* knows, that this "is not an Expreſſion ever uſed to ſignify the "*Miniſters* of the *Goſpel*, and that the Context "leads us not to any ſuch Uſe of it, in this "Place." Thus his Lordſhip, in which one Thing is very truly ſaid, that this Expreſſion *is never uſed* (except in this Place) to ſignify Miniſters of the Goſpel; but the Reaſon is, becauſe the very ſame Expreſſion is not uſed elſewhere at all. For the reſt, I beg Leave to diſſent from his Lordſhip for theſe Reaſons: 1. This Expreſſion, in the Verſe I referred to, *every one that helpeth with us and laboureth*, πάντι τῷ συνεργοῦντι καὶ κοπιῶντι, does, in St. *Paul*'s Style, ſignify ſuch as labour in the *Miniſtry of the Word*; and, if it does ſo here, then my Reference is pertinent; and it is reaſonable to conclude the ſame is meant by *Miniſtry*, in the Verſe foregoing. 2. Διακονία, or *Miniſtry*, when put in the abſolute Manner it is here, without an Article, does, in St. *Paul*, always mean the *Miniſtry of the Word.* Thus 2 *Cor.* vi. 3. *Giving no Offence in any Thing, that the* Miniſtry *be not blamed.* 1 Tim. i 12. *Putting me into the* Miniſtry.

ſtry. 2 Tim. iv. 11. *He is profitable to me for the* Miniſtry. And *Eph.* iv. 12. a Place that ſhould always be remembered by thoſe who diſpute about Church-Government, εἰς ἔργον διακονίας. *He gave ſome Apoſtles, and ſome Prophets, and ſome Evangeliſts, and ſome Paſtors and Teachers* —— *for the Work of the* Miniſtry: Nor, 3. does this Addition of τῶν ἁγίων deſtroy the Senſe of the Word, for certainly they do, at leaſt, as truly *miniſter to the Saints*, who do it in *Spirituals*, as they who do it in *Temporals*. The very ſame Expreſſion occurs no where elſe, but one very like it does, 2 *Cor.* xi. 8. *I robbed other Churches, taking Wages of them*, to do you Service, πρὸς τὴν ὑμῶν διακονίαν, (which is rendered in the *Vulgate*, *ad miniſterium veſtrum*, as the Expreſſion here is by *miniſterium ſanctorum*) that is, that he might be able to preach the Goſpel to them freely, as he explains himſelf in the preceding Words, —— ὑμῖν τὸ κηρύγμα τοῦ θεοῦ παρ' ἄλλων ἐσχεφόμην, are the Words of *Theophylact* upon the Place; in which it is remarkable, he uſes the very Form of Conſtruction which his Lordſhip thinks to make ſo much for his Senſe, παρ' ἄλλων, φησὶν, ἔλαβον, τοῦτο ὑμῖν διακονέμενος. This, I hope, will by the Learned be thought a ſufficient Proof, that the Expreſſion in Diſpute will bear the Senſe I have given it. But, 4. if Miniſters of the Goſpel be not here meant, but ſuch as miniſtered only in *Temporals*, then there is no Submiſſion to the Governors of the Church recommended, in this Epiſtle, which would be a ſtrange Omiſſion in St. *Paul*, when he does it, with Reſpect to Perſons ſo much inferior to them;

which Argument, I hope, his Lordſhip will like the better, becauſe it is borrowed from him. 5. It is plain *Stephanas* is the Perſon whom St. *Paul*, in this Epiſtle, treats with moſt Reſpect, by naming him firſt, and in a very diſtinguiſhing Manner; and that he was the ἀπαρχὴ, the Firſt-fruits of *Achaia*: Now, it is known, from a famous Paſſage of *Clement*'s Epiſtle, that the Apoſtles did ordain the ἀπαρχὰς, in all Places, εἰς ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν. 6. If the Expreſſion means *Miniſtring in temporal Things*, the Perſons, appointed even for this Service, were Eccleſiaſtical Perſons; and, if it would not be too great a Digreſſion, I could ſhew his Lordſhip there is ſome Reaſon to think, that the firſt *Presbyters* were the Perſons ordained in this Office. (See *Acts* vi. compared with xi. 30.) Who were not thereby excluded from miniſtring alſo in the *Word*, as appears by the Inſtances of St. *Stephen* and *Philip*. 7. If Miniſtring in Temporals be only meant, and that, by Perſons who were of no Order in the Church, it would ſtrengthen rather than hurt my Argument; for, if Submiſſion be due to theſe, *a fortiori* is it to the *Presbyters*, or thoſe who are appointed to *preſide*. But, 8. that his Lordſhip may ſee I am not ſingular in my Opinion, I will finiſh this Point with giving him the Senſe of a learned Commentator on the Place, a *Socinian*, indeed, but whom his Lordſhip will not like the worſe, for that; for the *Socinians* have ſtudied the Scriptures with great Application, and his Lordſhip knows *Hereticks* ſpeak their Thoughts freely and without Reſtraint; thus then *Slichtingius*

on

on the Place: *Et in ministerium sanctis ordinârunt seipsos. Hæc altera, eaque etiam major ipsorum laus est, præsertim si ministerium sermonis intelligatur, ut sequentia docent*, v. 16. Where, upon these Words, *Et omni cooperanti & laboranti*, he adds, *nempe in sermone & doctrinâ*, &c. Nothing can be more full for my Sense of this Place, than this Explication; but, had I been mistaken in it, it is of no Importance; as long as the former Passage in St. *Peter* stands good, my Argument will do so too, that ὑποτάσσεσθαι is used of the Submission due to Church-Governors: Which was the Thing to be proved.

A third Instance, his Lordship thinks he has found of my applying to Ecclesiastical Superiors Expressions that do not relate to them, is my referring to *Phil.* ii. 29. as a Proof, that they ought to *be had in Honour*. Here his Lordship is *filled with Astonishment*; and, were he not very meek, would be so *with Indignation* too: "for that *Epaphroditus* was not then among the *Philippians*, either "as a Ruler, or in any other Capacity, but was "now coming to them from St. *Paul*, who tells "them, how to receive so *good a Man*, on Account of his personal good Qualities; and that "such as him they should have in Honour." In all which, how much his Lordship is mistaken, a few Words will shew. For, 1. Though *Epaphroditus* was now coming to the *Philippians* from St. *Paul*, he came first to St. *Paul* from them, as is plain enough from the Context, and is still more so from iv. 18. so that hinders not but that he might be in any Office in that Church, though not then present with them. 2. If the Context be

be compared with what is ſaid of *Epaphras* (the ſame Perſon, as *Grotius* well obſerves) *Col.* i. 7, 8. it will appear he was a Preacher of the Goſpel. 3. That he was the chief Governor or Biſhop of the Church at *Philippi*, and that that is meant by his being called here their *Apoſtle*, ὑμῶν δὲ ἀπόστολον, is not only the Opinion of *Theodoret* and *Jerom*, no mean Authorities, and of others of the Ancients; but *Blondel* alſo and *Salmaſius* are in the ſame Sentiment, for whom, I dobut not, his Lordſhip has all due Reſpect: As the Reader may ſee more at large, in Mr. *Burſcough*'s *Treatiſe of Church-Government*, c. 6. a Book which well deſerves to be better known. Nor, 4. am I ſingular in my Opinion, that St. *Paul directs* them to *have him in Honour*, not merely as a good Man, but as acting ſuitably to his Character, as a faithful Miniſter of *Chriſt*, and one who ſpared no Pains, avoided no Dangers, to do his Duty; which, whatever Inſtance it were in, is here called *the Work of Chriſt*; and, if ſo, then, by Parity of Reaſon, Honour from hence will appear to be due to other Eccleſiaſtical Governors, if they diſcharge the Duty of their weighty Office, as they ſhould; and that, with his Lordſhip's Leave, we will in Charity, and, indeed, in Juſtice, ſuppoſe them to do, till the contrary appears. 5. We muſt obſerve, that the Apoſtle here requires not only *Epaphroditus* to be had in Honour, but *ſuch as he was*. Does his Lordſhip now think, that the *Apoſtle* included none within theſe Words, but ſuch as were exactly and in all Things like *Epaphroditus*? If he does, then, indeed, Eccleſiaſtical Go-

Governors muſt claim no Regard, from this Text, except in Time of Perſecution, and great Danger; but if that *ſuch* is not to be ſo reſtrained (and it is abſurd to ſay it ſhould, then Regard and Reſpect may, from hence, be claimed to other worthy and and good Paſtors. But, 6. Suppoſe his Lordſhip in the Right, how very little does he gain by proving, that, of two Places referred to for ſomething I expreſly ſaid, *I thought ſcarce worth obſerving*, one of them was not ſufficiently attended to by me? *Egregiam vero laudem* —— But to proceed,

A fourth Way of eluding all Texts, that may be urged in Proof of Eccleſiaſtical Authority, is to plead that they relate immediately to the *Apoſtles*, and particularly to St. *Paul*, *who had a Right to* order *ſome Things*, *and to give* Precepts *to* Chriſtians; which Right was founded on his Apoſtleſhip, and the immediate Commands he received from Chriſt; and ſo, for the Power of *Diſcipline* claimed and exerciſed by St. *Paul*, it is what he received *immediately*, as an *Apoſtle*; and, therefore, in his Lordſhip's Opinion, no Argument can be drawn, from hence, to prove that the Governors of the Church, in after Times, have a Right to *order* or to give Precepts, or *exerciſe Diſcipline*. And, becauſe many Expreſſions will ſtill remain untouched,

A fifth Refuge, his Lordſhip has, is to alledge, that, if they do not relate to the *Apoſtles*, yet they do to Perſons *immediately commiſſioned* by them, ſuch as *Timothy* and *Titus*, *Perſons well known to St.* Paul, *and thoroughly inſtructed by him*; and even them

them his Lordſhip ſtrips of all Authority, for Fear what they did ſhould be drawn into Example; he aſſures us that the Directions, *Timothy* was to give, were, all, the Directions of St. *Paul* himſelf; who tells him expreſly, what he ſhall teach and declare. He truſted him with the *Depoſitum*, and *Timothy* could of Right go no farther; nor was he left to give in Charge, or to teach any Thing he ſhould pleaſe, but that only which he had received. So likewiſe for *Titus*, he was left in *Crete*, not to perform his own Will, but what St. *Paul* judged proper, and expreſly directed him to do. Thus, in his Lordſhip's Judgment, *Timothy* and *Titus* were ſent by St. *Paul*, to carry Meſſages from him to the Churches of *Epheſus* and *Crete*, rather than to preſide over and govern them.

But how contrary is this, both to the Truth of the Fact, and to the Senſe of all Writers, ancient and modern, before his Lordſhip? This is juſt as if one ſhould argue, that a *General*, or *Governor* of a Province, or any other Perſon intruſted by his Prince with a Command, has no Authority to direct any Thing, to correct Diſorders, or puniſh Offenders, becauſe they all have their ſeveral Inſtructions by which they are to govern themſelves; whereas theſe Inſtructions, inſtead of proving thoſe they are given to, to have no Authority, are, indeed, the very Proof they have; nay, if this Argument were good, it would prove that even Kings themſelves have no Authority, when they are obliged to govern according to Law, ſince the Laws are Directions to them, how to act in the Exerciſe of

the

the Power committed to them; nay, our Saviour himſelf, at this Rate, had no Authority; for he did not his own Will, nor ſpake of himſelf, but as he was commanded by the Father: *Verily, verily, I ſay unto you, the Son can do nothing of himſelf. I can of my own ſelf do nothing: I muſt do the Work of him that ſent me. I have not ſpoken of myſelf; but the Father which ſent me, he gave me Commandment what I ſhould ſay, and what I ſhould ſpeak.* Theſe and other the like Declarations, St. *John* tells us, our Saviour made to the *Jews*, not to prove that he had no Authority, but that he had all Authority.

As to the Fact, it is moſt evident from the Epiſtles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, that St. *Paul* gave them both Authority to govern the reſpective Churches they were ſet over, to ordain Elders, correct Diſorders, to cenſure and depoſe even Preſbyters themſelves, who made *Schiſms*, or taught any Thing contrary to ſound Doctrine: In a Word, to exerciſe all *Epiſcopal* Authority; as the Learned have well proved, and particularly Mr. *Burſcough*, in the *Treatiſe* before-mentioned. And the ſame learned Writers muſt convince every impartial Man, who is a competent Judge in theſe Matters, that the Arguments taken from the Authority given to theſe by St. *Paul*, or even from that which was exerciſed by St. *Paul* himſelf, are not to be eluded by that ſtale Pretence of the Enemies of *Epiſcopacy*, and Church-Power; that they were extraordinary Perſons, and that, therefore, their Power died with them. All Pretences of this Kind are effectually defeated, by diſtinguiſh-

ing

ing between the *ordinary* and *extraordinary* Work of the *Apoſtles*, or of thoſe ſent by them. For, though the *extraordinary* was either perſonal, or continued in the Church but a little Time, yet the *ordinary* was not ſo; that was neceſſary to be continued to the Church, as long as the Church ſhould laſt: And ſuch all Men, hitherto, have eſteemed the Preaching of the Word, the Adminiſtring the Sacraments, and the Exerciſing of Diſcipline to be: And, therefore, in all ſuch Matters, the Precepts and Examples of the Apoſtles, and of thoſe commiſſioned by them, have been juſtly inſiſted on and followed by Eccleſiaſtical Governors, in all ſucceeding Times. This was the Senſe of the Church in the primitive Times, and has continued to be ſo ever ſince, and, no doubt, will be, in Defiance of all his Lordſhip's Efforts to the contrary; who will not allow St. *Paul*'s Example a ſufficient Warrant to ſubſequent Paſtors to rectify any great Indecency or Diſorder in the Church; nor his Injunctions to *Timothy* and *Titus*, to reprove Sinners, a juſt Ground for other chief Miniſters, in the ordinary State of the Church, to do the ſame; becauſe, it ſeems, they were intirely and perfectly inſtructed and directed by St. *Paul*, and himſelf was an Apoſtle. But, if the Governors of the Church have no Right, from hence, to theſe Acts of *Duty* rather than *Authority*, much leſs can his Lordſhip bear the Thoughts of their pretending any Right from St. *Paul*, or thoſe commiſſioned by him, to any Acts of a higher Nature, and that carry in them a real Power, ſuch as will prove them to be properly Governors, and that

Submiſſion

Submiſſion and Obedience is due to them, while acting in Chriſt's Name, and agreeably to his Commiſſion; which is all that the Aſſertors of Church-Power do contend for: A Thing his Lordſhip wants often to be put in Mind of, who, inſtead of the ſober aud juſt Concluſions the Governors of the *Chriſtian* Church have drawn, from Scripture, for the Ground of a reaſonable and neceſſary Power, is always miſrepreſenting them, as making the moſt abſurd Inferences imaginable, to ſupport an Authority, they have never once claimed. And, becauſe ſuch exorbitant Claims cannot be juſtified, from Scripture, therefore, what his Lordſhip contends for muſt be right; as if there were no *Medium* between Extremes.

But his Lordſhip thinks he has ſucceeded to Admiration, and effectually ſtripped Church-Governors of all Authority; for they are neither Apoſtles, nor immediately ſent by them; and no other Perſons are, or, indeed, could be mentioned, as uſing any Authority, or receiving any. And, if we ſhould argue, that *Timothy* is directed by St. *Paul* to commit the Things he had heard of him, to *faithful Men, who ſhould be able to teach others alſo*, the Anſwer is ready: Theſe Men were ſuch as *Timothy knew well*, and he was to commit nothing to them, but what he had heard from him. Thus every Thing is perſonal, and nothing can be concluded for any Authority in the Miniſters of the Word, in After-times: And, by the ſame powerful Argument, his Lordſhip might deprive the Miniſters of the Goſpel, not only of all Right of Maintenance for their ſpiritual Labours,

upon

upon Pretence that whatever can be ſaid for it, from Scripture, is ſaid, with Reſpect to the Miniſters, who did then preach and labour in the Word; he might, with as good Reaſon, argue for ſinking the whole Order of Eccleſiaſtical Perſons; for what Authority has any Perſon now to preach the Word, or adminiſter the Sacraments, or by any other Act to miniſter in holy Things, from any Thing in Scripture? The Commiſſion given by Chriſt to preach and baptize, I have already obſerved, was given to thoſe only who were preſent, his Apoſtles; and, therefore, when his Lordſhip pleaſes, he may tell us, it was only *perſonal*, and that no other Perſons have any Share in it. There is no Maintaining either the Rights or Duties of a ſtanding *Miniſtry*, but by Inferences drawn from the Commiſſions our *Saviour* gave to the *Apoſtles*, together with their Examples, and the Inſtructions they gave to others. And, by the like Inferences, we may aſſert their ordinary Authority alſo to their Succeſſors, without which, the Duties, they are charged with, can never be effectually performed. But, if nothing might be concluded, from Scripture, but what is expreſly, in the Form and binding Words of a Law, contained in it, and in direct Terms declared to be perpetual, there would be an End not only of Church-Power, but of all Obligation to Obedience, from thence, even to our Civil Governors, and, indeed, to every other Duty. And I would not deſpair, on this Foot, to prove, that Scripture is the moſt improper Thing in the World to be made a Rule of, for that, according to his Lordſhip's

ſhip's Method of interpreting and applying, nothing can ever be ruled by it; which is the beſt Argument againſt appealing to *Scripture, as a perfect Rule*, that can be put into the Hands of our ſworn Enemies the *Papiſts*, whoſe Cauſe his Lordſhip never promotes more, than when he appears moſt warm againſt it; as it were eaſy to ſhew, would it not carry me too far from my preſent Subject.

But his Lordſhip is not content to deny, that Church-Governors have a Right to any Power or Authority, in Virtue of any Thing I have alledged from Scripture; he will not allow ſo much as their Right to any Eſteem or Reſpect from their Flocks, if claimed from thence; and yet confeſſes the Text, 1 *Theſſ.* v. 12, 13. where St. *Paul* beſeeches them, *to* KNOW *them who labour among them, and are over them in the Lord, and admoniſh them, and to* ESTEEM THEM VERY HIGHLY IN LOVE, does relate "to the Teachers or Inſtructors of the *Theſſalonians*, whom St. *Paul* beſeeches them to *conſider* and take Notice of." But, ſure, theſe Perſons are more than *unauthoritative Teachers*. The Text calls them τὺς προϊσταμένους, thoſe that preſide over them; and I believe any good Commentator, ancient or modern, would have told his Lordſhip theſe were the *principes cœtûs*; and that εἰδέναι is more than to *conſider* them, it is to reſpect, διὰ τιμῆς ἔχειν. (See *Grotius* and *Theophylact.*) Well, but whatever Reſpect is here required to be paid, his Lordſhip deſires it may be obſerved, that it is *for their Works Sake*, not *for the Sake of what they profeſs to do by their Office*; *but for the Sake of their*

actual Doing their Office in the Lord. No Reſpect therefore is due to them, on Account of their *Function*; you muſt firſt be ſure of their actual Doing of their Office, and that they *labour* as much as you think they ſhould, before you ſhew to a Governor of the Church any Reſpect; and, if you think he does not thus labour, then this *Text*, inſtead of being a Ground for ſuch an one to claim Reſpect from you, is a good Warrant for you to ſhew him all the Diſreſpect you can. Theſe are the neceſſary Inferences from his Lordſhip's Explication of this *Text*, in which he plays the ſame able *Critick*, as when he proves, from the Thirteenth of the *Romans*, the Right and Duty of *Reſiſtance*. For, there alſo, the Ground of the Obedience, required by St. *Paul* to our Civil Governors, is, that they are appointed by God to be his *Miniſters to thee for Good*; *attending continually upon this very Thing*. When, therefore, you think them not to anſwer this Character, if they do not *actually and continually ſo attend*, and do not, in your Opinion, duly execute the Will of God, you are abſolved from your Obedience and Subjection: By which Comment the whole Deſign of the *Text* is utterly defeated; and that, which was ſaid by St. *Paul* to remove from *Chriſtianity* the greateſt Calumny, and, were it once credited, the moſt hurtful that could be caſt upon it, that it encourages Faction, Sedition, and Rebellion, is, by this Explication, made to juſtify the Scandal it was intended to remove, and to abet and countenance the Crimes it moſt expreſly forbids. Such a happy Interpreter of Scripture is his Lordſhip, who

who can encourage Sedition in the State, and Faction and Schism in the Church, from those very Texts that were designed to preserve the Peace and Unity of both As to those Words, *for their Works Sake*, in the *Text* before us, *Grotius* would have informed his Lordship, that *Work* here is the *Function*, ἔργον *hic intelligit*, διακονίαν, *quâ funguntur*, *quæ certè veneranda est*. Respect is due to our Spiritual as well as Civil Governors, on Account of their Office, and they are ordinarily to be supposed to discharge their Duty, as I observed before, till the contrary very manifestly appears. That is in common Justice, as well as for Order's Sake, due to them; and consequently this *Text* will be a just Ground for requiring Respect and Honour to be paid to them. This has always been the Sense of wise and good Men, who were not so *stupid* as not to see this Objection, and yet thought this and the like *Texts* sufficient Authorities to prove what I have brought them for. Thus *Chrysostom* on *John* xx. brings this very *Text*, and that of *Hebr.* xiii. [*obey them that have the Rule over you*] notwithstanding it follows, *for they watch for your Souls*, as good Proofs of the great Reverence due to the Ministers of *Christ*. Μεγάλη γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων ἀξία. But does he, therefore, take on him the Patronage of ill Ministers, of such as are unworthy of the Priesthood? No; far be that from him! Ταῦτα λέγω, says he, οὐκ ἀποδυρόμενος τὴν ἀναξίως τ ἱερωσύνην διοικοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα ἐλεῶν καὶ δακρύων. But even such, he thinks, ought not to be *judged* by the Populace, by the meanest of the

People, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πάνυ ἀφελεστέρων, who are commonly the most forward to censure and judge their Pastors. And, upon the other *Text* in the *Hebrews*, he puts the Question directly, Τὶ οὖν, παντὶ ἄρχοντι πείθεσθαι δεῖ, κἂν κακὸς ᾖ; To which he answers, *Yes, if he do not teach false Doctrine; for they sit not in the Seat of* Moses, *but of* Christ *himself; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do, but do not ye after their Works.* Thus this great Man, agreeably to the Sense of all wise and good Men before and since, as far as appears, till his Lordship arose, who seems to think too little Respect cannot be shewn to the Priesthood; else he would not have thought this Age had wanted any Cautions of this Sort. I cannot but say, that, as little as I like this new Interpretation, there is nobody living I had rather have it come from than his Lordship, who, when he thinks fit to make Trial of the Labour and Work of the *Episcopacy*, will, I doubt not, by Experience be convinced, that there is no Danger of a *Bishop*'s having more Esteem and Regard shewn him, than is necessary to give Success to his good Endeavours, and carry him through the Weight of the Pastoral Care, to the Edification of the People, and the Satisfaction of his own Mind.

Having given the Reader the Substance of his Lordship's five first Sections, I should now pass to the Sixth; but cannot leave these, without taking Notice of two very judicious Reflections his Lordship has made upon the Words διδάσκαλος and ἐπιπλήττειν. I had observed, that our Teachers and Spiritual

Spiritual Governors are called, in Scripture, by Names that plainly carry in them Power and Authority; one of which is διδάσκαλος, *Teacher*, a Name applied to our Saviour, and that, by himself. As this is a very true, so I thought it a very inoffensive Observation. But his Lordship cannot bear it, and tells me I should particularly have avoided it, "because *Christ* is the *one Master* or "*Teacher*, in the highest Sense; it is a Sacrilege, "therefore, to take that Regard which is due to "him, and place it upon others. And that, if "we will argue from the same Names being gi-"ven to others, which are given to him, we ought "to do it with Caution and Fear of offending; "and to acknowledge, that it is in a *subordinate* "and much lower Sense, even supposing the "Words to carry the *Idea* of Authority along "with them." For Fear the good People of the Church of *England* should think we advance ourselves into *Christ*'s Place, and should thereby be deceived into the Believing, that our Authority is equal to his; that we have a Right to make new Articles of Faith, and a new Gospel, and what not; to all which they are *implicitly* to submit, upon Pain of Damnation. A very sad Thing, indeed, should it so happen! But to me, I confess, there appears so little Ground for any such Apprehension, that I cannot but think this Caution as unnecessary as his other important one about *Shepherds*, that they are not to *fleece* their People, or *drive* them to *Market*, or down a *Precipice*.

His Lordship was conscious, how easy it was for me, on this Occasion, to defend myself. His

Concordance would ſhew him, that this Word is a Word of Authority, from *John* iii. 10. and *Rom.* ii. 20. that it is not only a Word of familiar Uſe, in the *New Teſtament*, but alſo appropriated to denote a particular Order of Miniſtry. See *Acts* xiii. 1. 1 *Cor.* xii. 28. *Eph.* iv. 11. and in theſe, and all the other Places where it is uſed, it is without that Caution that, in his Lordſhip's Judgment, is ſo neceſſary. St. *Paul* never once warns us to take Notice, that theſe *Teachers* are but *ſubordinate to Chriſt*; nor does he apprehend he ſhall be thought guilty of any *Sacrilege*, in taking that Title, as he often does, to himſelf. But the Spirit of the good Biſhop is ſtill full of Fear, of what may be the Conſequence of applying ſuch a Word *promiſcuouſly* to Church-Governors; and, to ſupport one abſurd Reflexion, makes another, that is much more ſo; and tells us, "that we ought, above all Things, to "avoid the *Appropriating* the *Terms* made Uſe of "for *Chriſt* himſelf, and his *Apoſtles*, and their "*contemporary* Teachers known and approved by "them, *promiſcuouſly* to all Governors, Teachers, "and Paſtors (ſo called) in all Ages of the *Chri-"ſtian* Church. This he cannot perſuade himſelf "to do: He thinks it a great Crime." What his Lordſhip means by his *Parentheſis*, I know not, unleſs it be to ſignify, that, when any of the People do not like their *Paſtor*, they are at Liberty to tell him he is no Paſtor, only a *Paſtor ſo called*. And as little do I underſtand his *Appropriating promiſcuouſly*; but if his Lordſhip's Reflexion be juſt, then, as we muſt not give to the Miniſters of the Goſpel the Title of διδάσκαλος, ſo neither,

neither, for the ſame Reaſon, muſt we give them thoſe of ποιμὴν, or ἐπίσκοπος, or πρεσβύτερος, or διάκονος; that is, we muſt not call them *Biſhops*, or *Presbyters*, or *Deacons*, or *Miniſters*, or *Paſtors*, or *Teachers*; for theſe are the *Engliſh* of thoſe Terms; and what then, I pray, is it his Lordſhip's Pleaſure they ſhould be called? If no Name be left, in a little Time, there will be none of the Thing exerciſed by them. And then there is, at once, an End of all Diſputes about Church-Authority, when there are no Perſons left to lay Claim to any Part of it. Had I found it, in a nameleſs or unknown Author, I ſhould have taken this whole Reflexion to be nothing better than a grave Banter, and that the Writer deſigned nothing leſs than to ſubvert *Chriſtianity* by depriving it of a *Miniſtry*, under a ſeeming Zeal for it. But far be it from me to entertain any ſuch Suſpicions of one of his Lordſhip's Rank and Station in the Church, and whoſe peculiar and diſtinguiſhing Character is Sincerity.

The other Reflexion of his Lordſhip's, I cannot paſs by, is upon the Word ἐπιπλήξειν, to *rebuke*, which is one of the many Words I had mentioned to prove, that the Apoſtles, when they ſaw Occaſion, knew how to change their Style, and ſhew they had a Right to expreſs themſelves with great Severity. Now it happens moſt unfortunately for me, that this Word ἐπιπλήξειν is uſed, but once, by St. *Paul*, and that is in the Inſtructions he gives to *Timothy*; one of which is, not, that he *ſhould rebuke* ——— but that he *ſhould not rebuke*. Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴ ἐπιπλήξῃς, 1 *Tim.* v. 1. What Mat-

ter of ſolid Triumph does not his Lordſhip find here? 1. He obſerves, that, if *Timothy* had a Right to *rebuke ſeverely*, it cannot be proved the Spiritual Guides, of later Ages, have the Powers of *Timothy*, who was immediately inſtructed and directed by an Apoſtle. This is the old Song; ſo let it paſs. But, 2. ſays his Lordſhip, if this Direction to *Timothy* ſuppoſes all *Spiritual Guides* to be poſſeſſed of this Right, it muſt ſuppoſe them all likewiſe to be adviſed not to make Uſe of it, and to act againſt an Apoſtle's Advice, whenever they do. What can be more ſagacious? St. *Paul* adviſes *Timothy*, who was but *young* (ſee 1 *Tim.* iv. 12.) not to rebuke an *Elder*, or an aged Perſon (which *Chryſoſtom*, *Theophylact*, *Grotius*, and others think to be meant here by πρεσβυτέρῳ) but to *intreat him as a Father*; therefore *Timothy* muſt never rebuke any Perſon, in any Caſe, no, not when he ſhould come to ſuch an Age as would make it more decent for a Rebuke to come from him; no, not even *young* Offenders, who are young in every Thing, but Wickedneſs: And, therefore, no other Biſhop of the *Chriſtian* Church, in any Inſtance, or any Circumſtances, muſt ever do ſo; for, if he does, he acts againſt the Apoſtle's Advice. But does not the very Prohibition, to *rebuke*, in one Caſe, allow the Doing of it, in others? Does not the ſame Apoſtle direct *Titus*, who had to do with a very perverſe People, κακὰ θυρία, *to rebuke them ſharply*, and *with all Authority*; μετ' ἀποτομίας, μετ' αὐθεντίας, ſays *Theophylact*, upon the latter; and, upon the firſt, σφοδρῶ δεῖ καὶ πληκτικῶ λόγῳ. Now if his Lordſhip can ſet the

Bounds

Bounds between ἐπιτιμᾶσθαι and ἐλέγχειν, which are both tranſlated by the ſame Word, or can ſhew that the firſt implies a greater Degree of Severity, than the other with its Adjuncts of *ſharply, and with all Authority*; then he may have ſome Reaſon to ſay, the Apoſtle forbids the firſt, in any Caſe, but allows the other, on all proper Occaſions. But, if this be extremely trifling and ridiculous, then what is become of his Lordſhip's Obſervation? His Lordſhip ſays, *Titus* was directed to *rebuke with all Authority, in a Manner becoming one commiſſioned by an Apoſtle to do every Thing neceſſary for their Good*; as if other Spiritual Paſtors were not commiſſioned by as high an Authority; or that an immediate Miſſion from an Apoſtle were neceſſary to authoriſe a Paſtor to what he ſaw was neceſſary for the Spiritual Good of thoſe committed to his Care. The Paſtors of the Church have the Commiſſion of *Chriſt*, and what is neceſſary to to be done for the Good of the People is, in many Caſes, a Commiſſion itſelf. And, whatever Powers of this Kind the Governors of the Church had then a Right to exerciſe, their Succeſſors muſt have the ſame Right to, and particularly this of of *reproving* and *rebuking* Sinners. And no Biſhop, I believe, was ever weak enough to think he might not ἐπιτιμᾶσθαι, in other Caſes, becauſe St. *Paul* adviſes *Timothy* againſt it, in one. One Inſtance is under my Hands; the Biſhops of the Council of *Antioch*, in their *Synodical* Epiſtle, ſpeaking of *Paulus Samoſatenus*, ſay, that, if he really were not guilty of ſome Things he was charged with, yet that he ought, as a Biſhop, to have avoided

even

even the Suſpicion of them, for how elſe can he be fit to *reprove* others? Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐπιπλήξειεν ἢ νουθετήσειεν ἕτερον; *Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccl.* p. 282. Need I add, for his Lordſhip's Information, that ἐπιπλήσσειν is ἐπιτιμᾶν, nothing more, and ἐπίπληξις ἐπιτιμία, as *Suidas* and *Heſychius* will tell him. But by this Paſſage his Lordſhip may, at the ſame Time, ſee, that νουθετεῖν, which is here joined to ἐπιπλήσσειν, is not ſo little a Word as he ſeems to think it, when he ſays it is an unfortunate Inſtance for my Purpoſe, becauſe St. *Paul* exhorts the People alſo νουθετεῖν, to admoniſh one another. This Cavil is already anſwered, it not being now firſt made. I ſhall therefore only add here the Remark of *Grotius*, a Perſon of great Learning, Wiſdom, and Judgment, and who knew how to make the right Uſe of Scripture; νουθετεῖν, ſays he, *omnium quidem Chriſtianorum eſt, ſed eximio jure ad Presbyteros pertinet, ut morum magiſtros.*

But, perhaps, his Lordſhip's Remarks and Obſervations upon Scripture may be more ſolid, where the Subject Matter is of more Importance. Having ſpent near thirty Pages upon two of mine, he comes, *p.* 49. to the Subject of *Excommunication*, upon which one might reaſonably have expected ſome *Eclairciſſement*, conſidering how much his Lordſhip long ſince wiſhed for an Opportunity of giving the World his Thoughts upon all *Texts* relating to Church-Power, of which *Excommunication* is, confeſſedly, the chief. But alas! the Reader will find himſelf diſappointed, in Proportion to his Expectation; the whole Section is mere Amuſement, made up of Complaints, according

cording to Cuſtom, and the moſt pitiful Cavils that ever came from any Pen. Firſt his Lordſhip complains, I have greatly miſtaken his Meaning, when I ſay, " The Oppoſers of Church-Authority " deny any Thing to be meant by the Church's " *judging* its Members, but what every private Man " has a Right to, nay, cannot but do, take No- " tice of the Behaviour of a diſorderly Brother, and " judge him to be what he is." In theſe Words I have not, by any Expreſſion, directly pointed out his Lordſhip; but I will own, this is one of the few Places in which he is in the Right, in thinking I had him in my Thoughts; and, whether my Memory deceived me much, let the Reader judge from theſe Paſſages.

I do not doubt, ſays his Lordſhip, *p.* 39, of his Anſwer to the Com. *but the Nature and Uſefulneſs of the Thing* [not any Authority or Commiſſion derived from Chriſt] *is a ſufficient Juſtification of any Chriſtians* [not, does make it the Duty of the Governors of the Church] *who ſet a Mark upon the open Immorality and Wickedneſs* [not their Hereſy or Schiſm] *of any profeſſed* Chriſtian, *even by refuſing to them the peculiar Tokens and Marks of Chriſtian Communion*, [not by judicially declaring them to be cut off from the Body of Chriſt's Church] *as well as by avoiding their Company and Converſation.*——" But what is this to their being *Judges* " of the Behaviour of others, in the ſame Senſe " that Chriſt is? Every Chriſtian has a Right to " *judge*; nay, he cannot help *judging* of the Be- " haviour of Men by a plain Law, *acknowledged* " *and received by the Offender himſelf.* That is,

" every

" every Man will judge *him* to be a *Murderer*, who " takes away his Neighbour's Life unjuſtly, and " *him* to be an uncharitable Man, who never does " any *Acts of Charity*; and every *Chriſtian* has a " *Right* to ſhew his Senſe of theſe *open Sins*. But " this is one Thing; and Judging ſo as to pre- " tend to determine other Men's *Conſciences*, and " fix their Condition, or at all affect it in the " Eyes of God; this is another Point intirely. " The one is *authoritative*, the other is not *autho-* " *ritative*, either ſo as to be peculiarly lodged in " any one Part of *Chriſtians* over another; or " ſo as at all to affect the Salvation of the Perſon " judged." Here are plainly in theſe Words two, and but two Sorts of *Judging* ſuppoſed; the one is affirmed to be *authoritative*, the other not. Of theſe, *this* is *one*, the Right every private *Chriſtian* is declared to have; but the Right the Church has to *judge*, in his Lordſhip's Opinion, is no more than that every private *Chriſtian*, nay, every Man, *Chriſtian* or not, has: For, if it be any other, then there is a third Sort of *Judging*, between that of every private Man, and that which his Lordſhip ſo ſtrenuouſly denies. So that this ſingle Paſſage is, I think, a full Proof that I have not miſtaken his Lordſhip's Senſe. A ſecond is in the next Page, where his Lordſhip wonders at a " *learned Member*'s contending warmly, that " there are Men who have a Right to *judge* in " one Senſe, in Oppoſition to him, who has " contended againſt it only in another: — ar- " guing from what is, indeed, no more than a " Right in all *Chriſtians*, to ſee *open* Wickedneſs,

" and

" and to judge wilful Sin to be contrary to " *Chriſt*'s Laws, and the notorious Sinner un- " worthy of being acknowledged by them as a " Brother." A third Paſſage we have in Page the forty-third, " The one [Kind of Judging] re- " lates to the Authority of *Judges* OVER *Men's* " *Conſciences*; the other [that of *Excommunicati-* " *on*] relates to quite another Matter, to the " Right of all *Chriſtians* to avoid the Company " of a Perſon acknowledged to be an open noto- " rious Violator of the Laws of *Chriſt*, and of " the *Dictates* of his own *Conſcience*. The *one* re- " lates to an *Authority* aſſuming to define, in the " Caſe of particular Perſons —— the *other* relates " to what is not, indeed, *properly* Authority; but " a Right which all *Chriſtians* have to avoid an " open, wilful, ſcandalous Sinner, if they can." Judge now, Reader, if his Lordſhip has not Rea- ſon to complain, that I have greatly miſtaken his Meaning.

Many are the Remarks that might be made up- on the Account here given of *Excommunication*; but that is not my preſent Buſineſs. I ſhall only obſerve, what is moſt material in it, that his Lord- ſhip ſhelters himſelf under the Authority of St. *Paul*, " who hath, he ſays, in Effect, aſſerted the " ſame Thing more ſtrongly, when he asks, with " Diſdain and Indignation, *Who art thou, that* " *judgeſt another Man's Servant?* Rom. xiv. 4." This Text has often been abuſed, but never more than by his Lordſhip, who firſt takes the Sound for the Senſe, and then thinks himſelf very ſafe under it. St. *Paul*, in this Place, forbids *Judging*;

in

in the Place concerning the inceſtuous *Corinthian*, he blames the *not Judging*. How now is this ſeeming Contradiction to be reconciled? Why thus, and only thus, ſays his Lordſhip, "By *Judging*, in "one Place, is meant an *authoritative* Judging "over *the Conſciences and Religion of others, ſo as* "*to fix their future Condition in the Eyes of God:* "In the other Place, *Judging* is only *Seeing* a no-"torious Sinner, and to ſhew we *know* a *Mur-*"*derer* to be a *Murderer*." This is his Lordſhip's Way of reconciling theſe two Places; and ſuch an one it is, as I believe never came into the Head of any Man before. What St. *Paul* meant, in the firſt of theſe Places, is beſt learnt from the Argument of the Chapter whence it is taken; which is all ſpent in endeavouring to reconcile the *Jewiſh* and *Gentile* Converts to one another, and to remove the Animoſities occaſioned by the different Sentiments they had about *Meats* and *Days*; Points, about which neither *Chriſt*, nor the *Apoſtles*, nor any *Council* of the Church had, as yet, determined any Thing. The *Gentile*, who underſtood the Liberty he had in *Chriſt*, and that he was not obliged to the *Jewiſh* Obſervances by Faith in him, is the *ſtrong* Brother, and the *Jewiſh* the *weak* one; who had not yet Strength enough to ſhake off the Sentiments he had been bred in, of the Neceſſity of obſerving the *Law* in Order to Salvation. Theſe the Apoſtle labours to bring to a Temper; and with great Earneſtneſs exhorts them to live well together, and bear with one another; than which, in the Infancy of the Church, nothing could be more neceſſary. He exhorts the *Weak*,

not

not to *judge*, that is, not to cenſure or condemn the *Strong*, as if it were a Sin in them not to abſtain from the Meats, or not to obſerve the Days themſelves did. The *Strong*, on the other Hand, he exhorts, not to *deſpiſe*, or *ſet at naught*, and treat with Contempt the *Weak*, which they were, perhaps, apt enough to do, of themſelves, but were made a great deal more ſo, by the Provocation the Behaviour of the *Jew* gave them. It is very remarkable, that it is the *weak* Brother that is forbid to *judge*, as the other is to *deſpiſe*; as if on Purpoſe to prevent the abſurd Interpretation his Lordſhip has put upon the Word. And it is with the *weak* Brother the Apoſtle expoſtulates ſo warmly, in the fourth Verſe, and whom he aſſures, in ſuch full Terms, that thoſe whom he cenſures with ſo much Bitterneſs, as impure and unholy, that is, the Converts from among the *Gentiles*, are accepted with God, though they do not obſerve the *legal* Ordinances. *Who art thou that judgeſt another's Servant? To his own Maſter he ſtands or falls*; *but he ſhall be holden up*, or ſtand. I have taken the Liberty, in this Verſe, to put *another's* inſtead of *another Man's*; becauſe that cannot be a proper Expreſſion, when *that other* is God. The ſame Unaccuracy our *Tranſlation* has in other Places, as 1 *Cor.* ii. 11. even *ſo the Things of God knoweth* no Man, *but the Spirit of God*; where it is manifeſt, *no Man* ſhould have been rendered *no one*. But this by the by. St. *Paul* does not take any Pains to prove to the *Gentile*, that the *Jew* would be accepted, for of that there was no Queſtion; but to convince the *Jew*, that the *Gentile*

tile would, since, what he did, he did to the *Glory of God*, as well as the other. The Remainder of the Chapter is chiefly spent in pressing *Charity* towards the weak Brother. This is the Substance of this Chapter, which is conducted with great Address, and is itself the best Comment upon the several Parts of it.

As to the particular Words in which his Lordship takes Refuge, they contain no other Precept than what St. *Paul* often gives, in other Places; no other than what is our Saviour's own Command, *Matt.* vii. 1. *Judge not, that ye be not judged:* A Duty much insisted on, in the *New Testament*, to prevent those rash and uncharitable Censures, which human Nature is always but too prone to, and which, when indulged, are of extreme ill Consequence to Society, at all Times, but were more especially so, in the Infancy of the Church, when nothing, humanly speaking, but the greatest Unity and Love among themselves could support so small a Body, labouring under so many Disadvantages, and exposed to so many Dangers as they were then threatened with on every Side. The strictest Prohibitions, therefore, were necessary to restrain this evil Practice which Men so naturally run into, especially in religious Differences, in Order to preserve *Christians* in a perfect Union with their Pastors, and with one another.

Now, however hard this Duty be to put in Practice, there is no one expressed in Words easier to be understood. Nor did ever any one, in Earnest, think there was so much as an Appearanc of a Contradiction between a Prohibition to private

Christians,

Chriſtians, not to cenſure one another, and a Command to the Governors of a Church, to cenſure its Members: Since it would be as abſurd to infer, that, becauſe private Perſons may not judge, therefore, a Church by its Governors may not; as it would be to infer, from the like Prohibition, that the Civil Magiſtrate may not judge the Members of the Civil State. There was, therefore, no Occaſion for his Lordſhip's Diſtinction to help St. *Paul*, but purely to extricate himſelf. Private Perſons are not to judge their Brethren, be they in Fault, or not; but ſhould leave that to thoſe whoſe Province it is; to God himſelf, and to thoſe to whom, by his Appointment, Judgment belongs. This is plainly the Meaning of the general Prohibition, *not to judge our Brother*; nor is the Senſe of the Precept at all altered by the particular Occaſion on which it happens to be uſed. In one Place, St. *Paul* reminds *Chriſtians* of it, for one Reaſon, and upon one Occaſion; and, in another Place, another Reaſon gives Occaſion for it, but it is ſtill one and the ſame Precept. In the Place his Lordſhip refers to, the Occaſion was, as I have already obſerved, the Diſagreement and Diſcord there was between the *Jewiſh* and *Gentile* Converts, on the Account of *Meats* and *Days*, the Obſervance of which the *Jew* thought not only to be ſtill in Force, as to himſelf, but that all others alſo, who would enjoy the Benefit of the New Covenant, and be ſaved by Faith in *Chriſt*, muſt, in Order thereto, become *Jews* firſt, and obſerve the Ordinances of the Law. And, becauſe the *Gentile* Convert would not ſubmit to this,

his weak Brother was much offended at him, and looked on him as unclean. To correct this cenſorious Spirit, St. *Paul* puts the *Jew* in Mind, that it is not his Buſineſs to cenſure or *judge* another. That his Brother's Practice is, in the Sight of God, as acceptable as his own; but, if it were not, what was that to him? Who made thee a Judge, or gave thee a Right to cenſure him? Whether he be or be not in Fault (which, indeed, he is not) it is nothing to thee; he ſtands or falls to his own Maſter, that is, God, who is a righteous Judge, and before whom *we muſt all appear*. Let every Man, therefore, mind his own Conduct, and take Care that what he does himſelf be according to what he is fully and firmly perſuaded is his own Duty; but, for his Brother's Actions, let him leave them to God. This ſeems to be the Meaning of thoſe Words, *ver.* 5. ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοὶ πληροφορείσθω. For it is eaſy to ſhew, that the true Senſe of πληροφορεῖσθαι is to be fully perſuaded or aſſured of a Thing. We have an Inſtance of this Word in this Senſe, in this very Epiſtle, Chap. iv. 21. concerning *Abraham*'s firm Belief in the Promiſe God had made him of a Son: *He ſtaggered not at the Promiſe of God through Unbelief, but was ſtrong in Faith, giving Glory to God*, and being fully perſuaded, πληροφορηθεὶς, *that what he had promiſed he was able to perform*. But, if this be the Senſe of the Word here, in Chap. xiv. then what the Apoſtle ſays is a Precept to them, to take Care to be fully ſatisfied in their own Minds of the Lawfulneſs of what they do in their Religious Obſervances; and

not

not a Permiſſion for every one to do what himſelf likes beſt. Had theſe Words ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ, &c. been placed, at the End of the Chapter, or had they been repeated there, the Senſe of them could not then have eaſily been miſtaken, as it now too generally is (which ſeems to have been chiefly owing to the *Latin* Verſion, *Unuſquiſque in ſuo ſenſu abundet*) as if they gave Men a full Power to do what ſeems right in their own Eyes, eſpecially what alone would juſtify them, in the Sight of God, and no Man upon Earth had a Right to judge them for it; for who art thou that *judgeſt another Man's Servant?*

But this is a wild Conceit, and a very great and dangerous Abuſe of the Apoſtle's Words, which are ſpoken upon a Caſe, the like to which can never happen in the Church again: A Caſe in which nothing had, as yet, been determined by a proper and competent Authority, and, therefore, probably not determined, becauſe it was thought neceſſary to bear with the Infirmity of the *Jews*, for a While, for Fear of giving them ſuch Offence, as ſhould make them fall off from the Faith; a Caſe not about Matters merely indifferent, as is commonly thought, but in which one Side was, in the Judgment of the Apoſtle himſelf, in the Right, and the other in the Wrong. For the Diſpute was not about Meats and Days, conſidered ſimply and in themſelves, but as they were legal Ordinances; and as the Obſervance of them was made Matter of Duty, and was an Acknowledgment of their Obligation to obſerve the Law as ſtill in Force. In this View, Meats and Days were not

a Matter perfectly indifferent. For, if they were, if the Practice of the *Jew*, in these Points, was in itself as right and as justifiable, as that of the *Gentile*, Why does the Apostle call him the *weak* Brother? That is a Demonstration he was really in the Wrong; and, consequently, the Matter was not, taken with all its Circumstances, perfectly indifferent; however, at that Time, and in that Place, it was, for very good Reasons, in the Judgment of the Apostle, necessary that these *weak* Brethren should be borne with, and that the *Gentiles* should not despise them, and treat them with Contempt, for this their Weakness; as it was, on the other Hand, that they should not censure the *Gentile* Converts, whom the Gospel had made free, for not conforming to their Practices. But, at other Times, and in other Places, St. *Paul* changes his Style, and uses a very different Conduct, and, in very severe Terms, censures the *Judaizing Christian*, particularly in his Epistle to the *Galatians*; where he not only tells them in direct Terms, *that Christ is become of no Effect to every Man that is circumcised, and that they are fallen from Grace*; but, with Respect even to *Days*, expostulates with them with great Vehemence, *How is it that ye turn back to the weak and beggarly Elements, whereunto ye desire again to be in Bondage? Ye observe Days, and Months, and Times, and Years. I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you Labour in vain.* And yet the Persons, he reproves so severely, followed, or, at least, pretended to follow the Persuasions and Dictates of their Consciences, as much as those he speaks to here, in his

his Epiſtle to the *Romans*. Which ſhews that the true Reaſon, why they are here forbid to judge one another, and both *Jew* and *Gentile* are treated with ſo much Tenderneſs, is not, becauſe it was in a Matter of Conſcience: The Exhortation is grounded partly on the general Reaſons for which all *Chriſtians* are forbid to judge one another; and partly on ſpecial and prudential Reaſons, with Reſpect to the then State of Things.

Beſides, as I obſerved before, it is not the *Gentile* Convert that is forbid to *judge* his Brother, who abſtained from Meats and obſerved Days; in which he could not diſpenſe himſelf with a ſafe Conſcience; it is the *Jew*, who is commanded not to *judge* his Brother for not obſerving the ſame Ordinances; which he did not refuſe to do, out of Conſcience, but becauſe he would not be debarred his *Chriſtian* Liberty. The Reaſon, therefore, why the *Judaizing* Brother muſt not *judge* the *Gentile*, is not for Fear he ſhould thereby wound his Brother's Conſcience, or that he might not, in doing ſo, aſſume an Authority over it; but becauſe, in doing ſo, he was guilty of the Breach of an important Duty, and violated that Love and Harmony, which it was neceſſary ſhould be preſerved, and by all poſſible Ways cultivated and increaſed. The Conſcience, which the Apoſtle is ſo much concerned that no Offence ſhould be given to, is not the Conſcience of the Perſon who was *judged* uncharitably; for that was the *Gentile*, who was ſtrong in the Faith, and knew he was in no Fault, in not obſerving the *Jewiſh* Cuſtoms; but that of the Perſon judging, the weak *Jew*,

who, the Apoſtle was afraid, might, by the ill Uſage of the *Gentile*, be tempted, in theſe Matters, to act againſt his Conſcience, and thereby bring himſelf under the Guilt of Sin. For *whatever is not of* Faith, *is Sin*, however lawful it may be in itſelf. This Snare, this Stumbling-block, this Temptation to act againſt the Perſuaſion of his own Mind, is what St. *Paul* ſo carefully guards againſt: For it is ſuch a Perſuaſion that is here meant by *Faith*. But, though it be neceſſary that we ſhould, in all our Actions, be fully perſuaded in our own Minds of the Lawfulneſs of what we do, and muſt not act againſt our Conſciences, in any Caſe, yet ſuch a Perſuaſion alone was not intended by St. *Paul* to be taken for the one Thing neceſſary to juſtify Men in all their Actions, Civil, Moral, and Religious; or, indeed, any, but ſuch as are perfectly indifferent, and where the Lawfulneſs or Unlawfulneſs of them is not determined by a proper Authority, either by ſome Law of God, or of *Chriſt*, or of the Civil Magiſtrate, or by the Church acting within their proper Bounds, and in Conformity to the ſuperior Laws of God and Chriſt; or where a Man is perfectly at Liberty to act, or not to act. In other Caſes, it is not ſufficient to juſtify a Man, that he acts agreeably to the Dictates of his Conſcience. To make an Action a good one, it is neceſſary, not only to follow Conſcience, that is, that the *Will* ſhould agree with the *Underſtanding*; but alſo that the Dictate of the *Underſtanding* ſhould agree to the Nature of the Thing. The Reaſon of the Thing ſhews this to be true to every intelligent Perſon,

that

that impartially conſiders it; ſince, otherwiſe, *Right* and *Wrong*, *Good* and *Evil*, would be perfectly arbitrary Notions, and there would be an End either of all Government, or of all Conſcience.

But, to ſhew that St. *Paul*'s Words ought to be underſtood with theſe Reſtrictions, it may be proper not to reſt in the Reaſon of the Thing, but to confirm it by ſome good Authorities. Thus then *Theophylact*, in Explication of them: ὅταν μὲ περὶ δογμάτων ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς πρὸ οἰκείου νοεῖ πληροφορεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἃ παρελάβομεν, ταῦτα κατέχειν. When the Point "concerns Doctrines, that is, Articles "of Faith, we are not then at Liberty to abound "in our own Senſe (for ſo he ſeems to underſtand πληροφορεῖσθαι) "but muſt hold what we have received "(he means the Apoſtolical Doctrine) though an "Angel from Heaven ſhould preach any other "Doctrine. But, when it concerns Meats, and "Faſts, and the like, and thoſe who ſtumble at theſe "are new Converts, and ſuch as want Indulgence, "there ſomething of the Rigour muſt be remitted." And to the ſame Purpoſe, *Theodoret*, Οὐ τοῦτο καθολικῶς τέθεικεν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τῶν θείων δογμάτων τοῦτο κελεύει φρονεῖν. "This is not ſaid as univerſally "holding, for he does not bid us think thus, with "Reſpect to the θεῖα δόγματα, thoſe Things which "God has either commanded or forbid; for he "*anathematiſes* all thoſe that teach Doctrines con"trary to the Truth; for he ſays, *Gal.* i. 1. *If* "*any Man preach any other Doctrine contrary to* "*that ye have received, let him be* Anathema. It "is, therefore, concerning Meats only that he

" gives every one a Liberty to choose for himself. " And that Liberty, says *Theodoret*, is still conti- " nued in the Church." To these I will only add the Words of *Jerom* and *Grotius*, upon the preceding Verse, *Who art thou that judgest?* —— *eum quem lex non judicat*, says *Jerom*; *nempe ubi domini legem habes nullam*, says *Grotius*. And *Theophylact* makes the like Remark upon Verse 22. *Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that Thing which he alloweth.* Ταῦτα δὲ νόει περὶ τῆς προκειμένης ὑποθέσεως μόνης, τῆς τῶν βρωμάτων.

But, if this be the Apostle's Meaning, in this Chapter, then neither the Words under which his Lordship shelters himself, nor any Thing in the Chapter that gave Occasion for them, can do his Cause any Service; it has nothing to do with any Sort of *authoritative Judging*, no Relation to the Authority of Church-Governors, and their Right to judge the Members of the Church, in any Case; it does not forbid them to judge, with Respect to Faith as well as Manners; much less does it restrain their Power, to judge only *open and notorious Immoralities*, as if they could not, upon violent Suspicion only, proceed, as other Judges may, to cite, examine, and pronounce, according to the Merits of the Cause; it does not, in short, hinder them from being *Judges over their Consciences*: A Phrase his Lordship is so extremely in Love with, that one would think it was familiarly used in Scripture, though, in Truth, it be not once there to be found; nor any Thing like it, as, *ruling* over, *lording* over, having *Dominion* over Men's *Consciences*, or any such Expression: For it is upon

Consciences

Conſciences that all the Streſs lies; though his Lordſhip, I confeſs, ſometimes ſeems to lay the chief *Emphaſis* upon the Particle *over*, in which there muſt be ſome ſtrange Charm, that one ſees that poor Particle which has no Meaning, but as joined with other Words, ſo often put in *Capitals*; the Inſtances of which are ſo many, in thoſe Pages of his *Anſwer to the Committee*, I have had Occaſion to refer to, that one cannot obſerve them, without Smiling; for of what Service is it to him? Or, Where is the Difference in being Judges *of* Men's Conſciences, and Judges *over* them? The only Reaſon I can imagine, for treating this poor Particle in ſo diſtinguiſhing a Manner, is, that his Lordſhip thinks, by the Help of it, to connect the various Expreſſions he has of this Kind himſelf, with one in *Scripture*, which he takes to be of the ſame Import; though this ſingle Particle be the only Word that is the ſame. 2 *Cor.* i. 24. there are theſe Words, *not that we have Dominion* over *your* Faith. Mind the Word *over*, is it not plain the Apoſtle here forbids the being Judges *over* Men's Conſciences, though there be nothing in the Text either of *Judging*, or of *Conſciences?* It is from this Text, which is much in Favour with him, his Lordſhip tells us, the Apoſtles *rejected with Abhorrence* the Word κυριεύοντες, which, he thinks, ſhould have been rendered *ruling over*.

Since his Lordſhip lays ſo much Weight upon this *Text*, it may not be amiſs to enquire a little into the true Senſe of it, it being a *Text* very often miſapplied by others alſo. Now, for this, we need only look into the Context. St. *Paul*, in the foregoing

foregoing Verſe, moſt ſolemnly declares, that it was out of Love to them, that he had not, as yet, been with them, as he had intended. *I did it*, ſays he, φειδόμενος ὑμῶν, *to ſpare you*; that is, that he might have no Occaſion to uſe Severity, that *Rod* with which he had threatened them, in his former Epiſtle. This was a hard and menacing Expreſſion (for he, that can ſpare, can puniſh;) St. *Paul*, therefore, the *Corinthians* being now in a much better Diſpoſition than when he wrote before to them, with his uſual Addreſs (of which there is a great deal in his Writings, particularly in this Epiſtle) ſoftens what he had ſaid, and corrects the Harſhneſs of the Expreſſion he had uſed, by adding, *not that we have Dominion over your Faith.* οὐχ' ὅτι κυριεύομεν ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως. St. *Paul* thus corrects his Expreſſion, partly to obviate the ſiniſter Interpretations the falſe Teachers would be apt to put upon his Words, who miſrepreſented him to the People, as affecting to *terrify them by his Letters*, ch. x. 5. and partly, to let them ſee, how different his Conduct was from that of thoſe falſe Apoſtles, who aſſumed a Liberty of uſing the People as their Slaves, and treated them with all Manner of Indignity, a Treatment they patiently ſubmitted to; *if a Man bring you into Bondage, if a Man devour you, if a Man exalt himſelf againſt you, if a Man ſmite you on the Face, you ſuffer it*, and take it patiently, 2 *Cor.* xi. 20. Thus they ſuffered themſelves to be inſulted by falſe Teachers, while they ſhewed little Regard to thoſe who were the true Apoſtles of Chriſt, even to him who was their Spiritual Father, and, as he ſays himſelf, *had*

begotten

begotten them in Jesus Christ through the Gospel, 1 Cor. iv. 15. With these Views, the Apostle adds these softening Words, in which we may observe, that he had expressed his full Sense, when he had said, οὐχ ὅτι κυριεύομεν ὑμῶν, not that we pretend to *a Dominion over you:* By which he did not mean to disclaim the Power given him to *judge* and punish all Sorts of Offences against the Doctrine and Faith of *Christ*; but that he pretended not to an *arbitrary* Power over them, as if he could punish whom he would *pro libitu*, for his own Profit, or Glory, or Pleasure; it was a Power given him for *Edification*, for the Good of the Church, and not for *Destruction*; and, with all his Power, he acknowledges he could *do nothing against the Truth*, but only in Defence of it; all other Use of Power he disclaims, and declares he is *weak*, can exert no Power, when there is not a just Occasion for it, 1 *Cor.* xvi 8, 9, 10. This shews us fully his Meaning, when he says, *we have not Dominion over you*; and, had he said no more, his Sense had been complete. Why then does he add ἀλλὰ συνεργοὶ to ὑμῶν, over your Faith? Not to make any Distinction, as if he had Dominion over them, in one Respect, but not in another; no, he was not their *Lord*, had no *Dominion* over them, in any Sense, or over any Thing that belonged to them, either their Bodies, or Minds, or Estates, or Liberties, or any other Thing. The Reason then I take to be partly this; it was their *Faith* that gave St. *Paul* any Relation to them, it was through him they had *believed*; it is, indeed, that gives all Pastors a Relation to their Flock;

it

it is as they are *Believers*. The Meaning, then, of the Apoſtle's Expreſſion ſeems to be this: Be not miſtaken, we do not, becauſe you have been brought to the *Faith* by us, therefore, pretend to a *Dominion* over you, or require you to transfer your *Faith* from *Chriſt* to us, as their falſe Teachers did, who preached not *Chriſt*, but themſelves, and perſuaded their Admirers to call themſelves by their Names. See 1 *Cor.* i. 12. This appears to me, upon a full Conſideration, to be the Meaning of the Words, with this Addition to them; but the chief Reaſon, why the Apoſtle made that Addition, and did not ſtop at ὑμᾶς, *that* I take to be for the Sake of what follows.

Having ſaid many ſevere Things, in his former Epiſtle, he thought fit, in this, to change his Style, they being now much reformed, and in better Temper; and, therefore, being obliged to touch again upon their late Diſorders, he does it with great Lenity, expreſſes the moſt affectionate Concern for them, and takes every Opportunity to mix Commendations with Reproofs. To this End, he adds the Word *Faith*, that he might take Occaſion from thence to commend them, for their Stedfaſtneſs in it; which he does, in the End of the Verſe, τῇ γὰρ πίστει ἑστήκατε, *for by Faith ye ſtand.* But the whole Senſe of this Place, to which muſt be taken in the firſt Verſe of the next Chapter, cannot, I think, be better expreſſed than it is by *Theodoret*: Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν τινὰς εἰπεῖν, &c. "It "being not unlikely ſome might ſay, What? "Was it for this we believed? That we might be "thereby made your Slaves, and be treated in a

"*deſpotic*

" *despotic* Manner, as if you were our *Lord* and " *Master?* It was necessary for the Apostle to add, " that he says not this, as assuming a *despotic* " Power over them, but as a Helper of their Spi- " ritual Joy, to which he would gladly contri- " bute all he could; for, as to your Faith, I have " no Fault to find with you, that is sound and as " it should be; but there are some other Things " among you, which want Amendment, and, " therefore, I was unwilling to come, till they " were amended, that my Presence, instead of " giving Joy, might not make you sorry." This is the Sense of *Theodoret*'s Comment on the Place; those, who would see it, in his own Words, have them below *.

Now, if this be the true Sense of this Text, what is it to his Lordship's Purpose, or how does it prove, that the Governors of the Church are not Judges over the Faith of *Christians*, in the Place of which his Lordship substitutes *Consciences*, so long as they judge righteous Judgment, and according to the Rules in the Gospel prescribed to them? It is, indeed, most certain the Apostles did

* Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν τινας εἰπεῖν, τί οὖν; τότε χάριν ὑπισχνούμεθα ἵνα δουλεύειν διεξώμεθα, καὶ δεσποτικῶς παρὰ σοῦ παιδευόμεθα; ἀναγκαίως ἐπήγαγεν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ὡς δεσπόζων ὑμῶν εἴρηκα, ἀλλ' ὡς τῆς πνευματικῆς ὑμῶν συνεργὸς εὐφροσύνης. [Τῇ γὰρ πίστει ἐγκαλεῖ· ἔχρινα δὲ ἐμαυτῷ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ πάλιν ἐν λύπῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν.] Κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην λείπει τὸ μὴ, ἵνα ᾖ, τῇ μὲν γὰρ πίστει ἐγκαλεῖ· λέγει δὲ τοῦτο, τῆς μὲν πίστεως ἔνεκεν ἐδαμῶς ὑμῶν ἐπιμέμφομαι, τὴν γὰρ ταύτης ὑγείαν περίκεισθε· ἕτερα δέ τινα παρ' ὑμῶν πλημμελεῖται, ἃ τινῶν διορθώσεως δεῖται. Οὐκ εὐδοκίμασα δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀφικνούμενον λυπῆσαι τὰς ἁμαρτάνουσας.

did judge of *Faith* as well as *Manners*, witneſs their frequent Cenſures of falſe Doctrines, and of thoſe that taught them. And do they not thus judge, every Time they declare a Man to be a *Heretic?* Do they not pronounce ſome to have made *Shipwrack of the Faith?* Does not St. *Paul* declare *Hymenæus* and *Alexander* to be of that Number, and, for that Reaſon, deliver them to *Satan*, 1 *Tim.* i. 20.? Does he not ſo far judge of Men's *Conſciences*, as to pronounce that their Falling from the *Faith* proceeded from an *evil Conſcience?* Does he not direct *Timothy* and *Titus* to oppoſe all that teach any Thing contrary to *ſound Doctrine?* And muſt they not, in order to this, *judge what is ſo?* Were they to forbear cenſuring falſe Teachers, becauſe they acted according to their Conſciences? They, no doubt, pretended ſo, and who could ſay, they did not? What could have been greater Folly, or more pernicious to the true Religion, than ſuch a Conduct? St. *Paul*, or *Timothy*, or any other Governor of the Church, are not Judges of Men's Conſciences, as *that* means their ſecret Thoughts, but they are Judges of their *Words* and *Actions*; they are able to know, or, if it be not their own Fault, may be ſo, whether thoſe are agreeable to *ſound Doctrine*, or not; and have a Right, nay, it is their Duty, to cenſure them, if they are not, inaſmuch as it is incumbent on them to defend the *Faithful* from the Snares of falſe Teachers, and to preſerve the holy Doctrine, committed to them, pure and undefiled. And both the Senſe of the Thing and the Practice of St. *Paul* ſufficiently ſhew, that the Governors of

the

the Church not having *Dominion over the Faith* of their Flocks, is no Obſtruction to their *Judging*, that is, Cenſuring and Condemning all Teachers of of falſe Doctrines; and it is *Chriſt* that judges by them, they act in his Name, and by his Commiſſion; and, if they judge according to Truth, he is *in the Midſt of them*, and makes their Act his own.

The Reader will, I hope, forgive my having ſaid ſo much, to vindicate theſe two *Texts* from Miſinterpretation, ſince ſo much Weight is laid on the miſtaken Senſe of them by the Enemies of Church-Authority, that they fill almoſt every Page in their Writings, and are in a Manner the whole Reſource they have from Scripture. I come now to conſider his Lordſhip's mean Cavils, againſt what I have ſaid, in my *Sermon*, concerning the Power of Church-Governors to *judge*. My Words are, that *St.* Paul *expreſly aſſerts to the Church a Power to judge its Members, and reproves the* Corinthians, *for not having done it, in the Caſe of the inceſtuous Perſon*, 1 Cor. v. No body, I am perſuaded, can miſtake the Meaning of theſe Words, but ſuch as do it wilfully. But if you will believe his Lordſhip, "Here is a dangerous Deſign to de-"ceive the Reader. Inſtead of *Spiritual Rulers* "and *Paſtors*, the Word *Church* is ſilently intro-"duced; and thus the Queſtion is ſhifted, and "the *Laity* are ſubſtituted in the Room of the "*Clergy*, for whoſe Power over the *Laity* I had "been arguing, till Page the *nineteenth*." Who would not think, I had been very large upon this Subject? *Nineteen Pages* ſpent, in proving, from

from Scriptute, that Church-Governors have a real Authority? How his Lordſhip come to let this Slip of his Pen paſs, who has ſo minutely in the *Errata* corrected others, I know not. But, for *nineteenth*, he ſhould have ſaid *ninth*; indeed, if he would not have amuſed his Reader, he ſhould have ſaid *third*. For it is but the third Page in which theſe Words are, after I have done with the Explication of the Words uſed in my Text. But let that paſs; my Crime is, "That I have ſilent-"ly introduced the Word *Church*, by which I "I muſt here mean a particular Congregation. "I call it the *Church*, without Explication; think-"ing, perhaps, that Word may paſs here, as it "has been uſed, in latter Ages, for the Clergy "only——very ſilently and without any Notice "ſhifting the Scene, and changing the Subject "of the whole Diſcourſe." Bad, indeed! How will the Dean be able to get clear of this? Nothing ſo eaſy. The Scene is not ſhifted, I am ſtill ſpeaking of the Governors of the Church, and do aſſert to them, from this Chapter of the *Corinthians*, a Power to *judge* the Members of their ſeveral Churches; I mean by *Church* the Governors of it, of which no impartial Reader could doubt, and his Lordſhip might as well cavil at the Title of my *Sermon*, as he does here; the Authority, I contend to be veſted in the Governors of the *Church*, I call *Church-Authority*, and accordingly, through the whole *Sermon*, mean them by the Word *Church*, when I ſpeak of its having any Authority to act. Nor is this a new Senſe of the Word, ſprung up in latter Ages; the Word, except

cept it ever mean the *Pope* in any Writers of the *Romiſh* Church, has no Senſe in theſe latter Ages, that it, and the like Words, had not always, as all know, who are not very ignorant in theſe Matters. For from whence does his Lordſhip date his *latter Ages?* Or, Did he never hear of St. *Chryſoſtom*'s Explication of thoſe famous Words, Ἐιπὲ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ —— τισὶν τοῖς προεδρεύσι? *Tell it to the* Church, that is, to the Preſidents and Rulers of it. And ſo *Theophylact*, Ἐπὶ τῶν δ' ἐκκλησίας προέδρων δημοσιεῦσαι τὸ πταῖσμα, *Publiſh the Offence before the Rulers of the Church.* To which Purpoſe, as Dr. *Hammond* ſays, in his learned Treatiſe of the *Power of the Keys*, from *Rabbi Kimchi*, it is obſervable, that Governors are often meant in the Old Teſtament, by the Word *Kahal*, that is, ἐκκλησία, or *Congregation*; and even the Word *People*, he obſerves, doth ſometimes clearly ſignify the *Elders* only, not all the People. The Word *Church*, a Perſon of his Lordſhip's Learning cannot but know, is uſed, in the ſame Senſe, in *Cyprian* and *Tertullian*; and older ſtill, it is obſervable that the Epiſtle of *Clemens Romanus* begins thus, *The* Church *of God that is at* Rome, *to the Church of God at* Corinth. Where by *Church*, in the firſt Place, the Biſhop and his Clergy are principally, if not ſolely, meant; as is well obſerved by Dr. *Hammond*, in the ſame Place. For what Part can the *Laity* be ſuppoſed to have in that Letter? Did they draw any Part of it, or were the ſeveral Paragraphs, when drawn, put to their Vote? The Writing ſuch a Letter might, in an Aſſembly, be propoſed to them; or, when it was writ, they

might give a reſpectful Approbation to it; or if any among the Laity, who in thoſe Times were not only Perſons of a private Conndition, but generally of the meaner Sort, if any of them were able to adviſe, what they had to ſay might favourably be heard by their Biſhop and Presbyters, but it could not, of right, determine them.

But, however that be, that the Word *Church*, in ancient as well as modern Writers, is often uſed for the Governors and Rulers of it, is moſt certain; and a Man muſt be a very ill Writer to leave it doubtful, whether he uſe it in that Senſe, or not. But his Lordſhip will have it, that by *Church* I mean the *Congregation*, becauſe I ſay, in the ſame Sentence, that St. *Paul* reproves the *Corinthians*, for not having judged the *inceſtuous* Perſon. I wonder his Lordſhip did not infer, by the ſame *Logic*, that I meant *Pagans*, as well as *Chriſtians*; for I did not ſay, *Chriſtian Corinthians*, as I ſhould have done, to prevent Miſtakes; for, certainly, all the People of *Corinth* were not then Believers, nor the more numerous, not the more conſiderable and ſubſtantial, much leſs the governing Part of that great City: Why then was I ſo careleſs, as not to put in the Word *Chriſtian?* For the ſame Reaſon that I did not add Governors to the Word *Church*, to avoid an unneceſſary Multitude of Words; it being impoſſible any body could miſtake my Meaning, but ſuch as read with his Lordſhip's Candor and Exactneſs.

His Lordſhip's next Cavil is grounded on his own wilful Miſtake; I had argued from St. *Paul*'s Declaring, that he had nothing to do to *judge them*

that

that were without the Church, and his Bidding them *judge thoſe that are within* (which he does to convince them, that when he warned them not to keep Company with Fornicators, *&c.* he did not mean thoſe of the *Gentiles* who were guilty of thoſe Sins, but thoſe of the Brethren that were ſo) from this Paſſage I argued, that by *Judging*, here, is meant ſuch an *authoritative* Act, as they had no Right to exerciſe over thoſe *who were without*; whereas, in his Lordſhip's Senſe, they might *judge* thoſe without, as well as thoſe within; they might *ſee* Fornicators to be Fornicators, and avoid their Company. This Act of Judging, which St. *Paul* exerciſed, in requiring them not to converſe with any *Brother* that was a Fornicator (which, for Want of ſufficient Limitation of his Words, was by ſome interpreted to extend to a Prohibition even of converſing with any *Gentiles* that were ſuch) this authoritative Act his Lordſhip turns into *Excommunicating*, and then very acutely obſerves, that *Chriſtians* had not only *no Right, but no Poſſibility of excluding thoſe who never were among them.* His Lordſhip might as well have ſaid ſo to St. *Paul*, as to me, who am only arguing from his Words; for this judicious Remark falls equally on both. That all Judging is not by me confined to the ſingle Act of *Excommunication*, his Lordſhip might have ſeen, if he had pleaſed, from the next Words he cavils at; where I ſay that the Power of *Judging* had, in the *laſt Reſort* of it, ſo real an Effect, as to *excommunicate* and put out from among them the Perſons that deſerved to be ſo judged. What is plainer from theſe Words,

in the laſt Reſort, than that I ſuppoſe there are many other Acts of *Judging*, inferior and prior to this of *Excommunication?* Which laſt Effect of the *Church's Judging* ſhews, at once, how different the Church's Power is from that his Lordſhip aſſerts to every private *Chriſtian*, who can have no Power to exclude an offending Brother from the Society of *Chriſtians*. But his Lordſhip does not know what to make of theſe *dark* Words, *the Perſon who deſerved to be ſo judged*. Strange, ſuch Words ſhould puzzle a Perſon of ſo great Penetration! I expreſſed myſelf ſo, for this plain Reaſon, becauſe I ſuppoſe the Governors of the *Church* to judge righteouſly, and not to abuſe their Power, for that, if they do, their Sentence is of no Force, in the Sight of God. The Perſon, whom thoſe of *Corinth* ought to have excommunicated, was not a Perſon unjuſtly accuſed of Fornication, but was really guilty of it, and that in one of the moſt enormous Inſtances. Such Perſons they ought to judge, and, if other leſſer Steps would not do, they might and ought to exclude him from all the Advantages of their Society, as Chriſtians; and, when he is deſervedly thus excluded, he is excluded, in the Sight of God as well as Men, from being a Member of the Body of Chriſt; and, if he do not repent, will have Reaſon to look on this Judgment of the Church, as the Judgment of God himſelf upon him. Of which more anon.

His Lordſhip's laſt Cavil upon this Subject is, at my ſaying, that the Expreſſion St. *Paul* uſes, of *delivering to Satan, though it be not attended now with the viſible Effects that were then conſequent upon*

upon such Delivery, may, for aught I see, be properly pronounced upon any Person deservedly cut off from the Body of Christ. It offends his Lordship that, before I quit the Subject of *Excommunication*, I do my utmost to keep up the Horror of it. I allow the Charge, and ask, who acts most like a Minister of Christ, he who endeavours to keep up in the Minds of *Christians* an Awe of that Discipline that is so useful to keep them in their Duty, and to reclaim Offenders; or he that does his utmost to destroy the Force of it, and render it contemptible, vile, and insignificant in the Eyes of all Men? What I said of this Expression was said in Defence of the *Christian* Church, which has always used this Language. That it was not disused after the *Apostolic* Times, and taken up in latter Ages by the Church of *Rome* (to which ignorant Men readily impute every Thing in Church Matters they do not like) I will shew his Lordship from a Writer of unquestionable Learning and Authority, St. *Jerom*, who wrote in the fourth Century, and yet thought it no Way improper to express *Excommunication*, by *Delivering to Satan*; nay, he uses it in such a familiar Way, as plainly shews it was then the Language of the Church. We have two Instances of this in his Epistles. In that *ad Heliodorum de V. E.* we have these Words, speaking of himself: *Illi* [*Presbytero*] *si peccavera, licet tradere me Satanæ* —— *& in veteri quidem lege, quicunque Sacerdotibus non obtemperâsset, aut extra castra positus lapidabatur à populo, aut gladio cervice subjectâ, contemptum expiabat cruore. Nunc verò inobediens Spirituali mucrone truncatur, aut*

ejectus de Ecclesiâ, rabido Dæmonum ore discerpitur. And in his Epistle *ad Riparium adv. Vigil. Miror Sanctum Episcopum, in cujus parochiâ esse Presbyter dicitur, acquiescere furori ejus, & non virgâ Apostolicâ, virgáque ferreâ confringere vas inutile, & tradere* [*Satanæ*] *in interitum carnis, ut spiritus salvus sit.* Thus *Jerom*; and a much earlier Writer, *Tertullian*, speaks the same Language. I will mention one Place only, *de Pudic. c.* 13. Traditis Satanæ, *id est, extra Ecclesiam projectis.* And, to the same Purpose, the *Greek* Commentators explain the Delivery to *Satan.* Thus *Theodoret*, Διδασκόμεθα ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς τοῖς ἀφοριζομένοις καὶ τοῦ ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ σώματος χωριζομένοις ἔπεισιν ὁ διάβολος, ἔρημον εὑρίσκων τῆς χάριτος. And *Theophylact* upon 1 *Tim.* i. 20. Πῶς δὲ παρεδίδοτο τῷ Σατανᾷ; ἐξεβάλετο τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἀπερρίπτετο τῆς ἀγέλης, καὶ παρεδίδοτο γυμνὸς τῷ κύκῳ. And *Œcumenius*, Παράδοσιν τῷ Σατανᾷ δι' ἀφορισμοῦ τῆς κοινωνίας γίνεσθαι. And these all speak the Sense of *Chrysostom.* I am content to bear his Lordship's Censures, when it is with such good Company; and, indeed, I have always the Comfort, that they do not fall upon me singly, but in general on the *Christian* Church (whose Cause I am pleading) and that best reformed Part of the present Church, the Church of *England*; though his Lordship often attempts to impose it on his Reader, that he is opposing only the Sentiments of a single Writer.

I cannot but observe, before I leave this Subject, that the *Christian* Church, ancient as well as modern, have always thought the Power of *Excommunication* to be well, though not solely grounded, on this Chapter of St. *Paul* to the *Corinthians.* But his

his Lordſhip, always ready to deſtroy, is of Opinion it can be no Rule to us; he queſtions, *Whether any Thing can be certainly argued from it, but where all Circumſtances are parallel.* But all Circumſtances never can be parallel, therefore, nothing can, in any Caſe, be certainly argued from it: For the firſt of theſe Circumſtances is, he tells us, *an Apoſtle joining.* From the Death, therefore, of the Apoſtles, there was an End of all Poſſibility of all Circumſtances being parallel, and, therefore, this Chapter can be no Juſtification of the ordinary Diſcipline of any *Chriſtian* Church. Thus the good Biſhop, in his abundant Zeal for the People's Liberty, enervates the Authority of the Church's Diſcipline, in Contradiction to all Antiquity, to the Senſe of the *Catholick* Church in all Ages. To whoſe Judgment we ought to pay the greateſt Deference, let the Reader judge.

His Lordſhip's next Attack is upon what I had briefly ſaid, upon the *Commiſſions* or Powers our Saviour gave to his Apoſtles, and, in them, to their Succeſſors, in thoſe three famous Paſſages, *Mat.* xvi. 19. xviii. 18. and *John* xx. 23. upon which Places (intending, at that Time, to make no other Uſe of them, but as they are a Proof, that our Saviour gave the Apoſtles a very conſiderable Power) I contented myſelf with giving a few Hints that I thought might help to clear the Way to the true Meaning of them. Upon theſe his Lordſhip ſpends three Sections, making no leſs than twenty-ſix Pages; in all which, if there be a ſingle Sentence that gives any new Light to theſe Places, or clears up any one Difficulty, or, if his Lordſhip

has, in any one Inſtance, repreſented my Senſe fairly, I give up all. The Subſtance of what he ſays, of the *Power of the Keys*, is, that the Promiſe of them to St. *Peter* was merely perſonal, and was fulfilled, in his being the firſt that opened the Door of the Church to *Jews* and *Gentiles*. This, in his Lordſhip's Opinion, is the *Power of the Keys*, the Privilege of one Perſon only, and that not a very great one: To have made the firſt Diſcourſe to ſome *Jews*, in the Second of the *Acts*, and to ſome *Gentiles*, in the Tenth.

But what Authority has his Lordſhip for this Interpretation? Did he draw it from the Writings of pure and genuine Antiquity, or from the Dregs of modern Times? That there is ſomething perſonal, in this Promiſe to St. *Peter*, is readily allowed; but, that it is intirely perſonal, is by the Writers of *Catholick* Antiquity univerſally denied. Was the Uſe of theſe *Keys* only to open the Doors of the Church, at firſt? How, then, was the Church opened to Converts, in all ſucceeding Times? Or, What Uſe had St. *Peter* himſelf of them, after his firſt Sermons? Need I quote Authorities, in ſo plain a Caſe, to prove it was the Senſe of the ancient Church, that the *Keys* were, in St. *Peter*, given to the reſt of the Apoſtles, and, in them, to their Succeſſors? And that this Power was the ſame with the Power of admitting into, and caſting out of the Church, or that, at leaſt, they are the moſt conſiderable Branches of it? I had ſaid, "That this Power does, in the loweſt "Senſe of it, imply an Authority to admit Per-"ſons into the Church by *Baptiſm*, and, in Order

"to

" to that, a Power of *Judging* of their Fitneſs " for it, and of giving them *Inſtructions*, and de- " claring the neceſſary *Conditions* of it; and, by " neceſſary Conſequence, to *put out* of the Church " ſuch Perſons, when admitted, who ought not " to have been admitted, had it been known " what they would have proved; or ſuch as re- " nounce the Conditions upon which they came " into it." Here was a proper Place for his Lordſhip, had he been ſo minded to ſpeak out, and bring Things to a Point. Does the *Power of the Keys* imply a Power of admitting into the Church by Baptiſm, or not? Does the Admitting to Baptiſm imply in it what I have ſuppoſed it to do? Is a Power of excluding unworthy Members a juſt and neceſſary Conſequence from the other, or is it not? Is Baptiſm an inſignificant Rite, that makes no Alteration in a Man's State who duly receives it? Is the Remiſſion of Sins, annexed to it by *Chriſt*, an empty Promiſe without Meaning, or not? Is nothing gained by a Man's Admiſſion into the Church, and, conſequently, nothing loſt by his being deſervedly thrown out of it? Or is ſomething gained by coming into the Church, that cannot be loſt by being caſt out again? When his Lordſhip anſwers diſtinctly to theſe Queſtions, it will go a great Way towards clearing this Diſpute concerning Church-Authority; but that is a Favour I may not preſume to expect from his Lordſhip, ſince another Hand has puſhed him ſo Home, upon this Subject, without being able to obtain a Word in Anſwer from him.

What his Lordſhip ſays, in the next Section, of the Power of *Binding* and *Looſing*, is as little edifying

fying as what he has said, in Explication of the Power of the *Keys*. I had taken Notice of two Senses in which it hath been understood; his Lordship, in Opposition to what has always been the Sense of the *Christian* Church, declares for that which cuts off the Successors of the Apostles from all Pretence to any Power from it. This Sense he declares for, but without offering any Thing new in Confirmation of it; he does not say so much for it, as a Man might do from the New Testament alone; he does not seem to understand even their Sense whom I referred to, for the Interpretation he has chosen; else he would not tell me, that Dr. *Lightfoot* had given two Interpretations of the Words *bind* and *loose*; in which I must take Leave to say, he is much mistaken; for Dr. *Lightfoot* does explain himself uniformly, that the Commission, given to the Apostles in these Words, was *to determine concerning the Use or Rejection of the* Mosaick *Rites and Laws*; and, if his Lordship were not strongly persuaded of the implicit Belief of his Readers, he would not, at this Rate, venture to impose upon them. What Dr. *Lightfoot* says is this, that *Binding* and *Loosing* here is meant of *Things*, not *Persons*, because our *Saviour* must be supposed to use those Words, in their received Sense among the *Jews*; but their received Sense is, in his Opinion, this: That to *bind* is to *prohibit*, or forbid, that is, to declare a Thing to be prohibited or forbid in the Law; and to *loose* is to *permit*, or declare a Thing to be permitted, that is, to be lawful by the Law. To prove this Use and Sense of the Words, he brings

thirty

thirty Instances out of the *Talmudical* Writers, and from these Premisses concludes, that this Expression was used *in doctrinâ & judiciis de rebus licitis aut non licitis in Lege*. And that, our *Saviour* using the Words, in this known and common Sense of them, the Substance of his Commission to St. *Peter* and the rest of the *Apostles* must be this: To *retain* or *abolish* such Parts of the *Mosaic* Law as they saw fit. *In* Lege Mosaicâ *quodcunque vos ligaveritis, id est, prohibueritis, prohibitum erit, sanciente authoritate divinâ; & quodcunque solveritis, id est, permiseritis, vel permissum & licitum docueritis, erit licitum & permissum——Hinc ligârunt, id est, prohibuerunt Circumcisionem, &c.——Solverunt, id est, permiserunt Purificationem* Paulo. ——*Et ut verba omnia, his Christi verbis iis commissum est, dirigente Spiritu Sancto, ut* de Religione decernerent, *quoad usum, aut rejectionem rituum & judiciorum* Mosaicorum, *idque vel in tempus, vel in perpetuum.* Then follows a Paraphrase of our *Saviour*'s Words to St. *Peter*, which ends thus, *Tu ita à Spiritu Sancto doceris, ut quodcunque* Legis Mosaicæ *illis prohibueris, erit prohibitum; quodcunque conceseris, erit conceessum, idque sub sanctione in cœlo.*

Then he shews, that the Commission, in St. *John*, of *remitting* and *retaining* Sins, is, in effect, the same with this; but with this Difference, that *Hic de doctrinâ solùm agitur, non de personis; illic de personis, non de doctrinâ: hic de rebus licitis, aut non licitis in* Religione *determinandis ab Apostolis; illic de personis obstinatis per eos puniendis, aut non puniendis.* It is impossible for any Writer to express himself more clearly and distinctly than Dr. *Lightfoot*

Lightfoot here has done; but, becauſe, in this laſt Paragraph, to avoid an unneceſſary Repetition of Words, he has not, after *in Religione*, added, as before, *quoad uſum, aut rejectionem rituum & judiciorum* Moſaicorum; an Advantage muſt be taken, from this Omiſſion, to impoſe upon us a ſecond Meaning of theſe Words, as the Senſe of Dr. *Lightfoot*. I own, it gives me great Indignation to ſee ſuch Unfairneſs; that a Perſon of his Lordſhip's Character will miſrepreſent the plaineſt Paſſages, and put one under a Neceſſity either of letting them paſs, or of being very tedious in their Vindication; ſince there is oftentimes no refuting what may be ſaid, in a very few Words, but by producing the Subſtance of the whole Argument relating to it.

As to this Notion of Dr. *Lightfoot*, among many other Objections to it, this is one, that he infers too much from this Senſe of the Words; for, that according to the *Talmudical* Uſe of *Binding* and *Looſing*, this Commiſſion would ſink St. *Peter* and the other Apoſtles into mere *Caſuiſts*, to reſolve Doubts that ſhould ariſe, with Reſpect to the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation; and would not impower them to declare what was commanded by the Goſpel, but to determine only what was permitted by the Law; which is ſo jejune and poor a Senſe, that Dr. *Lightfoot* could not but be ſenſible of it; and, therefore, would extend it to mean a Power of retaining and aboliſhing ſuch Parts of the *Moſaic Law* as they judged proper. But, inſtead of ſaying more of this Notion here, I ſhall refer the Reader to the learned Dr. *Hammond*, who has largely

largely considered and thoroughly confuted it, in his Treatise of the *Power of the Keys*, c. 4. But, to tell his Lordship the Truth, what I said, against this Interpretation, was not pointed immediately against Dr. *L*, but against one of his Lordship's Advocates; a young Writer, whose Name I had a Mind to spare, and, therefore, declined taking any direct Notice of him, and chose rather to go back to the Fountains from whence this Notion has been propagated.

The other Interpretation of this Commission, which his Lordship dislikes, being the received one, of *Binding* and *Loosing* Sinners, and inflicting or absolving from Censures, I supposed it so understood by every Body, and therefore, for Brevity Sake, did not give a particular Description of it; but thought it more to the Purpose to shew, how this Power came to be so expressed; for the Words, by which it is conveyed, are plainly figurative and metaphorical, which I endeavoured to account for, in the best Manner I could, and that after a long, and frequent, and attentive Consideration of them. The Words, *whatsoever ye shall bind*, &c. by those who agree in the same Sense of them, are, as to the Construction of them, understood two Ways: Some, by *whatsoever*, understand *Sins*; others, *Sinners*; both which come to the same Issue; binding Men under the Guilt of their Sins, or loosing them from it, being all one with binding Men's Sins upon them, or loosing, and so absolving them. Of these two I thought I had Reason to prefer the latter; and had the Satisfaction to find *Chrysostom*, *Theophylact*,

Theophylact, and the beſt Interpreters, generally of the ſame Opinion. For, though λύειν ἁμαρτίας is ſometimes uſed to ſignify Remitting Sins (of which there are two Inſtances, in the *Greek* Bible; one, *Eccleſ.* xxviii. 2. and another very remarkable one, in the laſt Chapter of *Job*, where what, in one Verſe, is ἵλεως τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αὐτῆς, is, in the next, ἀφῆκω αὐτοῖς;) yet I do not find any Inſtance of ſuch a Conſtruction of the Word δέω, that it is ever joined with ἁμαρτίαν, or with any other Word of the ſame Import. As to the Objection made to the *other* Senſe, from the *whatſoever* being in the *neuter* Gender, Dr. *Hammond* has ſhewn, in the Place before-mentioned, by a great many Inſtances, that nothing is more common, in the New Teſtament, than for the *Neutral* to be in Senſe *Maſculine* alſo, and to take in Perſons as well as Things. Now, ſuppoſing the Words to mean the *Binding and Looſing Perſons*, I thought the Metaphor was taken from making Perſons Priſoners, and releaſing them from Priſon; it being then, as I have ſhewn, the Cuſtom for Priſoners to be put in Chains. And, by this Account of it, this Figure of Speech agrees perfectly well with that other of *Delivering to Satan*, or ſentencing an Offender to be his *Priſoner*. And this Explication, which was long ſince the Reſult of my own Thoughts, upon conſidering the Places themſelves, without taking in any other Helps, I was pleaſed to ſee afterwards confirmed by great Authorities. *Chryſoſtom*, on *Joh.* xx. 23. *whoſe-ſoever Sins ye remit*, has theſe remarkable Words; καθάπερ γάρ τις βασιλεὺς ἀρχοντας ἀποστέλλων, ἐξουσίαν εἰς δεσμωτήριον

δεσμωτήριον ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ ἀφιέναι δίδωσιν· οὕτω καὶ τούτους ἐκπέμπων ταύτῃ περιβάλλει τῇ δυνάμει. I will only add to this a Paſſage of the moſt learned Biſhop *Uſher*, in a Speech of his, preſerved in the Hiſtory of his Life, *p.* 20. " By the Power of the Keys " (which, in the Language of the Church, takes " in this of *Binding and Looſing*, as a Part of it) " the ſpiritual Officers of the Church of *Chriſt* " are enabled to govern well, to ſpeak, and ex- " hort, and rebuke with all Authority, to looſe " ſuch as are penitent, to commit others to the " *Lord's Priſon*, until their Amendment, or to bind " them over to the Judgment of the Great Day, " if they ſhall perſiſt in their wilful Obſtinacy." The Judgment of a Man of his conſummate Learning, I muſt own, weighs greatly with me, who am ſo weak as not to be able to deſpiſe Books and Learning, but am always ready to pay great Deference to ſuch venerable Names, To confirm this Notion, I had brought a remarkable Paſſage from *Joſephus*, where λύειν τὲ καὶ δεῖν is uſed to ſignify a Power of Impriſoning, and Setting at Liberty. His Lordſhip treats it with great Contempt, without ſo much as underſtanding what I brought it for. To which I ſhall make no other Anſwer, but that when himſelf will produce ſuch another Paſſage in any *Greek* Writer (though no one can be ſo pertinent to the Point, as one from a Writer that was a *Jew*) I will give him my hearty Thanks for it.

Laſtly, I obſerved, that the Power of *Binding* and *Looſing* in this Senſe, as joined to the Power of the *Keys*, appeared to me to be well illuſtrated

by

by a Paſſage in the *Revelation*, where an *Angel is repreſented with a Key and a Chain.* This his Lordſhip cannot agree to, becauſe *a Chain is uſed only for Binding.* I wiſh his Lordſhip had told us what he thinks a better *Enſign* or Badge of ſuch Power. I know none. He grants, a *Chain* is uſed for *Binding*; remembering, no doubt, *to bind their Kings in Chains:* If ſo, then ſurely a *Chain* is a proper Badge of an Officer that has that Power; but he that binds can looſe (as he that *ſhuts* can *open*) a Chain, therefore, is a proper Badge of him who has Power to *bind and looſe*; as a *Key* is of him who has Power to *open and ſhut.* Which is what I was to prove. Who now ſees not, that his Lordſhip's Remarks, upon what I have ſaid upon this Head, ſhew nothing, but how little he has conſidered the Subject, how much a Stranger he is to the ancient Writers of the Chriſtian Church, and how ſtrongly he is diſpoſed to cavil? Elſe he would diſtinguiſh between the Senſe that ultimately reſults from a Place, and the Reaſon how ſuch a Senſe comes to be conveyed under ſuch a particular Form and Manner of Expreſſion. This laſt was what I aimed at; as to the Senſe reſulting from it, I had ſhewn plainly enough, that I underſtand the Place as the *Chriſtian* Church does at at preſent, and always has done; and expreſly ſaid, "I thought it differed in nothing, but Ex-"preſſion, from the other *Commiſſion* of *remitting* "and *retaining Sins.*" That, of the three Texts, the ſecond is meant of cenſuring Perſons, and *binding* or *releaſing* them, as they continue guilty, or not penitent, is to me undeniably plain, from the

the Context; and I would be glad to ſee a Paraphraſe of that Chapter, from Verſe 15. to 20. from his Lordſhip, to prove it does not. And, underſtanding it ſo, it agrees perfectly well with the Third; but it likewiſe agrees with the Firſt, which is expreſſed in the very ſame Words; therefore, the Firſt and Third agree alſo; and, conſequently, the Firſt muſt be underſtood, with Reſpect to Men's Sins, and their Repentance; that is, it gives the Governors of the Church a Power to *judge* the Members of it, which was the Power I had aſſerted to them, and, for the Sake of which, I made the Mention I did of theſe Commiſſions.

Upon the Third of theſe, the Power *of Remitting and Retaining Sins*, his Lordſhip, in ten Pages, ſays not a Word, to give us his own Senſe of it; they are all ſpent in cavilling at what I had offered, as mine; who declared myſelf for the obvious Senſe of the Words, that here is a Power given to *remit and retain Sins*, as it means Forgiving, or not Forgiving; and ſaid, "that no-"thing hinders this Power from being given, not "only to the Apoſtles, but to their remoteſt Suc-"ceſſors, keeping within the Rules of their Com-"miſſion;" that is, ſo long as they *remit or retain* the Sins of none, but in ſuch Caſes where *Chriſt*, in whoſe Name they act, would himſelf have *remitted or retained* them. His Lordſhip argues, that their Succeſſors cannot have this Power, becauſe they cannot give ſuch miraculous Proofs of it, as the Apoſtles could; as if a Power, and the conſequent Signs in Proof of that Power, were one and the ſame Thing; if not, the Suc-

ceſſors of the Apoſtles may have Power to *remit* Sins, though they cannot work miraculous Cures. This, however, his Lordſhip makes to be a *Contradicting* of myſelf. Another *Contradiction*, with him, is my Saying, "*That, whatever the Words of* "*this Commiſſion mean, as ſpoken to the Apoſtles, it* "*is eaſy to ſee they do not give their Succeſſors a* "*Power of remitting the Sins of this or that Man* "*abſolutely, becauſe they have not the Gift of diſ-* "*cerning Spirits*; that is, are not *infallible*. This, "I ſay, is a Power no Church, not even that of "*Rome*, ever pretended to, and that their Abſo- "lutions are then only ſuppoſed to be valid, when "the *Key does not err*." And, therefore, it is unjuſt and abſurd, in the Enemies of Church-Authority, to impute ſuch groſs Abſurdities to us, as they plainly do, when they oppoſe theſe Abſolutions in ſuch a pompous Manner, as can have no Senſe in it, upon any other Suppoſition.

This is the Subſtance of what I ſaid, upon this Head. His Lordſhip is ſo difficult, that he is offended at my Making the Suppoſition, *That poſſibly we do not know the preciſe Meaning of the Words, as ſpoken to the Apoſtles*, and eſpies in it a Contradiction; ſo dangerous is it to make the leaſt Conceſſions to ſome Adverſaries. And, becauſe I ſay, the Succeſſors of the Apoſtles could not *abſolve abſolutely*, for that they could not *diſcern the Spirits* of Men, he makes me ſay, the Apoſtles could; whereas, in Truth, I ſaid no ſuch thing; I did not, in the leaſt, enter into the Queſtion, Whether the Apoſtles had that Gift, or not, in ſuch Manner and Meaſure, as to know the Hearts of

all

all Men, with Reſpect to whom they were to uſe the Powers granted by this Commiſſion? I am, indeed, ſo far from thinking they had this Power ordinarily, that I am fully ſatisfied they had it not. Upon St. *Peter*'s Sermon, in the Second of the *Acts*, there were made about three thouſand Converts, *who were baptized into Chriſt for the Remiſſion of their Sins*. Did the Apoſtles look into, and diſcover the Hearts of all theſe Men, before they would admit them to the Benefit of Baptiſm? Nothing like it; they received all that offered themſelves, if there was no Reaſon to ſuſpect their Sincerity; and *as many, as gladly received the Word, were baptized*, ver. 41. and, if they were truly penitent, they did in that Sacrament receive *Remiſſion of their Sins*. But whether they all were ſo, nobody, I believe, will ſay St. *Peter* or any one elſe knew, but God only. But, becauſe they had not ſuch Knowledge of their Hearts, will it be ſaid, they had not Power or Authority to *remit*, or, which comes to the ſame Thing, to declare that the Sins of all true Believers were remitted? The Act is not the leſs properly called *authoritative*, becauſe it is not attended with *Infallibility*, though his Lordſhip perpetually confounds theſe two together, as if they were inſeparable; forgetting, it ſhould ſeem, thoſe memorable Words of his Maſter *Chillingworth* to Mr. *K.* "Methinks, ſo "ſubtle a Man, as you are, ſhould eaſily appre-"hend a wide Difference between Authority to do "a Thing, and Infallibility in doing it; and "again, between a conditional Infallibility, and "an abſolute." Every Act is an authoritative Act,

that the Miniſters of *Chriſt* are authorized to do, in his Name. The Apoſtles could ordinarily do no more to thoſe who deſired to be baptized, than *Philip* did to the *Eunuch*, *Acts* viii. 37. ask them, *if they believe with all their Heart?* And, if they anſwer, *they do*, they may be baptized; by which Act they were not only admitted into the Number of the *Faithful*, but their Sins were waſhed away alſo, according to thoſe Words of *Ananias* to St. *Paul*, Acts xxii. 16. *ariſe and be baptized, and waſh away thy Sins.* And, if the Apoſtles in Baptiſm remitted Sins only conditionally, and upon Suppoſition of a true Repentance, then they did no more than their Succeſſors might do; and the ſame Act, in their Succeſſors, is as valid as it was in them. And as the Apoſtles Refuſal of Baptiſm to Perſons, not qualified to receive it, would have been the *Retention of the Sins* of ſuch Perſons, ſo is the like Refuſal now in thoſe that are the proper Miniſters of the ſame Sacrament. And what is ſaid of the Effect of admitting to, or of repelling any Perſons from Baptiſm, will equally hold of receiving into the Church thoſe who, for their Sins, were caſt out, or of caſting out thoſe who were in. They, who have the Spiritual Government of the Church, have a Right to *remit the Sins* of thoſe who truly repent of the Sins for which they fell under the Cenſures of the Church, and to *retain the Sins* of thoſe, who, having fallen under its Cenſures, continue impenitent; for, what they do *on Earth*, our Saviour hath declared the ſame to be done *in Heaven*. And that this is the Senſe in which this Place in St. *John*, and the

the two others, in St. *Matthew*, were underſtood by the ancient Church, is ſo well known, that I need bring no Vouchers for it.

But his Lordſhip can, by no Means, allow of this, for weighty Reaſons; 1. Becauſe it is abſurd that weak, fallible Men ſhould have a Power of *remitting Sins*, and that God ſhould be obliged to *ratify* their Cenſures. But this Objection is fully anſwered, by the Abſolution being given only *conditionally*. If the Governors of the Church happen to be miſtaken, either in releaſing, or receiving into the Church thoſe that ſhould be bound, or kept out; or, on the other Hand, in *binding* thoſe they ſhould looſe, and not admitting or ejecting thoſe that ought to be received or kept in the Church; they pretend not to ſay, that God has obliged himſelf, by any Promiſe, to ratify ſuch Cenſures. Which Senſe of the Church cannot be better expreſſed, than it was very early done by St. *Cyprian*, Ep. 55. *Neque enim præjudicamus Domino judicaturo, quo minus ſi pœnitentiam plenam & juſtam peccatoris invenerit, tunc ratum faciat, quod à nobis fuerit hic ſtatutum. Si vero nos aliquis pœnitentiæ ſimulatione deluſerit; Deus qui non deridetur, & qui cor hominis intuetur, de his quæ nos minus perſpeximus judicet, & ſervorum ſententiam Dominus emendet.* And, agreeably hereto, the *Schools* teach, that the Paſtors of the Church, in *Penitence*, have only a dependent, miniſterial Power of looſing Men from Sin, but that the primitive, imperial, original Power is God's. "God's Power," ſays Archbiſhop *Bramhal*, ſpeaking in their Language, in his *Defence of* Proteſtants

Ordination, p. 986. " is absolute, *ad sententiandum* " *simpliciter*, without *IF's*. Man's Power is only " conditional, *ad sententiandum si*, to loose a Man, " if he be truly contrite and aptly disposed." And *p.* 993. he speaks thus: " To forgive Sins is " no more proper to God, than to work Wonders " above the Course of Nature; the one is com- " municable as the other. *Matt.* ix. 5. the Priest " absolves, or, to say more properly, God absolves " by the Priest. God remits sovereignly, impe- " rially, primitively, absolutely; the Priest's Pow- " er is derivative, delegate, dependent, minister- " rial, conditional." But, when they are not mistaken, their Censures or Absolutions are then valid before God, and are confirmed by him; then their Judging of an Offender ought, as *Tertullian* has well expressed it, to be looked upon as *summum futuri judicii præjudicium*; agreeably to what he says, in another Place, *cùm eum damnat dedendum Satanæ, damnatoris Dei præco est*. And the Sinner may from thence see what Judgment, if he continues as he is, he must expect at the Last Day; for God has given his Sentence against him by the Voice of his Church.

But the Allowing or Disallowing this Power to the Church does not really, even in his Lordship's Opinion, turn upon the Governors of it being fallible or infallible. Their Fallibility is insisted on only, as a pretty Subject to declaim upon; were they infallible, his Lordship would still be of the same Opinion, that this pretended Power of the Church is no Power; it is Amusement only, and perfectly insignificant, though their

Judgment

Judgment be true, and the Offender be juſtly cut off from the Church, or, upon Repentance, juſtly reſtored to it. His Lordſhip has nothing leſs than a Demonſtration, to prove the Truth of this Aſſertion; which is, *That what the Church does makes not the leaſt Alteration in the Man's Condition, in the Eyes of God. He is exactly the ſame, in the Sight of God, before the Judgment of the Church, as after it.* Behold now the Conſequences of this mighty Demonſtration! Firſt, if it be true, then the Senſe, in which the Church has always underſtood theſe three famous Places of Scripture now before us, neither is, nor poſſibly can be, the true Senſe of them; thus ſtupid have the Body of *Chriſtians*, and their Governors, in all Places and all Ages been. They have not underſtood even thoſe Places of Scripture, which it moſt concerned them not to be miſtaken in, the very Commiſſions our Saviour gave to his Apoſtles; and, in Conſequence of this Miſtake, have all along uſurped Powers they had no Right to. This muſt be very agreeable News to the Enemies of *Chriſtianity*; but, ſure, its Friends cannot hear it, without Horror; for, if the Church could be miſtaken in this Point, what is there in which one may be ſure it could not be miſtaken? Did our Saviour come from Heaven to found a Society, that had never Senſe enough to underſtand their Charter? Did the Spirit, that was given *to lead them into all Truth*, fail them in ſo neceſſary a Point, in which the Life and Eſſence of their Society conſiſted, that the Rulers of the Church ſhould not know the Extent

and Meaning of the Powers by which they were to govern it?

This is one Conſequence of his Lordſhip's Demonſtration; which, if it be good, the Church hath always affixed to theſe important Places a Senſe which it is impoſſible ſhould be true; for, if it could, then it is poſſible that what is, in this Senſe, bound by Men, may be bound by God alſo; and, conſequently, ſomething done by God, that was not done before; and an Alteration would thereby be made in the Man's Condition, in the Eyes of God, which his Lordſhip declares to be impoſſible. For if, upon the Cenſure of the Church, a Sinner be *bound* by God, then, before it, he was not actually ſo bound; and, therefore, an Alteration is made in his Condition, from *not binding* to *binding*; and it is the ſame, with Reſpect to a Man's being *looſed* by the Church. His Lordſhip may, perhaps, think it ſome Defence of himſelf, for rejecting the common Interpretation of theſe Places of Scripture, that they are confeſſed to be difficult, and that the Power in Diſpute is too important and weighty a Matter to be made to depend upon *obſcure* Paſſages. But it ſhould be conſidered, that the Obſcurity of the Scriptures is oftentimes accidental only; and ariſes purely from the Diſtance of Time we are at from the Writing of them, and the Alteration that has been made in Language and Cuſtoms, on which many Times the Senſe of certain *Idioms* of Speech intirely depends. Diſtance of Place likewiſe often creates an Obſcurity in Paſſages, that otherwiſe would be very eaſy to be underſtood. And it may, therefore,

fore, very well be, that the Paſſages now before us might be very eaſy and intelligible to thoſe who lived in or near thoſe Times and Places, when and where they were writ, though now it be difficult to fix the certain and preciſe Meaning of them, without having Recourſe to the Light given us by the ancient Writers of the Church. But the Imputation, here caſt upon the *Chriſtian* Church, is not barely its miſtaking the Senſe of ſome difficult Paſſages, and that in a very capital Point; they have not only fixed upon them a falſe Senſe, but a Senſe, in his Lordſhip's Opinion, ſo big with Abſurdity and Contradiction, that they muſt have been no better than *Idiots* and *Changelings*, not to ſee, at firſt Sight, that it could not poſſibly be true.

But this is not the worſt Conſequence of this *Demonſtration*; his Lordſhip is forced, in Virtue of it, to deny this Power even to our Saviour himſelf, and to affirm that he neither did, nor could, forgive Sins, in the obvious Senſe of the Words, while he was on Earth, in expreſs Contradiction to the plain Words of Scripture. Where our Saviour does not only often remit Sins in theſe Words, *thy Sins are forgiven thee*, but, in the Caſe of the Man ſick of the Palſy, *Matt.* ix. 6. he does, in the fulleſt Terms, declare, That *the Son of Man hath Power on Earth to forgive Sins*; which we muſt obſerve is ſaid, in Anſwer to thoſe who thought it Blaſphemy in him to aſſume ſuch a Power. *Why doth this Man thus ſpeak Blaſphemies? Who can forgive Sins but God only?* as it is expreſſed *Mar.* ii. 7. Is there any Room to doubt, what

what they, who uſed ſuch Words, meant by them? Did they not mean Forgiving Sins, in the obvious Senſe of the Words? Or, Was the obvious Senſe of theſe Words, in thoſe Days, different from the obvious Senſe of the ſame Words, now? But if they, who murmured at our Saviour's aſſuming this Power, underſtood the Words, in the obvious Senſe, Did not our Saviour, in his Anſwer, underſtand them, in the ſame? Did he not ſpeak *ad idem?* Did he change the Terms of the Queſtion, and give a deluſive Anſwer? Was it agreeable to his Holy and Divine Character, to affect ſuch Language, whereby he could not but know, he ſhould incur the Suſpicion of Blaſphemy, and to uſe Words that, in their obvious Senſe, carry in them ſo great a Power, to expreſs another, not only much leſs, but of a very different Nature? Had he really done ſo, he had impoſed upon thoſe to whom he ſpake, and had aſſumed a Prerogative he had no Right to (for Men's Claims muſt be conſtrued by the plain and obvious Senſe of their Words, where they do not expreſly caution to the contrary;) and their Charge had been juſt, in ſaying he blaſphemed, if he really *could not forgive Sins.* Nothing, therefore, can be more certain, than that our Saviour, while on Earth, had Power to forgive Sins: Πιστοῦται μέν τοι καὶ βεβαιοῖ ὁ Κύριος διὰ τοῦ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῦσαι, τὸ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ [αὐτὸν] ἰάσασθαι, διὰ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς τὸ ἀφανὲς βεβαιώσας, ſays *Theophylact.*

But his Lordſhip, in Defiance of theſe Conſiderations, adheres to his Demonſtration, and will by no Means allow, that to *forgive Sins* means to

forgive

forgive Sins; no, our Saviour had no ſuch Power. What the Scripture calls a *Power* was really "a "*ſupernatural Knowledge* only, by which *he* knew "*that God was going to ſhew Mercy to the Man.* "Our *Saviour*, *knowing* the Caſe of the Man, "aſſured him of God's Forgiveneſs; and *the Son* "*of Man's Power to forgive Sins on Earth* was "plainly to *declare* this to him, of whom he cer- "tainly and infallibly *knew* it to be true. This "aroſe wholly from his *infallible Knowledge* of the "Will of God, with Reſpect to that particular "Perſon. *Preſerv.* p. 94, 95." Such Work does the Biſhop make with Scripture, ſo free does he make with *Chriſt* and his Church, while he indulges his own Fancy, and lays ſo much Weight on a pretended Demonſtration. And I ſee not but, by Virtue of it, he may go ſtill farther in the ſame Way, and declare, that *Chriſt* can no more forgive Sins in Heaven, than he could on Earth; nay, that God himſelf cannot forgive Sins; and that if he ſhould declare, by a Voice from Heaven, to a penitent Sinner, that his Sins are forgiven, we muſt be obliged to put another Senſe upon the Words; for the Man's Condition, which is the great Demonſtration, is not altered by it a Tittle; nay, one Step farther, he might, by the ſame Reaſon, deny wholly to God, even at the Laſt Day, all Power of remitting or retaining Sins; for Condemnation or Abſolution depends not on the Sentence of God, but on the Merit or Demerit of the Man; no Alteration is made in his Condition by the Sentence, it was the ſame before the Sentence as after it; God has no

Power

Power in the Caſe, he is the Inſtrument only of *Neceſſity* and *Fate*. Theſe, I think, are the neceſſary Conſequences of his Lordſhip's Demonſtration, if it be a good Proof that the Sentence of the Church, though juſt and ratified in Heaven, is really of no Effect, nor an Argument of any Power given to it. And thus, by the Help of this, and his other Demonſtration about Sincerity, *equal Degrees of which, as ſuch, the Favour of God muſt equally follow*, his Lordſhip may demonſtrate away not only *Chriſtianity*, but even all Natural Religion.

How much more would it become weak and fallible Men to ſuſpect their own Reaſonings about God, than thus to fly in the Face of the *Catholick* Church of all Ages, and even of *Chriſt* himſelf, and the plain Declarations he has made in Scripture, I may ſay, even of God himſelf. If God be a free Agent (and that he muſt be, or elſe he is, properly ſpeaking, no Agent at all) has he not a Right to have Mercy on whom he will have Mercy? And may he not forgive the Sins of Men, when he will, and by what Inſtruments he will? *Nimirum præſcribes Deo, quibus temporibus, aut modis, aut locis de familiâ ſuâ judicet; quaſi non & præjudicare judici liceat.* Tertul. Scorp. *c.* 6. God may give *Infallibility* to Men, and make their Act his own, and declare to the World, that, on whom they pronounce Forgiveneſs, he forgives alſo; and, where he has not given *Infallibility*, he may give them Directions for the Uſe of this Power, and declare, that, when they *remit* the Sins of any according to thoſe Directions, they are

remitted,

remitted. But, if he either *bind* or *loose* Men by the Church, he does something that, till then, was not done, and an Alteration in the Condition of Men is thereby made; then Sentence is passed upon them. Now the Condition of a *Criminal* after Sentence cannot be said to be the same it was before, though he might have Reason enough to apprehend what it would be.

I would beg his Lordship, instead of indulging his own Reasonings so far, to consider that *Christianity* is an *Institution*, adapted by God in the best Manner to keep Men in their Duty, or bring them back to it; that it is οἰκονομία, a Dispensation, in which God condescends to the Infirmities of Men, and deals with them in a Way suited to their Weakness and Capacities, and, therefore, does not contain in it only such Things as are, by the mere Light of Reason, deducible from the Nature of Good and Evil, or from the Nature of God; but takes in also several other Things, which are not, in themselves, absolutely necessary, as Fences and *Preservatives*, for the more effectual securing Men's Obedience to those that are. Such are necessary Ingredients in an Institution of Religion; and such an Institution the Divine Wisdom judged necessary for the Reformation and Redemption of Mankind. For *Christianity* is not calculated for a few, but for the Body of Mankind, to whose Use nothing could be better accommodated. For the Generality of Men are strangely apt to flatter themselves in their Sins, and promise themselves Security, because Vengeance is not immediately executed upon every evil Work.

Work. What, now, could be better fitted to awaken Men from this fatal Security, and to bring them to a Senſe of the heinous Demerit of their Sins, than this Power given to the Church of *Binding* and *Looſing*? To offer certain Pardon to thoſe who repent, and embrace the Faith of *Chriſt*; and to denounce the Wrath of God on thoſe who, after their Admiſſion into the Church, fall back into their old Sins; and again to reſtore them, upon true Repentance? When a Sinner is juſtly fallen under the Sentence of the Church, ſo as to be ejected out of it; whatever he thought before, from that Time, he ſhould look upon himſelf as certainly under the Sentence of God himſelf: On the other Hand, when a Sinner is humble and repents, and is again received into the Church, he may then lay aſide all deſponding Thoughts, and be aſſured he is then in the Favour of God. And there is great Reaſon to preſume, that their Sentence ordinarily will be juſt. For, as fallible as Men are, if the Governors of the Church are careful in the Diſcharge of this important Truſt, in common Caſes, it will not be difficult for them not to be miſtaken.

But what News, it will be ſaid, is it, that *the Sins of him that repents ſhall be forgiven*, and that he who does *not repent ſhall be damned*; which is, in Effect, all that this Power comes to? I anſwer, very great, if we conſider it in its true Light. To which End, we muſt go back to the Beginnings of the Goſpel, and behold the Apoſtles declaring this to a ſinful World, and proving by Miracles that they had Authority from God to do

ſo.

ſo. Was this Declaring nothing, but what the World knew before? Did Men certainly know, that an Atonement could be made to the offended Majeſty of Heaven for their Sins? Or that God would pardon them, without any Atonement made for them; and that they had a Right to Pardon, upon an imperfect Repentance? The Sacrifices and other Ways of Expiation, uſed by all Parts of the Heathen World, ſufficiently ſhew they were far enough from any ſuch Thoughts; and ſo, indeed, does what followed upon the Apoſtles making this Declaration to them; for what Joy did it give to ſinful Men, to have ſo full an Aſſurance, ſo unexpected, and which they had ſo little Title to, given them, that, if they would repent and be baptized, their Sins, their many and crying Sins, ſhould not only certainly be forgiven, but immediately be waſhed away in Baptiſm? What Numbers were there, that, upon the Hearing this Goſpel, theſe glad Tidings, without Delay renounced their Sins, and embraced the Mercy offered? Three Thouſand, at once, we read of in the Second of the *Acts*. Such Power and Efficacy had this Meſſage from Heaven upon the World, when firſt promulged to them. It was ſo great and ſuch welcome News, that great Multitudes every where gladly liſtened to it; and, as they quitted their Sins to be admitted into the Number of the *Faithful*, ſo did they ſteadily continue in their new Life, that they might not be again caſt out, or forfeit the Privileges their *Chriſtianity* had intitled them to, by breaking the Conditions on which they were admitted; which, in the early

Ages

Ages of the Church, they could not eaſily do, without being ſeverely reminded of it by the Vigour of the *Diſcipline* that was then exerciſed. The ſtrange Turn, and the thorough Change, the Doctrine and Diſcipline of the Church, firſt wrought, and then preſerved in the Minds of vaſt Numbers, who had before been Men of diſſolute Lives, and profligately wicked, made *Origen*, in his Diſpute with *Celſus*, admit, as true, the Calumny thrown upon *Chriſtians*, of Μὴ ἐξέταζε, ἀλλὰ πίστευσον: *Do not examine, but believe*; for it is better, ſays he, for Men to believe a Religion that has viſibly ſo good an Effect on Men, and then *examine*; than for Men to live out of it, and loſe the Benefit of being reclaimed from their evil Ways, till they have *examined* it.

This, I hope, may ſhew, that the Power the Apoſtles had to offer Men, in the Name of God and *Chriſt*, Remiſſion of Sins, though miniſterial only, was a great Power, and that a right Application of it made an Alteration in the Condition of Men, in the Sight of God; that Men, who before were under the Guilt of their Sins, were, from the Time they ſincerely embraced the Pardon offered, no longer ſo; and that their Sins, by Baptiſm, were effectually remitted; and, conſequently, they, who were intruſted with this Sacrament, were intruſted with the Power of *Remitting Sins*. But, if this was a great Power, when lodged in the Apoſtles, it is the very ſame in the Hands of their Succeſſors, and Length of Time makes not the leaſt Alteration; it is not at all the leſs, becauſe it is not now new, or becauſe, by the

the Publication of the Books of the *New Teſtament*, all who are *Chriſtians* know the Power given to the Miniſters of *Chriſt*, as well as they do themſelves. We now all know, from the greateſt to the leaſt, that Pardon is offered by *Chriſt* to all that truly repent, and that, unleſs Man do repent, they ſhall not be pardoned; and that the Governors of the Church muſt, in their Cenſures, act agreeably to the Rules preſcribed to them; and that an unjuſt Sentence will not be ratified in Heaven: But we know by the ſame Scriptures, that a juſt Sentence ſhall be ratified. And this ought to have, and will have a great Influence on the Minds of Men, where it is thoroughly believed; they will conclude themſelves, from the juſt Cenſure of the Church, under the Diſpleaſure of God, ſince, where the Church does not judge wrong, the Sentence of God concurs with it, and both are one. For though the Diſpleaſure of God is not properly cauſed by the Cenſure of the Church (for an impenitent Sinner will not be damned at the Laſt Day, becauſe he is excommunicated by the Church, but becauſe he deſerved to be ſo excommunicated, according to the Terms of the New Covenant) yet the Cenſure of the Church, when juſt, is of that Efficacy, that the Sentence the Sinner will receive from God (the Declaration of which would otherwiſe have been ſuſpended, and which the Sinner might flatter himſelf, from the Mercy of God, who is perfectly free and infinitely good, would be remitted) is thereby actually denounced. God now judges him by the Voice of the Church, judging in the Perſon of *Chriſt*, and according

to his Appointment, and he has no Hope left of God's being reconciled to him, unleſs he be firſt reconciled to his Church, or is in a proper Diſpoſition for it, and do his Part towards it. The Governors of the Church in this Caſe are, as *Tertullian* ſays of the Civil Powers, *Miniſtri divini judicii, hic etiam de nocentibus præjudicantes.* And it is the ſame, with Reſpect to the *Looſing* and Remitting Sins. "They are authorized to declare "God's Pleaſure unto ſuch as believe and repent, "and, in his Name, to certify them, and give "Aſſurance to their Conſciences, that their Sins "are forgiven. For though others may bring "glad Tidings of good Things to the penitent "Sinner, as truly as they do; yet neither can "they do it with the ſame Authority, neither is it "to be expected, that they ſhould do it with the "ſame Power, ſuch Aſſurance, and ſuch full Satiſ-"faction to the afflicted Conſcience." Which are the Words of Archbiſhop *Uſher*, in his Anſwer to the *Jeſuits* Challenge, *p.* 97, 99. This is the Power God has, for the Good of Men, given to his Church; this the Sanction annexed to their Sentence, when they judge in Truth and Righteouſneſs.

I have been the longer upon this Power of *Binding* and *Looſing*, or of *Remitting* and *Retaining* Sins, both on Account of the Importance of the Texts themſelves, and becauſe I thought the Clearing of it, as far as I could, to be very pertinent to the preſent Diſpute concerning Church-Authority. I am not ſenſible there is any Thing, in the Explication I have given, that can be juſtly

thought

thought to be impoſſible or abſurd; any Thing that is inconſiſtent with the Honour of God, or that is not well ſuited to the Good of Men. Nor can I find any other that agrees ſo well with the Words of Scripture, conſidered by themſelves, or as underſtood by the *Catholic* Church. For, as to the Abſolutions of the Church, whether they are *operative*, or only *declarative*, that is a Diſpute I meddle not with, though it appears to me to be little more than a Diſpute about Words. But, if any one think I am miſtaken in the Interpretation I have given of theſe Texts, I can truly ſay, I ſhall, from any Hand, be glad to ſee a better.

In the mean Time, I will add to what I have already ſaid, that the Sentence of God concurs with the Cenſure of his Church, in the Caſes of *Hereſy* and *Schiſm*, as well as other Offences againſt his Laws; becauſe, when they are what their Names import, they equally proceed from a Pravity of Mind, and, therefore, equally put the Perſons, that offend in either of them, out of his Favour, and equally call for Declarations of his Diſpleaſure, or rather more, as by their Contagion they do more Miſchief to Religion, and ſpread their Infection farther than open Immoralities, which have not the Veil the others have, to cover them. And it is in vain pretended, that this is aſſuming a Dominion over the Conſciences of Men. The Governors of the Church have as much a Right to compare the Actions of *Chriſtians* with the Rules of their Society, as Civil Governors have to compare Men's Actions with the Laws of their

Governments, and to pronounce as they find. Men's miſguided Conſciences may prompt them to Perjury and Murther, and other the moſt execrable Crimes; but that will not exempt them from the Puniſhments due to thoſe Crimes; the Laws both of God and Man ſuppoſe they might have known better, had it not been their own Fault. And, as to Matters of Religion, though every Diverſity of Opinion be not *Hereſy*, yet ſure we are, there are *Hereſies*, and Conſcience, no doubt, may, and will be pretended for them; ſo likewiſe, though all Separation be not *Schiſm*, ſome certainly is, and, as ſuch, is a grievous Sin; and, therefore, theſe Offences come under the Cognizance of the Church as truly as any other, and the Privileges of the Goſpel may be forfeited, and the Diſpleaſure of God incurred by them, as well as by the moſt open Immoralities. As to the Church's Power of deciding in theſe Matters, I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak to that Point hereafter.

To return now to his Lordſhip, who has a particular Skill at proving that his Adverſaries, all of them, contradict themſelves, and agree with him, whether they will or no; after he has endeavoured to faſten upon me ſeveral Contradictions, in what I had ſaid concerning the *Remitting and Retaining* Sins, he now finds that I am at perfect Agreement with him; for I have ſaid, *That it cannot be the Meaning of this Text, that the Succeſſors of the Apoſtles can remit Sins abſolutely*, and this in Words, it ſeems, not very different from his. Upon this, his Lordſhip aſks, "Why he has not as much Right to

"obſerve

" obſerve what is not the Meaning of the *Text*, " as I have? That I myſelf raiſe the *Phantom*, and " then attempt to deſtroy it; that he has done " no more; that I do the very Thing I condemn " in him; that my Cenſure muſt equally fall on " both of us, let us, therefore, be pardoned to- " gether." Is not this very pleaſant? Are not the two Caſes extremely alike? He obſerves, that Men have not, from this *Text*, a Power of remitting Sins *abſolutely*; but to what Purpoſe does he make the Obſervation? To expoſe and vilify the Uſe of all Abſolutions, as mere *human Engines*, and devoid of all Authority from *Chriſt*, and to render the *Clergy* of all *Chriſtian* Churches odious, as if they pretended to ſuch an abſurd and enormous Claim. I make the ſame Obſervatioa, but to juſt the contrary Purpoſe; to ſhew the Injuſtice of ſuch an Imputation, ſince no Church does, or ever did pretend to it. This his Lordſhip calls Agreeing with him; juſt as *Black* and *White*, or any other the moſt contrary Things. Nothing is more common in a Diſpute, than to agree with an Adverſary in one Premiſſe, in order to infer a Concluſion directly contrary to his; and ſuch is our Agreement here.

As to the *Romiſh* Doctrines concerning the Nature of true Repentance, whether they are miſtaken in it, or not, is not the preſent Queſtion. What I have affirmed is, that all Churches, even that of *Rome*, have allowed that their Abſolutions were valid conditionally only, *clave non errante*; which is a Confeſſion the *Key may err*, and, when it does, the Abſolution is null. This I have af-

firmed, and his Lordſhip has ſaid nothing to ſhew, the Affirmation is not true.

I have now gone through what his Lordſhip had to ſay upon theſe three famous Texts, which have, hitherto, been looked on as the chief Foundations of all ſpiritual Authority, but which his Lordſhip thinks he has effectually explained away; ſo that no Degree of Authority whatever can be deduced from them, for the Uſe of the preſent Governors of the *Chriſtian* Church. This is the diſtinct Explication he promiſed of theſe important Paſſages; this the Reſult of his matureſt Thoughts; which has left every Thing juſt as it was, no one Difficulty cleared, no new Light ſtruck out, not ſo much as an Attempt towards it; not an Expreſſion, not a Word explained; in ſhort, what his Lordſhip has done, upon theſe Texts, is ſo far from anſwering the Expectation he has raiſed, that it is below the loweſt Commentator I ever looked into; which, I preſume, is owing to the great Contempt his Lordſhip every-where expreſſes for what is called *Learning*.

With theſe Texts his Lordſhip finiſhes what he had promiſed, in the firſt Article of his Title Page, *his Examination of the Texts that relate to Church-Authority*. The next and only *ſpecifick* Article in it is, *The Doctrine of Sincerity explained and defended*. Surely, his Lordſhip was hard put to it to furniſh out a Title, that this was made a Part of it, which I had given ſo little Occaſion for, that I could not preſently recollect I had given any: All I had ſaid, upon *Sincerity*, being contained in one

very

very ſhort Paragraph; which I take Notice of here, becauſe I intend not to tire either the Reader or myſelf ſo much, as I muſt, if I ſhould go ſo far into his Lordſhip's long Anſwer.

I have already, in the Poſtſcript to my *Sermon*, ſaid as much upon that Matter, as I think neceſſary in Defence of myſelf; and, therefore, ſhall only add here, that, though *Sincerity* cannot be too much recommended, as a neceſſary Qualification to render all our Religious Actions acceptable to God, there cannot be a more dangerous and pernicious Doctrine, than to teach Men to think it will be accepted in Lieu of all other Duties; and to put their whole Juſtification upon it. *Sincerity* is an Ingredient in all Virtues, but is not a Virtue by itſelf, nor by any *Moraliſt* put into the Liſt of Virtues, in the Senſe his Lordſhip underſtands it, but only as it is oppoſed to *Hypocriſy*; much leſs have either Philoſophers or *Divines* thought it a *Succedaneum* to other Virtues, or that it might ſupply the Want of them. To be *ſincerely* good and virtuous is a Commendation; but to be *ſincerely* wicked is new Language, and was never, before, thought commendable, or able to juſtify a Man. His Lordſhip, indeed, tells us, *Sincerity*, in his Senſe, takes in the Uſe of all proper Means, in Order to make a true Judgment, and to be rightly informed; but, if this be not repeated every Time the Word is uſed, the Danger from this Doctrine cannot be ſufficiently guarded againſt; for, as the learned Biſhop of *Oxford* has truly obſerved, *Sincerity*, in common Language, means the *preſent Perſuaſion* of the

Mind; and, since the *People*, whom his Lordship has taken into his Protection, will, no doubt, understand common Words in their common Sense, they will think themselves sincere, when they follow their Persuasion; and, in Virtue of his Lordship's Doctrine, will believe they are justified in the Commission of the greatest Villanies that Zeal and Bigotry can prompt them to, without due Care to be better informed; whereas, in Truth, the Rules of our Duty are the Laws of God and Man; and those we must obey, at our Peril: Conscience, when we offend, can plead for Pardon no otherwise than Ignorance; and, what Allowances ought, in Equity, to be made to that, God will judge at the Last Day; and, in the mean Time, they will judge on Earth, who govern under him. But I shall enter no farther into this Subject, which has been so largely and so well argued by Mr. *Stebbing*, who has shewn so good a Knowledge of Scripture, and so much Exactness and Acuteness in Reasoning, as must recommend him to the Esteem of all Persons that do not think Learning in a Clergyman to be a Crime. This Writer has examined his Lordship's grand Proposition, *That the Favour of God equally follows equal Degrees of Sincerity*, so thoroughly, that nothing seems to be wanting to expose it in a fuller Light, but to consider it in a *Mathematical* Way, and make some *Equations* upon it; which I have wondered has not been done, and was glad to see a Line, in Mr. *Stebbing*'s last Piece, look that Way, where he illustrates the Terms of his Lordship's Proposition, by those of *Euclid*, *Æqua-*

les

les rectæ lineæ æqualiter distant à centro. I will only add (which I find Mr. *Stebbing* also, in his last Book has observed) that the Gospel of Christ knows no Sincerity in Infidelity, or in a Refusal to believe the Gospel, when it is sufficiently proposed.

Having shewn what Foundation there is, in Scripture, for asserting to the Governors of the Church an Authority in *Ecclesiastical* Affairs, I thought it proper, for Method's Sake, to take Notice, who the Persons are, in whom, agreeably to Scripture, and the earliest Antiquity, this Authority is lodged; but, this making no Part of the Dispute in the present Controversy, I did but just touch upon it, in a very few Lines, and contented myself with observing, that neither the *Presbyterian* nor *Independent* Schemes have, either in Scripture or Antiquity, any Ground for them, but that the Apostolical and Primitive Government of the Church was by Bishops, and their Presbyters. This is a Point has been so fully proved by several eminent Writers of our own Church, that that Dispute may now be looked on, as at an End; but his Lordship cannot prevail with himself, either to own *Episcopacy* to be Apostolical, or that there is any Obligation on Christians to retain it; nor will he express the least Dislike of the other Schemes; but, on the contrary, shews plainly enough, he is offended at my Censure of them. I observed farther, with Respect to the mere Authority of a single Pastor, that the Scripture knows no such Thing as a single *Independent* Presbyter, but speaks of them always in the *Plural*, as I shewed in seven

or

or eight Inſtances, in which I can ſee no Pretence for complaining of Obſcurity, or in what goes before. But his Lordſhip, when he was writing this Section, had ſuch a Cloud upon his Underſtanding, that, to him, he ſays, *it is all Darkneſs*; and ſo leaves it. But this Darkneſs is no Darkneſs to any one who allows that the ordinary Powers of the Apoſtles were derived to their Succeſſors, and that Biſhops, with their Presbyters, are thoſe Succeſſors: And, therefore, one may from hence conclude, that his Lordſhip allows neither of theſe Points; and thinks, that, becauſe it has been a Diſpute, whether theſe two Aſſertions be true, it muſt ever be ſo. And of this he gives an Intimation, when, upon what I had ſaid, he obſerves, *that what has remained, through many Ages, a Doubt, among the beſt and greateſt* Commentators, *may be, at once, happily ſettled by the mere* Affirmation *of a learned Man.* I would be glad to know, through how many Ages his Lordſhip thinks this has been a Diſpute; or, whether *Epiſcopacy* was not, till the ſixteenth Century, the univerſally received, and uninterrupted Form of Church-Government; and whether, when a Point has been thoroughly and demonſtratively proved, it may not be taken and ſpoken of as ſuch, but as if it were a Thing ſtill in the dark. If it may, his Lordſhip's Cenſure upon my Affirmation is very groundleſs and unreaſonable.

His Lordſhip obſerves with ſome Pleaſure, that the Government, I have affirmed to be the primitive Government by *Biſhops and Presbyters*, does not agree well with the Conſtitution of the Church of

of *England*, and ſuppoſes I cannot poſſibly have in my Thoughts the two Houſes of *Convocation*. It is ſomething extraordinary, that a Biſhop ſhould want to be told, that the *Dean* and *Chapter* are his ſtanding *Presbytery*; and that, beſides this, he has frequent Opportunities of conſulting his *Presbyters* in his *Viſitations*, either in Perſon, or by his proper Officers; it is a Sign his Lordſhip has not been yet at *Bangor*. I acknowledge the Conſulting with theſe ſtanding Presbyteries is grown into Diſuſe, but it is, becauſe there is now little Occaſion for it, the Affairs of the Church being brought into that Method, that every Thing goes on in its proper Channel; and the Biſhop has ordinarily nothing to do, that requires any ſuch Conſultation, or that he wants to know the freſh Senſe of his *Preſbyters* upon. And, for the ſame Reaſon, the annual *Synods* of the *Clergy*, that were anciently held in each *Dioceſe*, have been laid aſide, there being in a ſettled State of Things no Uſe of them, ſufficient to balance the Trouble and Expence of ſuch Meetings: And, if any Inconvenience ſhould ariſe from this Diſuſe, the Defect is eaſily ſupplied by the frequent Meetings of the *Biſhops* and *Clergy* in *Convocation*.

Another Thing, his Lordſhip wants to have proved, is, how the Powers, veſted in the *Biſhops* and *Presbyters*, can *admit the Sanction or Controul of the Civil Government*. For *that it is not*, he thinks, *enough for me to affirm as I do, that it is not neceſſary, that this Power ſhould, in every Part of it, be kept ſtill in the ſame Hands*. Had his Lordſhip had any Thing in View but Caviling,

and

and Starting Difficulties, he would not have expected that all the Queſtions, that may be raiſed concerning Church-Authority, ſhould come within the Compaſs of a ſingle Sermon; nor would he run Diviſions upon one Controverſy, when the preſent Diſpute is about another. The Point now in Debate is not, what Right the Magiſtrate has in Matters relating to the Church, but whether there is not an Authority veſted in the Governors of the Church by *Chriſt*, to govern the People committed to their Care in ſpiritual Affairs.

But let us hear what his Lordſhip has to ſay. I ſaid it was not neceſſary that the Power, neceſſary for the Government of the Church, ſhould, in every Part of it, be ſtill in the ſame Hands. This Sort of Plea, ſays his Lordſhip, will ſerve both for the *Independent* and the *Preſbyterian* Schemes. And he ſpeaks, no Doubt, as he thinks; but, had he thought more, he would have ſeen that no two Things can be more different, than theſe that he takes to be alike. For he then would have obſerved, 1. that no Part of the Powers properly *ſpiritual*, ſuch as that of Preaching, Adminiſtring the Sacraments, Impoſition of Hands, Ordination, and the Denouncing of Church-Cenſures, are veſted in the Civil Magiſtrate. And 2. that the Power, which I ſay is not neceſſary to be in every Part of it ſtill kept in the ſame Hands, is ſuch a Power as the Church has a Right to from the *Nature of Society* for its Preſervation; all which muſt be lodged neceſſarily in the Eccleſiaſtical Governors of the Church, ſo long as it is unſupported by the Civil Magiſtrate; but,

but, when it has Aſſiſtance from thence, it is plain the Neceſſity of Keeping all this Power, in the Hands it was in before, is at an End.

The Civil Power, as has been very juſtly obſerved by one of his Lordſhip's Adverſaries, has an inherent Right to interpoſe in Matters relating to the Religion publickly profeſſed, to make Laws, and give Orders for the regular Adminiſtration of the ſeveral Parts of it, and to prevent Abuſes, of what Nature ſoever. And as the Civil Power has a Right to this, ſo does the Protection given to the Church, and the many Favours conferred on it, deſerve from the Church all the Regard, and all the Communication of Power they can give, though the Civil Power could not of Right claim it. Shall not the Crown, for Example, be allowed to nominate Biſhops, when it is to the King they owe their *Temporalities?* Shall not the *State* make Laws for the better Government of the *Clergy*, when it is to the Laws of the *State* they owe the Aſſignments of their Pariſhes, and the Aſſurance of their Maintenance? Laſtly, Shall not the Civil Power make Regulations for Church-Cenſures, and join Lay-Judges with thoſe of the Church, in Eccleſiaſtical Cauſes, when it has given ſuch a Weight and Force to their Cenſures, by the Civil Sanctions it has annexed to them? Sanctions, without which the Church could not eaſily have ſubſiſted, after the World was become *Chriſtian*. For a little Reflexion upon the preſent State of the World may convince a reaſonable Man, that the Government of a whole Nation, as it is *Chriſtian*, is too great a Work for Eccleſiaſtical Governors,

as

as ſuch; and that a Diſcipline, merely ſpiritual, would be too weak to attain thoſe good Ends now, for which, when *Chriſtians* were in Compariſon few in Number, and thoſe generally of the inferior Sort, and they were either under, or in Fear of Perſecution, it was abundantly ſufficient.

Theſe few Reflexions may let his Lordſhip ſee, that the Share the Civil Power, upon the *Empire* becoming *Chriſtian*, had in Church-Affairs, did not at all affect the internal Conſtitution of it, or alter its Government by Biſhops and Presbyters, or take any Part of their Functions out of their Hands, to put it into *lay* ones. All that *Conſtantine* took to himſelf was, to be ἐπίσκοπος τῶν ἔξω, and the Civil Powers, ſince, have but followed his Example. They have not taken to themſelves any Power that is properly Spiritual; the Inſtitution of Biſhops and Presbyters was continued, not only as Primitive, but *Apoſtolical*, and eſſential to the Being of the Church, in all Chriſtian Nations, till the *Reformation.* Is not, now, this Caſe of the Civil Power's interpoſing, in the Affairs of the Church, extremely like that of his Lordſhip's Friends the *Presbyterians* and *Independents?* Is it not mighty clear, that the ſame Sort of Plea will juſtify their novel Schemes? Or, Is it not very ſhameful to ſee a learned Biſhop put ſuch different Caſes upon the ſame Foot, which are juſt ſo much alike, and no more, as the Preſervation of a Thing is to the Deſtruction of the very ſame Thing? Mr. *Lock* ſomewhere obſerves, that *Wit* conſiſts in obſerving Likeneſſes in Things to one another,

but

but *Judgment* in being able to diſcern wherein they differ: If his Lordſhip had uſed a little more of that Faculty, on this Occaſion, he would have ſeen too wide a Difference, in theſe Caſes, to think the ſame Defence could ſerve for both.

But, this being no Part of the preſent Diſpute, his Lordſhip may be allowed to be the more negligent here, and to reſerve himſelf for the next Point, which being the *Criſis* of the Cauſe, we may there hope to find his whole Strength and Attention exerted to the utmoſt. For the Point, next under his Conſideration, relates to the particular Powers Church-Governors have a Right to. To go through every Branch of their Powers diſtinctly, with the proper Proofs for each, would fill a large Volume, much leſs could it be done, in a few Pages: Inſtead, therefore, of this, the next beſt Thing, I could do, was to point out the Grounds and Heads from whence they are deduced. And theſe I obſerved were three: *Scripture*, the *Practice of the Primitive Church*, and the *Nature of Society*. The firſt of theſe his Lordſhip diſcards, as of no Uſe, becauſe the Powers, mentioned in Scripture, are given to, and uſed by, Perſons extraordinarily aſſiſted, as if Powers, given to ſuch Perſons for the ordinary Ends and Uſes of the Church, were not ordinary Powers, and intended by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles to be continued to their Succeſſors; or, becauſe the Scripture is not a perfect Rule of external Worſhip and Diſcipline, it were no Rule at all. There is not, indeed, a Body of *Canons* for Church-Government

ment delivered to us in Scripture, nor a perfect Plan for it any where laid down; but, if that were a good Reason to prove it no Rule, it would be as good a one to prove it no Rule of *Faith*, there being no one compleat Summary of the necessary Articles of the *Christian* Faith to be found, in any Part of it; if there had, there had been no Occasion for the Church to have composed any Creed, not even that which is called the *Apostles*; this, therefore, hinders not but Scripture may be a Rule for the Government of the Church; and certain Powers, as well as a general Authority, may be concluded from it; but a perfect Plan it cannot be expected should be there, because the Form of it was not presently and at once settled, but gradually, as the Nature of the Thing required it should be. St. *Paul* wrote, while Churches were, as yet, but beginning to be formed: In his Writings, therefore, we can expect to find only the first Elements and Seeds of this Formation; not a perfect and finished Model, where all the Parts and Proportions are fully adjusted and determined. In a Word, every body that considers these Matters, must be sensible of the Difference there is between *Ecclesia constituta*, and *Ecclesia constituenda*; and the same Difference there will necessarily be between a complete Scheme of Church-Government, and what we have towards one in his *Epistles*.

But, if his Lordship will not allow any Powers for Church-Governors to be deducible from Scripture, one might hope he would be more favourable in his Sentiments upon the second Way proposed,

poſed, *the Practice of the Primitive Church*. Here was Room for his Lordſhip to diſplay his Learning and Judgment, to ſhew the World his Knowledge of Church-Hiſtory, and the Uſe which, in his Opinion, ſhould be made of it; one might have hoped he would have been ſo good, as to have told us, what he liked or diſliked in the Government of the Church, in the beſt and pureſt Ages of it; what he thought we might imitate in it, and what not; whether certain Powers, the Governors of the Church then uſed, were, in them, Uſurpations over the Conſciences of Men, and their *Chriſtian* Liberty, or were lawful; and, if lawful then, whether ſo now; and, if not, for what Reaſons. This, I ſay, one might reaſonably have expected from his Lordſhip, on this Occaſion; but he asks your Pardon —— *diſplicet ipſe locus* —— inſtead of any Thing of this Kind, which might enlighten or inform his Reader, and tend to clear up the Controverſy, in ſome Meaſure, he contents himſelf with theſe two notable Obſervations, "1. That many, who have taken this Way "to underſtand the Powers of Church-Governors, "have ſeemed to be more at a Loſs than they "were before; that many are the Differences, "upon theſe Subjects, even among the Learned, "who have ſtudied thoſe *primitive* Writings with "equal Sincerity and Impartiality." But why would not his Lordſhip tell us, who thoſe *many* are, or what are the *Points* of Church-Power, about which they differ? Which ſince he has not done, I ſuſpect his Lordſhip miſtakes the Point; and, becauſe there has been a Diſpute about the

State of the Church, till towards the Middle of the ſecond Century, whether it were then under Biſhops, or not, or who the Perſons were in whom the Government of the Church was then lodged, from thence concludes, it was diſputed, what the Powers were that were veſted in thoſe who did govern it.

But does his Lordſhip think, that, becauſe ſome Points cannot be demonſtratively cleared from the few Remains we have of the firſt and greateſt Part of the ſecond Century, that, therefore, the Practice of the primitive Church cannot be a Rule to us, or that it cannot be known? Is the Senſe of that Expreſſion, *the primitive Church*, confined to two Centuries? Muſt it ceaſe to be *primitive*, from the Time we begin to have a good Knowledge of it? From the Time we have any certain Monuments, next the Scriptures, of any Largeneſs relating to it? That is, from the Time *Juſtin Martyr* and *Tertullian* wrote, who are the oldeſt Writers that have left us any Thing more, that is certainly genuine, than a few Epiſtles: And the Genuineneſs even of theſe Epiſtles, or of moſt of them, his Lordſhip knows, hath been not a little diſputed. Is the Knowledge of the Practice of the ancient Church uſeleſs to us, as ſoon as it becomes certain? With his Lordſhip's Leave, we ſhall extend this Term of *Primitive* to other Bounds than he ſeems to have put to it, ſo as to take in the four firſt *General Councils*, at leaſt, and particularly the Age of *Conſtantine*, which is the earlieſt Age of the primitive Church, conſidered as under the Protection of the Civil Power; and

is,

is, therefore, the beſt Model for Churches under the like Protection, in all After-times, to form themſelves upon. We may, for Matters of *Faith* and *Doctrine*, juſtly be referred to earlier Times; but, ſure, for the external *State* and *Conſtitution* of a Church in a *Chriſtian* Country, to ſend us for a Pattern to the ancient Church before the Empire became *Chriſtian*, is extremely ridiculous. It is to ſend us for a Pattern to ſomething that, before the Reign of *Conſtantine*, was not in Being, the Condition of a Church in a *Chriſtian* State; and it is not ſo much as pretended, that the State of the Church was more perfect, or more fit to be imitated, in any Age after *Conſtantine*, than it was under him. The Practice, therefore, of the Church, as to the Authority and Powers exerciſed in the Government of it, in his Time, is the beſt Model for all Churches in the like happy Circumſtances. If it be ſaid, that this beſt Model was a very bad one, and ſuch as ought not to be followed; that is ſuch a Reflexion on the *Chriſtian* Church, in its greateſt Perfection, for ſo it then was, that one may be ſure there can be no juſt Grounds for it; eſpecially if we conſider, what great Lights, what bright Examples of Learning, Piety, and Virtue, adorned the Church, in that and the next Century, who knew perfectly well the Faith and Diſcipline of their Anceſtors, and would have died a thouſand Deaths, rather than they would adulterate one, or, in a faulty Compliance to the Civil Power, give up the other, or reſign to the Magiſtrate any Share of that Authority, which by *Chriſt* was unalienably veſted in

themſelves. We muſt, therefore, beg Leave to eſteem the Church, in theſe firſt and beſt Ages of it, a ſafe Pattern for us, in all Reſpects, and particularly in what relates to Church-Government, about which it is in vain to pretend Ignorance, when, beſides all other Helps, ſo many ancient *Canons* of Councils are ſtill preſerved to us. I do not ſay, it is neceſſary to follow the Example of the primitive Church, in every Thing; all I contend for is, that it is a ſafe Pattern, and that there is no Danger of the Governors of the Church receding from their juſt Claims, or ſetting up exorbitant ones, ſo long as they keep within thoſe Bounds. And this, if his Lordſhip will receive it, is the Juſtification of the Church of *England*, for acknowledging ſuch a Share of its Government to be lawfully veſted in the Civil Magiſtrate. She follows an Example of fourteen hundred Years Standing, the Example of the primitive Church, when it was firſt in Condition to be a Pattern to us; and what the Church then did was done agreeably to what was the Will of God in the *Jewiſh* Church, in the beſt Times of it. When his Lordſhip can make as good a Plea for the *Presbyterian* and *Independent* Schemes, though the ſame, or like it, cannot be, we ſhall readily allow it.

To come now to his Lordſhip's *Remark*, "Many, who have ſtudied the Primitive Writers to "know the Practice of the Church, as to the "Points in Diſpute, have ſeemed to be more at "a Loſs than they were before." Well, What then? Is it not ſo in every other Part of Knowledge?

Knowledge? Is not the Man, who knows moſt of any Science, beſt acquainted alſo with the Difficulties that are in it? Ignorance ſees no Difficulties, *ergo*, there are none. If this Argument were good, and it followed, that there are none, where thoſe that are blind ſee none,

Prætulerim——delirus inerſq; videri:

I ſhould treat *Learning* with as much Contempt as his Lordſhip does, and endeavour after a *conſummate Ignorance*. But, in Truth, nothing is ſo falſe as this Reaſoning; Difficulties are Difficulties, whether they are ſeen or not; thoſe, who are intirely ignorant, ſee nothing of them, they give no Diſturbance to their Repoſe; the half Learned ſee them, but know not how to extricate themſelves out of them, they are always in a Cloud; *aut videt*, *aut vidiſſe putat*; but the truly Learned can diſtinguiſh between what is knowable, and what not; they ſee Difficulties, but they ſee alſo the Solutions of many of them; and hence are able to arrive at clear and certain Concluſions.

It is to the unwearied Labours of ſuch Men we owe the great Diſcoveries and Improvements made in every Part of Learning, ſince the Reſtoration of Letters; who had they taken up with his Lordſhip's Sentiments, they had given over in Confuſion and Deſpair, and had ſuffered themſelves and the World to ſink into a *univerſal Stupidity and Ignorance*, which are ſo neceſſarily the Conſequences of ſuch Reaſoning as his Lordſhip ſeems to have taken up with, that, ſhould it pre-

vail, they would ſoon be *happily* eſtabliſhed, without the Help of an *Eſtabliſhment*. For his Argument, drawn fairly out, is this: What do you trouble yourſelf with ſtudying the primitive Books, to know the Diſcipline, or Government of the ancient Church? (And it holds as well of any other Part of ancient Learning.) Thoſe, that have ſtudied it, ſeem to be more at a Loſs than they were before, and there are great Differences, about it, between learned Men; let it, therefore, alone; where a Point is diſputed, it is plain neither Side of it is clear; therefore, you may take either, or neither; it is perfectly indifferent. This puts all Forms of Government in the Church, and, for the like Reaſon, all *Syſtems* of Doctrine, upon an equal Foot, and a Man may be eaſy under any. That is one Convenience ariſing from this new Way of Arguing. Another is, that there is no Need of ſtudying what is the Senſe of *Antiquity*, upon any Point, and ſo we are happily delivered from the uneaſy Task of labouring in dead Languages, and old Books; we may take our Eaſe in ſoft and ſweet Repoſe. Whether ſuch Arguments, were they univerſally received, would not ſooner *ſpread a conſummate Stupidity and Ignorance over the Face of the whole Land*, than any Thing that is contended for, in the *Report of the Committee*, or any other Book that has been written againſt his Lordſhip, in this Controverſy, I leave to any intelligent Reader to judge.

His Lordſhip's ſecond Remark upon this Way of knowing the Powers of Church-Governors is, *That it is of no Uſe to the unlearned Laity*, whom, being

being the *plures*, he never fails making his Court to. *What a Rule is this for them, to send them for Inſtruction, in this Point, to the Writings of the Primitive Church, of which they underſtand not a Word?* His Lordſhip, in his Concern for the *illiterate* Laity, forgets I was ſpeaking to the *Clergy*. I do not uſe to trouble an Aſſembly that is chiefly made up of illiterate and ignorant Perſons, with Controverſial Diſcourſes about Church-Government; with which I know nothing they have to do, but to ſubmit to what is eſtabliſhed; ſince their Approbation of it is not required of them, as a Term of Communion; unleſs any of them apprehend that there is a Nullity in the eſtabliſhed Miniſtry, and that, from thence, there is derived an Invalidity upon their Functions. But this is not pretended, by any *Species* of Diſſenters, againſt the Form of Government eſtabliſhed in the Church of *England*. But, if any illiterate Perſons were troubled with any Scruples of this Kind, does his Lordſhip know a better Way of removing them, than by ſhewing ſuch Perſons that our Church-Government is agreeable to Scripture, and the Practice of the primitive Church; when *Chriſtians* muſt be ſuppoſed to know, better than we can, at this Diſtance, what was the Apoſtolical Inſtitution, in this Point.

But how can they judge of Writings of which they underſtand not a Word? I anſwer, How do they judge of Scripture? Of which his Lordſhip thinks them not only very competent Judges, but prefers their Judgment to that of the moſt Learned; who are, ſays he, *conſtantly differing, and eternally*

wrangling with one another. In Truth, they can judge of neither, by themſelves, and without the Aſſiſtance of thoſe his Lordſhip ſo much deſpiſes; but, by their Help, they may judge of both. It is the *Learned* who have tranſlated the *Bible* into a Language the Illiterate can underſtand; and it is upon the *Learned* they muſt depend, for the Truth of the Tranſlation: And the ſame Learning will open to them what is ſaid, in the primitive Writings, relating to the Queſtion about which they want to be informed, not only by telling them, how it *ſounds* in *Engliſh*, but explaining to them the *Senſe* of it; without which, the Illiterate will be very little the wiſer for what they read, either in the primitive Writings, or in Scripture. For though his Lordſhip indeed tells us, "That one *illiterate honeſt Man* (in the Church "of *Rome*) is as capable of judging for himſelf "in Religion, as all their *learned* Men united, "even ſuppoſing them met together in a *General* "*Council*, with all poſſible Marks of Solemnity "and Grandeur;" I muſt beg his Lordſhip's Leave to ſay, that the Illiterate are in the Caſe of Queen *Candace*'s Eunuch, who, when *Philip* asked him, if he underſtood what he read, ſaid, *How can I, except ſome Man ſhould guide me?* Acts viii. 31. And, notwithſtanding what is ſaid of the Clearneſs of Scripture in neceſſary Points, the Ignorant and Unlearned cannot judge of the Senſe of Scripture, or of the Truth of their Religion, without the Helps the Learned, by the Care of their Governors, have provided for them.

But

But why does his Lordſhip tell us, that the Unlearned Laity cannot underſtand a Word of the Writings of the primitive Church? How came he to forget that ſeveral of them are tranſlated into *Engliſh?* Is his Lordſhip ſo wrapped up in modern Authors, that he could not remember, that what Writings are left us of the Apoſtolick Age were, long ſince, publiſhed in *Engliſh* by the preſent Lord Archbiſhop of *Conterbury?* Whom his Lordſhip could think of, in this very Book, to miſrepreſent in the groſſeſt Manner, even where his *Grace* had taken all poſſible Care not to be miſunderſtood. But he has, it ſeems, forgot, what the ſame Perſon had done towards reſtoring primitive Piety, and reviving a Zeal for true Religion, by his excellent Tranſlation of thoſe primitive Pieces, and by a learned Introduction to inform the leſs Knowing, in the Uſe of them. I ſhould not mention here his Lordſhip's Miſrepreſentation of the Archbiſhop, but that he plays it againſt me, (p. 175.) as the Senſe of one, *to whom I pay the greateſt Deference.* Which, if it will be any Satisfaction to his Lordſhip, I am very ready to own I do. But there is no Need of ſaying any Thing to juſtify his *Grace* from his Lordſhip's unjuſt Inſinuations, the Lord Biſhop of *Oxford* having already largely done it, in *Defence* of his *late Charge.* I will rather take the charitable Side, and offer an Excuſe for his Lordſhip, which the Biſhop of *Oxford*, I believe, was not aware of; which is this: If his Lordſhip had taken what he cites, as the Archbiſhop's Words, from the *Sermon* itſelf in which they are, it would, indeed, be very hard

to

to excuſe him from a wilful and deſigned Miſrepreſentation; which the leaſt Degree of Attention, had it not been deſigned, would have prevented. I incline, therefore, to believe, his Lordſhip quoted the Words, at ſecond Hand; for I remember to have ſeen them, more than once, in the *Flying-Poſt*. And who would not rather ſuppoſe, he took the Paſſage from that Paper, than that the Writer of that Paper was furniſhed with it from him? Eſpecially, it being plain by other Inſtances, that his Lordſhip makes no Scruple of quoting even modern Authors, at ſecond Hand. Of which we have a very remarkable Inſtance, in his *Appendix* to this very Book, where he quotes ſeveral Paſſages of Mr. *Chillingworth* from another Writer, and not from Mr. *Chillingworth* himſelf; as is evident, not only from the Quotations being the ſame in Number, and in the ſame Order; we find in them the very ſame Omiſſions alſo; which is a ſure Proof whence they were taken. Which however excuſable it may be, in other Caſes, one cannot but wiſh, that, ſince what his Lordſhip quoted from a Sermon of the Archbiſhop, preached thirty Years ago, was plainly intended as a tacit Reflexion on him for his preſent Sentiments, as if they were not now the ſame they were then; (though, in my humble Opinion, it is no Reflexion upon any Man, if, in the Experience and Improvement of thirty Years, he has ſeen Reaſon to alter his Judgment in Relation to Perſons or Things, in ſome Caſes:) Since, I ſay, what his Lordſhip did was deſigned, as a Reflexion, one cannot but wiſh, he had taken bet-

ter

ter Care not to be miſtaken; becauſe diſadvantageous Inſinuations againſt a Perſon, in ſo high a Station, cannot but have a very ill Effect, when they come from a Perſon of his Lordſhip's known Candor and Integrity.

But to return from this Digreſſion, Does not his Lordſhip know, that the ancient *Chriſtian* Apologies, and the Preſervative of *Vincentius Lirinenſis* againſt *Hereſy*, have been alſo, long ſince, tranſlated into *Engliſh* by another learned Hand? Or could he forget, ſo ſoon, what has been ſo lately publiſhed, Dr. *Marſhal*'s elegant Tranſlation of St. *Cyprian*? Which ſingle Book will give the *Engliſh* Reader a very good Knowledge of the Practice of the primitive Church, in Relation to its Government, as it ſtood, while unaſſiſted by the Civil Power. Need I add to theſe the *Engliſh* Works of Dr. *Cave*, the Tranſlation of *Euſebius*'s Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, and that Treaſure of ancient Church-Learning collected by *Du Pin*, which was, many Years ſince, tranſlated into *Engliſh*? And that the Canons of the ancient Church are laid open to the Eyes of all that will read, in the *Clergyman*'s *Vade Mecum*, and other Books? Not to mention many other Helps the Learned have by their Labours afforded the Illiterate, to underſtand the Senſe, the Practice, the Faith, the Diſcipline, and Government of the ancient Church, in the beſt and pureſt Ages of it; to excite in them a Zeal for God, that is after Knowledge, and to preſerve them from the Contagion of *Hereſy* and *Schiſm*. But yet, as if nothing of all this had been done, his Lordſhip gravely aſks, "What an excellent

" cellent Rule is this to the unlearned Laity, to " ſend them to the Writings of the primitive " Church, of which they underſtand not a " Word?" Which ſhrewd Queſtion, with his other Obſervation, of the Differences among learned Men about the Practice of the primitive Church, is the Whole of what his Lordſhip has thought fit to ſay, upon this ſecond Way o knowing what Powers belong to Church-Governors; which I had recommended as a very proper Help, and as a neceſſary Supplement to Scripture in ſuch Points.

The third Way of determining in this Controverſy, I ſaid, was to be taken from the *Nature of Society*. But, becauſe I have not left this Aſſertion naked and unguarded, nor have affirmed of Church-Government, what his Lordſhip has laid down as his grand Maxim for the Defence of *Civil* Government, *that it has a Right to every Thing that is neceſſary for its Preſervation, (per fas nefaſque*, for his Lordſhip puts no Limitations;) becauſe I have not taken up with ſo crude an Aſſertion, but have ſaid, that great Caution ſhould be uſed, for Fear of drawing Conſequences from it that are unjuſtifiable and unwarrantable, that are repugnant to Scripture, and contradict the conſtant Senſe of the primitive Church; therefore, his Lordſhip thinks, *this Way is of no Uſe at all, that it is itſelf no Way, but the two firſt over again.* But I have already taken Notice of this curious Piece of his Lordſhip's *Logic*, in the Poſtſcript to my *Sermon*, and, therefore, will ſay no more of it here. I will only take this Occaſion to obſerve,

that

that nothing appears, by every Part of his Lordſhip's Anſwer, to have given him ſo much Uneaſineſs, as to find he had to do with one of ſo very different a Complexion from himſelf; who, inſtead of crude, bold, unlimited, and general Aſſertions, which his Lordſhip ſo much delights in, takes Care to butt and bound his Propoſitions, and to ſpeak with Caution, to prevent their being miſunderſtood, or miſapplied, to ſerve Purpoſes that were not intended. His Lordſhip thinks he cannot go far enough from the Opinion he is oppoſing; which never fails to hurt the Cauſe he defends; and, therefore, cannot bear any one that ſpeaks, though it be on the ſame Side, with Caution and Temper; and, from hence, it is that he is ſo quick at eſpying Contradictions in others. Every Thing is a Contradiction that does not go his Length; and, if you ſpeak with any Limitation, you are preſently told, that one Part of the Sentence undoes the other. So that, in his Opinion, every cautious Writer is an inconſiſtent one: As if Truth, as well as Virtue, did not generally lie between Extremes; or that Propoſitions, in Subjects of a moral Nature, whoſe *Ideas* are extremely complex, could be expreſſed in as few and ſimple Terms, as the Propoſitions of *Geometry*; and were as rigid and inflexible, and would univerſally hold without Exception: Whereas nothing is more certain, or more known, than that the Truth, in ſuch Subjects, does not conſiſt in a few ſimple *Ideas*, but in a Complication of many concurring Circumſtances; of which, if any one be omitted or altered, the Propoſition will no

longer

longer hold. For which Reaſon, in all Subjects, except the *Sciences*, general Propoſitions admit of many Limitations and Exceptions. If his Lordſhip had duly conſidered this, he would not, I believe, have thought Government, either of Church or State, ſo eaſy a Subject as he ſeems to do; or that the many important Queſtions, relating to them, could be ſatisfactorily reſolved by a few, looſe, general Aſſertions.

The Reader has now ſeen all the Biſhop has to ſay againſt theſe three Ways; from which I am ſtill of Opinion the ſeveral Powers of Church-Authority may with Certainty and Safety be derived. To point out theſe was all I could do, in the Compaſs of a Sermon; and yet not doing more, the not bringing into a few Pages what would fill whole Volumes, is, by his Lordſhip, made a great Objection to it. Being now not ſo confined, though theſe Papers are grown upon my Hands much beyond my Intention, I will gratify his Lordſhip ſo far, as to tell him what, in the general, ſeems to me, not only to reſult from each of theſe three Principles of Power ſingly conſidered, but to be ſupported by the united Force of all.

In Virtue, then, of each, and much more of all, I muſt always believe, that our Saviour gave to his Apoſtles ſufficient Authority, with the proper Qualifications for the Exerciſe of it, to do every Thing that a ſucceſsful Propagation of the Goſpel, and the Preſervation of the true Faith, made neceſſary: That they were impowered to admit Diſciples by Baptiſm, and teach them a

Rule

Rule of Faith; to declare to them the whole Will of God, and the Conditions of the New Covenant, and to interpret the Old Teſtament; to plant Churches, and to appoint in them the proper Officers for the Work of the Miniſtry, and the Edification of the Body of *Chriſt*; to preſcribe Rules for the Exerciſe of publick Worſhip, for the Preſervation of Decency and Order; and to inſtitute a Form of Diſcipline, that the Behaviour of *Chriſtians* might be ſuch as becometh Saints; that incorrigible Members might be cut off, and caſt out of the Church; and that Seducers and falſe Teachers might not creep in, to the Subverſion of the true Faith, or the Corruption of Manners; ſo that neither *Schiſms* might diſturb their Peace and Unity, nor *Hereſies* deprave the ſound Doctrines *once delivered* to them. That the Apoſtles had this Power, and that the Diſciples were obliged, in thoſe Points, to ſubmit to them, appears to me both plain from Scripture, and neceſſary from the Nature of the Thing; and is abundantly evident from what we know was univerſally practiſed by their Succeſſors, who cannot be ſuppoſed in the *Apoſtolical* Churches to have ſoon deviated, in any Points of Moment, from them, and to have uſurped Powers they had not, by Commiſſion from the Apoſtles, a good Right to. For that the Apoſtles had alſo Authority to appoint Succeſſors, and to inveſt them with the Powers ordinarily neceſſary for the Well-governing of the Church, is as certain and evident, as that there ſhould be a Church continued after their Death; a Succeſſion of Perſons, to be miniſtred

to,

to, neceſſarily inferring a Succeſſion of Miniſters. This, therefore, the Apoſtles muſt be ſuppoſed ſufficiently impowered to make Proviſion for, as likewiſe to intitle them to a Right of Maintenance.

And, farther ſtill, it is evident, by all the Principles of Power I have named, that the Apoſtles and their Succeſſors had a Right to take the proper Methods to decide and terminate Diſputes that ſhould ariſe, with Reſpect either to *Diſcipline* or *Doctrine*, in all Points where the Peace of the Church, and the Preſervation of the *Faith*, ſhould make it neceſſary. The firſt, I think, is by no ſober Man denied; that they had a Right to do what they judged expedient, or neceſſary, in Controverſies that reſpected *Diſcipline*, and the external Order of the Church. And, as to Points of *Doctrine*, we have a very remarkable Inſtance of the Authority they exerciſed, with Reſpect to them, *Acts* xv. upon the Queſtion concerning the Neceſſity of *Circumciſion*; which deſerves to be very carefully attended to. For I would deſire the Reader to obſerve, that this Diſpute was relating to *the Favour of God*, viz. *Whether* Circumciſion *were neceſſary in Converts from* Gentiliſm, *in Order to their Obtaining the Salvation offered to them by the Goſpel.* This Point there was a Neceſſity of deciding, one Way or other: For it had made a very great Diſturbance at *Antioch*, and in the Churches near to it. Nor did the Diſpute begin there, it was brought thither by ſome that came down to them from *Jeruſalem.* And, had it not been decided, the Breach, made by it between the

Jewiſh

Jewiſh and *Gentile* Converts, might have been incurable; Things might have been carried to that Extremity, as muſt have ended in the Ruin of thoſe Churches. And who can ſay, where the Contagion would have ſtopped, there being the ſame Seeds of Diviſion in all other Parts, the firſt Churches every-where conſiſting of the like Mixture of Diſciples.

What Method, now, was taken to decide this important Queſtion? *Barnabas* and *Paul*, though choſen by the immediate Appointment of the Spirit to preach the Goſpel in thoſe Parts, and ſtyled from thence *Apoſtles*, did not take upon them to decide this Queſtion, by their mere Authority; partly as having no immediate Direction from the Spirit of God to do ſo, and partly from the Difficulty of the Queſtion itſelf, and foreſeeing that thoſe, who were for the Neceſſity of Circumciſion, would not acquieſce in it. But, whatever the true Reaſon of it were, whether for theſe Reaſons, or to give the greater Weight to what ſhould be reſolved, and make it more regarded by the contending Parties, they agreed to go with certain others to the Apoſtles and Elders at *Jeruſalem:* Not to the Apoſtles only, but to the Apoſtles and Elders. Upon which, the Apoſtles and Elders aſſembled to conſider of it. Now, in this Meeting, how do they proceed? Does any one Apoſtle, does *Peter*, or *James*, or all the Apoſtles together, take upon them to decide this Queſtion, in Virtue of their immediate Miſſion by *Chriſt*, or of a greater Degree of Inſpiration, or by an Authority *paramount*, and ſuperior to all Controll? No,

Do they argue it among themſelves, excluſive of the *Presbyters*, or *Elders*, ſo as to allow them no Share in the Debate? No ſuch Thing appears; the Point in Diſpute was referred to the *Apoſtles* and *Elders* both, and they conſidered of it jointly. The Queſtion was argued *pro* and *con*, for ſome Time, and both Sides were heard upon it; and, after much Diſpute, *Peter* roſe up and gave, not his Vote, but his Reaſons firſt, and then his Opinion, for the *Negative*. Then *Paul* and *Barnabas* informed the Aſſembly, what Miracles God had wrought among the *Gentiles* by their Miniſtry. After them ſpake *James*, and declared himſelf on the ſame Side of the Queſtion; and juſtified his doing ſo, by repreſenting to them, that what God had done, among the *Gentiles*, agreed exactly with what had by the Prophets been foretold he would do. *And to him*, ſays the Text, *all agreed.* Upon which they decreed, that no ſuch Burden ſhould be laid upon the *Gentile* Converts; and ſo an End was put to that unhappy Diſpute.

I beg his Lordſhip to conſider, what a Figure had the Apoſtles made, what a Condition had the Church been in, if they had acted then, as he would have the Governors of the Church act now? And they had, when they were aſſembled with the Elders, in this Manner, addreſſed to them, in the Preſence of the contending Parties? "Bre- "thren, it is with great Grief we ſee, what a "Height this Diſpute, concerning the Neceſſity "of *Circumciſion*, is come to; we cannot but "own, it is a Matter of very great Importance, "and

" and very neceſſary to be decided, to reſtore " Peace to the Churches of *Syria*; which, if it " continue much longer, will be in great Dan- " ger of being torn to Pieces by the *Schiſm* it " will occaſion; but what is it we can do, in this " great Extremity? You all know, there is no " Place in Scripture, where it is plainly and clear- " ly declared, whether *Circumciſion* under the " Goſpel be neceſſary to Salvation or not; nor " have we any expreſs Command, upon this Point, " from *Chriſt*, nor any immediate Revelation from " the Spirit; and *Chriſt* has given us no Autho- " rity to decide any Thing he has left undecided, " *eſpecially, in Matters relating to Conſcience and* " *the Favour of God.* He has left behind him " no *Vicegerents* or *Interpreters*; nor could he: " For the Church, you know, is his *Kingdom*; and " in his Kingdom he is *ſole King, ſole Judge, ſole* " *Interpreter.* You muſt, therefore, needs be " ſenſible, that we cannot, either of ourſelves, or " in Conjunction with you, even upon the ma- " tureſt Deliberation, and after hearing all that " can be ſaid on both Sides, make any authori- " tative Declaration or Deciſion upon this Que- " ſtion: And, therefore, whatever be the Conſe- " quence of this unhappy Diſpute, though we " were ſure it would end in the utter Ruin of the " Church, our Hands are tied, we dare do no- " thing to put an End to it. They muſt go on " to diſpute, as long as they think fit; all we can " do is to exhort them to Peace, and Love, and " to aſſiſt them with our Prayers, that God would

" enlighten their Minds, and give them a right " Underſtanding in all Things."

Sure, every thinking Man muſt allow, ſuch a Speech would have been very improper and abſurd, upon ſuch an Occaſion, where it was abſolutely neceſſary to come to ſome Reſolution. And I can ſee no Reaſon, why the like Speech would not be as abſurd now, upon a like Occaſion. Should a Diſpute ariſe of as great Importance, and which it was as neceſſary, for the Peace of the Church, ſhould be determined; I cannot ſee, why the Church might not aſſemble now, as it did then, and ſuffer the Point in Controverſy to be fully and fairly argued, and then come to ſome Concluſion upon it. If the Governors of the Church, on ſuch an Occaſion, would act with honeſt Minds, in the Fear of God, and under the Guidance of his Spirit, keeping ſteddy to the Scripture as their Rule, and taking the ancient Church for their * Guide in the Interpretation of it, which is alſo the

* I have ſaid in my *Sermon*, p. 37. that, if *the Senſe, the primitive Writers put upon a Place of Scripture, be not the true one, it is, at leaſt, a good one, ſince they give it in Defence of the common Faith.* This, ſays his Lordſhip, is *impoſſible*, becauſe it is *no Senſe* of the Place, and, therefore, cannot be a *good Senſe* of it, *p.* 145. To which I muſt take Leave to ſay, that it is impoſſible, his Lordſhip could have ſaid ſo weak a Thing, if he were at all acquainted with thoſe Writers, or had the leaſt Value for them. For whoever has looked into them knows, that they are not only not ſolicitous to find out the *literal* Senſe of Scripture with Exactneſs, but oftentimes purpoſely forſake it for one more ſpiritual and ſublime. How much they valued and preferred ſuch a Method of *interpreting*, his Lordſhip may learn, from

the beſt Pattern they can follow in *Diſcipline* and *Worſhip*; and not ſuffering themſelves to be influenced by *political* Conſiderations, and Reaſons of State; or by a Deſire of Dominion, by private Intereſt and Party-views, or any Thing that naturally tends to pervert the Judgment; if, I ſay, the Governors of the Church now would act in this Manner, under theſe Limitations, and with theſe Precautions; there can be no Reaſon to think, their Deciſions would not be right, and ſuch as ought to be ſubmitted to. What, blindly and implicitly? No, neither *Chriſt*, nor his Apoſtles, required ſuch a Submiſſion; nor is it due to, or claimed by, our Civil Governors. *Abſolute* Authority, as it means *unlimited*, is a mere *Chimera*; but, as it ſignifies a clear and indiſputable Authority *in all Things lawful*, Obedience is due to what is ordered, in Virtue of it, by our Governors in

---

from the ſingle Introduction of *Juſtin Martyr*, to his *Dialogue* with *Trypho*. But take my Words by themſelves, and without Regard to the Ancients: By a *true* Senſe, it is plain I mean the *literal* one; and a *good Senſe* is oppoſed to an *ill* one, and means a Senſe that is not *heretical*, nor any Way repugnant to Scripture, and the *Analogy* of Faith. What, now, do my Words thus explained contain in them, that every Day's Experience does not confirm? Has not every Preacher frequent Occaſion to obſerve, has not his Lordſhip himſelf often done it, that a Text ſeems equally ſuſceptible of ſeveral Senſes, which are each of them *good* ones, agreeable to Reaſon and Scripture? And yet, it is certain, one only is the true one. What, now, is become of his Lordſhip's Impoſſibility? If his Lordſhip goes on to write, in this Manner, his Readers will begin to think it a Sign of the Poſſibility of a Thing, that it is by him declared to be *impoſſible*.

Civil Affairs; and there is no Abſurdity, I know of, in thinking that the like Obedience is due to the *Deciſions* of thoſe who have the Government of the Church.

If the Term, *in all Things lawful*, is a Limitation upon Church-Authority, it is as truly ſo on that of the Civil Magiſtrate. For it is the Duty of the Subjects to conſider, whether what is, at any Time, commanded be lawful or not; and, if they are fully perſuaded in their Conſcience, it is not, they muſt *obey God rather than Man*. But this does not deſtroy the Magiſtrate's Authority, or take away his Right to the Obedience of his Subjects; and, therefore, though a Subject cannot in Conſcience obey, yet, ſuppoſing the Command lawful, he may juſtly puniſh him for his Diſobedience; becauſe it is to be preſumed, that his Pretence of Conſcience is Pretence only; or, if it be real, yet it proceeds, very probably, from Want of due Care to be better informed. But, if his Refuſal to obey proceeds not from a very culpable Neglect, but from ſuch Cauſes as are common to him with many others, wiſe and good Governors will not make Uſe of their Authority to force an Obedience, till all proper Means have been uſed to remove the Prejudices he labours under. And better Inſtruction, no Doubt, in a right Cauſe, will generally have that good Effect as to open the Eyes of the greateſt Part; and, for the reſt, it will nor be difficult to diſcover, whether their Recuſancy proceeds from a Defect in their Underſtanding, or from a Perverſeneſs in their Will; and, in Proportion to that, more or

leſs

leſs Indulgence will be uſed towards them. But, as I have ſaid, the Authority of the Governor does not depend upon the Conſcience of the Subject; for, if it did, it would ſoon come to be no Authority at all; it would not be able to ſecure him a general Obedience from his Subjects, in any one Command, how juſt or reaſonable ſoever; there being nothing in its Nature ſo indifferent, that ſome one or other, in a vaſt Multitude of weak and ignorant, or of perverſe and wicked Men, may not believe, either in Reality or Pretence, to be unrighteous, or unlawful. Of the Truth of which the World does not want Inſtances.

Thus Matters ſeem to me to ſtand, with Relation to the Authority and Power of the Magiſtrate: And it is the ſame, for aught I can ſee, in the Deciſions relating to Religion. There are *ſaving Truths*, as well as *damnable Hereſies*: And it is the Duty of Church-Governors to examine all new Doctrines, what Kind they are of, and to preſerve the Faith intire and undefiled. They muſt, therefore, have an abſolute Authority, as that means an indiſputable Right, to declare *ſaving Truths* to be *ſaving Truths*, and *damnable Hereſies* to be *damnable Hereſies*; and, in Order to that, to † interpret Scripture; which is the allowed Rule by which all Doctrines muſt be tried. And ſuch

† Upon this Point of *interpreting Scripture*, I will give his Lordſhip Mr. *Lock*'s laſt Thoughts, in a Letter to Mr. *C. p.* 264. in the Collection of *Pieces* publiſhed under his Name: "If "there

Declarations ought to be received as authoritative and binding on the Members; and those, who offend against them, may justly be censured, in Proportion to such Offence. But, in this, there is no implicit, unlimited Obedience contended for. People are not debarred the Use of their Reason, and Conscience, or precluded a due Examination. It is easy to render either Persons or Things odious,

---

" there be Need of *authentick* Interpreters of the Word of " God, what is the Way to find them out? That is worth your " thinking of, unless you would have every one interpret for " himself: And what Work will that make? Betwixt these two " find something, if you can. For the World is in Want of " Peace, which is much better than everlasting *Billingsgate*." I recommend this Passage to the Bishop's Consideration, who is of so different an Opinion, in this Point, that he declares the Question, which to Mr. *Lock* appeared so difficult, to be the easiest Question imaginable, to any one who will speak impartially, *p.* 135. Which I take Notice of here, because that Part of his *Answer* will not come within the Bounds to which I have confined myself. As to the Question itself, it is with Pleasure I can tell the Reader, that he will find that, as well as many others relating to the Rights and Powers of the Church, very fully considered by the Rev. Mr. *Rogers*, in his *Review*; which, since the Finishing my own Papers, I have read over; and, if I may judge by the Satisfaction it has given me, impartial Readers will allow he has answered all that was expected from him. There they will see *Conclusions* drawn from plain and simple Principles, in a Chain of regular Deductions, adhering to each other by an immediate and evident Connexion; and *Objections* not evaded, but answered; the Knots of them are not violently broken, or cut in sunder, but unravelled and untied, by an accurate and skilful Hand: And the *Opinions*, he opposes, are in the clearest Manner shewn to be either falsely drawn from true Principles; or, if truly drawn, that it is from false ones. One

of

ous, by false Colours, and gross Suppositions and Imputations: But if, instead of resting in Generals, we come to a particular Case; when that is fairly stated, the frightful Spectres, raised to amuse weak, and please libertine Minds, will immediately vanish.

If Spiritual Governors proceed with the same Care and Tenderness in their Decisions, as I have supposed Civil Governors to do; the Things, which they enjoin in Matters of Religion to be professed or done, will, in the main, be such as are plainly agreeable to the Doctrine and Precepts of our Saviour, as they were believed and practised by the *Catholick Church*, in the best and purest Ages of it. And then nobody can with Reason refuse Obedience to them; and they may justly censure those that do. In Matters of more Difficulty, they will avoid Decisions, when there is not a great Necessity for them; and, when they

---

of the Principal of which is the Supposing Mankind to be, not what *they really are*, but what they *should be*; that they are *sincere* and *honest*, *attentive* and *uncorrupted* by Passion, or Interest, or any other Prejudice; and rightly disposed to embrace Truth, whenever it is sufficiently proposed to them: Which is so far from being true, that the least Knowledge of human Nature may convince a Man, that nothing is more false. This, indeed, seems to me to be the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of the *new Scheme*, which makes it fit only for *Utopia*. But this is but one of the many false Principles on which it is built; the Reader will find, Mr. *Rogers* has, in the clearest Light and the most convincing Manner, exposed the Insufficiency and Falseness of the rest. Which alone, if Men were the reasonable Creatures our Adversaries suppose them to be, would go a great Way to put an End to this Controversy.

must

muſt decide, will take all proper Meaſures to be rightly informed, and proceed with the greateſt Caution and Deliberation; that they may not be deceived themſelves, or be the unhappy Inſtruments of leading into Error thoſe committed to their Care, whom it is their Duty to inſtruct in the Will of God, and the Knowledge of *Chriſt*. In Deciſions thus maturely made, it is morally impoſſible they ſhould err in Points of any Conſequence; and, for thoſe that are of little Moment, they will not make Deciſions about them; and, if they ſhould, an Error, in a Point of no Conſequence, would be an Error alſo of no Conſequence.

But, though they really do not err in their Deciſions, they may by many be thought to do ſo; due Allowances, therefore, will be made by wiſe and good Governors for involuntary Ignorance, and early Prejudices. They will endeavour to convince Gainſayers, by all the reaſonable Methods of Inſtruction; and never proceed againſt Men pretending Conſcience with any tolerable Appearance of Sincerity, to any Degree of Cenſures, when they can, without Prejudice to the Peace and Safety of the Church, be avoided: Much leſs will they, in ſuch Caſes, be forward to inflict Penalties, or temporal Puniſhments; which properly are not within the Power of the Eccleſiaſtical Authority, but are only, in ſome Caſes, annexed to it by the Favour of the Civil Magiſtrate.

But Church-Governors may make an ill Uſe of their Authority, to the great Hurt of Religion, and

to

to the Oppreſſion of the ſincere Profeſſors of it. Very true; it may be ſo, and often has been. And is it not as true of Civil Governors? But did ever any body think, that the accidental Abuſe of Power, in any Government, ought totally to take away the Uſe of it? Or that any Power will be left in any Kind or Form of Government whatever, if every Branch of it, that has been, or may be miſapplied, ſhall, for that Reaſon, be laid aſide? I cannot but think, that all the Objections, his Lordſhip has raiſed againſt Church-Authority, would be eaſily removed, at once, by drawing only the *Parallel* between the Eccleſiaſtical and Civil Power; and that they would vaniſh at the Sight of themſelves in ſuch a Glaſs. Let an Objection, made to one, be applied to the other, to try its Strength; and, generally ſpeaking, the ſame Solution, no doubt, will ſerve both Caſes. For I believe it will puzzle his Lordſhip to give a good Reaſon, why an Objection, that is weak and trifling, when made againſt the Uſe of Civil Power, ſhould be allowed to have Force and Weight in it, when urged againſt the Uſe of the like Power in Church-Affairs.

But it will be ſtill inſiſted on, that the Power of the Church, in requiring Submiſſion to its Deciſions, is very apt to be abuſed; eſpecially ſince, by the Favour of the *State*, theſe Cenſures of the Church are attended with Civil Conſequences; of which there are infinite Inſtances in all Places, where the *Papal* Power has prevailed. But from whence has this come? Is it not, becauſe, in the Churches under the *Papacy*, the Nature of Church-

Authority

Authority is intirely changed? Is it not taken out of the Hands of the Biſhops and their Clergy, and devolved wholly upon one See, that of *Rome?* And does not Power, when made to center in one Hand, naturally degenerate into *Tyranny?* Has it not, in Fact, done ſo in the *Papacy?* But what is this to the ſound Parts of the *Chriſtian* Church, who have thrown off the *Romiſh* Yoke, and have *reformed* themſelves upon the primitive Model, in Matters both of *Faith* and *Diſcipline?* What is this to us of the Church of *England*, whoſe Happineſs it is to live under a Conſtitution, where there is the leaſt Danger that can be of ſuch an Abuſe of this Power?

As the State has greatly favoured the Church, by the Force and Vigour it has given to its Cenſures; ſo has it taken the greateſt Care, its Cenſures, in Caſes of *Hereſy*, ſhould not be raſh, or unjuſt, or, in any Degree, arbitrary. The Laws have declared, that nothing ſhall be deemed *Hereſy*, that was not adjudged to be ſo by the whole *Catholick* Church, in the pureſt Ages of it, by the Decrees of *General* Councils, and thoſe univerſally received, and agreeable to Scripture. And, not content to fix the Rule they are to judge by, the Laws have taken Care of the Judges alſo, and have, in the laſt Reſort, provided, that, to *Eccleſiaſtical* Judges, others ſhall be joined; that Ignorance of the Laws (a perfect Knowledge of which *Eccleſiaſtical* Perſons cannot be ſuppoſed to have) may not, in any Step, miſguide them into the Giving a wrong or hard Judgment. Which Proviſion of our Laws, with Submiſſion to the Judgment

ment of a Right Reverend Prelate, I muſt own, I think the one beſt Thing in our *Eccleſiaſtical* Conſtitution, in what relates to *Diſcipline*. I might add, that what is *Hereſy*, within the Deſcription of the Law, is not now liable to that Severity of Puniſhment it was formerly in this Nation, and ſtill is in *Popiſh* Countries. But I inſiſt not on this; the Puniſhments ſtill ſubſiſting are more than enough ſevere, where there is not in the Offender the greateſt and moſt manifeſt Pravity of Mind.

I have ſaid thus much, of the Caution and Temper that ought to be uſed in theſe Caſes, to prevent the ſiniſter Conſtructions of ſome Perſons, who will be ready to interpret what I have ſaid, upon this Subject, to be a Calling for the Cenſures of the Church, and deſigned to awaken and exaſperate the Governors of it againſt ſome Perſons, who have not only revived *old Hereſies*, but, by their Indiſcretions, ſeem to think they never can provoke enough. To whom I wiſh nothing more, than what is moſt for their own Intereſt; firſt, that they would ſubmit their private Judgment to that of the *Univerſal* Church; and next, that, while they refuſe to do ſo, they would keep within the Bounds of Decency; that thoſe, who have the Power, may, by the Inoffenſiveneſs of their Behaviour, be prevailed on not to uſe it, but to connive at their Opinions, and ſhew them all the Indulgence that the Innocence of Error can lay any Claim to.

This, in ſhort, is the Subſtance of what, I think, neceſſarily and evidently reſults from theſe three

Sources;

Sources; from which, I had ſaid, that all the Powers of Church-Authority might, and ought to be derived: *Scripture*, the *Practice of the primitive Church*, and the *Nature of Society*. In Defence of which laſt Way of deducing Church-Powers, I took Notice of two Objections that had been urged againſt it: One, that the *Kingdom of* Chriſt *is not of this World*; and the other, that *the Church is an* Inviſible *Society*; and that, therefore, Arguments taken from *Viſible* Societies will not conclude to this. Upon this latter, his Lordſhip complains, that I have not fairly repreſented him, and that he does not argue from the Church's being *Inviſible*, but from its being a *Kingdom of a Spiritual Nature*. Whether it be a *Kingdom*, or not, we ſhall ſee preſently: But to ſay he does not argue from it, as an *Inviſible Society*, is ſomewhat extraordinary, when, in his *Anſwer to the Committee*, he ſays, "That the Church, he deſcribes in his *Sermon*, is no other but the *Univerſal Inviſible Church*; that the Deſcription, he had given, was of the *Inviſible Church of Chriſt*," p. 70. And again, *p.* 78. "I laid down a Deſcription of the *Univerſal Inviſible Church*, or Kingdom of Chriſt." And again in the ſame Page: "*The next* Point is, whether there be any Thing, in my Deſcription of the *Inviſible Univerſal Church, or whole Kingdom of Chriſt*, which can be proved to contradict the nineteenth Article." Let now the Reader judge, if I have miſrepreſented his Lordſhip in ſaying, that he argues from the Church's being an *Inviſible Society*. Having cleared myſelf of this Charge, I

ſhall

ſhall ſay nothing, with Reſpect to the Objection itſelf, the Argument of the Church's Inviſibility being already in the Hands of ſo good a Writer, who has conſidered all that need be ſaid on that Subject.

To come, then, to the other Objection, *that the Kingdom of Chriſt is not of this World:* To this I took the Liberty to ſay, it was, in Truth, nothing to the Purpoſe, the *Kingdom*, in this Text, not being the *Church*. And I added, *nor in any other Place of Scripture.* This, I acknowledged, was grown, indeed, to be the common Opinion, but ventured to affirm, it was without ſufficient Grounds. What I had ſaid, on this Point, makes ſomething above a Page. The Biſhop, who has diſpatched, in a Page, what he had to ſay againſt having Recourſe to the Practice of the primitive Church, as a good Direction to us, here, inſtead of being ſo fair as to own the Obſervation to be juſt, becauſe it touched himſelf, has ſpent above twenty Pages in a vain Endeavour to refute it. Firſt, his Lordſhip takes it ill, I ſhould ſay, that this has been made the *Corner-ſtone of the new Scheme*; and yet what can be more true? Has not *his Sermon* been the Occaſion of all the preſent Diſputes concerning Church-Authority? And is not this Notion, the Foundation he has laid, of the Doctrines delivered in it? Is not this Declaration of our *Saviour* to *Pilate*, that *his Kingdom is not of this World*, the Text? And does not his Lordſhip lay it down, as the grand Principle he builds all upon, that *the Church is this Kingdom?*

But

But let us hear his Lordſhip's Anſwer; firſt, he pleads, that, if he has miſtaken the preciſe Meaning of the Text, it is pardonable to have done it after greater Men; but, not to ſay that this is an Excuſe for almoſt all the Miſtakes that can be made, did I accuſe his Lordſhip of being ſingular in his Explication? Do not I expreſly own it to be the common Opinion? But his Lordſhip will not accept of this Conceſſion; and, inſtead of many other great Names, when he might have preſſed me with the Authority of one, who was a Prodigy of Learning, the great *Salmaſius*, who in his *Plin. Exerc.* expreſly ſays, that *the Kingdom of Heaven*, in Scripture, *always means the Church. In ſacrâ Scripturâ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν ſemper pro* Eccleſia *ſumitur.* (Which Authority, why his Lordſhip declined, whether from a general Diſlike he has to *Criticks*, or becauſe the *DEFENSIO REGIA* has made him particularly out of Humour with him, I know not.) But, however that be, inſtead of uſing this and other great Names by which he might defend himſelf, he ſingles out Mr. *Hales*, for the Sake of an ingenious Parallel between that learned Man and his unhappy Adverſary, who never pretended to Mr. *Hales*'s Learning, or Judgment. He tells us, *if he deſpiſed the ancient Writings of the Fathers, he did it not out of Ignorance, but out of Knowledge.* I beg his Lordſhip would be ſo good as to inform us, which of the ancient Writings this learned Man deſpiſed; and, when others have read the ſame, I am content they ſhould deſpiſe them too. His Lordſhip adds, *and beſides a great Judgment, equal*

equal to his great Reading, he had a Heart freely to make uſe of it. (Whereas his Adverſary has, hitherto, *hid from the World his Treaſure of Knowledge*, p. 48.) his Lordſhip, it ſeems, when he writ this, did not reflect, that the Title of Mr. *Hales*'s Works is, *GOLDEN REMAINS*, though it ſtands, in his Book, the very next Words to thoſe I have quoted. Had his Lordſhip, therefore, writ, in Mr. *Hales*'s Life-time, he might, with as much Truth and Juſtice, have reproached him, for hiding his Treaſure from the World; who, perhaps, would have told him, it had been better for the World, if ſome others had hid theirs too.

But, to let this paſs, his Lordſhip having ſhewn that he is very excuſable, if he has miſtaken the Meaning of his Text after ſo many modern Authorities as he might have produced, *could he be reconciled to the Bringing* [out of *his* Treaſure] *needleſs Quotations* (for of the Ancients he pretends to none) comes, in the next Place, to ſhew, he wants not that Excuſe; and, *p.* 99. ſays, "I will "now examine the Point itſelf, whether this *Text* "has been ſo greatly miſtaken, or not." But yet he has ſo little Stomach to come to it, that we hear no more of it till *p.* 111. where he owns, that *Church*, put inſtead of *Kingdom* in his *Text*, will not make Senſe; (and yet it is again and again declared in the *Sermon*, that *the Church is this Kingdom*) but pretends, that our Lord, *under the Image of a Kingdom, meant*, among other Things, *to ſignify the Church, the Society governed by him.* As if *Chriſt* had ſaid, *the Society governed by me is*

not of this World. A very pertinent Anſwer to *Pilate*'s Queſtion! But he adds, "That the *Dean* "cannot explain it himſelf, without either con- "tradicting his own Notions of βασιλεία, in the next "Page, or without denying to our Lord all *King-* "*ſhip*, but what is contained in his Coming here- "after with Pomp to judge the World (which is "little or none at all) and ſo putting a very low, "flat, and cold Senſe upon theſe Words. It is ſtrange his Lordſhip can be at any Loſs to know my Meaning of this Place, after I have ſo fully explained it. Once more, therefore, I muſt tell him, that *Chriſt's Kingdom*, in this Place, cannot, with any tolerable Senſe, be underſtood of the *Church*, or Society, that compoſes it; that I underſtand by βασιλεία *Chriſt*'s Regal Dignity and Power, his Dominion, or *Kingſhip*; (which laſt Word I avoided, becauſe not in common Uſe) that he was inveſted with this, upon his Reſurrection; but that the great Demonſtration of his Regal Power will be, when he comes to judge the World. His Lordſhip, indeed, declares, *this does not deſerve the Name*, that *it is little, or none at all*, and that *it makes a low, flat, cold Senſe.* I am very ſenſible the true Senſe of Scripture often appears to be ſo to Perſons of his Lordſhip's great Parts. But, as *low*, and *flat*, and *cold* a Senſe as he thinks this to be, I could, by many Teſtimonies from the beſt Authorities in ſuch Matters, prove it to be the *true* one. One happens to lie before me, who was as good a Judge of what was *flat* and *low*, as any Man; and was himſelf ſo *eloquent* a Writer, that he is called the *Cicero* among the

the Fathers; his Lordſhip ſees, I mean *Lactantius*, who in his *Epit.* c. 42. has theſe Words of *Chriſt*: *Nuncupatur* Chriſtus, *quod eſt* Rex; *ideò, quia ipſe de cœlo in ſæculi hujus conſummatione venturus eſt; ut judicet mundum, & reſurrectione mortuorum factâ, regnum ſibi conſtituat æternum.* But I do not inſiſt upon this Authority.

If his Lordſhip be capable of Conviction, when he has once taken up a Notion, I ſhould hope he would be convinced he is miſtaken here, upon ſo full an Evidence on the other Side, as is, I think, beyond all Exception. *Euſebius, Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 20. of his Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, tells us from *Hegeſippus*, a very ancient Church-Hiſtorian of great Credit, that, *Domitian* having ordered all the Poſterity, that could be found, of the Houſe of *David* to be put to Death, there were brought to him ſome who were deſcended of *Judas*, the Brother of *Chriſt*; who being interrogated by him concerning *Chriſt* and his Kingdom, as Perſons the beſt able to inform him, Ὁποία τὶς εἴη, καὶ πότε καὶ ποῖ φανησομένη; what Manner of Kingdom it was, and when, and where it ſhould appear? anſwered thus: Ὡς οὐ κοσμικὴ μὲν, οὐδ' ἐπίγειος, ἐπουράνιος δὲ καὶ ἀγγελικὴ τυγχάνει, ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τοῦ αἰῶνος γενησομένη, ὁπηνίκα ἐλθὼν ἐν δόξῃ κρινεῖ ζῶντας, καὶ νεκροὺς, καὶ ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ, κατὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ. "That it is not "a worldly or earthly Kingdom, but an Heavenly "and Angelical one, which will ſhew itſelf at the "End of the World, when he ſhall come in "Glory to judge the Quick and the Dead, and "ſhall render to every one according to his Deeds." Thus they, in Agreement with that of St. *Paul*,

I charge thee before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, *who shall judge the Quick and the Dead at his Appearing, and his Kingdom*, 2 Tim. iv. 1. Whom now shall we believe, his Lordship, at near 1700 Years Distance from *Christ*'s being upon Earth, or his Relations, who were but two Descents removed from him? In my poor Opinion, if we consider either the Scripture itself, or the Sense of the primitive Church, this is so true and just an Account of the *Kingdom of Christ*, and, consequently, so good an Explication of the Text before us, that no Words could give a better, though their Evidence were out of the Question; much more should we acquiesce in it, as true, when it is so well supported. But, if this be the true Sense of it, then the *Church* is not the *Kingdom* here spoken of, which is the Point I was to prove against his Lordship, and the whole Superstructure built upon it, unless otherwise supported, must fall with it.

But, not content with denying his Lordship's Explication of this Text, I added, *that the* Kingdom *does not mean the* Church, *in any Place of Scripture*. Whether this be true, or not, it mends not his Lordship's Cause at all, which, as managed by him, rests solely on on this single Text. But his Lordship delights so much in Opposition, that, instead of supposing I would not venture on such an Assertion without good Reasons for it, he is resolved to conclude it intirely false and groundless. To this End, he raises a great Dust through many Pages; but I shall shew, it is Dust only. In Order to which, it is necessary to observe, that

the

the Gospel of our Saviour, when expressed at Length, is said to be Εὐαγγέλιον τ βασιλείας τ Θεῦ, the *Gospel* (that is, the glad Tidings) *of the Kingdom of God.* As *Mar.* i. 14. Jesus *came into* Galilee, *preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God.* At other Times one, or two, of the three Members, of which this Expression consists, is put for the Whole; as, Εὐαγγέλιον τ βασιλείας, *the Gospel of the Kingdom*, Matt. iv. 23. Εὐαγγέλιον τ Θεῦ, *the Gospel of God*; as *Rom.* i. 1. 2 *Cor.* xi. 7. Εὐαγγέλιον singly, *the Gospel*, Mar. i. 15. — xiii. 10. Ἡ βασιλεία τ Θεῦ, *the Kingdom of God*, Mark x. 15. Luk xviii. 17, 29. Acts xx. 25. Col. iv. 11. which, in St. *Matthew*, is generally throughout his Gospel called ἡ βασιλεία τ̃ν οὐρανῶν, *the Kingdom of Heaven.* I will remind his Lordship only of one Place in the Chapter I had particularly referred to, xiii. 52. *Every Scribe, which is instructed* unto the Kingdom of Heaven, *is like unto a Man that is an Housholder, which bringeth forth out of his Treasure Things new and old.* Εἰς τ βασιλείαν τ̃ν οὐρανῶν; that is, says *Theophylact*, Εἰς τ τῦ Χριστῦ γνῶσιν. I wish this *Text* had made his Lordship think it not improper, to have supported his Notions, especially those relating to this *Kingdom*, from some Passages of the *Ancients*, and not intirely from *modern* ones; his Treasure, no Doubt, being well repleniſhed with both, whatever determined him to use one Sort only. But his Lordship thinks he can easily evade all the Arguments that can be drawn from this last Expression, by distinguishing between the *Kingdom of Heaven* and the *Kingdom of Christ*: And to make these two the same is,

in his Opinion, *no better than to profeſs to eſtabliſh the Meaning of one Phraſe, and to miſtake another for it.* This obliges me, for his Lordſhip's Information, to obſerve farther, firſt, that this Expreſſion, *the Kingdom of Heaven*, is peculiar to St. *Matthew*; and that the ſame is always called by St. *Mark*, and St. *Luke*, the *Kingdom of God*. The Reaſon of which, perhaps, was, that, St. *Matthew*'s Goſpel being writ in the *Hebrew* of thoſe Times, the Word, *Heaven*, was uſed for the *God of Heaven*; of which Uſe of the Word there are ſeveral Inſtances in the *Apocryphal* Books, and in the *New Teſtament*. I will mention only two very noted ones in the Goſpels, *Matt.* xxi. 25. *The Baptiſm of* John, *whence was it? from* Heaven, *or of Men?* And *Luke* xv. 21. *Father, I have ſinned againſt* Heaven, *and in thy Sight.* In both which Places it is manifeſt, that *Heaven* is put for the *God of Heaven*. And it is, probably, to this Language of the *Jews* we owe that of *Juvenal*,

Nil præter nubes & cœli numen adorant.

This *Kingdom of Heaven*, then, is the *Kingdom of God*; which is, indeed, exceeding evident from this one Paſſage in St. *Matt.* xix. 23, 24. Our Saviour, having ſaid, in the firſt of theſe Verſes, that *a rich Man ſhall hardly enter into the* Kingdom of Heaven, in the next Verſe, repeats the ſame Thing in theſe Words: *It is eaſier for a Camel to go through the Eye of a Needle, than for a rich Man to enter into the* Kingdom of God. Here the *King-*

dom

dom of Heaven and the *Kingdom of God* are moſt manifeſtly one and the ſame *Kingdom*.

And it is as plain, that the *Kingdom of Heaven*, or of *God*, is the ſame with the *Kingdom of Chriſt*. If we compare *Matt.* xviii. 1. with xx. 21. and *Mark* x. 37. what, in the firſt of thoſe Places, is expreſſed by the *Kingdom of Heaven*, in the ſecond, is called the *Kingdom of Chriſt*, and, in the third, *his Glory*. It is, indeed, originally the *Father's Kingdom*, but by his Gift veſted in the Son; and it is God that rules in *Chriſt*. This, to a *Chriſtian* and a Scholar, one would think, ſhould need no Proof. For the Sum of the whole Goſpel is contained in theſe Words, *The Kingdom of Heaven* [or, *of God*] *is at Hand*. It was in theſe Words, that not only *John* the *Baptiſt*, but our Saviour himſelf, and the Apoſtles by his Command, began their Preaching. And nobody, who conſiders, can doubt, whether that Declaration be not perfectly equivalent to this, *the Kingdom of Chriſt is at Hand*. Nobody, I ſay, can doubt of this, who obſerves, what were the Expectations of the *Jews*, at that Time, or the Prophecies on which they were grounded. And the ſame is evident by many expreſs Paſſages in the Goſpels. Let us but compare the parallel Places, in which the near Approach of this Kingdom is foretold, *Matt.* xxiv. 33. *When ye ſhall ſee all theſe Things, know that it* [or *he*] *is near, even at the Doors*. But (ver. 37.) *as the Days of* Noe *were, ſo ſhall alſo the* Coming of the Son of Man *be*. And the ſame Words we have, *Mark* xiii. 29. How now is this expreſſed in St. *Luke*, xxiii. 31.? *When ye ſee theſe Things*

come to paſs, know ye, that the Kingdom of God *is nigh at Hand.* To theſe Proofs, let me add the Words of *Tertullian*, upon *Luke* xvii. 20. (*When* Chriſt *was asked of the* Phariſees, *when the Kingdom of God ſhould come, he anſwered them and ſaid, the Kingdom of God comes not with Obſervation.) Ne argumentetur audacia hæretica, de regno Creatoris, de quo conſulebatur, non de ſuo reſpondiſſe eis Dominum, ſequentia obſiſtunt. Dicens enim, filium hominis ante multa pati, & reprobari oportere ante adventum ſuum, in quo & regnum ſubſtantialiter revelabitur; ſuum oſtendit & regnum, de quo reſponderat, quod paſſiones & reprobationes ipſius expectabat.* Lib. 4. cont. Marc. c. 35.

But, to ſhew the Complaiſance I have for his Lordſhip, I will, as abſurd as I have ſhewn it to be, ſuppoſe, that the *Kingdom of Heaven*, or *of God*, means one Thing, and the *Kingdom of Chriſt* another. All his Lordſhip will get by it is, that a great many Paſſages, indeed, will be laid aſide, as of no Force in this Queſtion. But will thoſe, that are left, do his Cauſe any Service? Not the leaſt; they are all ſtrong againſt him; as any one may ſee, that will purſue with Care what is ſaid of the *Kingdom of Chriſt*, from the ſixteenth of St. *Matthew* to the twenty-fifth, and then trace it through the ſame Steps back again. He will then ſee, that the Son of Man is repreſented, in Chap. xxv. as being come in *his Kingdom*; that, in the twenty-fourth, he gives his Diſciples the Signs of *his Coming*; in the ſixteenth, he tells them, *there were ſome ſtanding there, which ſhould not taſte of Death till they ſee the Son of Man coming in his Kingdom.*

This

This will ſhew his Lordſhip, that the *Kingdom of Chriſt* is not his Church, but the Glory and Regal Power, in which he will, at the Conſummation of all Things, manifeſt himſelf to it. And the ſame Search, continued farther back, will, at the ſame Time, undeniably prove to him, that this Kingdom is the ſame with the *Kingdom of Heaven*, which in the tenth, and preceding Chapters, *is ſaid to be at Hand. Repent ye, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at Hand.* Which Words cannot be better explained, than they are by *Tertullian*, L. 4. c. 24. cont. *Marc. Quid enim ad illos, ſi adpropinquaret regnum? niſi quia cum judicio adpropinquat, in ſalutem ſcilicet eorum, qui annuntiationem ejus recepiſſent.*

And as the *Kingdom* of *God*, and of *Chriſt*, mean the ſame Thing, when by *Kingdom* is meant Regal Dignity, Power, or Dominion; ſo likewiſe are they of the ſame Import, when the Word, *Kingdom*, is uſed to expreſs the Glory and Happineſs promiſed to the Saints; which is often expreſſed by *entering into the Kingdom of God*, as 1 *Theſſ.* ii. 12. *That you would walk worthy of God, who hath called you unto* his Kingdom and Glory, And *Jac.* ii. 5. *Hath not God choſen the Poor of this World* —— *Heirs of* the Kingdom, *which he hath promiſed to them that love him?* And by our Saviour himſelf in the *Goſpels*; ſee *Mar.* ix. 47. x. 23. *Luke* xviii. 17. and 24, which in *Matthew* is *Kingdom of Heaven.* See Verſe 10, 20. vii. 21. xviii. 3. But ſo likewiſe is it by entering into the *Kingdom of Chriſt*, 2 *Tim.* iv. 18. *The Lord* (Chriſt) *ſhall deliver me from every evil Work, and will preſerve me unto* his heavenly Kingdom. And 2 *Pet.* i. 11.

So

So ſhall an Entrance be miniſtred unto you abundantly into the everlaſting Kingdom of our Lord and Saviour *Jeſus Chriſt*. And what is ſtill more convincing, if poſſible, this *Kingdom* is expreſly called the *Kingdom of God, and of Chriſt*, by St. *Paul*, Epheſ. v. 5. *This ye know, that no Whoremonger, non unclean Perſon, hath any Inheritance in the* Kingdom of Chriſt, and of God.

But his Lordſhip has ſtill another Evaſion in Reſerve; he pretends, "that it is a Miſtake which "runs through my whole Performance, [*i. e.* half a Page.] "That I underſtand thoſe I oppoſe, to "maintain that there is nothing included in the "Meaning of the Phraſe, the *Kingdom of Chriſt*, "but the *Church*, or Society of People governed "by him. Whereas this Expreſſion includes in "it a Multitude of Ideas relating to the Goſpel-"ſtate, one of which certainly is the Nature of "the Church." To all which the ſhort Anſwer is, 1. That his Lordſhip, in his *Sermon*, takes no Notice of any other Notion included in this Expreſſion; that the Church of Chriſt, and the Kingdom of Chriſt, are, throughout his *Sermon*, convertible Terms: And, to preclude all ſuch Evaſions, in a Paſſage I have already quoted, *p.* 130. he does not only uſe this Expreſſion, *the univerſal inviſible Church, or Kingdom of Chriſt*; but ſtill more fully expreſſes his Notion thus, *the univerſal inviſible Church, or WHOLE Kingdom of Chriſt*. But, 2. The Queſtion is not, Whether his Lordſhip, or any others, allow the Expreſſion of the *Kingdom of Chriſt* ever to have, in Scripture, any farther Meaning beſides this of the *Church*; but, Whether

Whether it ever, in any Place, has that. Which is what I have denied; not only by ſhewing, it always hath ſome other Senſe, but that it cannot have that; becauſe the Definition of the *Church*, being put in the Place of the Thing defined, that is, πλῆθος βασιλεύομενον, in the Place of βασιλεία, will not make Senſe. Here lies the Streſs of the Diſpute.

But all his Lordſhip could ſay, he could not but be ſenſible, would be to no Manner of Purpoſe, unleſs he could bring ſome *Text*, where *it* can be plainly proved to mean the *Church*. This, therefore, he attempts, and, out of near an hundred and fifty Places, pitches upon four, which he thinks are deciſive againſt me; two out of the Goſpels, and two more out of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles. Of theſe two laſt, one is the noted Text, 1 *Cor.* xv. 24. *then cometh the End, when he ſhall have delivered up the Kingdom to God, even the Father.* This *Text* will give us little Trouble; for his Lordſhip himſelf confeſſes, that βασιλεία here ſignifies *Chriſt's Regal Dignity*; which is all I contend for. If it had ſignified the *Church* here, it had been to his Lordſhip's Purpoſe; but ſince, by his own Confeſſion, it does not, whatever other Purpoſe this *Text* may ſerve, it concludes nothing againſt me.

His next *Text* is, *Col.* i. 13. where St. *Paul*, ſpeaking of God the Father, hath theſe Words: *Who hath delivered us from the Power of Darkneſs, and hath tranſlated us into the Kingdom of his dear Son.* Here his Lordſhip is ſure, the *Church* is meant by the *Kingdom*. But, if his Lordſhip were better acquainted with St. *Paul*'s Style, he would be

be very ſure this is not the Senſe of it; and that this Expreſſion, *hath tranſlated us into the Kingdom of his Son*, is to be underſtood of the *aſſured Hope* he hath, by calling us to the Goſpel, given us of this Happineſs; by which we believe, that, if we *ſuffer with* Chriſt *here, we ſhall reign with him hereafter*, when his Kingdom ſhall be revealed from Heaven; of which, while in this Life, we are Heirs only through Hope; the *Hope of eternal Life*, Tit. i. 2. which in the next Chapter, Verſe 13. is itſelf called, the *bleſſed Hope*; —— *looking for that bleſſed Hope, and the glorious Appearing of the Great God, and our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt*. This is the *lively Hope*, to which St. *Peter* ſays, *God, through the Reſurrection of* Chriſt, *hath begotten us again*, 1 Pet. i. 3. Through the Strength of this Hope St. *Paul* anticipates the Joys of the other World, and ſpeaks of what will be, with that Aſſurance and Fulneſs of Faith, as if it already were. And this Figure of Speech he was very naturally led to, from what was the general Expectation of *the Faithful*, in thoſe Times; who not only firmly believed our Saviour's Promiſe, as what would, one Time or other, certainly be fulfilled, but lived in a perpetual Expectation of his Coming, and were as ſenſibly affected with the near Proſpect they had of it, as if he were already come; as is evident from many Places in St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles; who found it neceſſary to undeceive the *Theſſalonians* ſo far, as to let them know, that it was by no Means certain, *that the Day of* Chriſt *was ſo near at Hand*; and that there were Reaſons, why it might, and would be delayed, though he knew

not

not how long, God having reſerved *the Times and the Seaſons in his own Power.* In this preſent State, *our Life is hid with* Chriſt *in God. But when Chriſt, who is our Life, ſhall appear, then ſhall we alſo appear with him in Glory*, Col. iii. 3, 4. And the Hope St. *Paul* had of this makes him declare, *Rom.* viii. 18. that *the Sufferings of this preſent Time are not worthy to be compared with the Glory which ſhall be revealed in the Saints*; which he repreſents the whole Creation impatiently longing for: *The earneſt Expectation of the Creature waiteth for the Manifeſtation of the Sons of God.* St. *Paul* was wrapped up in theſe ſublime *ſeraphick* Thoughts; and, full of the Contemplation of this glorious State, every-where ſpeaks of thoſe who are called to have Part in it, as if they were already admitted into it, and Faith were turned into Fruition.

I ſhall give his Lordſhip but one Inſtance, which will, at the ſame Time, be a perfect Comment on the Text in Diſpute, and ſhew what is the true Senſe of it. *Eph.* ii. 5, 6. the Apoſtle ſpeaks thus: *When we were dead in Sins, God hath quickened us*, that is, reſtored us to Life, *together with* Chriſt, and *hath raiſed us up together, and made us ſit together in Heavenly Places, in Chriſt Jeſus.* Will his Lordſhip ſay, that ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις here means the *Church*, becauſe we are not yet made actually to ſit in any other *Heavenly* Places? Or will he admit, that St. *Paul* here ſpeaks by a *Prolepſis*, on Account of the Hope and Confidence we have in *Chriſt*, that we ſhall, when he appears, ſit with him in the Heavenly Places, ſhall partake of that

State

State of Life and Glory which ſhall then be revealed? *Grotius* has, in one Word, fully explained the Apoſtle's Senſe here: *Jus ad rem ſæpe rei nomen accipit.* And by the ſame Figure of Speech it is, that we are ſaid to be *already* tranſlated by God into the *Kingdom of his Son.* And the *Paralleliſm* of theſe two Places deſerves the more Regard, from the great Likeneſs that runs through theſe two Epiſtles; which is ſo great, that it is plain St. *Paul* wrote one, while his Thoughts were warm and full of the other; and, from thence, the Expreſſions, that ſeem to be parallel, may be preſumed to have fallen from his Pen, not by Chance, but becauſe the ſame Ideas were freſh in his Mind.

If this be a true Account of this Text, then what his Lordſhip ſays muſt be the Senſe of it, I take the Liberty to ſay, cannot be the Senſe of it. Which his Lordſhip might have ſeen from the Verſe immediately preceding, where the Apoſtle ſpeaks as if God had already made them *Partakers of the Inheritance of the Saints in Light*; which is exactly the ſame Figure of Speech, and what is as yet future, and in Hope only, is ſpoken of as already done. But, perhaps, his Lordſhip was not aware of this, becauſe St. *Paul's* Expreſſion is, that God hath *made them meet to be Partakers* — τῷ ἱκανώσαντι ἡμᾶς; but that does not mean, hath made them meet now, to be Partakers hereafter; but, that he hath now made them ſo; as his Lordſhip might have ſeen by his Uſe of the ſame Word, 2 *Cor.* iii. 6. ὃς καὶ ἱκάνωσεν ἡμᾶς διακόνους, *who hath made us meet to be Miniſters*;

sters; that is, as it is well translated, who *hath made us able Ministers*. Nor is the Sense altered by the different Construction; it had been exactly the same, if, instead of διακόνες, he had said, εἰς τ διακονίαν, as it is here in the *Col.* εἰς τ μερίδα. I might add, for a farther Illustration of this Place, that *God* hath *translated us into the Kingdom of his Son*, in the same Sense as his Son is said to *have delivered us from the Wrath to come*, 1 Thes. 1. 10. agreeably to the *Vulgate*, — *qui eripuit nos*. But, because it is in the Original, ῥυόμενον, in the present Tense, I do not insist upon it. Nor is there, after what has been said, any Need I should. But, that his Lordship may see I am not singular in this Explication, I will shew him that the *Greek* Interpreters understood it in the same Manner. *Theophylact*'s Words are these: Μέγα μ ἡ τὸ σκότος ἀπαλλάξαι· τὸ δ ἡ εἰς βασιλείαν εἰσαγαγεῖν, πολλῷ μεῖζον. ἡ οὐχ' ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥστε συμβασιλεῦσαι τῷ υἱῷ —— And *Theodoret*, τ τῆς υἱῆς βασιλείας ἠξίωσε. τοῦτο ἡ ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ ἔφη· εἰ ὑπομένωμεν, ἡ συμβασιλεύσωμεν. And the same Writer on the parallel Place in the *Ephesians*, αὐτῆς ἀναπάντ ἡμᾶς τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐνέτεινεν, ἡ αὐτῆς τῷ παθεῖ συνεδρεύοντ, μετέχομεν ἡμεῖς τ πάθους. And *Theophylact*, δικαίως νῦν, μετ' ὀλίγον δ ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ. —— αὕτη ἡ ἐλπὶς τ κλήσεως.

His Lordship's other Texts are in the Gospels; one of them, very unfortunately for me, in the Thirteenth of St. *Matthew*, the very Chapter I had referred to, to prove that the *Kingdom* does not mean the *Church*, and that, when it seems to do so, the Expression is *elliptical*. The other is the famous Text of the *Keys*, in which, it seems,

if

if we may believe his Lordſhip, I have myſelf explained the *Kingdom* of Heaven to be the *Church*; which, if true, would be ſtrange, indeed; ſince thereby I ſhould not only, in one Place, contradict what I have ſaid in another, which ſuch vulgar Writers may eaſily do (his Lordſhip's Adverſaries are ſuch poor Mortals, they do nothing elſe) but I ſhould, in doing ſo, contradict what has been my fixed Opinion, not leſs than five or ſix and twenty Years; and which I had the firſt Hint of, from the Converſation of a learned Friend, who was then ſtudying the Goſpels with great Application, and with a Mind equally attentive and impartial; but of this Text by and by. The Text his Lordſhip principally inſiſts on, in *Matth.* xiii. is in the *Parable of the Tares*, where, ver. 24. it is ſaid, that *the Kingdom of Heaven is likened to a Man which ſowed good Seed in his Field.* His Lordſhip is of Opinion, that the *Kingdom of Heaven*, in this Parable, is the *Church*. But I muſt take Leave to ſay, that is a Miſtake; and that the Expreſſion, in the firſt Verſe of this Parable, at full Length would be, *the Preaching of the Goſpel of the Kingdom of Heaven is likened*, &c.

But his Lordſhip thinks it very remarkable, that, when our Saviour himſelf explains this Parable, he ſays expreſly, *as therefore the Tares are gathered and burnt in the Fire, ſo ſhall it be in the End of the World. The Son of Man ſhall ſend forth his Angels, and they ſhall gather out of his Kingdom all Things that offend, and them which do Iniquity.* And here his Lordſhip triumphs greatly in his own Inaccuracy. I might, in Anſwer, tell him, that

ſome

ſome MSS. want theſe Words, ἐκ τ βασιλείας αὐτῦ, and that, when they are out, the 40th and 41ſt Verſes are more agreeable to each other; but *that* I take no Advantage of. The Point his Lordſhip ſhould prove is, that the *Kingdom* here is the *Church*. Now it happens, that our Saviour has explained every Part of this Parable himſelf, and ſays, that the *Field*, in which the Tares were ſown, is not the *Church*, nor the *Kingdom*, but the *World*. It is out of the *World*, therefore, the Tares are to be gathered, which, while it is the World, is not the *Kingdom*, but afterwards; for it follows, in the ſame Verſe, *the Harveſt is the End of the World*, συντέλεια τ αἰῶνος. Then appears the *Kingdom*, according to what I quoted above from *Hegeſippus*. Then, therefore, the *Tares* are to be gathered, that they may have no Place in it, but be thrown into the Fire to be burnt; but the Righteous ſhall *ſhine forth as the Sun, in the Kingdom of their Father*. For then ſhall the King ſay to them, *Come, ye bleſſed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the Foundation of the World*, Matth. xxv. 34.

This Parable, then, it it plain, will do his Lordſhip no Service: Much leſs will the next, *ver.* 47. where it is ſaid, *The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto a Net*, &c. in which Words the *Kingdom of Heaven* can, in his Opinion, mean nothing ſo probably, as the *Church of Chriſt*. But *Theophylact* was not of that Mind, when, explaining this Parable, he ſays, *the Net is the Doctrine of the Apoſtles*, σαγήνη γὰρ ἡ διδασκαλία τ̃ ἁλιέων Ἀποστόλων. The Truth is, the Words to be ſupplied here are the ſame, as

in the former Parable, *the Preaching of the Gospel of* the Kingdom. It is this is likened to *the Casting a Net into the Sea*; not the *Church*, or Society governed by *Christ*, which cannot make tolerable Sense in either of these Parables; as every unprejudiced Reader will, I doubt not, readily allow. And that this is generally the Sense of this Expression, when it does not mean the *Kingdom* that shall be revealed at the Last Day, and the Felicity and Glory *that* will bring to the Saints; his Lordship might have learned, from the incomparable *Grotius*, who, with his usual Sagacity, observes on *Matt.* v. 10. that this Expression, *the Kingdom of Heaven*, signifies sometimes the *heavenly Doctrine*, sometimes the *heavenly Glory*. *Modo doctrinam cælestem, & quæ eam in hac vita consequuntur, modo gloriam cælestem.*

The last Text appealed to by the good Bishop is, the famous one of the *Keys*, *Matt* xvi. 19. his Lordship's short-liv'd Triumphs here are very great. "He thinks he has a Right to mention "this Passage, to shew, after what an irresistible "Manner Truth sometimes flows from a Man, "even against the Force of his own Design. "That, by my Explication of this Text, it so unluckily falls out, that, even before I come to "make my Observation, I have myself utterly "destroyed it." In this Manner his Lordship diverts himself for a Page and half together. His Argument, from my Explication of that Passage, is this: The Power of the *Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven*, I have said, implies an Authority to *admit into, or shut out of the Church*; the *Keys*, therefore,

fore, *the Kingdom*, are the *Keys of the Church*; *ergo*, according to me, the Kingdom of Heaven is the Church. *q. e. d.* Here's a Proof againſt me nothing ſhort of Demonſtration; and ſuch it is, as his Lordſhip uſually puts upon his Readers for one. The Truth is, I was aware of this pretty Objection, at the Time I publiſhed my Sermon, and left it as a Snare, in which, I was ſure, his Lordſhip would be catched, if he meddled with it; and it has ſucceeded perfectly to my Wiſh, and drawn him into a ridiculous Triumph, in which he has expoſed nobody but himſelf.

To come to the Point; I could never perſuade myſelf to believe our Saviour ſpake, in this Place, ſo unaccurately, as when he had ſaid, in one Verſe, that he would *build his Church* on St. *Peter*, he ſhould mean nothing, but the *Keys of the Church*, in the next, when he adds, he will give him the *Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven*. This had, in my Opinion, been ſaying ſomething leſs than he had ſaid before; whereas I cannot but think it to have been his Intention, to riſe in his Promiſe, and give him ſomething greater than he had in the foregoing Words; ſo that the Senſe of the Place appears to me to be, as if he had ſaid: I will build on thee my Church here on Earth; and not only ſo, I will alſo give thee the *Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven*. But, as the Church is the Way, and the only Way, the Goſpel teaches to Heaven, the *Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven* muſt needs imply a Power of admitting into the *Church*; by which was opened the Paſſage into that Kingdom. *Aditum ad regnum cæleſte, id eſt, ad gloriam illam*

æternam, are *Grotius*'s Words. What now is become of his Lordſhip's mighty Triumphs? Where is the Force of his Demonſtration?

That this Interpretation is not new, I will ſhew his Lordſhip from two very good modern Authorities, *Petavius* and *Hammond*. The firſt, in his *Diſc. Eccl. l.* 1. *c.* 7. has theſe Words, ſpeaking of this Text: "*Nam & cælorum regnum, cujus claves* "Petro *datæ ſunt a Chriſto, Eccleſiam interpretatur*, "(Salmaſius) *non falſo tantum, ſed etiam inepte.*" And, in his 16th *Exercitat.* upon *Julian*, ſpeaking of the ſame Thing: "—— *quid de hujus cæcitate*, "*& ἀναισθησία dicam, qui Chriſti verba*, Matt. xvi. "18. *non impiè modo, ſed ſtupidè inſulſéque detor-* "*quet?* Tibi dabo, *inquit*, claves regni cœlorum, "&c. *regnum cælorum* Salmaſius *ait Eccleſiam eſſe.* "*Neque, quid ex eo ſequatur, animadvertit. Nam* "*cum ſtatim ſubjectum ſit:* & quodcunque ligaveris "ſuper terram, erit ligatum & in cœlis, *&c. hæc* "*erit interprete* Salmaſio *verborum iſtorum ſententia.* "*Et quodcunque ligaveris in Eccleſiâ, erit ligatum in* "*Eccleſiâ. Quod eſt enim ligare ſuper terram, præ-* "*terquam id in Eccleſiâ facere? at idem eſt, ut* "*aſſerit, cælorum regnum. Quid ſine dubio cælorum* "*nomine ſtatim appellat — idem eſt regnum cælorum* "*& cæli: neque alitèr antiquiſſimi patres acceperunt.*" Thus *Petavius*.

But I cannot ſhew his Lordſhip the Abſurdity of his Argument againſt me, better than in the Words of Dr. *Hammond*; who, though perſuaded as much as any one, that the *Kingdom of Heaven*, in the *New Teſtament*, ſignifies the *Church of Chriſt*, yet concludes his Explication of this Text concern-

ing

ing the *Keys*, thus: If this Notion of the *King-*
" *dom of Heaven*" [that it ſignifies the *Church*] " do
" yet ſeem *alien*, or forced, or leſs proper for this
" Place, then you may but pleaſe to obſerve,
" that a *Key* refers to a Lock, a Lock to a Door,
" or Entrance into any Place; and then, the
" *Church* being ſuppoſed the *Door*, or *Gate*, the
" only Way of Paſſage to Heaven, theſe *Keys of*
" *Heaven* itſelf muſt be the *Keys* of the *Church*
" below, as of the *Door* that leads thither; and
" then that will return to the ſame Iſſue ſtill."
Thus Dr. *Hammond*, in his *Power of the Keys*, c. 4. which agrees exactly to the Senſe in which, I have many Years thought, this Text ſhould be underſtood. By this Interpretation it is evident, the *Keys of the Kingdom* may be the *Keys of the Church*, and yet the *Church* not be the *Kingdom*. It is to be hoped his Lordſhip will take Care, another Time, to be ſurer of his Victory, before he triumph ſo inſultingly; which, indeed, few do who are uſed to conquer.

Theſe are the Texts upon which his Lordſhip puts the Strength of his Defence; which being all, when rightly explained, againſt him, his Oppoſition is, in Effect, a Confirmation of what I was to prove, that the *Kingdom* of *Heaven*, or *God*, or *Chriſt*, does not, any where in Scripture, ſignify the *Church of Chriſt* here on Earth, or the Society of People who profeſs themſelves his Diſciples; who live in Expectation of the Coming of his Kingdom, and are by himſelf taught to pray daily for it; which is all I have affirmed: Not that the *Church* may not, in any Caſe, be conſidered under

the Image of *Kingdom*, but that, in Fact, it is not ever ſo conſidered in Scripture; and, therefore, the Doctrines, drawn from that Image of it, ought not to be put upon us, as Scripture Doctrines, without ſome better Proof: Since, ſo far as they are built on this Image, they are without Foundation; and the Strength of his Cauſe, as it reſts upon his Text, is mere Weakneſs.

How much better had his Lordſhip, inſtead of a laboured, feeble Oppoſition, have owned himſelf led into a Miſtake, by what has been the prevailing Opinion of learned Men, for many Years; and have looked out for ſome other Support for his *levelling Scheme?* Which he might have found in every Page of the New Teſtament, at leaſt as well as in the Text he choſe, even ſuppoſing him not to have miſtaken the true Senſe of it. All he has advanced might have been deduced, with juſt as good Conſequence, from any Place, where *Chriſt* is called *Lord* and *Maſter*, or by either of theſe Titles, eſpecially the firſt, which is in the moſt eminent Manner appropriated to him. Such a Retreat had been no Reflexion on himſelf, nor could it have been Matter of much Triumph to his Adverſary; nothing being more common, than for little People, in the Commonwealth of Learning, to have the good Fortune, either by pure Chance, or by Force of a cloſer and more particular Attention, to hit upon ſomething that had eſcaped the Sagacity and Diligence of much greater Men. How very poſſible this is, I could ſhew his Lordſhip by a *Specimen* of Emendations and Obſervations (he would not, till he is in better Humour,

mour, be pleaſed to ſee) not only upon *profane* Writers, but upon capital Places in the *Sacred* and *Eccleſiaſtical* ones. But this is not a Place for it. I will give him in the * Margin one only, for an Inſtance, upon a *profane* Author, which I made,

---

* The Paſſage I mean is this:

Me doctarum ederæ præmia frontium
Dis miſcent Superis. Me gelidum nemus,
Nympharúmque leves cum Satyris chori
Secernunt populo ——

This Place, as it is now read, is plainly faulty in theſe three Reſpects: 1. Here is, in a *Dedicatory Ode*, no Compliment to his Patron, when there was the propereſt Occaſion in the World for one, and which the End of the *Ode* ſuppoſes him to have made. 2. Here is a moſt extravagant Exaltation of himſelf, which exceeds all he dares to vent in a *Poetick* Rank, at the End of any of his Books, when he has done his Work; much leſs is it tolerable at the Beginning, before the Poet has warmed either his Reader, or himſelf; and while his Merit, as yet, does not appear. *Sumo ſuperbiam* will not be endured, till he has ſhewn what he can do; till he can add, *Quæſitam meritis*. In ſuch lofty Language *Horace* ventures to end a Book, but never to begin one. But, 3. Here is a moſt abſurd Fall, in a Moment, from Heaven to Earth; from being Company for the *Dî magni*, to *Satyrs* and the *Sylvan* Deities, whom *Ovid*, in his *Ibis*, ingeniouſly calls the *Plebs Superûm*.

Theſe are Faults ſo polite a Writer, as *Horace*, could not poſſibly be guilty of; much leſs at firſt Setting out, where, common Senſe tells one, an Author ſhould take the greateſt Care to be correct. For the Reader is then cool, and the firſt Impreſſion he takes ſticks by him. But change now but a ſingle Letter in the firſt *Me*, and for *that* read *Te*; and all theſe Faults immediately vaniſh, and as many Beauties ariſe in their Place. There is then a fine Compliment made to *Mæcenas*, in the Part

he

above ten Years ago, upon the firſt Page of a Book that is in every body's Hands, the firſt *Ode* of *Horace*; where the Change of a ſingle Letter (obſerved, hitherto, by none of the ableſt *Criticks*, though *Horace* has been a favourite Book with all of them) reſtores Beauty, and *Decorum*, to a Place, that, according to the preſent Reading, is manifeſtly indecent and abſurd. But twenty ſuch Emendations would give me no Rank, no Right to pretend to an Equality with thoſe great *Genii*, who have made *Horace* their Care; much leſs to inſult them, for Diſſembling Faults they could not but ſee, becauſe they knew not how to mend them. His Lordſhip, therefore, might have allowed me to have ſucceeded, in an Obſervation upon an Expreſſion in the New Teſtament, without any Fears of

---

he loved to be moſt flattered in. (See *Od.* 11. *l.* 12. 111. 8. and 1 *Ep.* 19.) He is declared, in the loftieſt Words, to be at the Head of the *Belles Lettres*, the ſupreme Judge of Wit: The moſt exceſſive and offenſive Vanity is turned into the greateſt and moſt becoming Modeſty; and that, which now appears to be ſo precipitate and ridiculous a Fall, is nothing but the humble Diſtance at which the Poet places himſelf below his great Patron. I inſtance in this Emendation the rather, becauſe the ingenious Author of the *Free-Thinker* tells us, that another Perſon alſo, of no Name in *Critick*, a learned *North-Briton*, hath had the Fortune to hit upon the ſame. This Correction, with another very little one, no leſs certain, and which has formerly been eſpouſed by ſeveral very learned Men, the Removal of the *Point* at *Deos* in the ſixth Verſe, and placing it at *Nobilis*, in the Fifth (the Want of which has made the firſt Part of this *Ode* appear, hitherto, extremely confuſed) clears up all, and reſtores this whole *Ode* to its firſt Beauty; Perſpicuity, Propriety, and Decency return, after a long Exile; and *Horace* knows himſelf again.

of its giving me too great an Advantage, or of its doing any Prejudice to his ſuperior Merit.

But his Lordſhip diſdains ſo mean a Part, for two Reaſons, neither of which could be reſiſted; firſt, the *Dean* muſt, on no Terms, be allowed to be ſo much as once in the Right; and, in the next Place, the Biſhop, who has been in this Way a Warrior more than twenty Years, muſt not now begin to yield. There cannot be a better Indication of his Lordſhip's Readineſs to ſubmit to better Information, than what has already been obſerved by others: That, during all the Controverſies he has been engaged in, he has never once owned himſelf to have been in any one Miſtake. And, therefore, vain would it be in me to hope, that any Thing I have ſaid, in Explication of this important Phraſe, the *Kingdom of Heaven*, or *God*, or *Chriſt*, however ſatisfactory it may appear to others, ſhould convince him: No; I am ſo far from any ſuch Expectation, that, as I have ſaid in the P. S. of my *Sermon*, I have, what I think a Demonſtration, to prove *that* to be impoſſible: Which whether it were not ſaid with Reaſon (though, perhaps, not without Reſentment) let the Reader judge, when he has ſeen, by the Inſtance I ſhall give, with what an invincible Obſtinacy his Lordſhip is capable of defending a Miſtake, even then when it is ſo enormous, that it is amazing, how a Man of Letters could poſſibly fall into it.

The Inſtance I mean is, in his *Meaſures of Submiſſion*; where, that his Cauſe might want no Manner of Support, he endeavours, among other Things, to prove the *Right of Reſiſtance*, in certain

tain Caſes, from the Authority even of the primitive Church. A hardy Adventure! This was Attacking his Adverſaries in their *Capitol*; and that, when there was not the leaſt Need of it. But no Difficulties can diſcourage one of his Lordſhip's Proweſs; he chooſes to encounter, rather than decline, when it is perfectly unneceſſary. In this Spirit he attempts to prove the Lawfulneſs of *Reſiſtance*, from the Words of a primitive Biſhop, from a Saint of the *Apoſtolick* Age, from a *Martyr* at the Stake for his Religion, even from the dying Words of the holy *Polycarp: Hear, O Heavens! and give Ear, O Earth!* Was ever Miſrepreſentation like this? A Charge more falſe, more groundleſs, more abſurd, never was, never can be made.

But, that his Lordſhip may not complain I do not do him Juſtice, and that the Reader may judge, upon full Evidence, I will lay the whole Caſe before him: "It is very remarkable, *ſays his* "*Lordſhip*, and ought not to be omitted, what is "recorded of St. *Polycarp*, who was a Diſciple of "St. *John* the *Apoſtle*, and a *Martyr* for the Truth "of the *Goſpel, viz.* That, juſt before his Martyr-"dom, in his Diſcourſe with the *Proconſul*, he "took Occaſion to let him know what Obliga-"tions he thought *Chriſtians* under, with Reſpect "to Magiſtrates: Διδασκόμεθα ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ὑπὸ "τοῦ Θεοῦ τεταγμέναις τιμὴν κατὰ τὸ πρέπον, ἢ μὴ ΒΛΑΠ-"ΤΟΥΣΑΝ ἡμᾶς ἀπονέμειν. *We are taught to give* "*to* Rulers, *and the* Powers *ordained by God, ſuch* "*Honour, as doth not hurt ourſelves.* This is "plainly ſaid, with Reference to the ſame Place

"of

" of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtle to the *Romans* (C. xiii. 1.)
" of which it is, indeed, *too looſe* an Interpreta-
" tion. But it manifeſtly ſhews, that there were
" *Chriſtians* and *Martyrs* amongſt the immediate
" Succeſſors of the *Apoſtles*, who did not imagine
" that St. *Paul* had obliged them to Subjection in
" all poſſible Caſes, and who interpreted his Rules
" about the Behaviour of Subjects, ſo as to leave
" them even GREATER LIBERTY than what is
" given them in the foregoing *Sermon*. This ex-
" preſs Teſtimony, with another from *Origen* (*in*
" *which his Lordſhip is as much miſtaken*) makes it
" (*he thinks*) *highly probable*, that the *Chriſtians* of
" the firſt Ages did not interpret the Precepts of
" St. *Paul* concerning *Subjection to the higher Pow-*
" *ers*, ſo as not to allow the Lawfulneſs of *Re-*
" *ſiſtance* in ſome Caſes. And, therefore, deſires
" to know, with what Juſtice it can be affirmed,
" that he has interpreted St. *Paul* contrary to the
" univerſal Voice of the *ancient Church*? p. 140.

In this Paſſage, his Lordſhip would perſuade us, that the primitive *Chriſtians* were not all of a Mind, upon the Subject of Obedience to the Civil Powers. That one of the earlieſt is with him; nay, is more *looſe* in the Explication of St. *Paul*, than himſelf, and allows the Subject greater Liberty; and this in a Diſcourſe with the chief Magiſtrate, the *Proconſul*, juſt as he was going to the Flames, and with Deſign to let him know his Senſe of the Obligations *Chriſtians* are under to Magiſtrates. All which is pure Miſtake. *Polycarp* had no Diſcourſe with the *Proconſul*, about the Obedience due to Magiſtrates; he was asked nothing about it,

nor

nor had any Design to make any Declaration, what his own Thoughts were on that Subject; much less did he intend to give a particular Explication of that famous Text of St. *Paul*: Nor can any Thing be a wilder Imagination than to fancy, that he has given *too loose* an Interpretation of it. It is in vain, therefore, pretended from this Passage, that the primitive *Christians* were not all of the same Mind, as to the Subject of Obedience to the Magistrate.

To know what St. *Polycarp* meant, we must consider the Occasion of his Words. He had been pressed, to prevent his being put to Death, to swear by the *Fortune*, or *Genius* of the *Emperor*, to *sacrifice*, to *deny Christ*, and the like. *Polycarp* would do none of these Things, and declares he *he will not blaspheme his King and Saviour, whom he had served to an extreme old Age.* He could not give an active Obedience to such Commands, which were unlawful, and against the Commands of *God* and *Christ*, and, therefore, could not be obeyed, without incurring the Divine Vengeance, and everlasting Punishment. Afterwards the *Proconsul* himself pressing him to swear by the *Fortune of the Emperor* (which was a *Criterion* by which a *Christian* was known from others) he answers him thus: If you press me to this, as wanting to know what I am, I tell you plainly, I am a *Christian*; and, if you would know what *Christianity* is, appoint a Day, and you shall hear. To this the *Proconsul* replies, Speak to the People, πεῖσον τὸν δῆμον, persuade them, if you can, (who were clamorous to have him put to Death.) To this *Polycarp* answers

ſwers again: No, I do not think them worthy of it; but, if you pleaſe, I think that *Reſpect* due to you; ἀδιάφορον γάρ, &c. *For we are taught to give to Principalities and Powers, as being ordained by God, all due Honour, that will not hurt us.* *Polycarp* had refuſed Compliance, in Things that were not lawful for him to comply in, and would not give undue Honours even to the Emperor; but, in other Things, ſhews he has for Magiſtrates, as the Ordinance of God, all due Reſpect. He ſays this, plainly to ſhew, that what he had ſaid before, and the Conſtancy with which he had refuſed to *ſwear by the Fortune of the Emperor*, that is, in other Words, to renounce *Chriſtianity*, was not the Effect of a ſullen Obſtinacy, or out of any Diſreſpect to the *Emperor*; ſo far from that, that he is ready to pay all due Honour to all in Authority under him; but with this Limitation, provided it be conſiſtent with his Duty to God, and will not *hurt* him in that Reſpect, will not wound his Conſcience, and expoſe him to the Divine Vengeance.

His Lordſhip might eaſily have known, that this is the Senſe of ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ, in the Mouth of a primitive *Chriſtian*, much more of a *Martyr*. They did not think themſelves *hurt* by any Thing they could ſuffer from Men, ſuch as the Loſs of Goods, or Liberty, or even of Life itſelf, Theſe were not *Evils*, even in the Mouth of a Philoſopher. Some Sects even of them had that Contempt of all external Things, that they declared it was not in the Power of the World to *hurt* them. Thus *Socrates* tells his Judges, "That, in

"putting

" putting him to Death, they will not *hurt* him so " much as themſelves: That *Anytus* and *Melitus*, " his Accuſers, can do him no *Hurt*; for it is " not, ſays he, in the Power of an ill Man to " *hurt* a good one: They may procure my Death, " or Baniſhment, or Diſgrace, which others think " great Evils, but, for my Part, I think them " none. It is, in my Opinion, much more an " *Evil*, to do what they are attempting, to take " away the Life of an innocent Perſon:" Ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ΒΛΑΨΕΙ ἔτι Μέλητος, ὅτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος ΒΛΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ. Ἀποκτείνειε μέ τ' ἂν ἴσως, ἢ ἐξελάσειεν, ἢ ἀπιμάσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔτος ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τις ὦ μεγάλα ΚΑΚΑ· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτοσὶ νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι. Apol. *Plat.* p. 23. And, in the Cloſe, he ſays, " he " promiſes himſelf that Happineſs in Death, that " he could not be very angry either with his " Judges or Accuſers, though they had not done " what they did, with that Intention, but with a " Deſign to *hurt* him," ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ με.

Thus the Divine *Socrates*: And the ſame Spirit was kept up by his Followers; they thought the *Mind to be the Man*, and *Virtue to be the only Good*. And, therefore, in their Opinion, nothing was an *Evil*, nothing could *hurt* them, that did not corrupt the *Mind*, and take from them their *Virtue*. Shall now the Diſciples of *Socrates*, full of the Virtue of their Maſter, in his Senſe, and after his Example, declare, it is not *ſuffering*, but *doing* only, what is *Evil*, can *hurt* them? And

ſhall

ſhall we be ſo degenerate, as not to underſtand the ſame Language, in the Mouth of the Diſciples of the bleſſed *Jeſus*, the primitive *Chriſtians?* Who, true to the Example of their great Leader, rejoiced that they were counted worthy to ſuffer for his Sake, and eſteemed *all Things but Dung*, as St. *Paul* expreſſes it, *Phil.* iii. 8. *that they might win Chriſt.* The ancient *Apologies* are full of this noble Spirit, and ſhew, that the *Chriſtians* then not only equalled, but greatly exceeded the utmoſt *Philoſophy* could do, in Proportion as the Views and Hopes, they acted upon, were more certain, as well as more ſublime. To be convinced of this, we need only read the latter Parts of the *Apologies* of *Tertullian* and *Minutius Felix.*

But, for the Senſe of the Word βλάπτειν, in the Mouth of a *Chriſtian*, nothing can be more full and appoſite, than what we meet with, at the very Entrance of the larger *Apology* of *Juſtin Martyr*; where he ſays to the Emperor, *&c.* to whom it is inſcribed, *You may kill us, indeed, but you cannot hurt us; for we can ſuffer nothing that is really a* Hurt *to us, ſo long as we do no Ill:* Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς οὐδενὸς πείσεσθαί τι κακὸν δύνασθαι λελογίσμεθα, ἢν μὴ κακίας ἐργάτῃ ἐλεγχώμεθα, ἢ πονηροὶ διεγνώσμεθα· ὑμεῖς δ' ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνασθε, ΒΛΑΨΑΙ δ' οὔ.

Thus we ſee, what his Lordſhip calls *too looſe an Interpretation, and Allowing greater Liberty for Reſiſtance* than himſelf contends for, is really the Reverſe of it. The holy *Martyr* dares not pay *idolatrous* Honours to the Emperor, dares not renounce his Religion, will not give an *active* Obedience to any unlawful Command of Men; but, for

for a *paſſive Obedience*, or a *Non-reſiſtance*, he ſays nothing about it, in his Words; but, in his Actions, ſhews himſelf ready to ſuffer every Thing an incenſed Magiſtrate, and in Compliance with a more incenſed *Mob*, can inflict upon him. He is ſo far from diſtinguiſhing between *Reſiſting* and *not Reſiſting*, with Reſpect to temporal Things, and what relates to this Life, that he makes not the leaſt Account of them. He has but one Thing in View, worth contending for; to pleaſe God, and gain *Chriſt*. For the Sake of this, he ſuffers patiently the Loſs even of Life, and rejoices in the very Flames.

This was the Senſe of *Polycarp*, and of all the other *Martyrs* of the ancient Church, indeed, of all the primitive *Chriſtians*; who had no legal Rights to defend by Arms, if they would; nor, in the Circumſtances and Sentiments they were, would they, if they could. They were perſuaded *Reſiſtance* was not lawful, even againſt a private Man who injured them; in ſo literal and ſtrict a Senſe, did they underſtand our Saviour's Precepts, *Matt.* v. 39. *But I ſay unto you, that ye reſiſt not Evil*, &c. Much leſs did they take it into their Heads that they might, in any Caſe, reſiſt the Magiſtrate, whom they looked on as God's *Vicegerent*, and ſet over them by his Appointment; *quem neceſſe eſt ſuſpiciamus*, ſays *Tertullian*, *ut eum quem DOMINUS NOSTER elegit*; *& merito dixerim*, noſter *eſt magis* CÆSAR, *ut a* noſtro *Deo conſtitutus*. Apol. c. 33. And c. 37. *Male facere, male dicere, male cogitare de quoquam ex æquo vetamur. Quodcunque non licet in Imperatorem, id nec*

in

in quemquam. Quod in neminem, eo forsitan magis nec in ipsum, qui per Deum tantus est. And yet, as far as *Tertullian* was from any Thought of resisting the Magistrate, he would not, any more than *Polycarp*, give him the Honour that did not belong to him; as may be seen in the 33 & 34 c. *non enim* Deum *Imperatorem dicam, vel quia mentiri nescio — Dicam plane* Imperatorem *Dominum; sed quando non cogor, ut Dominum DEI vice dicam.* And in his *Scorpiace*, c. 14. *condixerat scilicet* Petrus *Regem quidem honorandum, ut tamen tunc Rex honoretur, quum suis rebus insistit; quum à divinis honoribus longe est; quia & pater & mater diligentur; cum Deo non comparabuntur.* And this he says, while he has this Text in the Thirteenth of the *Romans* full in his View, for he recites it, at large, but just before.

It is now, I hope, plain to the meanest Capacity, that nothing can be a greater Perversion of *Polycarp*'s Sense, than the Explication the Bishop has given of it; which is, indeed, all over Mistake, and as opposite to the *Martyr*'s true Sense, and that of the primitive *Christians* in general, as Light and Darkness are to one another. There is no Need, I think, of observing, how unaccurately his Lordship has translated the Martyr's Words; *we are taught to give to Rulers and the Powers ordained by God*; instead of, *to Principalities and Powers, as being ordained of God*; (but by the Way, these Words, *Principalities and Powers*, shew that *Polycarp* had a Passage of St. *Paul* to *Titus* in his Thoughts, as well as that in the *Romans*; for the first Verse of the third Chapter of that Epistle

begins thus, *Put them in Mind to be ſubject to Principalities and Powers, to obey Magiſtrates*; as it is alſo probable he had that of St. *Peter*, 1 Epiſt. ii. 17. *Honour the King*;) then καὶ τὸ πρέπον is not tranſlated at all; by which is meant, ſuch Honour as it became them, as Subjects, to pay to every Magiſtrate reſpectively, ἃ ταῖς διαφόροις ἀρχαῖς πρέπει. But as it is their Duty, *to give to* Cæſar *the Things that are* Cæſar's; *ſo muſt they give to God the Things that are God's*. And, therefore, as *Chriſtians*, they muſt give no Honour to Men, that belongs to God alone; whom they are commanded to *fear*, by the ſame Apoſtle, that bids them, *Honour the King*; no Honour that will *hurt* them (not as Men, not as free Men, not as poſſeſſed of certain Rights and Properties, but) as *Chriſtians*; as the Servants of God, who, after Men have killed the Body, *can deſtroy both Body and Soul in Hell*. The only *Hurt* the Martyr had in his Mind, or was at all afraid of, never once came into his Lordſhip's Thoughts; as, on the other Hand, what his Lordſhip's Thoughts were ſo full of, and ſo intent upon, the *Martyr* did not think worth a Thought.

Had his Lordſhip entered, in the leaſt, into the Sentiments of the primitive *Chriſtians*, and known, in any Degree, what Spirit they were of, he might have been ſure, without ſeeing his Words, that St. *Polycarp* could not poſſibly ſay what he puts into his Mouth; or, had he conſidered, with any Care, the Words themſelves, and what gave Occaſion to them, though he had known nothing of the Character and Sufferings of the ancient *Chriſtians*, he could not have put ſo abſurd a Senſe upon

upon them: But, being full of his own Notions, neither the Plainneſs of the Words, nor the Spirit of the Writer, could hinder him from ſeeing in them what he had a Mind to ſee, and putting upon a *Martyr* a Senſe the fartheſt poſſible from his own Thoughts. He is made by the Biſhop to declare for *Reſiſtance*, not only without his Will, but againſt it; and not only to declare for it, but to do this, in a *more general and looſe* Manner than himſelf. Even that Conſideration, which alone would have alarmed another Man, could not make his Lordſhip ſuſpect he was in the Wrong, or that he had miſtaken the Martyr's Senſe; being reſolved that he ſhall be of his Opinion, and, as ſuch, be cited to bear Teſtimony to him.

After his Lordſhip's Book had been ſome Time publiſhed, among other Things objected to it, this was one: That he had miſtaken *Polycarp*'s Meaning, and had made him a Witneſs for his Cauſe, without any Colour of Reaſon for it; nay, when, undoubtedly, he was againſt it. Upon this, in a ſecond Edition of his Book, his Lordſhip prefixes a long *Preface*, in Defence of it; and, having taken Notice of other Objections that had been made to it, at *p.* 38, comes to this, concerning the Words of *Polycarp*. What Part now does his Lordſhip take on this Occaſion? Does he own his Miſtake, or plead Inadvertency? Or give up the Paſſage, upon ſecond Thoughts, as making nothing for him, and do Juſtice to his Author? Nothing like it. He ſtifly defends what he has ſaid, and maintains his Interpretation to be true. He has, he ſays, conſidered it *ſeriouſly* and *impartially*;

and ſo fruitful is his Invention, that he is able to defend it by many Reaſons; where there neither is, nor poſſibly can be, ſo much as the Colour of one. Which, to ſatisfy the Reader's Curioſity, are theſe: " It is *objected*, that I have miſtaken St. " *Polycarp*, p. 140. 1. Be it ſo, it is of ſmall " Importance, if ſo be I have not miſtaken St. " *Paul*. The *Cauſe* I have undertaken will not ſuf- " fer by this; and, for myſelf, I am ſure I was " not wilfully guilty of miſtaking, or miſapplying " what he ſaith in the Paſſage referred to. 2. It " is manifeſt, that, at a Time when it was for his " Intereſt, and for the Intereſt of the *Chriſtian Re-* " *ligion*, that he ſhould ſpeak as highly as poſſi- " ble of the *Obedience* to *Magiſtrates*, he is far from " repreſenting St. *Paul*, and the *Chriſtian Religion*, " as ſome Perſons have ſince done; but is content " with a very general and looſe Expreſſion con- " cerning the *Obedience* required by it. 3. It is " manifeſt, that, in the Paſſage referred to, he " hath *Rom.* xiii. 1. in View; and that this *holy* " *Martyr* thinks it ſufficient to tell the *Proconſul*, " that the *Obedience* taught and enjoined, in that " *Paſſage*, is, καὶ τὸ ωφελοῦν, and ſuch as *doth not* " *hurt ourſelves*. Doth this look as if he thought " *abſolute Obedience* of any Sort required by St. " *Paul?* Nay, doth it not appear that it was his " Opinion, that the *Honour* and *Obedience* of any " Sort, here required by St. *Paul*, was only ſuch " as *doth not hurt ourſelves*; and that the Judg- " ment concerning *this* was left to ourſelves? It " is a very looſe and general Expreſſion, all muſt " own; and ſuch an one as could never have ſlip-

" ped

" ped from a Man thoroughly poſſeſſed with the " Belief of the *Duty* of *abſolute Non-reſiſtance*. " So that I cannot retract what I have fixed upon " this *Holy Man*, till I am better convinced I " have done him an *Injury*. My *Doctrine* gives " Liberty of withdrawing *Honour* and *Obedience*, " when the continuing them would be *public Ruin*: " This *Father* acknowledges an Obligation to no " other *Honour*, but what *doth not hurt ourſelves*; " which Expreſſion, I ſay, leaves the Matter in " a greater Latitude than my *Doctrine* hath done. " If any think otherwiſe, they have their Liberty. " But can any one prove that this *Father*, who " thus expreſſed *himſelf*, reckoned it amongſt " *harmleſs*, or even *lawful* Things, to diveſt our- " ſelves of our *Rights* and *Privileges*; and to give " up ourſelves, our Families, and our Poſterity " after us, to Miſery and Slavery, at the Com- " mand of an *earthly Prince*? But, 4. We " ſee that this *plain* and *poſitive* Text of St. *Paul* " has been *encumbered with Gloſſes*, and beſet with " *Reſtrictions* from the Beginning; and this even " by *Chriſtians* of the firſt Ages: As is plain " not only from this of St. *Polycarp*, but likewiſe " from the plain and unexceptionable Teſtimony " of *Origen* produced together with it." To re- cite theſe Reaſons, after what has been ſaid, is to expoſe them; nor is there Need of *Remarks*, to ſhew either the Weakneſs of the Reaſons, or the Temper of the Writer; to whom, in that Capa- city, if I had the Honour to be his *Slave*, I ſhould think, I could not do better Service, than frequently to whiſper in his Ear,

REMEMBER *POLYCARP*.

Such a Miſtake ſo perſiſted in, and defended with ſuch a pompous Obſtinacy, as it is, I believe, without Example; ſo, I hope, it will be thought by impartial Readers a ſufficient Juſtification of me in what I have ſaid, of the Impoſſibility of convincing his Lordſhip, when he is once in a Miſtake. Had I been to ſay the ſame Thing firſt now, I might, perhaps, do it in other Words, but muſt ſtill be of the ſame Mind. I can have no Expectation, that any Thing in theſe Papers ſhould have any Weight with his Lordſhip, and have writ them, only to undeceive others, that might be miſ-led by him. And that, I hope, I have, in ſome Meaſure, done, having gone through ſo much of his Anſwer, as has any Shew of *Learning*, and meddles with *Scripture*, and the Senſe of *Texts* in the Original; in the Interpretation of which, either his Lordſhip, or myſelf, is extremely unhappy; which, the Reader muſt judge. As for the remaining Part of his *Anſwer*, it is either what I think may be ſafely truſted with the *Engliſh* Reader, or has already been ſufficiently anſwered by others who have writ on this Subject *. What elſe there is, is only perſonal Cavil and *Chicanery*, upon ſomething I have ſaid, without af-

* Thoſe who want yet farther Satisfaction, upon the Points I have not entered into, will find more than I could have given them, in Mr. *Rogers*'s excellent *Review*; through which there runs ſuch a Vein of clear and juſt Reaſoning, in every Part of it, that it makes one doubly feel that ſtrange Want of *Logick*, that is ſo conſpicuous in the Writers of the other Side.

fecting

fecting the Merits of the Cauſe. Of which Kind, whatever there is, I had rather it ſhould quietly poſſeſs what Credit it can get with thoſe it can deceive, than be at the Trouble of refuting it; having no Concern for Victory, but Truth.

Here then I take my Leave of his Lordſhip, and of all that he has writ, or ever ſhall write, in this Controverſy; which, as managed on his Part, is the moſt jejune and barren, the looſeſt and moſt trifling, the moſt unneceſſary and unprofitable, that was ever brought upon the Stage. It is founded in Miſtake, and ſupported by *Chicane*; it is built on nothing, and ends in nothing; it looks on *Learning* as its Enemy, and diſdains to be tried by *Antiquity*, the only poſſible Way of ending Controverſies, and reſtoring *Unity*, in Church-Affairs, where the Senſe of Scripture is diſputed: But his Lordſhip will not ſubmit his Cauſe to be ſo tried, but appeals, from *Learning* and *Antiquity*, to the *unerring* Judgment of the *ILLITERATI* of the preſent Times: And even there, ſuch is his Cauſe, he is far from having a Majority. Which yet is neceſſary for the new Scheme; nor will will that alone do: A Majority of *Laity* and *Clergy* of the better Sort muſt be gained, before *Arianiſm* and this new *Independency* can get the better of the ancient Faith and Conſtitution, and erect themſelves into an *Eſtabliſhment*. Which if our new Maſters would ſeriouſly conſider, they would ſee Reaſon to be quiet; and not move Heaven and Earth to effect an impoſſible Attempt. And if they had any Senſe of what they owe to their Superiors, both in Church and State,

for their Connivance and Indulgence, and the Eaſe they thereby enjoy, unmoleſted and undiſturbed, they would in Gratitude think, that a Submiſſion of *Silence* was due from them. Or, if they muſt be filling all Places with their own Opinions, they would do it, not with that Rudeneſs and Inſult upon the Conſtitution, as if the Numbers and the Power were already with them; but with Modeſty and Decency; and in ſuch a Manner, as to convince all equitable Judges, that they are acted by no other Motives but the Love of God and Truth. And ſuch I ſhall always wiſh may be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe who take the ſame Liberties, without any Spark of the ſame Virtues.

But one Thing I would beg Leave to remind them of: That they are, in ſome Meaſure, anſwerable for all the ill Conſequences of the like Liberties taken by worſe Men (which, in ill Hands, quickly degenerate into the groſſeſt Errors, and the greateſt Licentiouſneſs) as they have ſet the Example; much more, if they are themſelves acceſſary to ſuch Abuſes; and either openly, or ſecretly, abet and encourage ill Men to do what they do not think it ſafe or decent to do themſelves, in order to make a Party, and ſtrengthen themſelves by ſuch *Proſelytes*, or Advocates; which Strength is, indeed, mere Weakneſs. They ſhould likewiſe conſider, that not to diſcourage all they can, in others, the pernicious Exceſſes of thoſe Liberties which they are concerned to have connived at in themſelves, is really to encourage them: *Qui non vetat, — cum poteſt, jubet.* Theſe Reflexions,

flexions, which the preſent melancholy State of Things, with Reſpect to Religion, ſuggeſts to me, I cannot but recommend to the ſerious Conſideration of all thoſe, who, however they may differ with us, upon ſome Points, heartily wiſh well to the Cauſe of Virtue and Religion. And let not any wonder at ſuch Advice, from one who has been thought no Enemy to Liberty. A little Experience may convince Men, that the ſame Thing, at different Times, is not the ſame. The Liberty, I am now ſpeaking of, is, at ſome Times, in ſuch Diſtreſs, that it is exceeding difficult to gain the leaſt Room for it. It is like moving a vaſt Weight up Hill, ſo great is the Oppoſition it labours to ſurmount. Such was the Spirit of the Times, not many Years ſince; when there appeared a Diſpoſition to proceed with extreme Rigour againſt ſome, who are now far enough from any ſuch Danger. To try to moderate ſuch a Spirit, though, perhaps, a fruitleſs Labour, yet was it not uncommendable. Good Nature, and Friendſhip, and a Love of Truth, and a Deſire to promote Knowledge, and a Zeal for the Honour of God, and an Abhorrence of what looked like Perſecution for Righteouſneſs Sake, might make it, then, be thought reaſonable and honourable, to plead the Cauſe of Liberty.

But the Spirit of the Times ſoon altered to the oppoſite Extreme. Then the ſame Liberty, being put again into Motion by a bold Hand, which before had been labouring ſlowly on in vain, took large Steps, and has, ſince that Time, advanced from Strength to Strength, with that Violence, that nothing

nothing now can ſtand againſt it. Impatient of Delay, it knows no Checks, no Bounds; it bears down all before it with Force impetuous: From ſmall Beginnings it is grown to ſuch a Head, that it wants Reſtraint now much more than before it did Encouragement; and is ſo big with Evils, that every Day we feel the dire Effects of it. To oppoſe *Liberty*, thus *degenerated*, is as conſiſtent with being a Friend to it, while kept within Bounds, as it is to *extinguiſh* Fire, when it threatens nothing but Deſtruction; though nothing be more worth preſerving, or more uſeful to human Life, when under due Reſtraints. Let not, then, the the Advocates of this Liberty confound together Things the moſt unlike. It is this *boundleſs* Liberty we complain of, which has laid waſte Religion far and wide, and has ſpread through all Ranks of People a Contempt of every Thing that is *ſacred*; which if ſome Stop be not put to, *OMINARI HORREO QUÆ FERAT.*

Here I had ended, in Deſpair of ſeeing Things ſoon in a better State, when, behold, on a ſudden a moſt agreeable Surprize! Our drooping Hopes are very unexpectedly revived by an ORDER of *Council*, for *ſuppreſſing*, *in the moſt effectual Manner*, *all Profaneſs*, *and every Thing that tends to the Corruption of Principles and Manners*; upon Information given to his MAJESTY of *Societies* formed, on Purpoſe to carry on ſuch wicked Ends. In this *Order* it is declared, to the great Joy of all good Men, *That his MAJESTY has nothing more at Heart, than to maintain the Honour of God, ſo impiouſly ſtruck at; and that he is determined to*

ſhew

ſhew all Marks of Diſpleaſure and Diſcouragement to any who lie even under the Suſpicion of ſuch deteſtable Practices; *and will uſe all the Authority God has committed to him, to puniſh*, with the utmoſt Severity, and moſt publick Ignominy, *ſuch enormous Offenders*; *and cruſh ſuch ſhocking Impieties, before they increaſe, and draw down the Vengeance of God upon the Nation.*

If this ORDER be executed with a Vigour proportioned to the juſt Reſentment his MAJESTY has expreſſed on this Occaſion, we may hope theſe monſtrous Impieties will ſoon have an End. But that is not all that this ſeaſonable and vigorous Interpoſition of the *Royal* Authority, in the Cauſe of God and Religion, gives us Room to hope for: His *Majeſty's* Commands, *to detect and proſecute with Vigour all Profaneſs*, will, we hope, ſtrike a Terror into other Offenders in that Kind; and ſtop *profane Pens*, as well as *Tongues*, who are perpetually poiſoning the Youth of the Nation from the *Preſs*; and have, for ſome Time paſt, *in the moſt impious and blaſphemous Manner, inſulted and ridiculed the moſt ſacred Principles of our holy Faith*, the Authority of the Scriptures, the Myſteries of the Goſpel, the Rites and Sacraments, the Doctrines, Diſcipline, Worſhip, and Miniſtry, and whatever elſe makes a Part of the *Chriſtian* Inſtitution. Since the preſent Diſtraction of the publick Affairs has not hindered the *KING* from taking into his Conſideration the Suppreſſing one one Sort of *Blaſphemers*, we may hope, when Things are a little more ſettled, his Attention will be turned with with no leſs Indignation towards

theſe

theſe other; and that his *Parliament* will be ready to do every Thing neceſſary, on their Part, to ſtrengthen his Hands againſt ſuch Offenders; who cannot be content to be without all Senſe of Religion themſelves, unleſs they can corrupt a whole Nation, or the *Youth*, that are the Hopes of it. Such Men are, of all others, their Country's greateſt Enemies, and moſt juſtly deſerve to feel its Vengeance. One of whom ſeems to have *dedicated* his whole Life to the Cauſe of *Irreligion*; and, though he was, on that Account, many Years ago, forced to quit one Kingdom, he is perpetually, by the ſame wicked Practices, provoking the ſevereſt Reſentments of another. Had he dared to act the ſame Part, in any other Nation under Heaven, he would long ſince have had his Reward. *BRITAIN* is the only Country, where Men may openly propagate Irreligion with Impunity; I ſhould ſay, *ENGLAND*, for *SCOTLAND* will not bear it: It is a Reproach peculiar to ourſelves, which it is high Time ſhould be wiped off, if we have any Regard to the Glory of God, the Honour of the *King*'s Government, or our own *national* Happineſs; which, otherwiſe, I know not how ſoon it may pleaſe God, in his juſt Anger, to take from us.

EPISTOLA

EPISTOLA CRITICA

AD

Ad Eruditissimum Virum *H. B.* S. E. I.

In qua omnes doctissimi BENTLEII in PHÆDRUM Notæ atque Emendationes expenduntur.

Viro Eruditissimo atque Amicissimo

H. B. S. E. I.

* * *

SALUTEM.

QUUM destinassem Animadversionum libellum in *Phædrum*, post tot eximios atque omni literarum genere insignes viros a Cl. demum *Bentleio* recensitum atque emendatum, in lucem dare; et vetus illa quæ mihi tecum, Vir Eruditissime, intercessit amicitia, & singularis tua in melioribus literis scientia, quam præclare indies testantur tot Ingenia a Te tam feliciter exculta; facile suaserunt ut tuo potissimum

mum nomini hoc quicquid est opusculi inscriberem. Cur tardius ad te dederim, tute pariter mecum scis: Nec opus est ut pluribus narrem, quid me ad hasce nænias a Musis severioribus abduxerit. Ne dicam me semper Phædrum inter optimos Latinitatis auctores, aut optimis proximum habuisse; jam quinque anni sunt, aut plus eo, quod pueruli instituendi gratia Phædri versiculos in dipodias, eodem fere quo jam Bentleius modo, accentibus supra positis distinxi, & non ita pridem de ejusmodi Editione in puerorum usum paranda nonnihil mecum cogitabam, cum forte ab amicorum uno atque altero acciperem, Cl. Bentleium Terentio Phædrum adjungere constituisse, & in eo totum esse. De quo dum ruri nuper agerem, certior factus, a proposito edendi Phædri libenter destiti, leviore multo opera Animadversiones in eum conscripturus, si quem iis locum Vir doctiss. relinqueret. Quo consilio Editionem, quæ mihi unica tum ad manum erat (fuit autem illa quam anno 1703 cum notis perpetuis patris & emendationibus suis edidit Jac. Gronovius) per duos aut tres dies sedulo evolvi; & cum probe scirem, quocum mihi res futura esset, quæ ex conjectura se legenti offerebant, ad libri marginem adscripsi, & cum amico quodam erudito, qui tum una aderat, communicavi. Cum vero Burmanni editione destituerer, quam in vicinia frustra quærebam, adeoque ultra conjecturas progredi non liceret, contentus notasse loca, quæ librorum supellectilem & codicum subsidium postulare videbantur, nihil amplius de Phædro cogitare decrevi, donec Editio prodiret Bentleiana; de qua maximam mihi expectationem

tionem feceram, tum ex summa Viri doctissimi in his literis præstantia, tum quod Regio Puero opus destinatum esset. Cum igitur in manus tandem devenit, curiosis oculis, quod facile credes, ad eam continuo me contuli, nec librum prius de manibus deposui, quam omnia, quæ annotasset, perlegissem. At qui lectionis exitus, quis fructus! *Carbonem, ut aiunt, pro thesauro*; piget dicere, quantum de spe deciderim; nec ullis satis verbis exprimi potest, quam longe infra expectationem meam opus hoc subsederit. *Tantamne rem tam negligenter!* Vehementer equidem mirabar, quicquam tam imperfectum a tantæ eruditionis viro proficisci potuisse. Multa enim affecta loca & manum medicam poscentia, intacta reliquit; plura quæ sana atque integra erant, tentando insigniter corrupit; pleraque vero omnia, quæ aliquam veri speciem habent, non sua ipsius sunt, sed ab aliis desumpta, nec raro tacitis eorum nominibus unde sublegerit. Inque his ipsis, multa sunt mali commatis, conjecturæ leves, nequaquam certe necessariæ, nec ulla codicum auctoritate suffultæ; nec pauca manifesto falsa & inepta. Et quo huic Editioni labes inureretur, qua omnes aliæ carent, conjecturis hisce, quales quales erant, textum ipsum Phædri fœdissimo atque hactenus inaudito more, pessimo certe exemplo contaminavit.

In Horatio suo omnes præcedentium temporum Editores Vir doctiss. textum interpolandi licentia longe post se reliquit, hic vero se ipsum etiam superavit. * *Miseram vero optimorum scriptorum for-*

* Hæc ingeniosissimi viri Jani Gulielmii verba sunt, l. 1. ad Herennium, c. 1. quæ inter multa alia hujusmodi citat Paræus in prolegomenis ad Plautum.

tem,

tem, si hoc modo illis præscribere, & pro captu quidvis immutare nobis licebit! Si hanc a duobus retro seculis veterum scripta interpolandi licentiam sibi Critici indulsissent, quo jam in loco res esset literaria? Quam incerta, dubiæque fidei, & proinde inutilia, veterum scripta, monumenta, testimonia redderentur? quibus indiciis genuina a spuriis, vera scriptoris manus a falsaria internosci potuisset? quam Historiæ fides omnis discederet, quam Linguis eruditis suus honos atque utilitas? cum nulla veram earum cognitionem adipiscendi, nulla earum ætates dignoscendi, nulla vocum vel seorsum sumptarum usum, vel junctarum potestatem intelligendi, certa jam via supereesset. Hæc insana in veterum scriptis quidlibet audendi licentia tot tantisque malis fœta est, tam certam literis veræque eruditioni perniciem affert, ut omnes sanioris judicii Critici ab ea, tanquam capitali flagitio, abhorruerint. Viri in re literaria principes tanta cum religione ad membranarum fidem in veterum scriptis recensendis se adstrinxerunt, ut ab iis vel apicem recedere, nisi in re compertissima, & conjecturas in auctoris textum ingerere, quæ non claræ, liquidæ, certæ, planeque necessariæ essent, nefas semper duxerint.

Hæc Criticis scripta Veterum tractandi ratio, hæc religio fuit, donec Bentleius, † *novum illud Britanniæ nostræ lumen*, exoreretur, qui quasi summum in re literaria Principatum solus atque unus obtinuisset, *jura negat sibi nata*, nec ullis se legibus co-

† Vide Bentl. Dissert. de Phalaridis Epistolis p. 81.

erceri

erceri patitur; nullos potentiæ suæ Criticæ limites agnoscit; in veterum scriptis impune pro arbitrio, pro imperio grassatur; & quod libet, licet. Quis immanem hanc licentiam in Critico quantumvis magno patienter ferat, etiam iis in operibus, quæ acerrimo cum judicio, summaque adhibita diligenti, rebus omnibus multum diuque cogitatis & expensis, & post justum temporis intervallum secundis tertiisque curis recognita ediderit? ne dum in iis toleranda est, quæ temere, negligenter, præcipiti consilio & festinante calamo, parum cogitata, & fortasse ne semel quidem relecta in publicum emiserit. Sic autem cum Phædro actum fuisse res ipsa aperte clamat; cujus ventustissimos versus Vir doctiss. tot locis tam fœde deturpavit, ut ad visum plane obstupescerem, & sic continuo mecum: Hiccine ille est Bentleius, * qui *una alterave diecula* tantum potuit in Tusculanis? hiccine est, † qui *opera extemporali* tam præclara ingenii sui specimina dedit ad Menandri & Philemonis reliquias? *Horatium* non hic commemoro, cum ibi tam lente, tam curate Vir doctiss. singula pensitarit, ut illi edendo tantum temporis impensum fuerit, quantum expugnandæ Trojæ. Hiccine fœtus illum habuit parentem, cui tanta ingenii vis, tam mira sagacitas, tam subactum judicium, eruditio summa, & diligentia pene infinita? Qui in

---

* *Scis enim* UNA ALTERAVE DIECULA *hoc quicquid est mihi natum esse.*] Epist. Bentleii Emendat. in Tusculanis præfixa.

† *Scriptæ hæ Emendationes* OPERA EXTEMPORALI. & finitæ Idibus Dec. 1709. vid. Burm. præfat. p. 6. ad quem mensem demum Aprili sunt transmissæ.

Græcis Latinisque Poetis evolvendis, dramaticis præsertim, eorumque versibus ad digitos, ad aurem exigendis ætatem fere omnem contrivit? qui tanto impetu in hæc studia fertur, ut ea * *sacra sua*, nec injuria nuncupet; nec ab iis ullum sibi tempus aliis vel studiis vel officiis eripi nisi ægre patiatur. A tali viro nihil leve aut vulgare, nihil quod non reconditum, & ex intimis meliorum literarum medullis ductum, expectare fas erat. At in Phædro quam se dissimilem sui Vir summus dedit! *quantum mutatus ab illo!* adeo ut meis ipse oculis diffiderem, cum elegantissimum Scriptorem conspicerem a tanto viro tam male habitum. Quæ ne gratis dixisse videar, age, Notas ejus atque Emendationes sigillatim mecum expendas; nec interdico, quin omni deinceps apud te fide caream, si non hæc quæ dixi vera esse, vel potius minora vero, certissimis probationibus evicerim.

Sed non prætereunda, quæ prima se nobis offert, ad Lectorem Epistola, qua monet Vir doctiss. *post egregias plurimorum operas adhuc incurata restare non pauca ab indoctis librariis inflicta vulnera, quibus ipse sibi videbatur posse medicari.* Hic vides magna & præclara minantem; Phædrum ægrum adhuc atque ulcerosum sua tandem ope integritati pristinæ restitutum iri, quasi alter esset Æsculapius; quæ tamen omnia, cum ad rem ventum est, pauciss. mis exceptis, in fumos abeunt. Eoque gravius Lector se delusum dolet, quo majorem ex his ina-

---

* *Inque his ut ad* MEA ME SACRA *referam, respice oro rem Literariam.*] Vid. Dedicat. ad Horatium p. penultima.

nibus

nibus promissis spem animo conceperat. Subsidia quæ ad hanc Phædri curationem vir doctiss. adhibuit, sunt *lectiones*, quæ habentur in Eruditorum Commentariis Editioni Burmannianæ adjunctis, ex antiquis exemplaribus desumptæ, quæ *duo* tantum fuerunt, si Bentleio credimus. Atque hinc scias, qua cura lectiones has Vir doctiss. expenderit; præter enim duo illa exemplaria, quorum altero usus est Petrus Pithœus, qui primus Phædrum edidit anno MDXCVI: altero, quod *Remense* dicitur, Rigaltius triennio post; præter hæc, inquam, Rigaltius, nec non Gudius, ad librum primum sæpe memorant codicem sive exemplar *Danielis*, qui aliis etiam nominibus Gudio venit, nunc *Schedæ Regiæ*, quod olim penes *Christinam* illam Suecicam fuerit, nisi me memoria fallit; (licet Schefferus a *Schedis Regiis* Danielis exemplar diversum putarit) nunc codex *Vossianus*, cum tandem ad Is. Vossium devenerit, interque ejus membranas Leydæ asservetur. Quod autem Heinsius duo illa exemplaria, aut eorum alterum versaverit, quod B. asserit, nequaquam constat. Quæ vero aut quot exemplaria Gudius triverit, cum notæ ejus post mortem demum editæ fuerint, nulla iis adjuncta est Præfatio, quæ hoc indicet. Sæpius certe laudat MS. Wissenburgense; codicem antiquissimum, in quo pleræque Fabulæ Phædri satis ampla paraphrasi explicantur, & ex eo veras interdum lectiones Gudius eruit, qualem unam, eamque verissimam exhibet ad *Lib.* primi *Fab.* 13. ubi de hoc codice ea quæ dixi habentur. Quod de his nihil B. festinationi, an negligentiæ imputandum?

Dein monet Vir doctiss. *Notas suas ad Burmanni editionem exactas esse* A. D. MDCCXVIII. *editam, ubicunque vero ab illius textu diversus abit, Lectorem in notis admonitum, utramque sub uno conspectu editionem habiturum.* Sed hic etiam tam indiligens Vir doctiss. fuit, ut sæpe non admonito lectore lectionem a Burmanno diversam reponat, interdum aliud agens tanquam Burmannianam lectionem, aliam dederit, cujus exemplum vel in prima fabula occurrit. Postremo se Phædri exemplo *brevitatis laudem sectatum esse* narrat, *contentus fere rationem correctionis uno verbo indicasse, nonnunquam ne uno quidem, studiosis qui post se sua probabunt, eam provinciam relinquens.* duram sane provinciam, ut quis rationem correctionum reddere adgrediatur, quæ ratione omni destitutæ sunt. Illarum certe parens unus dignus est, qui tuendarum curam in se recipiat. Atque hæc, quod ad Phædrum, præfationis hujus summa est. Nihil enim dixit de aliis quæ ad editionem suam adhibuit subsidiis, nihil de editionibus quæ Burmannianam præcessere, quasi nullas inspexerit; nihil de *Anonymo* Fabulatore, nihil de *Romulo* seu *Romulio, vetere Fabularum Phædri metaphraste, quem rectius Phædrum barbare glossatum dixeris,* inquit Gudius p. 221, nihil de horum editore * *Nilantio,* cujus diligentiam obscuravit scriptorum, quos edidit, ignobilitas; ut his in terris liber

* Anno 1709. *Joh Frederic. Nilant* edidit *Fabulas Antiquas* anonymi Auctoris, & *Romuli Fabulas Æsopias.* Fabulæ illæ antiquæ sunt ex Phædro servatis fere ejus verbis desumptæ, & soluta oratione expositæ. illæ Romuli, sunt nunc earundem, nunc aliarum laxa admodum, & barbara paraphrasis.

ber ejus perpaucis cognitus sit; ego certe, ante di- LIB. I.
em quo hæc ad te scribo, nunquam videram. Cum vero Vir doctissimus in notis frequentem horum mentionem fecerit, par erat, ut paucis saltem, qui, qualesque essent, lectorem moneret. Sed, de his cum taceat, frustra expectaveris, ut de Apologorum natura, usu, antiquitate quicquam dicat; aut, quod propius Phædrum tangit, de illius ætate, vita, fortunis, stilo, scriptis. De his tam altum silet, ut ne silentii quidem causam vel verbulo reddat. Præfationem denique tam jejunam, siccam, aridam non vidi; qualis ad hunc scriptorem, & ab hoc homine, minime expectanda erat, cum priores Phædri Editores præfationes utilissimas & elegantissime conscriptas ambitiose & certatim dederint.

Sed jam tempus est ut pergamus ad Notas ipsas, dignas sane quæ tali præfatione commendentur. Si prius paucis dixero, quæ ipse subsidia in his Animadversionibus conscribendis adhibuerim. Ea vero fuere, Burmanni Editio prima, Schefferi secunda, & illa quam prius memoravi, a Jacobo Gronovio edita. Sed absolutis demum, & cum jam in eo essem ut prælo subjicerem, accesserunt & alia, Hoogstratani nempe Editio tertia, Burmanni secunda, & Fabulæ Nilantii. Et eodem ipso tempore Neveleti quoque inspiciendi mihi copia facta est, quam ampliſſima illa nobiliſſimi Comitis de *Sunderland* Bibliotheca perbenigne suppeditavit. Ex his subsidiis Animadversiones jam novis hic illic additamentis auctiores ad te veniunt, quas ut æquiore judicio legas, memineris hominis esse, qui a prima usque juventute, sepositis hisce studiis,

LIB. I. quæ tum plurimum amabat, severioribus se addixerit, qualia scilicet & vitæ genus, & officiorum rationes postularunt, atque ut *parerga* tantum hæc habuerit. Sæpius quidem mirari subiit, quam prave vulgo, & quam præpostere de vera Eruditione judicetur. Cujus ut laudem aliquam consequaris, secure neglectis iis, quæ scire maxime intererat, ad ea te studia conferas oportet, quæ si rem rite æstimemus, & de iis, sive ex dignitate, sive ex utilitate, sive denique ex difficultate judicia feramus, postremo in loco merito habenda sunt. Atque hic sane amplissimus patet dicendi campus; sed me reprimo, & eo unde digressus sum redeo. Prima viri doctiss. nota est ad hæc verba,

PROL. *Quod arbores loquantur, non tantum feræ.*

6. Reponit B. *Quod* ET *arbores loquantur.* Quid vero? num sic Codices? minime. num priores editores, Rigaltii, Gudii, Heinsii, Schefferi, Fabri, hic aliquid deesse suspicati sunt? nihil minus. num particulæ istius ulla hic necessitas? plane nulla. Cur igitur Vir doctiss. intrusit? ideo tantum, quia *voluit.* Si quidem inverso sententiæ ordine dixisset Phædrus, *Quod non tantum feræ loquantur, sed,* — lector & vel *etiam* insequi merito expectaret; Cum vero recto & simplici verborum ordine dixerit, *Quod arbores loquantur*; plena est & integra oratio, nec quicquam est, quod lector desideret. Cur autem ad hæc verba non lectorem monuit Vir doctiss. hinc liquido constare, quod quædam fabulæ ex hoc primo libello casu quodam interciderint, cum nullæ jam in eo arbores loquantur? Prologum enim hunc ad primum tantum librum attinere, non ad omnes in unum conjunctos, non modo

ex

ex eo patet, quod Veteres libellos seorsum edere solerent, ut clarissime noster ostendit in præfatione ad Horatium; sed quod in Phædro singuli suis Prologis instructi sint. adde quod, si ad omnes, cum jam in unum collecti essent, spectaret, Patroni alicujus nomen præ se ferret, ut in tertio & quinto videmus; & de quarto procul dubio idem constaret, si non quædam excidissent. Sed ad hæc Phædri verba aliud porro monendum, eum nempe non hoc modo præfari, quasi rem novam atque inauditam fecerit; nam hic etiam Æsopum sibi præeuntem habuit; sed quod portentosæ istæ narrationes, quæ antiquissimorum temporum hominibus in tanto usu tantaque admiratione fuissent, Romanis sui temporis ingeniis ne in fabulis quidem placerent. Credibile sane est primos apologos hujus plurimum fuisse generis, ex duobus antiquissimis exemplis, quæ nobis Historia Sacra conservavit; altero eleganti admodum de arboribus ad Regem constituendum convocatis, Jud. ix. 8. breviori altero de Carduo & Cedro. 2 Paral. xxv, 18. Prisci certe Sapientes hanc utilissimam docendi rationem existimarunt, quod ad excitandam auditorum attentionem egregie comparata esset, quæ eo magis accenditur, quo res quæque mirabilior; præsertim apud imperitos & rudis ingenii homines, quales antiquioribus sæculis fuisse satis constat, cum adhuc tenuis esset, & perquam exigua, rerum divinarum humanarumque cognitio. Atque huic, ni fallor, mirabilium & prodigiosarum narrationum amori, qui tantum istis temporibus invaluit, debemus τὰ μυθικὰ, & fabulosam illam Poetarum historiam, a qua tempus, quod Olympiadas præcessit, doctis.

LIB. I. doctissimus Romanorum Varro τὸ μυθικὸν appellavit. Hic vero παραδόξων amor, prout vulgus aliquantum sapere incepit, & aliquam rerum cognitionem obtinere, sensim decrevit, donec tandem penitus desierit. Quæ animorum conversio, vera, opinor, causa est, quod tantum sit in paradoxis narrandis inter Homerum & Virgilium discrimen. Homerus iis ubique indulget, apud Virgilium contra sunt pauciſſima, & si quæ ab Homero, vel aliunde ex antiquioribus poetis assumit, mira arte & prudentia sunt emollita, ne ad hæc difficiles & morosas suorum aures offendat. Homerica scilicet tempora hujusmodi portentosas narrationes non ferebant modo, sed etiam deamabant; Virgiliana contra ab amando tantum aberant, ut ægre & moleste ferrent; *Voluerunt, ut Ficta etiam proxima Veris essent.* Sed hæc præter propositum pluribus exsecutus sum; brevior ero in sequentibus.

I. 3. *Tunc face improba*
Latro incitatus jurgii causam intulit.

En hic egregium in ipso operis limine negligentiæ specimen! profitetur B. se, cum a Burmanno diversus abit, lectionem ejus in notis daturum. Et tamen in prima etiam fabula sui oblitus pro Burmanniana lectionem aliam dedit: Burmannus enim, non *face*, quomodo Pithœus edidit, quem plures alii deinceps secuti sunt; sed *fauce*, quæ Remensis codicis lectio est, a Guyeto, Heinsio, Gudio, Fabro, Jac. Gronovio, aliisque doctissimis Viris, illa altera melior habita. Et sic Romulus. Sed harum lectionum neutra Bentleio placet: cum enim *incitatus*, inquit, dixeris, intelligas oportet *affectu aliquo* vel *appetitu.* Ille igitur conjecturam amplectitur

plectitur Rittershusii, & reponit *Fame*; cum vero præcesserit, *siti compulsi*, cui paulo attentius hæc legenti placere possit tam subita *sitis* in *famem* conversio? quod si *gulâ incitatus improba*, dicere liceat, quod nemo, opinor, negaverit, cur non & *fauce?* LIB. I.

Cur, inquit, turbulentam fecisti mihi 5.
Istam bibenti?

Vett. Editt. *Cur, inquit, turbulentam mihi fecisti aquam*
Istam bibenti? quomodo codices habuerint, nec Gudius, nec Rigaltius dixere. miror igitur unde B. dicat sic *libros scriptos* habuisse. Ego quidem crediderim *aquam* ab iis abfuisse. alias enim, cur recentiores omiserint, non video; sed interea certum est *istam* sine *aquam* stare non posse, cum præcesserit, *rivum:* præterea nec vox ipsa placet; si enim lupus loquutus esset δεικτικῶς, non *istam* sed *hanc* dixisset. Sic igitur in libris fuisse suspicor *mihi fecisti aquam bibenti.* cum vero *aquam* compendio forte scriberetur *am̄*, ex his literis & ultimis verbi præcedentis Librarios fecisse *istam:* veram autem loci lectionem hanc esse,

Cur, inquit, turbulentam fecisti mihi
Aquam *bibenti?* Et hanc lectionem firmant cum Anonymus, tum Romulus. B. cetera se recte habere putans, *istam* mutatum vult in *obstans:* quod immane quantum scriptione ab *istam* recedit, nec sensu satis commodum videtur, cum *obstans* aliquid majus dicat, quasi agnus vi quadam & magno cum molimine se lupo opponeret. Sed huic lectioni Vir doctiss. censet Neveleti Græcum favere, Fab. 232. (l. 233.) Λύκος θεασάμενος ἄρνα ἀπό τινος

ποταμοῦ

LIB. I. ποταμοῦ πίνοντα, — ϛὰς ἀνωτέρω, ᾐτιάσατο αὐτὸν, ὡς θολοῦντα τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ πίνειν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐῶντα. hæc postrema verba in Græco prorsus necessaria sunt, alias enim nullus esset criminationi locus. Neque enim in iis quæ præcedunt, lupum quoque siti illuc adductum *bibere* voluisse dicitur; neque agnum *turbasse* aquam, ut lupo inde incommodum aliquod crearet. sed in Phædro longe dispar ratio; ibi & *siti compulsi*, & *turbulentam* MIHI FECISTI AQUAM *bibenti*. Ideoque in Anonymo Neveleti, totum *quod dicitur est*, *Rupisti potumque mihi, rivique decorem*. si hæc Phædri fabula ad Græcum hoc modo refingenda esset, plura alia mutari oporteret, ut mox videbimus.

7. *Qui possum, quæso, facere quod querere, lupe?* Sic sane Burm. sed *querere* pro typographi errato semper habui, cum omnes aliæ quas viderim editiones, *quereris*. recte. non igitur hæc lectio pro sua venditanda erat a viro doctiss. qui dicit se reponere, *ut numeri molliores incedant*.

8. *A te decurrit*. Anonym. *Dum a te*. leg. forte, *Cum a te decurrat*.

9. *Repulsus ille veritatis viribus,*
Ante hos sex menses male, ait, dixisti mihi: Si Neveleti Græcus hic Phædro præscribere deberet, pro *mihi* legendum esset, *patri*. sic enim ille, ὁ λύκος ἀποτυχὼν (leg. ἀποτυχὼν) ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ πέρυσι τὸν Πατέρα μου ἐλοιδόρησας. hinc patet quam parum tutum sit alterum ex altero emendare, nisi aliæ probæ accedant rationes.

11. *Respondit agnus; equidem natus non eram*. Lege, inquit B. ut verba hic cetera, præsenti tempore, *Respondet agnus*. At quis non videt agni innocentiam

tiam ad respondendum paratissimam, altera lectio- L. I B. I.
ne melius exprimi? præterea solenne Phædro est, *respondit*. vid. I. 22. 4. II. 8. 17. III. 6. 4. V. 1. 16. 3. 6. Et sic hic Anonymus.

Pater hercule tuus, inquit, maledixit mihi. Editt. 12.
vett. *Pater hercle tuus.* ut versus constet, addendum, opinor, ab initio, *At*. *At pater hercle tuus.* ut modo in Græco, ἀλλὰ ὁ πατὴρ, &c. Ἀλλὰ Græce, & *At* Latine, eleganter initio orationis ponuntur, cum adversatur, vel excipit. Anonym. Gudii, *Pater tuus, inquit, hercle maledixit mihi.* non male. B. *Pater hercle* TUM *tuus*, inquit, *maledixit mihi.* quod nescio an aliis, mihi certe illepidum videtur. ista vero viro doctiss. emendatio nata videtur ex Heinsii conjectura ad verba proxime præcedentia, qui, pro *equidem natus non eram*, legit, *ne quidem natus* tum *eram*. Cum vero sæpius in sequentibus Heinsii mentio fiat, & multas ejus conjecturas in textum B. reponat, commodum erit hoc loco lectorem monere, quid de eis dicat Burm. qui in lucem primus dedit. sic igitur ille in præfatione. " Denique per totum libellum sparsas breves quas-
" dam viri illustrissimi *Nicolai Heinsii* Notas, ex co-
" dice quo usus olim fuerat, descripsimus. Et
" quamvis non is labor aliquibus videri possit, qui
" celeberrimo Heinsiano nomini ingens decus ap-
" ponere possit, *cum non diligenter elaboratus &*
" *elucubratus, sed temere, & ut inter legendum menti*
" *ipsi occurrebat, in marginem Phædri conjectus fue-*
" *rit*, non tamen ullam manibus Viri Nobilissimi
" injuriam me feciss puto, quum ex paucissimis
" ejus viri versibus ingens lux huic scriptori sæpe
" affundatur, & aliorum diligentia conjecturæ &
" ex

LIB. I. " ex MSS. collectæ lectiones illustrari poterunt." Ex his Lector facile perspiciet has Heinsii ad Phædrum conjecturas non in eodem numero habendas esse, ac alia ejus scripta, quæ ipse in lucem dedit; & quæ tantam sibi apud eruditos omnes existimationem compararunt. Hæc semel monere visum est, ne Heinsiano nomini nimium tribuas, & inde nimis æquus accedas conjecturis, quas noster novarum semper lectionum avidus levissimis sæpe de causis in textum reponit.

13. *Lacerat injusta nece.* Anonym. *Et ita correptum lacerat injuste. lacerat* est pro composito *dilacerat*, *nex* vero Phædro videtur idem valere ac *cædes*, cum utrumque ab *activo* verbo ductum sit. sensus est, inquit Scheff. *lacerat* eum, ut sequeretur *nex*, seu mors, atque illa injusta; proinde hæc illi sunt judiciosa verba, a præcedentibus distinguenda; cum *lacerare nece* non dicatur. Hæc ille. Ego vero, si quid mutandum sit, hoc modo legendum putem, *Atque ita correptum lacerans injuste necat.* Sed recepta lectio videtur ferri posse, si *nex* pro *cæde* sumatur. vid. II. 8. 2. B. vero codicum lectionem, aut literarum ductum parum curans, legit, *mactat*, immolat. nempe IV. 5. 9. habemus, mures *immolatos avidis dentibus*. nonne hoc lepidum argumentum? *mactat*, qua voce Phædrus nunquam utitur, hic reponendum, quia Phædrus alibi dixit, *immolatos?* quid agebat Vir doctiss. cum hæc scriberet?

II. 8. *Omne insuetis.* MSS. *omnino*, & hanc reponi lectionem velit Jac. Gron. pro illa altera quæ est ab Heinsio; cujus conjecturæ valde favet Phædri consuetudo, qui semper alias composita a *fuesco* quadrisyllaba facit, uno loco excepto, I. 16. 5.

Qui

Qui dissolutos mores vi compesceret. Hoogstratanus versum hunc, Rigaltium secutus, posuit post V. 22. sed hanc illi sedem asserunt & Anonym. & Romulus. LIB. I. II. 12.

missum quod subito vadi 14.

Motu sonoque terruit pavidum genus. sic Cod. Rem. recte, opinor: *missum* est *emissum*; distinguendum vero videtur post *subito*, ut sit adverbium; qua forma *subito* Phædro in frequenti usu est; alias enim *quod* ante *missum* poni deberet, quod metrum corrumperet. atque hanc lectionem probant Rigalt. Heins. Scheff. Gud. J. Gron. alii. B. lectionem alteram amplectitur, *vadis*. sed nusquam alias Phædrus *vada* dixit, & ποιητικώτερον merito videri possit, nisi præcessisset, *liberis paludibus:* Anonym. aliam lectionem exhibet. *missum quod subito*, levi *motu sonoque*, quæ forsan non contemnenda.

Hoc mersum limo cum jaceret diutius, i. e. cum *tigillum* aliquamdiu soni motusque expers jacuisset, nec quicquam metus de novo iis incuteretur, tandem una caput extulit. quo quid apertius? B. tamen locum ab eruditis omnibus hactenus intactum vitii arguit, & ad hunc modum refingit, 16.

Immersæ limo cum laterent diutius. quo non modo omnis loci elegantia tollitur, sed & ratio, quæ tandem ex iis unam impulit, ut caput timore posito proferret. sed ad hanc emendationem tuendam Vir. doctiss. duos testes idoneos allegat, qui hanc rem eodem modo narrant. Alter est Græcus Neveleti; *Fab.* 170. Ξύλον εἰς τὴν λίμνην καθῆκε, καὶ οἱ βάτραχοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον (B. omisit τὸ μὲν) καταπλαγέντες τὴν ψόφον, εἰς τὰ βάθη τῆς λίμνης ἔδυσαν. cur vero hic subsistit Vir doctiss.? in testibus requiritur, ut nihil

LIB. I. hil reticeatur, quod ad causam attinet. audiamus igitur, quid Græcus porro dicat. Ὕστερον δὲ ὡς ἈΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ἦν τὸ ξύλον, ἀναδύντες εἰς τοσοῦτον καταφρονήσεως ἦλθον, ὡς καὶ ἐπιβαίνοντες αὐτῷ ἐπικαθέζεσθαι. —— ὡς ἈΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ἦν τὸ ξύλον. *cum lignum immotum jaceret*; quid melius cum Phædri verbis convenire possit, aut aptius sententiam eorum reddere? tantum igitur abest, ut Græcus Bentleii emendationem firmet, ut contra plane evertat. Quod dicit Gr. *ranas in profunda paludis se abdidisse*, hoc Phædrus, brevitatis mire studiosus, omittendum putavit, satisque habuit dicere, *terruit pavidum genus*. Alter sane testis disertius loquitur, Anonym. nempe Fabulator: Ille enim hæc ipsa fere habet quæ Vir doctiss. reposuit, *mersæ limo cum laterent*; sed Græca forte fabula, vel sua ipsius inscitia Anonymum in errorem induxit, ut putaret *Hoc* in Phædro non ad *tignum*, sed ad *genus* referendum esse. *laterent* vero librarii forsan culpa est pro *jacerent*, cum in verborum principiis sæpe *l.* & *j.* misceri soleant. autoritas certe ejus non tanti facienda, recentis & obscuri glossatoris, ut a constanti codicum lectione multa immutando recedamus, nisi sensus quoque & mens loci idem suadeant; quæ hic, ni fallor, stant a recepta lectione. Sed objicit Vir doctiss. —— *quomodo mergi potuit lignum aqua levius? aut si semel limo mersum est, cur non ibi permansit?* sed hæ objectiunculæ facillime diluentur, si ponamus *limum* vel tam crassum, vel tam parum altum, ut *lignum* non penitus demersum vel submersum esset, sed ita *mersum*, ut saltem parte sui aliqua extaret, vel forsan tota superiori superficie e limo tantillum emineret. Quis non

non in stagnis prope exsiccatis, vel aliis cœnosis locis ad fluviorum ripas hoc centies vidit? LIB. I.

Lignumque supra turba petulans insilit. En alterum ejusdem negligentiæ, nisi id dedita opera fecerit, quam ad primam fabulam notavi, exemplum! Burmannus enim non *tignum* quod est ab Heinsio, sed *Lignum*, quomodo habent Codices; ad quod hæc Scheff. *prorsus eleganter*; non *tigillum*, ut ante, vel *tignum* appellat, (sed) voce viliori, ut ostendat, quam contemptus fuerit rex ille a ranis. Schefferum recoquit B. Codex, ait, uterque *Lignum*. recte. Rex ille tot modis spretus, contemptus, etiam vocabulo ut *Ligneus* fastiditur. Tignum vero majestatis quid habet, præ illo altero *Parvum tigillum*. Tantine vero fuit Schefferum exscribere, ut Burmanno falsam lectionem affingeret, quo huic annotationi locum faceret? addit, *Græcus hic habet* ξύλον. quid vero? an lectio inde firmatur? hoc argumento, loco *parvi* etiam *tigilli lignum* reponi oporteret, cum ibi quoque Græcus habeat ξύλον. ξύλον εἰς τὴν λίμνην καθῆκε. Ineptum igitur Græci lectionem in hac causa allegare. 20.

Alium rogantes regem misere ad Jovem, i. e. misere ex suis quæ rogarent, ut IV. 17. 1. *Canes* Legatos *olim misere ad Jovem*. B. *rogantes* primi casus esse putans, cum sit quarti, quærit, si ranæ ipsæ rogassent regem, quid opus erat, ut ad Jovem mitterent legatos? reponit igitur, *Alium* rogatum *regem misere ad Jovem*. Sed receptam lectionem comprobat Anonym. *Alium rogantes*. quod primi quoque casûs esse possit. 22.

Suoque potius habitu vitam degere. Meurs. *suo* III. 2.

QUIN

Lib. I. QUIN *potius*. quem eruditorum nemo secutus est ante Bentleium; qui ad lectionem hanc firmandam locum e Terentio adduxit a re prorsus alienum,

III. 2. ——— *nunquam tam astutus fui,*
QUIN *quicquid possem, mallem auferre* POTIUS *in præsentia.* ubi *quin* valet *ut non.* sed sic Anonym. quoque.
Suo quin *potius vivere malle.* sed nonne hic Librarius errare potuit? nonne auctor ipse sic Phædri vocem immutare, quia alterius lectionis elegantiam non intelligeret? utinam Vir doctiss. locum attulisset huic nostro parem, & ubi verborum eadem est collocatio, *suo quin* pro *quin suo*, & cum verbo infinito.

5. *Pennas, pavoni quæ deciderant, sustulit.* Anonym. *Pavonum.*

7. *Formoso se pavonum immiscuit gregi.* Codd. *Immiscuit se pavonum.* quod cum versus respuit, B. reponit *Immiscet.* sed verba præcedentia, *sustulit, exornavit,* postulant præteritum. rectius, opinor, Heins. vocibus trajectis, *se immiscuit.* Anonym. *miscuit se pavonum formoso gregi.* unde suspicetur aliquis legendum,
Gregi formoso se pavonum immiscuit. cum illi auctori familiare sit ultimum versiculi vocem primo loco ponere. sed lectio Heinsiana propius ad Codices accedit.

8. *Illi impudenti pennas eripiunt avi.* Anonym. *imprudenti.*

11. *A quo repulsus tristem sustinuit notam.* Hic Bentleius cum aliis silet. ego mendum subesse vehementer suspicor, & pro *repulsus* legendum esse *repulsæ.*

pulsæ. ut *v.* ultimo, *nec hanc* repulsam *tua sentiret* LIB. I.
calamitas. cum *nota* minus recte absolute poni videatur. *nota repulsæ*, ut apud Cic. *Nota turpitudinis.* Et jam ex Hoogstratano video idem sensisse Jac. Tollium ad Auson. *p.* 337.

Aliamque prædam ab alio ferri putans. Ut versui IV. 4.
consulant, monent *m* in *prædam* non elidendam, quod sæpe fit in Plauto & Terentio. sed distinguenda tempora : ejusmodi licentias non tulit Phædri ætas. alii igitur, ut sustentent versum, vel *perferri* vel *se ferri* malunt. Burm. observat Marcilium ad *Hor. Od.* IV. 10. legere *ferri deputans.* sed, ipsa sententia duce, vera ni fallor lectio est, *Aliamque prædam ab alio* cane *ferri putans.* Hanc lectionem ante complures annos amicis communicavi ; atque inde forte est, quod Vir doctiss. eandem jam reponat.

Nec quem petebat adeo potuit adtingere. Cum 7.
versus non constet, Ursinus reponi voluit, pro *adeo potuit*, *potuit adeo.* cui accedit B. & sic sane metro satis consultum est. at quis sensus ☞ *adeo* in ista collocatione ? jungesne ad *potuit*, an ad *adtingere ?* utrumvis facias, nihil expedies, erit insulsum & vox nihili. vitium est in ultima voce, pro qua reponendum simplex *tangere.*

Nec quem petebat adeo, potuit tangere : sic IV. 2. 2.
Uvam adpetebat summis saliens viribus,
Quam tangere *ut non potuit.*

Nunquam est fidelis cum potente societas. Mallem V. 1.
potenti, ut tot brevium vitetur concursus, licet Comicis hoc non infrequens sit.

Ego primam tollo, nominor quia Leo. Et sic Anonym. *quia nominor Leo.* Versum in mendo esse 7.

Lib. I. omnes vident, sed medicinam nemo adhuc feliciter adhibuit. B. qui verborum similitudinem parum curat, *Nomine hoc, quia sum Leo.* sed nisi plurimum fallor, vera & facilis emendatio erit, si pro *quia* legamus *quoniam.* Cum *quum, quia* & *quoniam* compendio fere scribi soleant, facile invicem miscentur. en insigne hujus in *quum & quoniam* exemplum in Plauti Merc. III. IV. 13.

Spem speratam quum *obtulisti hanc mihi, tibi grates ago.* sed V. II. 2. hic idem versus sic habet,

Spem speratam quoniam *obtulisti* —— ubi manifestum est pro *quoniam* reponendum esse *quum. quia* vero & *quoniam* miscerі exemplum dabit Curculio. V. II. 67.

Quamobrem istuc? quia *ille ita repromisit mihi.* ubi metrum clare ostendit legendum esse *quoniam.* Vid. etiam Cap. V. II. 19. Sed ne longius quæramus, exemplum mendi hujus, ni fallor, in propinquo est, in his ipsis fabulis. *Fab.* 8. 2. *Primum* quoniam *indignos adjuvat.* sed Anonym. *primum* quia *indignos.* sed quorsum exempla congeram in re eruditis omnibus notissima? Nolim vero putes legendum *quia*, quod sequatur, *Quia sum fortis, Quia plus valeo.* nam sic Phædrus alias, ut *Fab.* 2. 7. *Non* quia *crudelis ille, sed* quoniam *grave.* & 8. 2. *Bis peccat; primum*, quoniam *indignos adjuvat.*

Impune abire deinde quia *jam non potest.* Sed Bentleio displicet *nominor*; " Neminemne sensisse, " illud *nominor* in mendo cubare? non eo ceteris " feris excellit, quod *nominetur*, sed quod *sit* Leo. " ut ne addam, quod non ubique gentium sic no- " minetur." Piget referre tanti viri tantas ineptias.

Regiumne

Regiumne Theologiæ professorem nescire, quam frequens apud sacros Scriptores *vocare* seu *nominare* sit pro *esse?* quod ab Hebræis in alias linguas traductum. Sed non opus est eo confugere. *nominor Leo*, i. e. is sum cui nomen est *Leo*, & qui vel solo nomine metum omnibus incutio. sed inquit Vir doctiss. *non ubique gentium sic nominatur.* lepidum profecto, quasi non in quavis lingua eadem fabula eandem vim haberet, & Leonis nomen, Græcum vel Hebraicum, istarum gentium feris non parem metum faceret. Postquam hæc scripseram, video in Burm. Editione secunda Richterum mecum sentire, & *quoniam* pro *quia* legere. LIB. I.

Malo adficietur, si quis quartam tetigerit. Malo adfici frustra, opinor, quæras, inquit B. apud bonos auctores. Repone: 10.

Male accipietur, siquis quartam tetigerit. Modestius paulo Gudius, *adfici malo vix reperias.* Sed *malo adfici* Latine dici pluribus docet ad Senecam de Ira, *l.* 1. *c.* 16. J. Fr. Gronovius. ubi inter alia hoc adducit ex *l.* VI. de Benef. *c.* 37. exemplum, quod ipse etiam observaveram; *satius erat duos iniquo* malo adfici, *quam omnes publico.* Cur non Vir doctiss. Gronovium falli in his ostendit, aut si refellere nequeat, cur non a textu interpolando abstinet? Putesne eum, indignum Gronovium censuisse quem adiret, cum Notæ, quas in manibus habuit, ad locum ipsum remitterent? at quem virum!

Vicini furis celebres vidit nuptias VI. 1.

Æsopus, & continuo narrare incipit. ad hæc B. Ita quidem librarii; sed auctor, nisi fallor, hoc modo.

Vicini ut *furis celebres vidit nuptias*

LIB. I. *Æsopus*, sic *continuo narrare incipit*: Cum semel excidisset *ut*, quod in his Fabulis sæpe evenisse reperies, pro *sic* necessario substituebant &. Quæ hæc in optimis auctoribus contaminandis licentia! eodem enim quo hic modo, decem vel quindecim loca in tam parvo libello Vir doctiss. corrupit. Quis crediderit quenquam potuisse tam cæco sui amore abripi, ut non incidat suspicio, seipsum potius in sententia de locis his ferenda falli, quam Librarios toties eadem chorda oberrasse? Omnes, quas Vir doctiss. hujusmodi interpolationes dedit, sunt revera totidem corruptiones, quibus non modo Phædri verbis vis infertur, sed & menti ejus; cum venustæ illi narrandi brevitati, cujus laudem tam sedulo captavit Phædrus, immane quantum detrahant, ut quivis facile deprehendet, qui totum librum raptim & cum impetu, semel atque iterum perleget. Eodem vero auctario Vir doctiss. jam olim mactavit Horatium Serm. I. 9. 1. *Ibam forte via sacra. Ibam* VT *forte.* Huic vero versui interpolando cum obstaret secundus versus, ne *ut* illud inficetum non ingereret, istum quoque corrupit, & pro *& narrare*, *sic narrare* legi jubet. Hunc autem locum sanum esse non modo res ipsa ostendit, sed & locus huic gemellus, iii. 19. 5.

Tum, circum eunti fuerat quod iter longius,
Effecit brevius; namque recta per forum
Cœpit redire; & *quidam e turba garrulus.* sed hunc quoque locum Vir doctiss. nobis eripit, & pro & reponit *hic.* Ita nihil rectum putat, nihil sibi intactum elabi patitur, quod non prima fronte, & festinanti oculo arridet.

3. *Solem velle ducere.* Rigaltius ex Codice Rem. *Sol quum vellet ducere*, quomodo legendum sequens versus

versus clare docet. hoc igitur reponit B. quod idem ex conjectura fecerat Meursius. Et sic ante sexaginta annos dederat Schefferus. LIB. I.

Personam tragicam forte vulpes viderat; VII. 1.

O quanta species, inquit, cerebrum non habet. Hæc Bentleio sunt *arena sine calce, scopæ dissolutæ. pro cæmento* igitur *ac vinculo* ingerit hic, ut in præcedente fabula, *Ut* post *forte.* altera nempe narrandi ratio Phædro placuit, altera Bentleio; qui Phædrum pro arbitrio in suas partes cogit, & in librarios plagis ferendis natos culpam rejicit. in secundo versu pro *habet* reponit *habes*, in qua correctione Broukhusium & Hoogstratanum duces habuit, sed neutrum nominat. at recepta lectio mihi verior videtur, cum non *ad* larvam sed *de* larva vulpes loqui videatur. sic certe Græc. Neveleti.

Ω οἷα κεφαλὴ, κ᾽ ἐγκέφαλον οὐκ ἔχει.

Os devoratum fauce cum hæreret lupi, VIII. 4.

Magno dolore victus cœpit singulos. Si Bentleio credimus, in hac lectione deest ad constructionem *is* vel *ille*; repone igitur, inquit,

Os devoratum fauce cui hærebat lupus, vel potius, *Os devoratum fauce cum hæreret* lupo. At quorsum hæc correctio? num *is* vel *ille* requiritur, ut ambiguitas aliqua tollatur? num alius præter lupum est, ad quem *Victus* trahi possit? nonne similis prorsus locus, V. 3. 1.?

Calvi momordit musca nudatum caput:

Quem opprimere captans—En *caput calvi!* ut hic *fauce lupi*; cur non ibi quoque Vir doctiss. reposuit *calvo?*

Pro quo cum pactum flagitaret præmium. Sic Virg. Æn. III. 604. PRO QUO *si sceleris tanta est injuria nostri, Spargite me in fluctus.* Anonym. *A* 10.

LIB. I. *quo cum pactum*; quod reponit B. si enim *pro* hic admittitur, utique reponendum erit *pro qua*, scilicet *medicina*. Itane vero? nonne Gruis flagitabat præmium pro eo, quod medicinam lupo fecisset? rectius igitur *quo* quam *qua*, quoniam non pro *medicina* simpliciter, sed pro eo quod feliciter medicinam adhibuisset, præmium deberetur. Emendatio igitur hic minime necessaria, & sic re perpensa censuit doctissimus Burmannus.

12. — *ore quæ nostro caput*
Impune abstuleris. Pro *ex* vel *abs* ore, inquit Scheff. præpositionem omittit ob verbum subsequens, cui vis ejus inest. Sed constructionis hujus exemplum desidero; aut legendum igitur *ori*, vel quod magis placet, *e nostro*, quod reponit B. sed quum *quæ e* ingrato sono sit, malim *quum e*, quod in *quæ* facile transire potuit. Anonym. *Ore nostro quod caput.* Rom. *Caput incolume meis faucibus extulisti:*

IX. 2. *Paucis ostendamus versibus.* legendum videtur, *ostendemus*; sic III. 3. 3. *Notescet.* III. 7. 1. *proloquar.* III. 10. 1. *exponam.* IV. 3. 12. *admonebit.* & IV. 24. 3. *tradam memoriæ.*

3. *Oppressum ab aquila, fletus edentem graves.* Omissa conjunctione, pro *& fletus.* Scheff. Anonym. *& fletus.* B. reponit *ac*, quod minus placet, cum præcedat idem fere sonus in *aquila*, & præcesserit *ab.*

8. *Lepus semianimis mortis in solatio.* Nihil ad hæc B. qui hic a Burmanno recedit non admonito lectore; ille enim, ut & alii omnes, *semianimus.* in qua voce observat Scheff. Phædrum imitari Ennium, qui (Cic. l. 1. de Divinat. c. 47.) dixit, *anguem semianimum.* Sed utcunque scribas, in versu primum *i* eliditur. de *mortis in solatio* utinam Vir

doctiss.

doctiss. aliquid dixisset; cum ibi mendum latere Lib. I.
eruditis plerisque, & merito, ni fallor, visum sit, qui mallent *mortis in solatium*. Sed neutrum mihi arridere fateor, cum hæc verba debeant esse pars orationis, qua lepus se solatur. Gronovius ad hæc verba locum adducit ex Appiani lib. 4. cujus ultima sunt hæc. ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ, παραμύθιον ἔχεις. unde mihi statim suborta est suspicio, legendum esse *en solatium!* vel quod scriptori propius accedit, *mortis en solatia!* & jam video idem conjecisse Heinsium. *Solatia* pro *solatio* levissima est mutatio. Simili vero mutatione corrigendus videtur locus Virgilii, quod miror Heinsium fugisse, Æn. IV. 38.

Sed quis erit modus? aut quo nunc certamine tanto?

Quin potius pacem æternam — leg. *aut quo nunc* certamina tanta?

Simili querela fata deploras *tua*, cum præcedat 10.
Qui modo, si per codices liceret, libenter legerem, *nunc ploras*.

Negabat illa, se esse culpæ proximam. i. e. quod X. 5.
Cic. dixit, *culpæ affinem.* nec quicquam hic mutandum, B. vero reponit, *culpæ* huic *proximam.* hæc nempe alia ratio est, qua Vir doctiss. complura Phædri loca commaculavit, articulum hunc plane contra Phædri mentem inferendo; quod satis liquet ex iis locis, quæ sic interpolari metrum vetat, cum articulus tamen illic etiam sit pariter & ex æquo necessarius; i. e. non omnino.

Dixisse fertur Simius sententiam. B. *Dixisse hanc* 8.
fertur. Et sic ipse ad Phædri mei marginem adscripseram, inductus locis huic simillimis. I. 12. 12. & III. 13. 13. & idem voluit Heins. sed loco

Lib. I. certe alieno, cum in fine versiculi *hanc* addendum putaret. Sed multum abest, ut hanc emendationem necessariam censeam, & in textum reponendam. Licentiam istam Viro doctiss. lubens integram relinquo.

XI. 1. *Virtutis expers, verbis jactans gloriam.* Quid sodes est, inquit B. *jactare gloriam verbis?* an gloriosa & magnifica verba? dederat auctor,

Virtutis expers, verbis, jactans Gloria. Ut *decepta* aviditas 4. 5. *corvi* stupor 13. 12. & *servit* utilitas *sibi* 22. 11. Sed hæc exempla a re prorsus aliena sunt: *aviditas* enim est *canis*, de quo ibi igitur, *stupor*, *corvi*: & tertium exemplum, si integrum apponatur, sic se habet, Quorum *privata servit* utilitas *sibi*.

His igitur exemplis nihil proficitur: *Gloria* enim non est animi *gloriantis* affectio, neque, si esset, hic locum habere posset, cum *Abstractis* nominibus a Phædro nunquam adscribantur actiones, nisi præcesserit persona, ad quam referendæ sint. Neque si hoc ferri potuisset, recte se haberet *jactans* gloria, cum *virtutem* vix ex priore versus membro subintelligi possit. Ut vero sciamus quid sit *jactare gloriam*, observandum est, *gloriam* hic poni pro rebus seu factis quæ *gloriam* afferunt, & proinde idem fere esse ac *Virtutem*. quo sensu ab ipso Phædro usurpatur IV. 4. 10. *Auctoritatem similis referens* gloriæ, quem locum Vir doctiss. insigniter corrupit, ut pluribus dicetur, cum eo deventum fuerit. Eodemque sensu *laudem*, vocem utique huic prorsus similem, adhibuit Epil. 11. 12.

Non tamen eripiet laudis *conscientiam.*

XII. 2. *Sæpe inveniri, hæc exerit narratio.* B. ex altero codice

codice reponit, *teſtis hæc narratio eſt.* ſed ſi duo- LIB. I.
rum codicum lectiones inter ſe conferantur, verior, opinor, totius verſiculi lectio eruditis hæc videbitur,

Sæpe eſſe, teſtis hæc erit *narratio. Erit* enim eſt in cod. Rem. quod in *exerit* mutavit Pithœus; ex altero vero codice ſupplendum *teſtis*, quod Remenſi deeſt, in quo pro *eſſe teſtis*, eſt *inveniri.*

Ibi dum ramoſa mirans laudat cornua. Mallem 5.
admirans, quod facili lapſu mutatum eſt in *mirans*, cum ſcribere ſolerent *ammirans*, & alteram *m* lineola ſupra poſita notare; *a* vero a præcedente litera abſorberi in proclivi fuit. *Admirari* enim, fere de iis dicitur, quæ in laude poſita ſunt, & quæ cum gaudio audimus vel intuemur. ſic iv. 21. 21. *abſentis* admirator *maximus*. & iii. 18. 3. *cunctis* avibus *admirabilem*; ſi locus ſanus ſit, de quo eſt quod dubites. at ſimplex *mirari*, fere ſignificat tantum rei inſolentiam, vel quod præter expectationem acciderit. ut iv. 17. 14. MIRARI *ſibi legatos non revertier.* Sic enim legendum videtur, non *mirati.*

Utilia mihi profuerint, quæ deſpexeram. B. qui- 14.
dem, merito, ni fallor, præfert lectionem quam ſervat Danielis codex, *Utilia mihi quam fuerint.* quomodo Rem. etiam Codex legit, ſi parvo & frequenti errore liberetur. ibi enim *Utilla*, pro *Utilia:* Cur vero hanc lectionem præferat, non dixit. Ego quidem meliorem cenſeo, quod codex alter, qui habet *Ut illa, quam* etiam habeat ante *profuerit.* Quid quod hac lectione admiſſa, extrema fabulæ primis non re tantum ſed etiam verbo tenus reſpondeant, Laudatis *Utiliora.*

Seræ dant pœnas turpes pœnitentiæ. Quomodo XIII. 2.
habet

LIB. I. habet Codex Danielis, si Heinsio credimus; at Rigaltius ibidem se legisse dixit, *sera pœnitentia.* Atque hæc lectio se probavit Rigaltio, Guyeto, Gronovio, Heinsio, Scheffero, Gudio. Nec quicquam elegantius dici potuit. *Dant pœnas turpes.* ut 25. 2.

Et perdunt operam, & deridentur turpiter. & V. 5. 38.

Turpemque *aperto pignore errorem probans. Sera autem pœnitentia,* idem est ac *inutilis.* unde Liv. l. 29. *Celerem pœnitentiam, sed seram* & inutilem *sequi.* ut ad locum Scheff. miror igitur cur Vir doctiss. lectionem illam alteram prætulerit.

Fere dant pœnas turpi pœnitentia. Recte, inquit, si quid mihi judicii est. *Fere* est *plerumque,* & sic in ἐπιμυθίοις solet noster. Bis scilicet in quinque libellis. Hoc nostro est *solere.* Sed aliud est quod facit ut hanc lectionem improbem, quod *fere* nunquam alias a Phædro usurpetur.

5. *Dehinc sic occepit loqui.* Nullus Codex habet *occepit.* nec alias ea voce utitur Phædrus, sed semper *cœpit*; nec *dehinc,* sed *dein* vel *deinde.* ad libri igitur marginem ex conjectura ascripsi, *deinde sic cœpit,* quomodo jam video esse & in Danielis codice, & in Wissenburgensi: atque hanc lectionem reponit B.

9. *At ille stultus, dum vult vocem ostendere.* Cum *stultus* nullo codice nitatur, ejiciendum. Codd. habent, *dum etiam vult.* Si inversis verbis legas, *dum vult etiam,* versus erit optimis numeris,

At ille, dum VULT ETIAM *vocem ostendere.* Cur B. diversum verborum ordinem elegerit, nescio. sic enim ille,

At

At ille DUM ETIAM VOCEM VULT *ostendere.* E-LIB. I.
legantius certe est, ut verba disjungantur, & ὁμοιοτέλευτον concursus vitetur; adde quod in *dum etiam* ingrata sit elisio.

Hac re probatur, quantum ingenium valet; 14.
Virtute & semper prævalet sapientia. Hi versus, sive Latinitatem, sive numeros, sive sententiam spectes, tam aperte spurii sunt, ut mirer eruditos non uno consensu confixisse. Ego certe dudum induxeram, & jam video idem de iis sensisse Guyetum & Heinsium, quibus accedit B. de iis tacens. nec parva est suspicio versus hos a mala manu esse, quod hoc pacto eadem Fabula duplex haberet ἦθος contra perpetuum Phædri morem; quod ab Heinsio etiam observatum est.

Malus cum sutor inopia deperditus. Pessimum, XIV. 1.
inquit B. habemus hic Librariorum facinus. Quis enim, cui ullus Latinitatis sensus est, ne dum Phædrus, sic loquatur, *inopia deperditus.* Quid igitur? nullusne Latinitatis sensus fuit summis illis Viris, Gronoviis, Fabris, Heinsiis, quibus tantum debent Latinæ Literæ, qui omnes hæc saniissima esse putarunt? Sed ad rem, quid est quod in hac locutione reprehendat? nonne optime dicitur *amore, luxu, perditus?* Nonne Cicero dixit, *Egestate perditus?* quidni igitur *inopia perditus?* quod si *perditus*, cur non *deperditus*, cum *de* vim simplicis verbi solum intendat? cur, cum dicatur *amore deperditus*, non Phædro etiam liceat composito uti, metro id poscente? quod Scheffero adeo non displicuit, ut eleganter dictum putaret. nullum igitur hic Librariorum facinus; pura puta est Phædri ipsius manus. Sed videamus jam quid ejus loco Vir doctiss. suffecerit: illi utique certum est

legendum

Lib. I. legendum esse *proterritus*. Plautus enim dixit *hinc proterritum*, & Ter. *proterruisti hinc*. Miror autem Virum doctiss. non observasse, utroque loco addi *hinc*, quod ostendit, unde sint proterriti, & *personas* etiam, *a quibus*. hic vero apud Phædrum nihil simile. Præterea *proterrere* est, de *subito*, *trepidum* & *perterritum* loco pellere; quod ab hoc loco alienum. *deperditus* igitur, nisi novas quasdam machinas Vir doctiss. adhibeat, de sede sua non proterrebitur.

9. *Hoc bibere jussit ipsum posito præmio*. *Hoc* abest a codicibus; laboranti autem versui eruditi variis modis succurrerunt. alii enim *hoc* addunt, non male; alii *obbibere*, alii *tum* bibere. Richterus *ebibere*. Et hoc reposuit B. tacito Richteri nomine. Sed hoc minus placet, cum in hujusmodi narrationibus simplici *bibere* uti soleant, ut ostendit Jac. Gronov. ex Justino & Livio, & sic alias Phædrus tribus aut quatuor locis. Neque sane putandum est regem eo verbo usum fuisse, & dixisse, *ebibe*, sed *bibe*; alterum enim servulorum tantum aut congerronum, se liberius invitantium. Ego quidem, cum nullus frequentior librariorum error sit, quam qui ex omissione syllabæ geminandæ oritur, *toxicum* vero immediate præcedat, legendum esse *combibere* suspicatus sum, quod jam video Burmanno etiam placuisse, qui hanc lectionem non parum firmat his Horatii verbis 1 Od. 37. 27.

Ut atrum
Corpore combiberet *venenum*.

ubi percommode accidit, ut ibi de *veneno* pariter, ac hic, agatur. Sed & alia ratione & forsan veriore versus emendari potest, si pro *posito* legamus *proposito*, cum posterius

poſterius a priori in MSS. nequaquam differat, niſi quod *p* gemino ſcribatur. Si hæc vox reſtituatur, & in principio ſedem habeat, verſus pulcherrime incedet, LIB. I.

Propoſito bibere juſſit ipſum præmio. ſic V. 5. 5.
Propoſito *cunctos invitavit* præmio.

Hoc pertinere vere ad illos dixerim. 17.

Quorum ſtultitiâ quæſtus impudentiæ eſt. In priore verſu mallem *vero*, cum *vere* nihil ad ſententiam conferat; quicquid enim *pertinet*, *vere pertinet*. in altero MS. *ſtultitiæ* & *imprudentia*. Sed Eruditi, ipſa fabulæ ſententia eo ducente, recte repoſuerunt *ſtultitia* & *impudentiæ*. Sed alii *ſtultitiæ* primi caſus eſſe voluerunt, alii ſexti, & in iis Burm. ſed niſi fallor, altera melior lectio, cum ſic majorem verba emphaſin habeant. pro *quæſtus* vero legendum forte *quæſtui*, atque huc jam video inclinaſſe Gronovium.

Aſellum in prato timidus paſcebat ſenex. *Timidus* XV. 4.
& proprium ſenis eſt, & Fabulæ convenit, qua male ſuadet aſino, ut inſtantibus hoſtibus fuga ſibi conſulat. Fruſtra enim ſenex, ætate, aſinus natura tardus, & clitellis onuſtus, effugere in tam præſenti periculo ſe poſſe ſperant. Sic V. 2. 4. *timidus accurrit comes*. Nec ſane quis ante Bentleium (ſi Meurſium excipias, qui *tumidus* inepte maluit) hanc lectionem improbavit. Ille pro arbitrio reponit *quidam*, quod prorſus otioſum, nec unquam a Phædro, nomini ſubſtantivo unam perſonam denotanti adjunctum eſt; ſed vel ſolum ponitur, vel tantum adjectivis additur; ut *quidam petulans*, III. 5. 1. *quidam garrulus*, III. 19. 7. Si unum excipias locum, III. 10. 9. *Maritus* quidam, ubi vix abeſſe

LIB. I. abesse potuit, cum *maritus* sit τῶν πρὸς τι; sed ne otiosum videatur, posterius ponitur. Sed cur obsecro *timidus?* inquit B. quasi vero *timidus* dicendus erat, qui unus & senex adversus integram cohortem stare non sustineret? nihil ad Fabulam, seu senex ille *timidus* sive *audax* fuerit: Neque epitheto χαρακτήριζον τι ullus hic locus. Sed hæc, ni fallor, supra dicta satis diluunt. quid quod si hæc vera sint, cur *senex* omnino dicitur? cur non *quidam* nullo nomine adjuncto adhibetur? cur vero non *seni* epithetum χαρακτήριζον addatur, cum ad eundem modum *patiens ovis injuriæ* dicatur. 5. 3.

6. — *Ne possent capi.* Ipse sc. cum asino B. vero reponit *posset*, quasi senex de asini salute unice sollicitus esset, suæ negligens; sed & vox *timidus*, & rei ipsius ratio clare ostendunt legendum *possent*.

Fraudator nomen quum locat sponsu improbo,

XVI. 1. *Non rem expedire, sed mala videre expetit.* Locus vexatissimus. Cod. alter, *Fraudator homines cum avocat sponsore improbo.* unde, metro duce pariter ac sententia, facile reponas.——*homines cum advocat sponsum improbos.* sed haud paulo difficilius dicere, quomodo alter versus refingendus sit. Quomodocunque legas, sive *mala videre*, sive cum Gronovio, *malum dare*, sensum exinde nullum commodum elicias. Quid enim est, *Fraudator non expetit rem expedire?* quis tam fatuus ut id a *fraudatore* speret? si illa lectio retinenda sit, pro *mala videre expetit*, legendum putarem, *malum avidus expetit.* Mihi vero, re perpensa, & quale ἐπιμύθιον Fabula postulet, legendum videtur, non *expetit*, sed *expedit*, & sic MS. Phædrus enim incautos monet,

monet, ut sibi caveant, ne temere se in laqueos induant, si forte homini improbo, qui quid ab iis mutuo sumere velit, sponsores quoque accedant improbi. tunc enim nequaquam *expedit* ei fidem habere, aut quid roget, mutuum dare; non debent rem quam velit, *expedire*, seu expeditam dare, sed ab eo mala (sibi) metuere. hæc, opinor, Phædri mens, eademque est Gudius sententia; adeoque ad hunc modum locus non incommode refingi possit. *Non rem expedire, sed mala metuere expedit.* Quodque magis suadet hunc versum non ad *fraudatorem* pertinere, *rem expedire* neutiquam videtur idem esse, quod *nomen expedire*, quod debitoris est, seu ejus qui hic *fraudator* dicitur. Ad hunc nodum nihil B. exscribit tantum Burmannum, eamque in textu lectionem ponit, quam ille in notis optimam judicavit; hanc sc. LIB. I.

Fraudator hominem cum vocat sponsum improbum,
Non rem expedire, sed malum dare expetit.

Bidens jacentem in fovea prospexit lupum. Cod. XVII. Danielis, *Videns*, unde acutissime Heinsius, *Bidens*; *Ovis*, quod alii habent, hujus manifesto gloss est. quæ vero aliis omnibus egregia emendatio visa est, Bentleio displicet, & ipsius judicio hæc lectio tanto altera deterior, quanto affectatior. Quid vero? num *Bidens* affectatum magis, quam *Laniger*, quam *Auritulus*, quam *Barbatus?* Phædro placuit, quod Bentleio affectatum est; judicent Quirites. Phædro certe in partes advocandus est Virg. quem lubens imitatur, illi enim BIDENS frequens est; adhibuit etiam Horatius. Sed quid si demus, hæc omnia paulo affectatiora esse, quis præstiterit ab homine peregrino affectati nihil excidisse,

LIB. I. cidisse, dum sermonis Romani puritatem atque elegantiam captat? Quæ autem vera causa est, quod Vir doctiss. hanc lectionem tam inique ferat? quoniam illa locum suum obtinente, nequit tam commode pro more suo *Ut*, bellum illud editionis suæ emblema, huc intrudere: amoto igitur τῷ *bidens*, quærit voculam otiosam quæ cum *ut* vacuum spatium complere possit, & audacter reponit, Forte ut *jacentem in fovea* conspexit *lupum*. Ita optima lectio movetur, ut pessimæ locum faciat. *conspexit*, quod pro *prospexit* reposuit B. lectio est quam habent Nevelet. Faber. Scheff. & nescio an Rigaltius. sed an aliquis codex ita legerit, quod asserit Vir doctiss. non liquet ex commentariis quos editioni suæ Burm. adjecit, unde lectiones codicum se hausisse in Præfatione profitetur. Ut illud sit, recentiores editores *prospexit* in textum receperunt, quod vix, opinor, fecissent, nisi & hoc codicis vel Remensis, vel Pithœani auctoritate niteretur.

XVIII. 5. *Onus naturæ melius quo deponeret.* Sic Codd. & ad eundem fere modum *naturæ* partes IV. 14. 5. Naturæ *partes veste quas celat pudor. Onus* sc. *uteri.* sed Heinsius, pro *naturæ*, *maturum*; quod avide arripit B. dicens se pigere Gudii, qui alterum tuetur; sed in locis ab Heinsio adductis est *uteri* vel *ventris* mentio, nec usquam *onus maturum* pro fœtu seorsum positum ostendit.

6. *Minime, inquit, illo posse confido loco.* Cod. Dan. *minime, inquit* illa, *posse confido* hoc *loco.* quod reponit B. & placet quidem in hac lectione *illa*, at *hoc* non item. Cum enim a lecto mulier jam abesset, *isto* rectius dixisset, non *hoc*, quod proprie locum designat, in quo tum jacebat. Priorem

igitur

igitur lectionem prætulerim, cum *illa* non sit ne- LIB. I.
cessarium, sed locus ipse satis ostendat eam, non
virum, hæc dicere. iste Codex, qui habet hic *illa*,
eandem vocem invito metro ingerit sequenti Fa-
bulæ *v.* 9.

Dum firmiores posset catulos ducere. ad hæc B illud XIX. 7.
ducere magnam *interpretibus molestiam creat.* immo
nullam, vel nulli proximam; sed his Vir doctiss.
viam parat eruditioni ostentandæ. Homerus l. p.
133. dixit de *leone*, νήπιοι ἄγρην. quod est verbum
verbo *Catulos ducenti*. Idemque est σωμναγωγεῖν,
ut παιδαγωγεῖν. sed quid hoc ad Phædrum? *ducere*
absolute sumptum idem valeat ac *educere*. i. e. *edu-
care*; non Phædrus dixit simpliciter *catulos ducere*,
sed *firmiores* catulos ducere, quod ostendit *ducere*
hic esse pro *abducere*. nec quicquam hic novi vir
doctiss. nos docuisset, si non errasset. *Ducere* enim
proprie de *bestiis* dici, cum catulos suos ægre ad-
huc incedentes post se trahunt, observat ad locum
Scheffer. Sed festinanti, opinor, imposuit Justini
locus, ubi hæc eadem fabula paulo aliter narratur,
l. xliii. *c.* 4. *Canem aliquando partu gravidam iterato
petisse, ut sibi* educare *eodem in loco catulos liceret.*
Sed *fanus est locus*, inquit Vir Doctiss. Et ego,
quis unquam de ejus sanitate dubitavit præter Hein-
sium? qui non ideo dubitabat quod locutio ista illi
displiceret, sed quod *Schedæ regiæ* haberent *dedu-
cere*.

flagitare validius 8.

Cubile cœpit. Series narrationis satis docet, quæ-
nam duarum canum esset, quæ *cubile flagitaret*. tu-
gurii sc. domina B. tamen legi vult *flagitari*. quid
autem inde lucratur? omnino nihil; subintelligen-

LIB. I. dum enim, *a cane domina*; sed nec hac immutatione contentus, hic quoque pro more *Ut* post *flagitari* ingerit, insulse.

XX. 5. *Aquam cœpere bibere.* B. codex alter, *cœpere ebibere.* hic, ut sæpe alias, fallitur Vir doctiss. cum nobis *codicem alterum* obtrudit pro exemplari *Danielis*, quod a duobus Pithœi & Remensi, ut hujus Epistolæ initio dixi, diversum fuit. Sed hanc lectionem viris doctis probari noster miratur. Cum enim *ebibere* sit *totum bibere*, quem hic locum habeat *cœpere?* certe *ebibere* non incipientis sed perficientis est. Quid vero? si *ebibendi* consilium inierant, nonne cum hoc exequi cœperunt, *ebibere cœperunt?* quid si puero libellus ad verbum ediscendus erat? nonne opus hoc aggressus, *ediscere cœpit?* merito igitur hæc lectio eruditis placuit. κύνες (inquit Græcus Neveleti. 211.) συνέθεντο ἀλλήλοις (l. ἀλλήλαις) ὅπως πρῶτον τὸ ὕδωρ ἐκπίωσι. si *cœpere* idem valet, ac *aggressi sunt*, id quod constituerant efficere, hæc nequaquam sunt ἀσύστατα. pro *cœpere* vero Vir doctiss. *cœperunt.*

XXI. 3. *Defectus annis, & desertus viribus.* De utroque versus membro, inquit B. litigant interpretes. utinam dixisset, quinam essent; ego enim a nemine litem moveri video de posteriore ejus membro, nec quemquam præter Schoppium contendisse contra lectionem prioris. ille quidem pro *defectus* legendum censuit *defessus*: sed alii omnes contra eum receptam lectionem strenue tuentur. nec sane quicquam est in utrovis membro, quod non optimæ Linguæ Latinæ ætati convenit. Ex hac tamen, quam sibi somniavit, Interpretum litigatione occasionem arripit Vir doctiss. utrumque membrum, nulla

nulla aut codicum auctoritate aut rei necessitate eo ducente, immutandi. & versum sic pro arbitrio reponi jubet. *Dedit sine dubio* Phædrus, LIB. I.

Confectus annis, & defectus viribus. mira profecto lectio, & opinor, absque exemplo, ut *confectus* & *defectus* in eodem versiculo conjungerentur. Anonym. *Defectus annis, & desolatus viribus.* quod receptam lectionem firmat.

Calcibus frontem extudit. sic Codex Danielis, & MS. Remense. sed Pithœi codex *exterit.* prior lectio Gudio placet, cum cetera verba sint præteriti temporis; Rigaltio, Heinsio, aliisque fere omnibus, inque iis Burmanno, *exterit.* Licet enim in prima quoque Burmanni editione *extudit* in textu sit, tamen inter Errata ponitur, neque sententiam se mutasse in secunda dicit. atque hanc lectionem reposuit B. 9.

Quod ferre certe cogor, bis videor mori. Bentleio non placet illud *certe.* melius utique dixisset, *Quod sustinere cogor*, vel *Quod ferre inultus cogor.* quæ hæc corrigendi libido? mihi quidem *certe* hoc positu parum placet, sed facilis medicina, voces transponendo. 12.

Quod ferre cogor, certe bis videor mori. quo verborum & major emphasis, & melior cæsura. 29. 7.—*similem si negas*

Tibi me esse, CERTE *simile est hoc rostro tuo.* & juvat, quod jam videam Neveletum & Meursium idem sentire.

Effugere vellet: quæso, inquit, parcas mihi. Codd. *parce*, quod cum versus respuat, Salmas. mutavit in *parcas*; sed ista correctione facile carere possu- XXII. 2.

LIB. I. mus, si *parce* transponas vel ante vel post *quæso*; prius videtur melius, idque reposuit B.

7. *Quas sunt rosuri.* legendum forte *sint.* Anonym. *Quas illi erant rosuri, totas devores.*

XXIII. *Verum peritis inritos tendit dolos.* B. una litera
2. mutata, *Rerum peritis*; quæ sane correctio prima facie se plurimum commendat: quod si penitius inspicias, quænam ejus necessitas? quia *peritis*, inquit, absolute positum dissertissimo auctori non convenit. Et verum quidem est *peritus* rarius absolute poni, quod tot fere *Peritiæ* genera sint, quot rerum; sed ubi vel ex verborum oppositione, vel locorum circumstantiis, satis elucet de quali *peritia* agatur, nihil tum vetat absolute poni. & cum *peritus*, tum *imperitus* hoc modo absolute poni posse, bene multa exempla ex optimis scriptoribus docent. sic hoc in loco cum præcesserit *stultus*, quis nescit, quid velit *peritus?* nec video, cur non pari jure absolute dicatur vir *peritus*, ac vir *experiens.* de quo nemo tamen litem moverit. Sed nec altera vox *verum* nostro arridet: Sed ideo, opinor, displicet, ut emendationi locus sit. *Verum* enim ex iis verbis est, quæ absque sententiæ dispendio plurimis in locis vel adesse, vel abesse possunt. Sed aliud est, quod facit, ut hanc emendationem minus probem; quid enim est canis *rerum peritus?* quod tamen Fabula postulat, ut ἐπιμυθίῳ conveniat.

XXIII. *An cibo possit capi.* Sic quidem MSS. sed Ritterus.
4. mutavit in *posset*, & sic omnes quas vidi editt. ut *possit* in Burm. pro typographi errore habuerim. reponit igitur B. *posset.*

5. *Heus, si, inquit, linguam vis meam præcludere, Ne latrem pro re domini, multum falleris.* Illud

si,

si, inquit B. ab Heinsio additum est; abest a manuscriptis, & merito; si distinctione sententiam adjuves. Quis non putaret illud *si* occupasse omnes editiones post Heinsium, & distinctionem ab ipso profectam esse, interrogandi sc. notam post *domini?* Schefferus tamen non modo, quam noster velit, lectionem exhibet, sed & distinctionem. quæ tamen distinctio nequaquam necessaria; adeoque Jac. Gronovius in editione sua poni noluit, quocum ipse sentio; falsius enim videtur canis furem irridere distinctione altera. Heus, *intelligo quid velis*; *vis*, *ut ne latrem*, *sed multum falleris*. LIB. I.

In prato quodam rana conspexit bovem. Rectissime, inquit B. Heinsius, in *prato quondam.* idem ipse ad libri mei marginem adscripseram, cum Phædrus, ut dixi ad 15. 4. non soleat *quidam* nominibus substantivis adjungere, quod sententiam nihil adjuvet. XXIV. 2.

Quis major esset. illi dixerunt bovem. Tolle hunc versiculum, inquit B. utpote spurium, & κακῶ κόμμα]τος. *Quis major* de duobus, pro *uter* major. Bis quidem vel ter in tota Latinitate *Quis* sic accipitur, sed loca mendi suspecta sunt. Nonne hæc satis pro imperio? meum quidem non est de tota Latinitate pronuntiare; hanc laudem iis relinquo, qui in studiis hisce consenuerunt. Sed ut Græce τί pro πότερον sæpe dicitur, sic Latine *quis* pro *uter* licere dicere, abunde constat. Exemplum ex Apuleio adducit ad locum Scheffer. Et plura dat Pricæus, ad quem remittit; sed loca ista nostro omnia mendi suspecta sunt: Sed unde hoc evenit? pone in codicibus variari, & in aliis legi *quis*, in aliis *uter*; utrum, quæso, veri simi- 8.

LIB. I. lius, *uter* a librariis vel sciolis in *quis* mutari, aut *quis* in *uter?* posterius certissime omnes æqui harum rerum judices existimabunt. Sed quid dicetur ad illud Virgilii, Æn. 12. 658?

Quos generos vocet? quod adduxit Pricæus; ubi Servius, *quos pro utros.* quid ad notissima illa Lucani, (quem scriptorem noster nuper in deliciis habuit, & totus deperibat, cum desubito alio affectu abreptus, excusso Lucano, in medio opere, ad Terentium omnes curas suas transtulit) quid inquam vir doctiss. reponet ad illa Lucani?

QUIS *justius induit arma,*

Scire nefas. Cæsar nempe, an Pompeius? quid denique ad hæc ipsius Phædri? III. 13. 14.

Apertum est, quis non possit, aut quis fecerit. Apesne an Fuci? sed exemplum his etiam disertius, & ad locum de quo agitur, propius multo accedens, etiam Phædrus habet, IV. 23. 1.

Formica & musca contendebant acriter,

QUÆ PLURIS ESSET. ovum, opinor, ovo non similius, quam *Quæ pluris esset,* & *Quæ major esset.* Longe certe facilius de *tota Latinitate* pronuntiare, quam idoneis argumentis pronuntiata comprobare. Quam iniquum vero est, ut quis eo usque se in veterum Scriptorum Censorem erigat, ut integros versus deleat, aut spurios pronuntiet, quia levis illum de locutionis Latinitate suspicio incesserit? Quis ad insanam hanc licentiam non exhorrescit? Cum tali censore, judicium tam temere de veterum scriptis ferente, Viri in re Literaria Principes nunquam sentient, nec pro illius arbitrio hæc Phædro abjudicabunt. Sed ut ad posteriorem versiculi hujus partem veniam, nec illa nostro placet.

pro

pro *bovem*, inquit, alius dixisset, *Bos.* ut Horat. Art. Poet. 328. poterat dixisse, *Triens?* Eu! LIB. I.

Rem poteris servare tuam. Incredibile profecto est, ut quis hæc sollicitet, in quibus nihil est, quod vel levissima suspicionis causa sit. *dixerunt bovem*, esse sc. majorem. æque bene dicitur, dixerunt *bovem*, vel *bos est*. Sed hac occasione liceat Horatii locum emendare, quo hæc ipsa fabula narratur, quem Vir doctiss. insigniter corrupit.

Illa rogare,
Quantane? num tantum, sufflans se, magna fuisset?
Major dimidio. Num tantum? cum magis, atque
Se magis inflaret; non, si te ruperis, inquit,
Par eris. Cum Vir doctiss. ex codicibus cetera restituisset, ad hæc verba, *Major dimidio*, hæc habet. " Illud quod jam dicturus sum, nescio an " auctori ipsi sit vitio vertendum. Qua enim veri " specie aut decori ratione, respondet hic ranula, " Major DIMIDIO? An credibile hoc aut me- " morabile est, ranam vel prima sufflatione di- " midio duntaxat minorem bove visam esse? —— " Quid fiet? an ipsum Flaccum hujus culpæ dam- " nabis? an ob magnas multasque ejus Virtutes " quidlibet potius in quemvis impinges, quam ut " tantæ incogitantiæ reus peragatur? equidem sic " potius scripsissem,

Quantane? num tantum, sufflans se, magna fuisset?
Major PERNIMIO. —— " Quod si ejusmodi est, ut Horatio non tam dari, quam reddi & re- " stitui videatur, equidem ejus causa gaudebo. " Sin ita est, ut *πὶ dimidio* nullo pacto *poterit* (in " erratis emendatur *possit*) ab auctore abjudicari, " id tamen nostrum omnium interest, ut in ve-

Lib. I. " terum scriptis non omnia æque sine cura dis-
" criminis probare videamur." Quis hæc sine risu legerit? quis non videre sibi videtur *ranam se pernimio sufflantem?* dum tam sollicitus est de Horatii existimatione, ne illi labes inhæreat, quæ, si ejus verba recte intelligantur, nulla est. Ob hæc pluribus eum castigavit acutissimus & infinitæ diligentiæ Vir, Alex. Cunningamius, in doctissimis Animadversionibus, quas dedit ad *Bentleii* in Horatium *notas*, p. 115. Nec vero ipsi melius res hic successit; " Nunc, inquit, huic versui (*major di-*
" *midio*) quærenda est medicina, quæ eo difficilior
" repertu est, quod Regulæ Criticæ, quæ pleriscque
" Flacci locis parum sanis auxilium promittunt,
" huic denegant," & locum fere insanabilem videri pronuntiat: hoc autem modo refingendum putat.

Major. dein. num-tantum? Major. cum magis atque. Quæ emendatio nemini, opinor, hactenus se probavit. Sed nihil mirum, tantæ eruditionis, tantique acuminis viros in hoc loco restituendo frustra insudasse, cum toti animum eo intenderent, ubi nihil erat vitii. id enim in versu præcedente latet, & levi mutatione omne tollitur, si pro *fuisset* legamus, *fuit? tum.* Et huc ipsa constructionis ratio eos ducere debebat, cum *num fuisset*, nisi plurimum fallor, dici nequeat, sed *num fuit?* jam autem vide, quam recte omnia incedant.

Illa rogare,

Quantane? num tantum, sufflans se, magna fuit? tum (cum ex pulli silentio mentem ejus satis intelligeret) se iterum vehementer sufflans, & jam *major dimidio* facta, iterum interrogat, *num tantum?*

pullus

pullus etiam num tacet ; quo irritatior reddita, magis adhuc magisque intumescit ; quod cum toties repetitis vicibus frustra fecisset, tum demum pullus, LIB. I.

Non si te ruperis, inquit,

Par eris. Vides facili emendatione Horatium liberari ab infami illa macula. quam nec Librariis imputari, nec ipsi condonari posse noster credidit.

Rupto jacuit corpore. Jacuit cum risu quodam hic usurpatur simul atque exprobratione, eleganter, inquit Scheffer. ut 27. 9. *O Canis, merito jaces.* Anonym. *rupta interiit.* Unde fortasse est reponendum, Bentleio judice, *rupto* INTERIIT *corpore* ; quasi scriptor iste ne verbo quidem a Phædro recederet, aut non interdum uno verbo dicat, quod ille pluribus ; quod si putemus, ut reponendum *interiit*, ita delendum *corpore.* Sed nulla non fabula istius scriptoris has nugas esse nugacissimas ostendit. 10.

Canes currentes bibere in Nilo flumine. Ritterſh. *e Nilo*, quod reponit B. Gronovio contra, Grævio, Scheffero, & postremo Burmanno mirifice placet *in Nilo*, quod judicium eorum miratur B. cum *Nilus* non pro *poculo* sed pro *poculento* habendus sit, nec alveus fluvii dicatur Nilus, sed aqua in alveo ; adeoque non quadrent huc exempla, quibus dicitur *in paterra*, *in auro* bibere. Burm. tamen ad hunc modum refixit duo Ovidii loca ex optimis codicibus, *in flumine* & *in amne bibat*, cum prius utrobique esset *e*. Sed quicquid de iis locis statuere par sit, hic certe malim *e*, cum canes non in Nilo stantes biberent, sed secundum fluminis ripam XXV. 3.

Lib. I. pam currentes aquam lamberent. Facile autem fieri potuit ut *e* absorberetur, ab ultima præcedentis vocis, *in* autem nasceretur ex primis sequentis.

Anonym. *Canes currendo bibunt ex Nilo flumine,*
Ne rapiantur a Crocodilis ; rapidius. Si Phædrus ex hoc scriptore refingendus esset, eorum loco quæ jam habemus, legendum esset

Canes currendo flumine ex Nilo bibunt,
A Crocodilis ne rapiantur. rapidius

5. *Igitur quum currens.* Ex his vides, quam lubricum sit hoc duce quicquam in Phædro immutare, nisi aliæ quoque accedant rationes.

Igitur cum currens bibere cœpisset canis. Mallem numerorum gratia, *Cum currens igitur*, ut vitetur accentus in ultima τῦ *igitur*. Sic I. 2. 27. *Furtim igitur*, & II. 7. 10. *Spoliatis igitur.*

6. *Sic crocodilus ; quamlibet lambe otio,*
Accede, pota leniter. & noli dolos,

Inquit, vereri. Rigaltius, cum secundus versus in codice veteri non parum esset impeditus & inconditus, totum omisit, & in tertio, pro *inquit*, posuit *noli : nimis temeraria correctione*, Scheffero judice. Sed hæc censura non obstitit Bentleio, quo minus idem faceret. in priore autem versu pro *quamlibet* reponit *qualibet*. Quod autem ad secundum versum attinet ; si minus placeret vulgata lectio, non erat tamen cur Vir tantus de eo restituendo desperaret ; si vel Gronovii vel Hoogstratani editionem consuluisset, ulteriori in his labori supersedere potuisset. Sic enim Hoogst. optime,

Pota,

Pota, atque accede Nilo temere, de dolo LIB. I.
Noli vereri: immo si attentius paulo Gudii notas inspexisset, hujus versiculi membra omnia facile deprehendisset ab ipso sic restituta ex libri veteris vestigiis: qui insuper pluribus probat *temere* esse *audacter*. Pro *de dolo* autem rectius fortasse inquit Gud. *sed dolos*, additque, elegans ille est usus particulæ *sed*, ut apud Ciceronem, Plautum, Terent. aliosque sæpius.

B. quidem versiculi hujus omissionem tuetur ex eo, quod Anonym. quoque omittat. Sed quid si obscurus ille Scriptor omiserit ob eandem rationem ac Rigaltius, quod in suo sc. codice ita corruptus esset, ut nihil inde sani expedire potuerit? neque enim dubitandum quin Phædri codices corrupti fuerint, longe antequam in auctoris istius manus venirent.

Multandum simili jure, fabella admonet. simili XXVI.
jure, i. e. ut recte Ritterſh. *talione.* Edictum juris 2.
est, ut idem annotat, *Quod quisque juris in alterum statuerit, ut ipse eodem jure utatur.* Sed hæc viro doctiss. nequaquam arridentſ; sunt infra Phædri elegantiam, nec probi saporis. Ille igitur pro arbitrio reponit,

Mactandum simili vice, fabella hæc admonet. quas vero probationes afferţ vir doctiss. quibus emendationem hanc tueatur? Stephani Thesaurum, indicesque pro more adit, & inde exemplis pluribus ostendit, recte dici, *mactare malo, damno, cruciatu, infortunio.* quid autem his exemplis probatur? Hoc unum & solum, nempe si Phædrus *mactandum* dixisset, adhibuisset vocem scriptoribus optimis bene cognitam; probatur licuisse Phædro hac voce uti;

non

Lib. I. non quod revera usus esset, quod tamen est πρόβλημα. atque hoc modo vir doctiss. perpetuo fallit & fallitur. Utinam tritum illud *Scholarum*, inter corrigendum, semper meminerit, *a posse ad esse non valet*, contra quam verissimam Dialecticæ regulam omnibus paginis peccat, putatque se strenue probasse, hanc vel illam lectionem ab ipsius auctoris manu fuisse, quia si voluisset, ita per Latinitatem scripsisse fas erat; quæ ratiocinandi methodus quam in universum absurda sit, etiam pueri vident, & tamen perpetuo emendationes ex ea sola natas eruditis obtrudit. Sed ut ad Phædrum redeamus, hic ipsa exempla etiam virum doctiss. destituunt, neque enim ullum adduxit, quo dicitur *mactare vice.* nullum sc. illi, emendationum hujusmodi fundus, *Stephani Thesaurus*, subministravit. Quod autem ad posteriorem versus partem, particulam *hæc* nequaquam necessariam esse ostendit Fab. III. 17. 13.

Nihil agere, quod non prosit, fabella admonet. Præterea in loco quem laudat, 5. 2. non est *Fabella hæc*, sed *hæc fabella*, quod diligenter observandum; Phædrus enim semper *fabulæ* aut *exemplo* articulum, si quem adhibet, præponit, vid. quæ dixi ad II. 2. 2.

XXVI. 4. *Prior invitasse, & illi in patina* (Burm. patena) *liquidam*

Posuisse sorbitionem. Cum nemo quod sciam post Lucretium primam in *liquidus* produxerit, vix putem Phædrum a suæ ætatis consuetudine recessisse, adeoque hic aliquid mendi subesse suspicor. Burm. quidem dicit Schefferum receptam lectionem edidisse ex veteri codice, sed in eo Vir doctiss. fallitur: Scheffer.

Scheffer. nihil de veteri codice; sed, contra, dicit, Veteres habuisse, *& ei liquidam in patena*, vett. sc. Editt. & in eo credibile est codices iis præivisse. Quod si is verus verborum ordo sit, & cætera quoque sana sint, necesse est ut mendum lateat in *patena*, utpote quæ glossa fuerit, in textum e margine traducta loco vocis rarioris & minus notæ, qualis est *paropside*, qua Martialis etiam usus est. Sed si legendum est *illi*, non *ei*, alia quærenda vox quæ dactyli vel Cretici vicem impleat, & hujusmodi prima quæ cogitanti occurrebat, fuit vox Plautina *tryblio*. Stich. V. 4. 9. LIB. I.

Olea in tryblio, *lupilli comminuto crustulo.*

Sed Anonym. hic habet, *posuit illi in scutella sorbitiunculam.* qui cum Phædri verba plerumque servet, inde mihi alia suboritur conjectura, an non pro *patena* reponendum sit *scutula*, quod vasis genus a *scutra* dictum, id autem a χύτρα, *olla*. Sed huic conjecturæ obstat, quod nullo exemplo constet primam in *Scutula* produci posse; Martialis, qui bis ea voce usus est, utrobique corripuit, & recte, si revera sit a χύτρα, non a *Scutum*, unde deduci putavit Ger. Vossius. B. credit Phædrum sic dedisse,

Prior invitasse, & liquidam in patina fictili
Posuisse sorbitionem.

Sed cur *fictili?* quia ter quaterque habes apud Plinium; ergone sic Phædrus? sed *illi*, inquit, prodiit ex *fictili*. unde vero hoc constat? num *illi* in medio versus ortum est ex *fictili*, in fine? præterea, quantum liquet, codices non *illi* habuere, sed *ei*. Sed Vir doctiss. probat *illi* abesse debere, quod mox sequatur, *Intrito cibo Plenam lagenam posuit?* Scilicet *patinam* & *lagenam*

LIB. I. *genam ambabus simul fuisse positas, non hanc illi, huic illam:* deinde ponit Anonymi lectionem, quæ directe contra ipsius sententiam pugnat, cum is habeat *illi*, quod Vir doctiss. delendum censet. Epithetum hoc *fictili* viro doctiss. suggessit Gudii nota ad *Lagenam*, quam dicit fuisse vas *fictile* collo angusto; dein addit *Lagunculæ*, *vasa fictilia*, in Glossis vett. Quid autem inficetius hac interpolatione? num Fabula id postulat; num nitoris quicquam narrationi inde accedit? si patena *aurea* vel *argentea* fuisset, ornatus gratia addi poterat. Sed ut *fictili* intrudatur, nihil causæ fuit, cum sit & humile, & otiosum. Nec meliori jure *illi* e textu tollitur, ut huic inerti Epitheto locum faciat. Sed Bentleio judice ejiciendum, quod *patena* ambabus simul esset posita, ut mox *lagena*. suaviter profecto; miror non ipsam morum urbanitatem virum doctiss. ab hoc argumento deterruisse: quid enim, nonne qui amicum covivio excipit, *illi* dicitur dapes vel fercula apponere, quod & ipse quoque de iis comedat? quotidianus loquendi usus ineptum facit exempla in hac re conquirere.

8. *Plenam lagenam posuit.* Cum *lagena* sit a λάγυνος, per *o* scribendum censuerunt Rig. Faber. Jac. Gron. Gudius, & sic MSS. quibus accedit Burm. sed B. non admonito lectore, *lagenam*, quo modo etiam scribi fatetur Gudius in nonnullis quas viderat Inscriptionibus. Sed & *Laguna* in quibusdam MSS. reperitur, unde *Laguncula*.

9. *Satiatur ipsa, torquet convivam fame.* Codd. *Satiatur ipsa, & torquet.* Sed & delevit Heins. parum, opinor, recte; cum Phædrus dicere voluerit duplicem ciconiam voluptatem ex hac re cepisse,

pisse, quod & ipsa satiaretur, & vulpes interea graviter esuriret. pro *fame* autem malim *fames*. *Satiatur ipsa, & torquet convivam fames.* LIB. I.

Hæc res avaris esse conveniens potest, XXVII.
Et qui humiles nati, dici locupletes student. Quis veterum sic locutus est; *esse conveniens potest*, pro *convenit?* nihil certe insulsius, nec *hæc res* pro *hæc fabula* est ex Phædri more. Hos igitur versus puto ab eadem esse mala manu cui debemus duos illos inficetos in fine Fab. 13. & eadem viri doctiss. est sententia, qui insuper addit, fabulam non iis convenire, qui *dici*, sed qui *esse* locupletes student; sed quam infirmum hoc argumentum putem, videbis iis quæ dixi ad 5. 7. 1.

Invenit, & violavit quia manes deos. ad hæc B. Codex unus *violat*, alter, *violarat*. Retinendum hoc posterius, quod jure Gudio & Burmanno placebat. Quid vero sibi vult hæc nota? nonne ipse Burm. in editione quam ex professo noster sequitur, *violarat* legit? ut inutili notæ locum faceret, videtur Vir doctiss. dedita opera *violavit* pro *violarat* in citando Burmanni textu posuisse. 4.

Pœnas ut sanctæ Religioni penderet. Sic. IV. 10. 4. *Repente vocem sancta misit Religio.* Sic. Virg. Æn. III. 363. *Namque omnem cursum mihi prospera dixit* RELLIGIO. 6.

Trivio conceptus, & educatus stercore. Et & versum impedit, & de sententiæ emphasi atque elegantia nonnihil detrahit, ideoque ad libri mei marginem deleveram. omisit etiam B. 11.

Nidoque posuit pullis, escam ut carperent. Distinguendum, opinor, non post *pullis*, sed post *escam*; XXVIII. 4.

Lib. I. *cam*; *carperent* vero est pro *discerperent*, simplex pro composito, quod Phædro frequens. Heinsius maluit, *carperet*. vide autem quid ad hæc B. Si, ut oportet, post *posuit* subdistinguis, (quo tamen modo nemo distinguendum putavit) syntaxis est vitiosa. Sic igitur ille reponit,

Nidoque posuit, pullis ut escam conderet. Condere cibos, fructus, frumentum, inquit, sæpe habemus. Quæ exempla pro more hausit ex Stephani Thesauro. unde factum est ut eodem, quo Stephanus ordine posuerit, secundum Alphabeti seriem, nec alia, quam quæ ille, exempla attulerit. sed vide, quam parum hæc emendatio loco conveniat. *Nido posuit*, i. e. *condidit*, ut *conderet*; lepide mehercle.

Hosti dolorem damno miscens sanguinis. Hæc corruptissima esse prima fronte se produnt, inquit B. Ego vero cum doctissimis viris sana esse contendo. *miscens* est *parans*, *instruens*, translatione sumpta a potionibus. Cic. Tusc. IV. 36. *Major mihi moles, majus miscendum malum*, ex antiqua, forte Accii, Fabula. Hæc vere & erudite Gronov. *Sanguinis* autem est *prolis*, nempe *suæ*, ut recte Rigalt. Hosti, *Aquilæ*, *Vulpes* dolorem creare vult, id est, hostem ulcisci, damno etiam prolis suæ. Quod ut sensit *Aquila*, *incolumes natos vulpi reddidit*. Heins. codici suo adscripserat legi posse, *Hosti dolorem damno ulciscens sanguinis*. Et Ovidii locum adscripserat, *Quæ proprii damno sanguinis ulta virum est*. Sed postea eam conjecturam induxit. in Ovidii autem versu, (quod observat Burm.) scribendum erat, *Quæ* Socii *damno sanguinis ulta virum est*. Ovid. Rem. v. 60. His addit Burm. locum ex Valerio Max.

Max. II. 10. 2. ubi *dolorem ulcisci* dicitur. His LIB. I. subsidiis adjutus Vir doctiss. hanc nobis emendationem excudit.

Proprii dolorem damno ulciscens sanguinis. quasi idem hic dicere Phædrus voluerit, ac III. 10. 28.

Nihil respiciens, dum dolorem vindicet. miraturque viros acutissimos, quibus hæc loca ante oculos erant, hanc emendationem non perspexisse. Ego vero multo magis mirarer, si perspexissent. Vide autem, quid Heinsium intereſt & Bentleium. Heins. re perpensa conjecturam suam induxit: B. suam in textum ingerit; mutato *hosti* in *proprii*, quo nihil ab hoc loco alienius, cum *hostis* mentio prorsus necessaria sit. Cum *Vulpes* de suorum salute desperaret, ne *Aquilæ* pulli iis superessent, constituit omnes communi ruina involvere. Si cui vero *miscens* minus placet, cum de incendio agatur, is forte legendum putet, *immittens.* Jac. Gronovius conjicit, *injiciens.*

Et sibi nocivum concitant periculum. B. censet XXIX. *nocivum* non posse Latine dici, licet & hoc loco, 4. & Plinii altero se tueatur. Locus Plinii est XX. 6. *Pecori præcipue nocivam.* in qua lectione consentire libros omnes etiam MSS. testatur Harduinus, & hic etiam nulla est in codicibus varietas. Unde vero est, quod non plura vocis hujus exempla hodie supersunt? inde opinor, quod olim Critici quidam, nostro nimium similes, vocem hanc expunxerint. Ostendit enim Heinsius ad Ovid. *Remed.* v. 45. pro *herbas nocentes* codicem Puteanum habere *nocivas*; & *Tristium* l. V. 10. *tela nociva* in veteri codice legi, eandemque vocem alio Ovidii loco restituendam putasse Scaligerum dicit. Ne-

Lib. I. que vero Grævio displicuit hæc vox, qui his Phædri versus citans ad Offic. Cic. p. 158. addit, *ut elegantissimus Phædrus canit.* Sed hæc Bentleio non satis sunt; *nocivum* extrudi jubet, & loco ejus reponi *Vicissim.* quod hoc loco est plane otiosum, & nihili: nec Phædrus eo alias utitur. Quod si vox Latina contra Criticum nostrum se sustinere nequeat, etsi ter quater occurrat, quod non ab illo bonis omnibus metuendum esset, si Hebraicæ Veritati manus admoveret; ubi tot ἅπαξ λεγόμενα occurrunt? sed bene est, quod * multa obstent quo minus ullum S. literis inde sit periculum.

7. *Si similem negas*
Tibi me esse, certe simile est hoc nostro tuo. MS. *similem si negas.* Quod Gudio *melius* merito visum est. Cur *melius sit*, inquit B. quod ille tacuit, dicam. Nempe hoc pacto utrumque, *similem* & *simile*, accentum habent in prima, quod in repetitione attendi solet. Hæc B. ut scientiam in *re metrica* ostendat, in qua se solum regnare volens, alios omnes pro cœcis & talpis habet. Viri tamen doctissimi cum venia, dico illum hoc loco falli, nec eam, quam attulit, veram esse rationem, cur *similem si* sit melius quam *si similem.* Etsi etiam *simile* non repeteretur versu proximo, nihilominus hæc melior fuisset lectio, ne accentus in ejus ultimam caderet.

XXX. *Rana in palude pugnam taurorum intuens.* B. e 2. *palude*, quia ex altera lectione suspicari quis posset,

* Vid. Doctissimi Con. Middletoni Animadversiones secundas in Novi Testamenti Specimen Bentleianum. p. 53.

pugnam

pugnam taurorum *in palude* pugnatam esse. Sed non tam crasso atque hebeti ingenio Lectores suos fore putavit Phædrus. retineatur igitur *in*, in quo codices consentiunt. LIB. I.

Est statio separata, ac diversum genus. MS. Rem. Est *ratio separata*, inquit, *ac div.* Pithœi codex, *Est ratio separata*, ait, unde manifestum est *ait* vel *inquit* esse insititium, quo sublato constat sibi metrum. Salm. pro *ratio* voluit *natio*, sed id nec versui, nec sententiæ satis convenit. optime Gud. *Statio*. i. e. *sedes*, qua voce Phædrus utitur 3. 13. & 6. 8. Et proprie de aliis præter homines dici ostendunt illa Virgilii Æneid. V. 128. *Statio gratissima mergis*. & Georg. IV. 8. *Principio* sedes *apibus*, statioque *petenda*: quæ loca adduxit Gudius. Sed nihil horum Bentleio arridet, quasi his lectionibus vitio verteret, quod non satis a codicibus recedant. Ille igitur sic locum refingit, 7.

Esto, inquit, dispar vita, *ac diversum genus*. Et, si illi credimus, *dispar* bene respondet τῷ *longe ab illis degerent*. Sed nemo, opinor, cum illo sentiet. Præterea *dispar vita* & *diversum genus* & male conjungi videntur, & idem utrumque dicere. Sed putavit Vir doctiss. *inquit* vel *ait* non posse abesse. Sed alia prorsus doctissimorum hominum sententia. Si illos audiamus, *usitatissimæ sunt Phædro tales ellipses*, quæ Gudii verba sunt. est quidem locus huic simillimus, IV. 23. 10.

Est glorioſus sane convictus deum; quibus verbis Formica Muscæ respondet; sed ne inde suppetias petamus, istum quoque locum Vir doctiss. gravissime corrupit; ut ibi pluribus dicetur.

Caput ita ad nostrum furor illorum pertinet. Lege 11.

LIB. I. numeris melioribus, inquit B. *Ita caput ad nostrum.* & sic ipse ad libri marginem legendum annotaram; ne sc. secunda in *caput* acuatur. Sed hac lectione admissa, in prima Ιαμβικῇ διποδίᾳ primus pes erit τετρασύλλαβος, seu *Proceleusmaticus*, utraque *spondei* longa in duas breves resoluta. *Ita caput* enim pes primus est. Et sic semper fit, cum, duabus brevibus pro semipede abscissis, primus Ditrochæi pes est Tribrachys vel *Anapæstus.* Quod Vir doctiss. non videtur animadvertisse, cum nec hic, nec in *Schediasmate de metris* de hoc quicquam dixerit. Exempla vero hujusmodi pedis in prima sede non desunt & alia apud Phædrum. vid. III. 2. 4. III. 15. 12. IV. 23. 17. (apud B. 13.)

XXXI. *Auxilia dum requirit, exitium invenit.* Nemini
2. ante Bentleium hæc displicuerunt. dedit auctor *auxilium*, inquit, & elegantius est antitheton: quod firmat ex Anonymo, ibi enim *Auxilium.* Sed mihi contra elegantius *auxilia.* Sic enim meliores numeri, & vitatur ὁμοιοτελεύτων concursus, & *auxilia* proprie dicitur de iis, quos populus oppressus sibi in auxilium adsciscit.

3. *Columbæ sæpe cum fugissent Miluüm,*
Et celeritate pennæ vitassent necem. In secundo versu Heinsius legi vellet, *evitassent.* Quo arrepto, B. in priore quoque reponit *effugissent.* Utrumque male; nam in utroque versu simplicia ponuntur pro Phædri more, sic 19. 2.

Quos ut vitemus, *versus subjecti monent.* (vid. etiam II. 4. 22. & V. 4. 8.) & II. 8. 2.

Ut venatorum FUGERET *instantem necem.*

Sed concesso legi debere *evitassent*, absurdum tamen est, ut legamus etiam *effugissent.* Sensus enim est, cum sæpe *fugissent*, ne a miluo corriperentur,

&

& *fugiendo* necem *evitassent*, —— quod si *effugissent* LIB. I.
legamus, uno illo verbo totum, quod auctor voluit, dictum est, alterque versus eo fit plane inutilis & ineptus. Recepta itaque lectio in utroque versu retinenda est. quod firmat etiam Anonym. qui in utroque loco verbum simplex posuit.

Et genus inerme tali decepit dolo. Anonym. Et genus *incertum*, quod facit ut legendum putem genus 6.
inermum, ut Virgil. *vulgus inermum* Æneid. XII. 131.

De reliquis tunc una, Merito plectimur. Codd. *Tunc de reliquis una*, ubi metrum ostendit *reliquis* esse quadrasyllabum, & scribi debere *relicuis*. quod 13.
vidit Ritterſh. primus voces transposuit Rigaltius, metro vitium inesse credens; perperam sine dubio, est enim *reliquis* quadrasyllabum, ut apud Phædrum semper. Et sic olim fuit apud Plautum & alios *frequentissime*. contracte autem erat trium syllabarum aliis in locis, ubi metrum exegit. hæc Gudius. Sed audiamus jam Bentleium. Hac, inquit, occasione alios docebo, *quod ipse nunc primum disco*. *Reliquus* apud veteres semper quatuor syllabis efferebatur.—Iis denique temporibus numquam non πρασύλλαβον fuisse, vel id certo indicio est, quod apud Virgilium, Horatium, Tibullum, Propertium, &c. nusquam reperiatur; versu scilicet Heroico & Pentametro tale πρασύλλαβον non admittente.— Scribendum igitur ubique in Plauto & Terentio *reliquüm*— nusquam ut nunc, *Relliquum*. MSS. *Relicuum*.

Palmaria sane observatio, qua Gudii *frequentissime* mutatur in *semper*. Quas non debemus summo viro gratias, pro hac tanta humanitate, quod hoc repertum non lectoribus inviderit, sed eo ipso temporis articulo, quo ipse *didicit*, benigne lectores idem docuerit quorum nulli de tam recondita ob-

Lib. I. servatione quicquam in mentem alias veniſſet. Veriſſime certe Vir doctiſſ. dicit, *ſe hoc nunc primum diſcere.* cum enim ad *Eunuchum* ſcriberet, II. 2. 9. verſum iſtum ita dedit,

Itan' paratti te, ut ſpes nulla relliqua in te ſit tibi?

& in nota dicit, Relliqua semper *apud Terentium primam producere.* Unde vero eſt quod Vir doctiſſ. hoc nunc primum ad hanc Phædri fabulam didicerit? aut a quo? num a ſeipſo? nihil minus. nonne enim illi ad manum erat aliqua Schefferi Editio? nonne ibi deprendit in angulo ad extremum libri latentes pauculas acutiſſimi Guyeti notas? nonne ad hunc ipſum verſum vir ingenioſiſſimus hæc annotat? Reliquis, ſeu Relicuis, πραυμάξως *pronuntiandum, ut apud Plautum & Terentium* semper. Quid vero eſt, quod huic Guyeti annotationi Vir doctiſſ. de ſuo addidit? ad indices in Poetas, quibus ætas Guyeti caruit, ſe recipit, quorum majorem nemo copiam habet, nemo diligentius excutit, iiſque conſultis, quod ne quartam quidem horæ partem poſcit, hanc vocem nuſquam invenit apud Virgilium, Horatium, Tibullum, Propertium; unde etiam certo conſtat eorum quoque temporibus convenire, id, quod Guyetus de Plauto & Terentio obſervarat. Quod igitur vir doctiſſ. *nunc primum didicit*, quivis a Guyeto diſcere potuiſſet ante annos ſexaginta.

Cur igitur Guyetum debita laude privat? quo jure ſibi obſervationem hanc, ut prorſus novam, vindicat? Eodem utique, quo in Notis ad *Tuſculanas* p. 53. jactat ſe primum deprehendiſſe apud Terentium verſus *Creticos*, qui hactenus ibi *latitaſſent a nemine animadverſi*, cum ante ducentos fere annos

annos idem observasset, & aperte ostendisset Eras- LIB. I.
mus, quod palam & publice testantur Terentii edi-
tiones, quas *Frobenius* & *R. Stephanus* cum Erasmi
dissertatione de Metris Comicis, notisque ejus ex-
cuderunt: Eodem, quo egregiæ emendationis lau-
dem sibi arrogat in notis ad Aristophanem, quem
ante quinquaginta fere annos dederat *Faber* ad Lu-
cretium, idque tanto cum verborum apparatu, &
tam prolixe, ut illi qui semel legerit, in memo-
riam se altissime infigat. Quod ne temere aut ma-
ligne me dixisse putes, dabo tibi primum Fabri
verba, dein Bentleii, ut iis inter se collatis ipse-
met judicium feras, an non prima & præcipua
emendationis laus Fabro debeatur.

Sic igitur ille, " Apud Aristophanem in Pluto
" anus quædam est facetis sane & lepidis morata
" moribus. Ei olim adolescens quidam fuerat, for-
" mosus sane & strenuus, quique res ipsius ex sen-
" tentia procurabat. Id quandiu factum est, tan-
" diu nulla inter eos simultas, jurgium nullum,
" querela fuit nulla. Sed *mala ætas*, *mala merx*,
" inquit Comicus; neque libenter vetulam amet
" qui potiorem conditionem habeat. Itaque a-
" massius ille bonæ mulierculæ ubi primum habe-
" re cœpit unde res constabiliret suas & sibi meli-
" uscule faceret, deserta misella animum suum alio
" contulit; quæ res aniculam ita perculit, ut eo
" dolore amens & plane perdita cœlo terræque
" ærumnas narraret suas, ut in Medea Ennius &
" Eurip. dixerunt. Ibi autem cum chorum adi-
" isset, inter ceteras verborum delicias, quibus ad
" se usum esse olim adolescentem commemorat,

LIB. I. " se ab illo vocari solitam esse ait *Nitarium* & *Ba-*
" *tium.*

Καὶ νὴ Δί', εἰ λυπουμένην γ' αἴσθοιτό με,
Νιτάριον ἂν καὶ Βάτιον ὑπεκορίζετο.

Et per Jovem, sicubi me tristem cerneret,
Nitarion appellabat, aut Batium suum.

" Quæritur itaque quid sit Nitarium, quid sit Ba-
" tium. Alii alia fortasse conferent, nos ea, Lec-
" tor, quæ jam jam leges. Scripsit olim Symma-
" chus, Aristophanis Interpres, ideo *Nitarium* vo-
" catam fuisse aniculam, quod Nitarus quidam ob
" mollitiem famosus fuerit. Sed contra judicium
" faciat qui amiculæ blandiens, eam aut Bathylli
" nomine, aut Ganymedis, vocaverit; Quare ri-
" dicule Terentianus ille Thraso fecit, qui coram
" Thaide ausus sit dicere, *Ego illum Eunuchum, si*
" *sit opus, vel sobrius.* Alii autem qui eam senten-
" tiam Symmachi probare non possent, Nitarium
" plantæ genus esse dixerunt, unde nullus esse sen-
" sus possit, nisi, [Me quasi pro floribus habebat,]
" rem plane fatuam & imperito magistello dig-
" nam: θέλει οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, ὡς ἄνθη εἶχέ με, inquit.
" Didymus autem scribit *Nitarium* & *Batium* esse
" blanda dicta, quibus mulierculas delinibant,
" NITAPION ΔΕ NEOTTION, οἱο-
" νεὶ κοράσιον. Alii vere σκατοφάγοι homines aiunt
" βάταλον significare ἕδραν, podicem scilicet, atque
" inde βάτιον vocatam illam mulierem fuisse; quod
" ita ridiculum est & ineptum, nihil ut ineptius
" quidquam fingi queat, ut ne de turpissima ima-
" gine dicam. Quin & vocem illam significare
" fatuum aiunt, vel mollem & delicatum, uti *ba-*
" *tus pisciculus* est (quem tamen eundem esse ar-
" bitror,

" bitror, qui apud nos *Raya* dicitur, non inter pis- LIB. I.
" ciculos habenda.) Denique pumilas mulieres
" βατίλας dictas fuisse aiunt; quod tamen Græci
" sermonis ratio non patitur, dicendum enim fuit
" βατίλλας, forma diminutiva a βατὺς exiguus. Et
" hæc quidem ab illis scripta fuere; Videamus
" ecquid aliquanto meliora sint, quæ mihi in men-
" tem. Legendum puto, non Νιτάριον, quod ni-
" hili est, sed Νηττάριον, id est *anaticulam* a νῆττα;
" unde ex Dorico ἄνατα Latinum *anas* prodiit.
" Inter ceteras autem amatorculorum blanditias
" aves locum habebant; idque non apud Græcos
" & Italos tantum, sed apud Hebræos ipsos, qui
" interdum belli homines erant, & columbulas &
" turtures in eam rem adhibebant. Sed de ana-
" ticula locus Plauti in Asin. suffecerit:

" *Dic igitur me anaticulam, columbam vel catellum,*
" *Hirundinem, monedulam, passerculum.*

" Βάτον autem avicula etiam est, ea ipsa, opinor,
" quam *rubellinam* vocamus, aut alia quævis ex
" earum genere quæ βάτοις seu rubetis aut spinetis
" delectantur. Hoc itaque mihi debebit Aristo-
" phanes, quod, qui locus antea a nemine intel-
" ligebatur, nunc planus erit & perspicuus. Ce-
" terum æquitatis meæ esse arbitror agnoscere Di-
" dymum, doctissimum illum & laboriosissimum
" grammaticorum, non aliter olim sensisse, atque
" nunc sentio; sed ab imperitis compilatoribus
" locus illius ita corruptus est, id ut hodie appa-
" rere nequeat. Nam in illis verbis νεόττιον οἱονεὶ
" κορόσιον, mendum est. Pro νεόττιον autem legen-
" dum νήττιον, quod idem est ac νηττάριον seu *ana-*
" *ticula.*" Hæc *Faber*, qui tanto ingenio fuit,

Græcisque

LIB. I. Græcisque & Latinis Literis promovendis tam egregie natura comparatus, ut semper eum plurimum amarim, doleatque tantum virum tam immodice fuisse gloriosum, nec gloriosum modo, sed malignum etiam. sic enim de eo Nic. Heinsius, vir noti candoris, ad Artem Amator. *L.* II. *v.* 660. " Quæ cum ita sint, miror extitisse nuper admo-" dum Tanaquillum Fabrum, virum cætera eru-" ditum & ingeniosum, sed præ nimio sui amore " caligantem haud raro; quod ferendum utcun-" que esset, si hæc φιλαυτία, & immoderata sui " ostentatio cum malignitate & contemptu alieno " non conjungeretur;" quæ illius vitia vir doctiss. ibi pluribus persequitur, sed hæc de *Tanaquillo* satis sint.

Videamus jam, quid ad eundem Aristophanis locum dederit Bentleius. " Νιταριον ἂν καὶ βάτιον " ὑπεκορίζετο] *Nitarion appellabat aut Batium suum.* " Nempe si credimus Symmacho, Grammatico " passim a Scholiaste laudato, *Nitarus* quidam & " *Batus* erant mollitie infames. Ergo ἀπὸ Νιτάρου, " Νιτάριον. ἀπὸ Βάτου, Βάτιον. Atqui (ut condone-" mus ei cinædos suos Νίταρον & Βάτον, quos nemo " alius memorat, quique a Symmacho confecti vi-" dentur, ne nihil dicendo ignorantiam suam fa-" teretur) quî, sodes, fieri potest, ut nominum " virilium diminutiva tribuantur mulieri? Σωκρα-" τίδιον est diminutivum Socratis, ut nullius alte-" rius: sic Νιτάριον solius *Nitari* fuerit; Βάτιον, so-" lius *Bati*. Sed cum hæc interpretatio plane sit " absurda, aliam infit: καὶ τὰς μικρὰς δὲ θηλείας, βα-" τύλους ἔλεγον. Quæ primo corrigenda erunt, de-" inde expendenda. Suidas habet μικρὰς καὶ θηλείας: " unde

" unde sic lego, καὶ τοὺς μικροὺς καὶ θήλεας, βατάλους LIB. I.
" ἔλεγον. *Viros pumilos & effæminatos Batalos vo-*
" *cabant.* Vide βάταλος apud Hesychium, Har-
" pocrationem, Suidam, Etymologum, Plutar-
" chum in *Vita Demosth.* cui ob mollitiem cog-
" nomen *Batalus* adhæsit. Certa est hæc emen-
" datio; & fortassis insuper legendum est, τοὺς
" μαλακοὺς, pro μικροὺς: etsi & hoc tolerari potest.
" Jam vero quid βάταλος facit ad βάτιον? quibus fi-
" diculis extorquebunt, ut ex *Batalo*, *Bation* dimi-
" nutivum prodeat? A βάταλος certe βατάλιον fu-
" erit, non βάτιον. Tamen & alter Scholiastes sig-
" nificare ait, βάταλον τὴν ἕδραν· παρ' ὃ καὶ βάτιον. *Ba-*
" *talum* sc. esse *sedem* (i. e. *podicem*) a qua voce
" βάτιον venire. Et quidem βάταλον notare πρωκ-
" τὸν, testantur Plutarchus, Etymologus, Harpo-
" cration: sed inde βάτιον deducere ineptum est.
" Ergo alius, sed nihilo sapientior, νιτάριον & βάτιον
" ait esse plantarum nomina, & interpretatur,
" ὑπεκορίζετο νιτάριον καὶ βάτιον; quasi dixerit, ὡς ἄνθη
" με εἶχεν, *florum loco me habuit.* Bellorum me-
" hercule florum! cum βάτος, non rosam, non
" lilium, sed *sentem*, *spinam* significet: νιτάριον au-
" tem de flore vel planta dici sit inauditum & fal-
" sum. At tandem, opinor, ad rem ipsam de-
" venimus. Nam βάτος, ait alter, est pisciculi
" genus; unde mollis & luxuriosus, qualis iste est
" pisciculus, βάτιον dici potest. Βάτος quidem
" piscis est, hoc vere; sed satius fuerit pisce mu-
" tiorem esse, quam tam lepidum ὑποκόρισμα nobis
" obtrudere. Restat adhuc Didymus, qui νιτάριον
" exponit, νεόττιον, οἱονεὶ κοράσιον: sed cum nemo
" omnium Grammaticorum hoc memoret, cras ei
" cre-

LIB. I. " credimus, hodie nihil: utpote qui hoc confin-
" gere potius voluerit, quam ignorantiam suam
" candide fateri. Quid ergo? Ipsa certe tot in-
" terpretationum varietas satis per se ostendit,
" quantam ad ἀφασίαν καὶ ἀμηχανίαν redacti fuerint
" miselli Scholiastæ. Nobis autem si locum a
" multis jam seculis in mendo cubantem, & ab
" ipsis Græcis Magistris frustra tentatum, certa
" conjectura restituere poterimus & extra omnem
" dubitationis aleam ponere; ecquid erit pretii,
" προσφιλέστατε Kustere? Gratiam, sat scio, a te
" magnam inibimus, & ab omnibus φιλαριστοφάνεσι,
" qui tuâ operâ id olim possunt resciscere. Fa-
" ciamus igitur periculum: & primo illud per-
" commode accidit, quod apud Suidam ista no-
" mina cum duplice ταυ efferuntur, νιττάριον, &
" βάττιον: cui scripturæ astipulatur Scholiastes ille
" ad locum, qui βάταλον δὲ, ait τὴν ἕδραν, παρ' ὃ καὶ τὸ
" βάτιον· τὸ δὲ συνεσταλμένως ἀναγινώσκειν, ἀνόητον. Hoc
" est, *stultum est correpte verbum illud pronunciare.*
" Scripsit ergo iste, syllabâ per geminam conso-
" nantem productâ, βάτταλος, & βάττιον; ut pro-
" fecto apud Etymologum hodie habetur, βάτταλος
" καὶ βατταλίζειν. Jam igitur sic locum refingo, mi-
" nima mutatione.

" Νηττάριον ἂν καὶ φάττιον ὑπεκορίζετο.

" *Anaticulam & plumbulam me blande vocabat.*

" Non dubitaveram consueta quædam ὑποκορίσματα
" amatoria sub mendosis illis delitescere; & pro-
" inde tentanti quiddam ejus generis ex iis ex-
" tundere statim successit, A νῆσσα, Attice, νῆττα,
" diminutiva exstant, νήττιον & νηττάριον; a φάσσα,
" φάττα, est φάττιον. Onomasticum Latino-Græ-

cum

" cum Labbæi : *Palumbes*, φάπα. *Palumbula*, Lib. I.
" φάπιον. Porro inter blanditias amantium, *ana-*
" *ticulas*, *palumbulas*, sive quod idem est, *colum-*
" *bulas*, (nam palumbes est genus columbæ) vel
" primum locum obtinere, ex notissimo Plauti
" loco constat, *Asinar.* III. 3.

" *Dic igitur me anaticulum, columbulam, catellum,*
" *Hirundinem, monedulam, putillum, passerillum.*

Sic corrigenda sunt ista, nam in editis mendose habentur contra legem metri. Sed & illa ibidem sic scribe.

" *Dic igitur me passerculum, gallinam, coturnicem,*
" *Agnellum, hædillum me tuum dic esse, vel vitellum.*

Ut mittam jam has Plauti depravationes, & quæ alia in hac annotatione reprehensione digna sunt, si Vir doctiss. *Fabro* tribuisset primam emendationis partem, nemo illi invidisset laudem, quam pro altera meruit, in qua Fabro melius ei successit. Facile tamen esse inventis addere, vetus verbum est ; & cui mendum primum suboluerat, vel qui aliunde didicerat, ad alterum emendandum ipso casu duci potuisset, si forte in hæc incidisset, Pac. 1004. Χλῶες, NHTTAΣ ΦATTAΣ τεγχλους. Crede jam, si quidem potes, viro doctiss. Fabri notam vel non lectam fuisse, vel lectam memoriæ ejus, cum hæc scriberet, excidisse. Prius ne ipse quidem diffitebitur, cui Lucretius tam familiaris est ; de altero aliorum sit judicium. Mirum profecto est tantæ eruditionis virum, & cui tam instructum penu est, ab hujusmodi furtis non posse abstinere, idque cum toties deprensus fuerit. Jam multi anni sunt, quod duo hujus generis furta maxime insignia eum fecisse, alterum de Vizzanio, de Neveleto alterum,

evider-

Lib. I. evidentissimis indiciis & copiose demonstrarunt illi, quibuscum ei controversia intercessit de Phalaridis Epistolis.

Nec magis manifestum ego hominem unquam ullum teneri vidi. Idem in plurimis Horatii locis, ut alios taceam, sole clarius ostendit diligentissimus Cuninghamus. Sed nec ille omnia.

Eundem vero morem Vir doctiss. in Terentio etiam servat, nec ibi a *furtis* abstinet. In ipso fere limine, in secunda Emendatione ad primam Scænam, pro *immemoris beneficii* tanquam de suo legendum dicit *immemori*, cum hæc etiam sit Guyeti emendatio, quam non memorat modo, sed & prolixe tuetur Boeclerus. Et ne hæc in abdito latere putes, nec facile adiri posse, habentur etiam in Editione, quæ *Variorum* vulgo dicitur, edita anno MDCLXXXVI. Sed ut nullum hic furtum suspiceris, in nota proxime præcedente ingenue confitetur Vir doctiss. per quem profecerit, & cum pro *haud muto factum.* so. *gaudeo*, reponat, *haud muto.* so. *factum gaudeo. hoc* dicit, *olim monuisse Palmerium, nemine tamen ei auscultante.* Nec quisquam, opinor, posthac auscultabit, ut id obiter dicam; est enim ineptissima emendatio, & prorsus absurda, cum sequentem versum reddat omnino inutilem & inficetum. Ad hunc modum Vir doctiss. pergit furta facere; hæ celandi artes; sic lectoribus fucum facit; nec unquam certius in propinquo fraus est, quam cum ingenue & aperte agere videtur. Quod si e libris notissimis, quique in omnium sunt manibus, Vir doctiss. aliorum Emendationes atque Observationes sublegere, earumque laudem sibi intervertere non veretur, non est quod mi-

remur

temur eum hic in Guyetum tam iniquum esse, cum notæ ejus in Phædrum sint & brevissimæ, & in obscuro lateant: neque enim omnes in editione Burmanniana proferuntur. Turpe certe, & erudito homine indignum, ne in his etiam rebus *suum cuique tribuere*, & debita quemque laude impertire. LIB. I.

Sed tempus est, ut ad istum Phædri locum redeam, qui jam est sub manibus, qui necdum mittendus est: Nec enim uno tantum ille virum doctiss. errore liberavit: non tantum hinc *didicit* RELIQUUM semper esse *quadrisyllabum prima brevi*; quod ille ad Terentium affirmaverat esse *trisyllabum prima semper longa*; loci hujus auxilio alius quoque ipsi error exemptus est, quod frustra premit & dissimulat, non sustinens utique generalem observationem quam ad Terentium cum insigni fastu dederat, palam retractare. Observatio est hæc: *Quadrisyllaba brevia* SEMPER *apud antiquos primam acuere, Mulieres, Propemodum, Perierint, Inopiam, Itinere.* id est, in hujusmodi verbis quadrisyllabis, quorum tres primæ breves sunt, primam syllabam nunquam a ceteris divelli, ut secunda Trochaici pedis fit prima. *Hoc*, inquit, *apud Comicos perpetuum est; & certe operæ pretium est id SÆCULO huic indicasse, ut quomodo ROMANI pronuntiaverint sciamus.* Not. ad Heaut. II. 3. 30. Hanc egregiam, novamque prorsus, & huic nostro demum Seculo erudiendo natam Observationem hic unus Phædri locus evertit, & ut Vir doctiss. de Comicis etiam temere pronuntiatam sentiret, occasionem percommode dedit. Dum enim hoc exemplo monitus redit in vestigia sua, & loca recolit, quibus Terentius RELIQUUM adhibuit, primus ad quem *Index* remittit, locus,

est

LIB. I. est Eun. V. 5. 26. qui sic se habet. RE'LIQVOM? *tantum est. cesso hoc introrumpere?* ubi manifestum est primam in *Reliquom* a ceteris disjungi, & accentum cadere in secundam. falsum igitur est quadrisyllaba hæc brevia SEMPER apud antiquos *primam acuere.* Hoc ipsum autem verbum dum Vir doctiss. per loca indicata persequitur, alio etiam exemplo se falli deprendit. Hecyr. enim IV. 1. 55. habetur hic versus.

Hoc mihi' unum ex plurimis mi-seriis *reliquum fecerat malum.* En hic MISERIIS, alterum nempe exemplum, ubi verbi brevis quadrisyllabi secunda habet accentum. Est quidem in Phædro, in ipso operis aditu, in ipso Prologo v. 7. exemplum ejusdem generis, licet viri doctissimi observationem videatur effugisse.

Fictis jocari nos me-minerit *fabulis.* Et in libris hunc sequentibus alia magno satis numero occurrunt, quæ omnia tibi apponam, ut certius scias, quomodo ROMANI *pronuntiarint.*

II. Prol. 9. *Sed si* li-buerit *aliquid interponere.*
1. 12. *Verum est* a-viditas *dives, & pauper pudor.*
3. 3. *Audierat esse quod* re-medium *vulneris.*
4. 23. *Quid multa?* in-edia *sunt consumpti cum suis.*
5. 6. *Cæsar* Ti-berius *quum petens Neapolin.*
III. 4. 2. *Inter* re-licuas *merces atque opsonia.*
7. 13. *Quanto est* fa-cilius *mihi sub tecto vivere.*
10. 8. *Narrabo tibi* me-moria *quod factum est mea.*
IV. 1. 15. *Alter* si-militer *periit, deinde & tertius.*
5. 5. *Duces*

5. 5. *Duces eorum qui* ca-pitibus *cornua.* LIB. I.
24. 2. *Dixi* su-perius: *quantus nunc illis bonos.*
12. *Accepit partem: quum* re-licuum *posceret.*
25. 14. *Fruar* di-utius, si ce-lerius *cæpero.*
V. 4. 12. *Paucis* te-meritas *est bono, multis malo.*

Ecce in hoc uno libello doctiss. viri observationem exemplis septemdecim everti; quibus ipse aliud addidit: ad IV. 4. 32.

Interpretari non po-tuerint *Attici:* Hæc exempla fecere; ut in Erratis ad Terent. moneat ad hunc locum, pro SEMPER legendum esse *plerumque*, & pro PERPETUUM, *pene perpetuum*. Ita in fumos abit recondita hæc observatio, unde sæculum hoc nostrum *rem magnam*, se nunc primum certo didicisse, sponsore tanto fretum credidisset. Sed ad hæc e Phædro exempla regeret Vir doctiss. se hoc de *Comicis* dixisse. Id vero pernego, de Antiquis generatim loquitur, & hic nobis indicat, quomodo Romani pronuntiarint. Comicorum quidem tantum meminit, quia hujusmodi verba quadrisyllaba nullum in Heroico vel Pentametro versu locum habent. Sed ne pergat contendere, se de iis tantum hoc dixisse, & uno atque altero excepto observationem in ceteris apud Comicos obtinere? Ecce exempla quædum e Terentio, quæ levi opera congessi, quæ observationem hanc falsam & temere factam planissime ostendunt.

Addd. Prol. 15. *Id isti* vi-tuperant *factum, atque in eo disputant.*
I. 1. 44. In'opia *& cognatorum neclegentia.*

2. 32. *Ubi' vis* fa-cilius *passus sim, quam in* ‖ *hac re me deludier.*
V. 6. 5. *Mea* Gly-cerium *suos parentes repperit. factum bene. bem.*
14. *Sequere hac me intus ad* Gly-cerium ‖ *nunc est. tu Dave abi domum.*
Eun. II. 3. 24. *Si qua' est* ha-bitior *paulo, pugilem esse* ‖ *aiunt: deducunt cibum.*
IV. 4. 4. *Quid huc* tibi re-ditio est? *quid vestis mutatio?*
V. 5. 26. Re'licuum? *tantum est. cesso huc introrumpere?*
Heaut. II. 3. 126. *Ut illius animum cupidum* in-opia *incenderet.*
IV. 1. 35. *Male docet te mea* fa-cilitas ‖ *multa. sed istuc quicquid est,*
Adelph. III. 3. 31. Pro'fugiet *aliquo militatum. o Demea,*
37. *Patris &* fa-cilitas *prava. fratris me quidem*
V. 4. 13. *Duxi uxorem; quam ibi* mi-seriam ‖ *vidi? nati filii.*
Hec. IV. 1. 55. *Hoc mihi' unum ex plurimis* miseriis ‖ *reliquium fuerat malum.*
Phorm. I. 4. 33. *Satin fic est? non. quid si sic?* pro‖pemodum. *quid si sic? sat est.*
III. 3. 33. *Qua via istuc facies? dicam in* i‖tinere: *modo te hinc amove.*
V. 3. 19. *Non temere dico; redi mecum in* me‖moriam. *satine sanus es?*
33. *Quid*

33. *Quid istuc negoti est? jamne* o-pe- LIB. I.
ruit ‖ *ostium? jam. o Jupiter.*

En totidem exempla ex Terentio, quot modo dedi e Phædro; unde videas quam periculosa sit his etiam in rebus definitio; perrarum enim est, ut subverti non possit: & quam facile tamen Vir doctiss. in universum de iis pronuntiet. In his autem exemplis duo sunt ex iis quæ ipse nominatim in contrariam partim profert, *Inopia* nempe & *propemodum*; tertium interpolavit, nullam aliam ob causam, quam quod observationis suæ veritati obstaret. sc. *itinere*. vides, inquit, accentum habere in secunda. Vel eam ob causam corrigo, *itere*. Et ut hanc emendationem magis speciosam redderet, in alio etiam loco, *itinere* mutavit in † *itere*, licet ibi accentus eam occuparet syllabam, quam

 ipse

† Mirabili prorsus argumento probat Vir doctiss. pro *itinere* legendum esse utrobique *itere*. Grammatici nempe docent, apud antiquos ab *Iter*, *Iteris*, ab *Itiner* dictum esse *Itineris*. Ergo nusquam *Itineris* dixit Terentius, quia ubique dixit casu recto *Iter*. Quo quid absurdius dici poterat? Ante Terentii ætatem, ut & post, in usu erant & *Iter*, & *Itiner*, a quibus in obliquo casu *Iteris* & *Itineris*. Ita vero demum evenit, ut in recto casu brevius nomen, in obliquis longius magis placuerit: unde factum est ut *itener*, vel *itiner*, & *iteris* obsolescerent, & in desuetudinem abirent. Et sic semper locutum esse Terentium ad Scriptorum Elegantissimorum normam, tum Grammatici veteres, tum Codices omnes clare ostendunt. Qua igitur ratione Vir doctiss. hic reponit *Itere*, quia Terentius in recto casu dixit *Iter*, eadem in omnibus quæ supersunt veterum scriptis, ratione, in obliquis casibus idem facere liceret; cum omnes in recto casu *iter* dixerint, si excipias Plautum & Lucretium, qui & *iter* habent & *itiner*, & paucula Fragmenta ex Accio, Pacuvio, Ennio, Varrone, quæ Grammatici nobis conservarunt.

LB I. I. ipse voluit, sc. primam. vid. ad supra locum laudatum Heaut. II. 3. 30. Potuissem his exemplis aliud addere ex Eun. IV. 3. 23.

At' pol ego amato res mu-lierum *esse* || *audieram eos maximos.*

Sed cum verba hæc varie in libris collocentur, & licet Faernus hoc elegantius putet, mihi tamen altera collocatio, *audieram* || *mulierum esse* melior videatur, & magnus sit in ea codicum optimæ notæ consensus, hoc exemplum urgere nolim, præsertim cum semper alias apud Terentium *mulieres* in trisyllabum contractum sit. Ad hæc autem exempla non pauca quivis, opinor, addiderit, qui Terentium eo animo relegerit. Sed hæc satis superque probant, quod probare instituera m. Et huic Phædri loco multum debemus, quod magnum Sæculi magistrum, quo in his errante erramus omnes, duplici se sese errore extricandi feliciter occasionem dederit. Sed de his fortasse plus satis: age, jam ad doctiss. viri Notas in secundum librum tandem accedamus.

LIB. II. *Exemplis continetur Æsopi genus.*

PROL. *Nec aliud quicquam per fabellas quæritur,*

1. *Quam corrigatur error ut mortalium.* In horum versuum primo nihil, opinor, sollicitandum, cum *Exemplis Æsopi* significentur *Fabellæ*, & locus ipse utrisque idem Phædrum voluisse dicere ostendat. In hoc tamen loco vitii aliquid latere mihi quidem compertissimum est, cum *genus* pro *humano genere* poni nemo persuaserit. præterea, ni fallor, aliud etiam vitii indicium manifestum est, quod hæc, prout nunc se habent, nimis brevia & abrupta sint.

Quod

Quod auctor dicere voluit, non intra unius versi- culi limites contineri potuit. Nihil igitur dubito, quin versus, qui secundus erat, casu quodam intercideri (quod & alias apud nostrum accidisse indubium est) cujus prima vox fuit *Humanum*; reliqua quæ fuerint, quis certo dixerit? sed ad hanc fere sententiam factum fuisse facile, opinor, concesseris. LIB. II.

Humanum, ne quid peccet imprudentia.

Et B. quidem sensit necessario reponendum esse *Humanum*, cui ut locum faciat, *Æsopi* ejicit; quod frustra explicare conantur, inquit ille, facinus est Librariorum aliud agentium. Dedit auctor,

Exemplis continetur humanum *genus*. Hoc est, *exemplis* potius *continentur* homines, reguntur, flectuntur, gubernantur, quam legibus aut præceptis. Qua explicatione, tota via, Vir doctiss. a mente Phædri aberrat, cui non in animo fuit generalem de *Exemplis* sententiam dicere, sed de unicis ÆSOPI *exemplis* loqui, ut utilissimis & ad vitam moresque hominum formandos egregie comparatis. *Æsopi* igitur necessario retinendum est, nec alia ratione locus sanari potest, quam alium, ut dixi, versum post primum inserendo.

Quicunque fuerit ergo narranti jocus. Codd. *Narrandi locus.* sed *l* pro *j* verborum initiis familiaris librariorum error, ut dixi ad I. 2. 16. Et facili quidem lapsu *narranti* mutatum est in *narrandi*. Burmanniana igitur haud dubie vera lectio est, quæ debetur Rittershusio & Frienshemio. Et sic doctiss. Grævius, fere puer, legendum vidit, nisi quod ille, *narrantis* pro *narranti*: quæ posterior lectio melior videtur & constructionis ratione, & 5.

Lib. II. ut vitetur *fiblius*, cum sequatur *jocus*. vide ipsum ad Cic. Famil. XVI. 21. ad quem remittit Burm. Sed hæc Bentleio neutiquam placent, ille reponit *narrandus*, quod tanquam e suo promit; sed hoc etiam a Guyeto, tacito ejus nomine, sublegit. Versu autem sequente pro *commendatur* ex Heinsio reponit, *commendetur*: sed nemini non præter Heins. alterum recte se habere visum est. Voluit nempe auctor dicere, jocos laudari solere, non quod hujus aut illius fuerint, sed quod *lepidi*, *faceti*, *urbani*; nec enim *frigidi* summorum virorum joci probantur, quod Ciceronem expertum esse nemo paulo humanior ignorat; quæ Grævii verba sunt.

10. *Dictorum sensus ut delectet varietas.* Ne ab hoc quidem loco, quamvis saniissimo, interpolando temperare potuit Vir doctiss. Repone, inquit, Diversum, *sensus* — quid quæso est, *aliquid interponere*, nisi addideris *diversum?* Ego contra contendo id satis innui ipsis hisce verbis *aliquid interponere*, & *diversum* frustra addi; & elegantius distingui post *interponere*, ut Prol. secundo, V. 1. post *inteeposuero*, sed ecce aliam a viro doctiss. allatam emendandi rationem! Quæ constructionis ratio sit, in ambiguo est; an *varietas dictorum delectet sensus*. an *varietas sensus dictorum delectet*, an *varietas delectet sensus dictorum?* Quid vero? an obtusa adeo nobis esse pectora vir doctiss. censet, ut vel leviter dubitemus, quænam ex his constructio eligenda sit? aperte dicam, secundam tertiamque esse absurdissimas, adeoque primam tantum veram esse posse. Quod vero impedire debebat virum doctiss. ne locum hunc tam fœde interpolaret, *Varietas* a

Phædro

Phædro nunquam absolute dicitur, sed in regimine, ut loquuntur Grammatici. LIB. II.

Distringit quem multarum rerum varietas. IV. 25. 3. & V. 5. 40.

Et copiosa abundat rerum varietas. ad quem modum hic dicitur *dictorum varietas.*

Bonas in partes, Lector, accipias, velim. 11.

Ita sic rependet illi brevitas gratiam,

Cujus verbosa nescit commendatio. Illi in secundo versu plane ostendit, in primo legendum esse *accipiat*, ut ad libri marginem annotaveram. Quod ad secundum, Codd. *Ita sic rependit.* Cum vero *Ita sic* manifeste mendosum sit, Heins. mutavit in *Ita, si*, cui accedit B. nisi quod *rependit* retineat, pro quo alii mallent *rependet.* Jac. Gronov. *Paci rependet*, quod nemini, opinor, arrisit. Scheff. *Sic ista tibi rependet.* Perizon. *Sic istam.* Gudius *Studio.* mihi vero, quod & Burmanno visum est, ne sic quidem locus integer videtur. Unde *sic* pedem huc intulerit, nescio; sed illo sublato, pro *ita* legendum putem *meritam*, quod compendio scriptum *mitā* facile in *Ita* deflexerit, prima litera ab ultima vocis præcedentis absorpta; *er* enim apice supra posito notare solebant, & *m*, finale præsertim, lineola appicta. hinc autem pulchra exurgit oratio. Bonas in partes hæc accipere Lector non fastidiat, pro qua ejus benignitate gratiam debitam, seu quam meruit, *brevitate* mea rependam. *Brevitate* se non exiguam a lectoribus iniisse gratiam plus semel noster dixit. Sic. IV. 25. 8.

Brevitatis *nostræ præmium ut reddas peto.* & V. 5. 45.

Si non ingenium, certe brevitatem *approba.* In

LIB. II. tertio versu pro *nescit*, *ne sit*, eruditi dudum reposuerunt, & hunc cum sequenti conjunxerunt. Ut in his nihil Bentleio proprium sit.

1. *Super Juvencum stabat dejectum Leo.* Hæc etiam B. interpolavit interponendo *ut* post *juvencum*.

12. *Verum est aviditas dives, & pauper pudor.* Pulcherrima sane sententia, & omnibus numeris absoluta. Sed aut fallor, inquit B. aut dedit auctor, *Verum* hodie *aviditas dives* EST, *pauper pudor*. Quis non reclamat? *fallitur*.

II. 2. *Ament, amentur, nempe exemplis discimus.* Ne tam gravis in feminas censura ab uno exemplo inclementius ducta videatur, *exemplis* dixit Phædrus, non *exemplo*. sic Codd. sed invitis iis B. reponit *exemplo hoc*, a qua interpolatione, opinor, abstinuisset, si animadvertisset in hac ipsa fabula exempla duo contineri, ne dicam Phædri perpetuum esse morem, ut articulum nomini præponat. *Hoc exemplum*, hoc *exemplo*, *hæc fabella*, *hæc fabula*. *hoc argumentum*. vid. I. 1. 14: 3. 3: II. 8. 27: III. 6. 10: 13. 16: IV. 2. 6: 3. 12: II. 7. 14: IV. 10. 14: 15. 7: V. 3. 11. quid quod vim suam amittere videtur *nempe*, si uni exemplo astringatur.

III. 6. *Cum scierint esse tale culpæ præmium.* Lege, inquit B. numeris mollioribus, *Cum* TALE SCIERINT ESSE *culpæ præmium*. Si quidem de Iamb. Græco ageretur, Emendatio hæc merito admittenda esset; sed Latini non tam de metro solliciti, ac de recta verborum collocatione. In eorum igitur scriptis ordo verborum non temere mutandus, nedum hic, ubi metrum se satis bene habet. Sed hoc videtur esse Viri doctiss. πρῶτον ψεῦδος in hujus generis scriptis recensendis, ut dum ad elaborata Græcorum

Græcorum exempla Romanorum versus refingendos censet, quidvis sibi licere putet: & si ex versibus asperis & incomptis venustulos comptulosque facit, egregie se defunctum arbitratur. Hinc tantus Correctionum numerus in Terentio suo quem toties fere corrupit, quoties emendasse sibi visus est. LIB. II.

Aquila in sublimi quercu nidum fecerat. sic III. IV. 1. 13. 1.

Apes in alta *quercu fecerant favos.* Quis non existimasset locos tam similes mutuo sibi subsidio satis munitos, contra interpolatoris manus? Sed ea viro doctiss. est emendandi libido, ut nec hic temperare queat, quo minus pro *sublimi* ingerat *suprema.* sic autem Græc. etiam Neveleti *Fab.* I. de Aquila. ὁ μὲν ἐν ὑψηλῇ πίτυϊ τὴν καλιὰν ἐπήξατο.

Aprum insidiosum, quercum vult evertere. Nimis cito, inquit B. *insidiosum* vocat, causa nondum reddita. corrige, *Aprum*, insidiosus *quercum*: quasi non criminantium natura esset rerum tempora prævertere, & eum, quem accusant, odiosis verbis importune incessere. Præterea Phædrus solet in cæsuris distinctionem ponere, non vero ante, nisi interroget. Duobus igitur nominibus hæc emendatio non videtur admittenda. 9.

Terrore offuso, & perturbatis sensibus. Legendum forte *Terrore offuso* huic C. sc. aquilæ) *& turbatis sensibus.* ut *v.* 15. Hunc *quoque terrore postquam complevit locum.* Heins. delet *&*, ut sit *terrore sensibus offuso.* 11.

Dolosa tuto condidit sese cavo. Codd. *toto*, quod mihi recte se habere videtur: *se toto cavo condidit* idem est, sed elegantius dictum, ac *totum se cavo condidit.* Se vero *totum cavo involvere*, subito & vehementi, quem simulabat *Feles*, timori bene convenit. quid 17.

vero

Lib. II. vero *tuto* velit, nescio. Heins. *noto*, atque id repo-
suit B. dicitque *cavernam esse qua pepererat*, cum
tutus cavus possit alius esse quicunque. sed quomo-
do hoc elicitur ex *noto ? num sibi noto ?* tum *noto*
idem erit ac *suo*. Sed quis *noto* hoc sensu dixit ?
quid autem, num *aliis noto ?* quid id ad rem,
utrum aliis *notus* sit necne ? quidni igitur retinea-
tur *toto ?*

23. *Quid multa ? inedia sunt consumpti cum suis.*
Felisque catulis largam præbuerunt dapem. B. con-
tra codices primo versu pro *sunt*, *sic*; in secundo
pro *Felisque catulis*, *Feli atque catulis*. sed multo fa-
cilius confeciset, si, primo versu intacto, pro *Feli*
atque reposuisset, *Felique & catulis*. qua ratione *Fe-*
li integre auditur, cum altera in monosyllabum co-
gatur, quod minus convenit, cum *Feles* sit prin-
ceps Fabulæ persona.

26. *Documentum habere stulta credulitas potest.* Heins.
Documentum hoc, quod arripit B. leviissimas quasque
emendandi occasiones misere captans, quasi nume-
ro, non pondere, labor ejus æstimandus esset. Sed
alibi ostendi hanc particulam Phædrum sæpe omit-
tere solere : & recte codices omissa illa se habere
ex eo liquet, quod metrum ipsum respuat.

V. 3. *Gratis anhelans, multa agendo nihil agens. Mul-*
tum egisti in versu penultimo, facit, ut hic legen-
dum putem, *multum agendo*.

4. *Sibi molesta, & aliis odiosissima.* legendum forte,
Et sibi, quod videtur elegantius.

10. *Prospectat Siculum, & prospicit Tuscum mare.*
MS. *perspicit*; Gronov. *respicit*. atque idem Hein-
sio placuit, quomodo & ipse ex conjectura repo-
sueram. Frons sc. villæ in fretum Siculum, ter-

gum

gum in Etruscum mare versum fuit. sed Guyetus, LIB. II. *despicit*, i. e. subjectum spectat, quod Bentleio etiam arrisit. sed alterum propius ad codices accedit, & *perspicere*, & *respicere* sæpe a Librariis miscentur.

Humum æstuantem, come officium jactitans. Codd. *jactans officium* COME. Hoc est, inquit B. cum a DCC annis diphthongus *ae* simplici *e* scribi *solitum* sit, *Comæ*. Interpretes *Come* acceperunt neutrum, a *Comis*; inde verborum ordinem immutarunt. Quis hæc legens non crediderit hoc esse viri doctiss. ἐνύπνια, alios autem interpretes nescivisse, *ae* diphthongum *e* simplici scribi solere? quod a vero tantum abest, ut omnes hoc proculdubio probe sciverint; sed cum non intelligerent, quomodo *Comæ* huic loco convenire possit, adjective sumendum putarunt, quod in MSS. invenerant, & cum adjectivi quantitas metro repugnaret, verborum ordine inverso, & *jactans* in *jactitans* mutato, reposuerunt, *come officium jactitans*. Hanc autem lectionem improbat B. quod nusquam alias appareat *come officium:* unde vero hoc constat? quia nempe in duobus locis quæ attulerat Scheff. non *come* officium, sed *omne* legendum contendit. Esto; num vero exinde sequitur, nusquam apud alios scriptores supersse lectionis hujus exemplum? Sed hoc quoque concesso, non hodie extare; certumne est nullas locutiones olim in usu fuisse in tanto librorum numero, qui jam diu perierunt, quia nulla earum vestigia habentur in illis qui supersunt? Forte autem fortuna accidit, ut apud Justinum etiam extet *officii Comitas*, l. 5. c. 2. *Cui se celeriter* OFFICII COMITATE, *& obsequendi gratia*

Lib. II. *tia insinuavit.* id quod Ardelio noster hic voluit. Quod si *officii comitas* dicatur, quidni & *officium come?* Sed hoc modo *officium come* relegato, in locum ejus vir doctiss. suffecit verbum nequaquam literis affine, nec sententiæ aptum, legitque *officium leve*, i. e. levem operam. Hæc ille.

Ut jam dicam quid ipse de loco vexato sentiam, *come* quidem displicet, non tantum quod metro repugnet, & interpretes cogat a codicibus nimium recedere; sed quod officio servili non bene conveniat. *Comitas* enim videtur ea esse animi benignitas, qua pares mutuas sibi tradunt operas, vel qua, qui superiori loco constitutus est, hominibus infra se positis amicitiæ vel humanitatis officia præstat. Servo vero nequaquam competit, ne dum servo, cui dominus est Cæsar. Sed nec *comæ* placet, cum non intelligam, quid sit *officium* COMÆ, vel *officiosa coma*, quomodo Ursinus hæc joco dici censet. Pro hac quidem lectione plurimum faceret quod dicitur *v.* 13. *cirris dependentibus*, si non de fimbriis extremis vestium assui solitis, sed de capitis cincinnis intelligendum esset. Ita quidem intellexit Pignorius de Servis. Per cirros, inquit, puerum cirratum intelligit Phædrus, ut loquitur Persius, qualem nobis exhibent imagines Antinoi, quem imperatoris Hadriani Atrienſem fuisse testatur apud Eusebium Hegesippus. In hujus Icones non omnino convenit illud Martialis, *mollesque flagellant Colla comæ*; cum sint neque promisso capillo, neque detonso, sed cirrato & leviter diffuso, quem *comæ* tenorem servant omnes Antinoi imagines. Ut ex his & Phædri carmine liceat suspicari, Atrienses perpetuo *cirratos* fuisse, neque aluisse

aluiſſe comam prolixam, neque attondiſſe eandem, LIB. II.
ſed longiuſculam fuiſſe in uſum cirrorum.

In hanc Pignorii ſententiam ivit Praſchius; eidem etiam accedit Burmannus. Et ſi hæc quidem vera eſſent, *comæ* hic de cirris intelligendum eſſe merito contenderent; & quod, *jactans officium comæ* eſſet officioſe jactans caput cirratum, dum magno ſtudio humum dextra lævaque irrigaret. Ut 7. 5. *collo jactans tintinnabulum.* Sed, cum præcedat *tunica ab humeris deſtricta*, CIRRIS ad tunicam non ad caput ſpectare, ideoque non *cincinnos* ſed veſtium *fimbrias* intelligi longe veri ſimilius; nec *dependentibus* recte dicitur, de cincinnis, niſi promiſſa coma dependeant, qualem non fuiſſe ſervorum comam Pignorius ipſe agnoſcit; nec in univerſum de Atrienſium cirris quicquam ex unius Antinoi iconibus certo colligi poteſt. Præterea, quod proxime ſequitur, *Sed deridetur*, non obſcure innuit *jactans* de verborum *jactantia* capiendum eſſe. Cum vero Atrienſem ipſum nulla jactatione uti, ſed tacite operi, in quo occupatus erat, aſſiduum incumbere circumſtantiæ loci ſatis doceant, quærenda lectio eſt, quæ hunc ſenſum fundat. Ea vero obtinebitur. ſi legamus, *jactat officium comes.* cujus ultima litera a prima ſequentis ſyllabæ abſorpta eſt. *comes*, i. e. quidam, quem Atrienſis ſibi comitem adſciverat, ut ineptam hanc ejus opellam inſpectantibus deprædicaret, atque ita demum vexatiſſimi hujus loci, vera, ni fallor, lectio eſt reſtituta. Cum hæc ſcripſeram, video in Hoogſtratani notis Ch. Waſium legendum putaſſe *jactans officium comes*, & exponere, *in ſacro comitatu præ cæteris jactantior*, ſed locum non adjecit, ut plenius ſciam,

quid

Lib. II. quid Wasius vellet; ex iis quæ dedit Hoogst. nullum opinor commodum sensum elici posse.

20. *Id ut putavit esse nescio quid boni. Id* abest a codicibus. quo dempto versus laborat; quem ut integrum præstemus, forte quatuor ultimæ literæ vocis præcedentis repetendæ sunt, & legendum,

Igitur *putavit esse nescio quid boni.*

22. *Donationis alacer certæ gaudio.* Hæc in mendo esse contendit Gudius, nec aures veterum poetarum lectione tritas duram latrantis syllabæ CER repetitionem ferre posse; *alacer* enim esse a Librariis, qui cum ultima in *alapæ* detritis aut fugientibus literis excidisset, primam syllabam sequentis vocis male geminarunt, & pro *certæ* dederunt *certe.* Hæc ille, acutissime quidem, & ni fallor, cum magna veri specie. Hac autem lectione admissa, *Alapa* erit quid *Donatione* minus: *certe* enim est *ad minimum, saltem*; quod magnam ultimis hujus fabulæ lucem affundit. Si enim *Alapa* non sit tantum, quantum *Donatio, alapæ* in postremo versu non erit *manumissio*, quod omnes hactenus fuisse censuerunt. Manumitti enim, seu libertate donari, non leve præmium, aut cum pecuniolæ donatione ullo modo conferendum; nec ob unam levem operam vel ab ardelione nostro facile sperari poterat. Neque vero *Alapa* pro colapho in pœnam aut contumeliam inflicto hic accipi potest; huic enim sensui locus ipse aperte reclamat, cum manifestum sit de præmio agi. Tertium autem nihil est, quod hac voce significetur, nisi ponamus *alapas* levi & amica manu ductas inter blandimenta fuisse, quibus, comi & faceto more, qui superior erat, quod alter officiose fecerat, lepideve dixerat,

sibi

sibi arridere gratumque esse indicaret. Talem vero *alapam* Cæsarea sibi manu allatam, non in nullo, opinor, pretio homo ineptus habuisset, etsi spes eum cetera frustrata esset. Tiberius vero, qui non modo pecuniæ parcus, sed tristi etiam & morosо ingenio fuit, hanc ardelionis operam, ne *alapa* quidem, quam ille forte incessu, vultu, gestu, sperare se ostenderat, ne dum *donatione* dignam putavit. Hæc loci obscurioris explicatio nullis, quod videam, premitur incommodis; cum vero prorsus nova sit, pro vera certaque nolim asseverare. LIB. II.

Tum sic jocata est tanti majestas Ducis :
Non multum egisti, & opera nequicquam perit. 23.

Multo majoris alapæ mecum veneunt. Jocata est, Excerpta Rigaltii ex codice Remensi. sed Editt. vett. *locuta est,* ex Pithœi, opinor, codice. Et sane nemo, prout hi versus nunc leguntur, *joci* aliquid subesse suspicatus esset, nisi Poeta disertis verbis ita dixisset. Quid enim hic lepide aut festive dictum est ? Sed mendum, ni fallor, subest, quod totius loci sensum non obscuravit tantum, sed plane sustulit. Pro *Non multum egisti,* legendum puto, *Tu multum egisti* ; quæ quidem bona verba sunt, & mercedis spem non inanem faciunt : *& opera* — hactenus omnia illi credulo bene procedunt. Sed sequentia, *nequicquam perit,* hominem enecant ; falso jam gaudio se duci sentit ; expectabat illorum loco, *mihi gratissima est,* aut aliquid ejusmodi. Tiberii jocus partim in eo consistit, quod altera versiculi pars alteram evertat ; partim in oppositione illa, quæ est inter hunc & sequentem. *Tu multum : sed multo majoris mecum*

cum

Lib. II. *cum* alapæ veneunt. Quantum vero salis hæc verba, *opera nequicquam perit*, habeant, ut intelligas, adeundus Macrobius Saturnal. II. 5. cum iis allusum videatur ad percelebre Corvi dictum, cui, cum Augustum transeuntem salutasset, Augustus aride respondit, *Satis* (mihi) *domi salutatorum talium*; Tum vero Corvus, *opera & impensa periit.* Sed locus ipse dignus est qui consulatur; Rigaltius enim non integrum dedit. Quid ipse de ultimo versu sentiam, dixi ad *v.* 22. Alii uno consensu *alapas* intelligunt de manumissione. B. vero de *colaphis* hoc modo: *Donationem*, inquit, id est, pecuniolam, expectabat servulus: Tiberius contra, nondum eum ob stultam & ingratam diligentiam *colaphos* meruisse, majoris eos apud se venire, non nisi ob graviora delicta solitum irasci. Si enim, ut alii, intelligas, *Vestram fidem! quomodo sodes jocatus est Tiberius, si tam triste & aridum responsum dederit?* Sic ille, dum jocum ibi quærit, ubi nullus est. Sed quod magis adhuc mireris, ad hanc suam explicationem firmandam adducit hæc Terentii ex Adelph. II. 1. 5.

Quamquam est sceleste, non committet hodie unquam iterum ut vapulet. Hæc Æschinus minitans, ad servum de lenone tum præsente; tam male, inquit, illum mulcavi, ut vix putem ausurum quicquam facere, quo novas plagas mereatur; non est igitur ut illum metuas, ——*numquam dum ego adero, hic te tanget.* Quam belle hæc conveniunt Tiberii Joco? quantum *quadrata rotundis.*

VI. 1. *Contra potentes nemo est munitus satis.* Recte, inquit B. sed & satis bene alter Codex, *Contra potentes nemo tutus est satis.* mihi vero hæc altera lectio melior

melior, quod sic ἐπιμύθιον fabulæ disertius conve- Lib. II.
niat.

Sic tuta *quæ naturæ fuerat munere.* adde quod 6.
tutus Phædro familiare est, sic 7. 13.———tuta *est hominum tenuitas.* & sic alias quater aut quinquies.

Nec ullo pacto lædi posset condita. B. concinnius hoc modo, *Pacto nec ullo.* Phædro autem aliter visum est, qui nec verba ista disjungi, nec *pacto* præponi voluit.

Gravi nequicquam te lassabis pondere. MS. Gudio 10.
teste, *lassabit*, quæ certe melior lectio, cum Jac. Gronov. doceat, *te lassabis pondere* non ullo facile exemplo defendi posse. nec plus uno contra attulit Burm. quod non prorsus ad rem quadrat. *Neuter longo se gurgite lassat.* Lucan. V. 466. ubi non tantum non agitur de *pondere*, sed nec de *hominibus*, sed de fluviis *Genuso* & *Apso.*

Qua comminuta, facile vescatur cibo. B. Repone. 13.
Qua comminuta, facili *vescatur cibo.* quam emendationem Vir doctiss. de suo dat, cum a Burmanno sublegerit. sic enim Burm. Puto, *facili vescatur cibo.* vid. quæ notavimus ad Petron. XCIII. sed mihi *facile* verior lectio, ut V. 3. 6. *Mecum* facile *redeo in gratiam*, non *facilem*; & sic sæpe alias. præterea, quid est *facilis* cibus, nisi cibus *parabilis?* quid autem hic loci habet, *parabili vescaris cibo?* Quod si nihil aliud obstaret, locutio nimis poetica pro hoc scribendi genere videtur.

Inducta verbis aquila, monitis paruit. Gronov. 14.
pro *verbis*, *veris*, Heinsius *monito.* Utrumque arripit B. & reponit.

Inducta VERIS *aquila* monito *paruit.* Sed Burm.

Lib. II. merito dubitat, an non præstet *verbis*, & alterius immutationis necessitas plane nulla est.

15. *Simul & magistræ large divisit dapem.* Burm. *largam*, ut 4. 24. *largam præbuerunt dapem*; cui accedit B. sed nec hujus emendationis vel minima est necessitas. quid enim? nonne recte diceretur *parce dividere?* recte igitur, & *large*, i. e. liberaliter. sed hoc, inquit B. *ingenio aquilæ non adeo convenit.* non igitur hoc quotidie & pro more consueto Aquila fecerit. nullone vero tempore grato aquilam animo fuisse existimat Vir doctiss.? ne tum quidem, cum tanto beneficio astrictus teneretur? Ego certe de hoc avium Rege mitius censendum puto.

VII. 4. *Ille onere dives, celsa cervice eminens,*
Clarumque collo jactans tintinnabulum. Meursius hic censuit aliquid deesse, sed nemo ejus sententiæ accessit ante Bentleium, qui *it* incommode inserit inter *celsa* & *cervice*, quod ex primo versu facile subintelligi viderunt omnes. si quid mutandum, mallem *eminet*, & *jactat.*

6. *Comes quieto sequitur & placido gradu.* B. auctor, nisi fallor, sic dedit, *Comes quietus.* quod si Phædrus dixisset *quietus*, nullus dubito, quin noster reposuisset, ut auctoris manum, *quieto.* sic enim Seneca & alii, *quietus placidusque.*

8. *Interque cædem ferro mulum trusitant.* Dum nempe mulorum custodibus ictus ingerunt, mulus in medio positus nonnullos excipit. MSS. *trucidant.* quod cum contra & metrum & sententiam peccet, Rigaltius acute reposuit *trusitant*, quæ & facilis & vera, opinor, emendatio. Vett. Editt. *tonsitant.* Meurs. *tunsitant*, vel *tuditant*, cui posteriori, ut recte

recte Faber, metri ratio repugnat. Heinf. possit Lib. II.
legi *fauciant*, vel credo scripsisse Phædrum, *incursitant*. B. priorem Heinsii conjecturam arripuit, & reponit *fauciant*. quæ hæc licentia! noli, inquit, dubitare, quin id dederit auctor. sed vides ne ipsi quidem Heinsio satis hoc arrisisse, cum & a codicum lectione nimis recedat, nec opus sit ut tum *ferro* addatur, cum *fauciant* id satis innuat.

Magnæ periclo sunt opes obnoxiæ. legendum opinor *magno*, ut supra, 4. 13. Magno, *inquit*, *in* periclo *sunt nati tui*, & 8. 18. Magno *in* periclo *vita vertetur tua*. *Opes* autem absque *magnæ* significat opulentiam, ut IV. 11. 1. Opes *invisæ merito sunt forti viro*. Quod si Phædrus voluisset *opes* Epitheto augere, non dixisset, opinor, *magnæ periclo*, sed *Periclo magnæ*, neque vero Epitheta tanto solet intervallo a nominibus sejungere. Vim autem hujus sententiæ aliis verbis sic extulit—V. 4. 8. *Periculosum semper vitavi lucrum*. vel, ut alii, *reputavi*. 14.

Ut venatorum fugeret instantem necem. *Necem venatorum*, i. e. *necem* a venatoribus inferendam. Plane ut Oppianus, φόνον ἀγελαίων dixit. sic Ritterfh. qui Oppianum edidit. & hanc lectionem nequaquam sollicitandam esse censet Burmannus, cum apud Livium pari fere modo *mulierum injuriæ*, & *legatorum injuriæ* sint injuriæ iis illatæ. Et sic apud Salust. *Pompeii metus*, quod *metueretur*. vid. Gal. IX. 12. Ut vero hæc Phædri illis Oppiani perfecte respondeant, *nex* idem valere censendum est ac *cædes*, ut dixi ad I. 1. 13. *Venatorum* autem habet etiam Anonym. Quid ad hæc Bentleius? *Ridiculum! necem venatorum* pro *a venatoribus*. *Ex-* VIII. 2.

LIB. II. *citatus* autem, a quo, vel quibus? Corrige & distingue,

A venatore, ut fugeret instantem necem. Miror hominem doctiss. non in partes advocasse illud ex l. I. 22. 1. *Mustela* ab homine *prensa, quum instantem necem Effugere vellet.* Quod si recepta lectio cetera sana sit, hic mallem *instantum* necem.

14. *gaudens ferus*

Bobus quietis agere cœpit gratias. i. e. tacitis, quod latitantem non prodidissent. Anonym. *Agebat gratias bobus quod fugientem celassent.* B. tamen reponit *quietus*, quo nihil certe invenustius. Si rythmum enim spectes, duo sic habes ὁμοιοτέλευτα; si constructionem, duo Epitheta uni substantivo adjuncta; si sententiam, cum *quietus*, ipso interprete, sit *securus*, *gaudens* id omne & plus eo in se continet. Exempla vero, quæ huic lectioni firmandæ affert, tam a re aliena sunt, ut pigeat excutere.

23. *Quantum est laboris?* Heinsius mallet, *Quanti*: quod arripuit B. sed nihil mutandum optime ostendit Burm. In priore autem versu post *stramenta desunt*, apponit B. notam interrogandi, in eo Schefferi judicio obsecutus. sed Burman. quem se sequi profitetur, aliique, plenam ibi distinctionem ponunt, quod videtur melius indignanti convenire.

EPIL. 1. *Æsopo ingentem statuam posuere Attici.* MS. *Æsopi*, unde Gudius, pro *ingentem*, *ingenio:* ingeniosa sane & acuta emendatio, quam amplexus etiam est Burm. & olim Hoogst. sed is postea ab ea recedendum putavit, & *ingentem* reposuit. recte, ni fallor;

fallor; *ingenio* enim alicujus *statuam ponere*, nullo, LIB. II.
quod sciam, exemplo dicitur. Nec in recepta lectione quicquam est absurdi; cum nemo sanus statuas omnes eadem fuisse apud Atticos magnitudine putarit. *Ingentem* vero ideo magis placet, quod eam vocem toties adhibeat Virgilius, quem noster lubens imitatur, ut nulla apud eum signantius aut frequentius occurrat. Sed audiamus Bentleium. Cur, obsecro, *ingentem?* an Colossum? nugæ. Respondeo, quia sic Atticis visum est: *ingens* autem *statua* non necessario *Colossus* est. Istud vero *Nugæ* & ad præcedentem fabulam *Ridiculum* sunt vere Bentleiana. Sed pergit. Codices, *Æsopi*, unde obvia & certa est Gudii emendatio. Sed non constat utrumque codicem *Æsopi* habuisse; & si haberent, uter facilior lapsus, *o* in *i*, an *io* in *tem?* Gudius quidem emendationem firmat ex eo quod Prol. III. 53. dicatur, *Æternam famam condere ingenio suo.* Sed egregie falsus est, si putavit *ingenio* esse tertii casus. famam *sibi* condiderunt, non *ingenio* suo; *ingenium* vero id erat, quo condiderunt.

Patere honoris scirent ut cunctis viam. Vet. Edit. *Cuncti.* Et ita Salm. Heins. Gronov. Gud. alii, ut mirer Burmannum non *cuncti* in textu posuisse, quod fecit Scheff. Jac. Gronov. Hoogst. pro *honoris* vero codices *homini*, unde Heins. inverso verborum ordine, *Patere* scirent nomini *ut cuncti viam.* Sed rectius, opinor, *honoris*, vel *honori* potius, cum *s* ex prima forte vocis sequentis litera huic adhæserit, male, ut sæpe fit, geminata. B. quasi nemo ante eum *cuncti* legendum esse vidisset, 3.

Lib. II. *Quinam isti, inquit,* qui scirent? Codices pro *honoris* habent *homini.* Repone,

5. *Patere* honori *scirent ut* cuncti *viam.*
Quoniam occuparat alter, ne primus forem,
Ne solus esset, studui, MS. *foret,* sed Salm. corrigit *forem,* & sic etiam Ritterſh. *Quoniam occuparat alter,* (id est, prævenit, antevertit me) *ne* ego *primus forem* (fabularum sc. inventor) *studui,* h. e. in id incubui, quod proximum erat, ne ipse *solus* esset fabulator. hæc Ritterſh. sed cum MS. *foret,* B. pro *ne primus,* reponit *ut,* quod ipsi multo elegantius videtur; cui emendationi ansam dedere hæc ex Plinii Paneg. 10. quæ adduxit Scheff. *Occupavit,* primusque *fecit, quod omnes facturi erant.* Sed altera lectio, opinor, melior, & levior mutatio; cum *occupare, ut primus ipse sit,* insolentior videatur locutio; *occupare,* ne alter sit, proprie dictum, & significet *occupando* facere, *ne primus sit.* Sed utro modo legas, parum refert. Nihil vero ad locum magis appositum, quam vetus illud elogium, quod adduxit Ritterſh.

Cicero effecit, ne Demosthenes esset solus orator;
Demosthenes, ne Cicero primus foret.

10. *Si livor obtrectare curam voluerit.* Scheff. scribendum putat *sin,* ut v. 15. *Sin autem,* & sic Gudius: accedit Bentleius.

12. *Si nostrum studium ad aures pervenit tuas.* Hæc clare, ni fallor, indicant, quædam ex hoc Epilogo intercidisse, cum, in iis quæ præcedunt, nemo nominetur, ad quem *tuas* referatur. Et vett. quidem Editt. lacunam præ se ferunt post v. 4.

13. *Et arte fictas animus* sentit *fabulas.* Sic Prol. III. 3.

Ut

Ut liber animus sentiat *vim carminis.* LIB. II.

Sin autem : ac illis doctus occurrit (Burm. occurret) *labor.* MS. *ab illis.* olim forte hic versus e librariorum manibus sic exiit. *Sin autem minus, ac illis doctus occurret labor.* Ut Prol. III. 31. 15.

Quem si leges, lætabor ; sin autem minus,

Habebunt certe, quo se oblectent posteri. Postea vero, qui hæc metro repugnare viderunt, cum vel *autem* vel *doctus* inducendum esset, ejecerunt *minus. doctus* enim abesse poterat, & *labor* absolute dici, ut *curam* v. 11. Scio quidem non deesse exempla, in quibus *Sin autem* idem est, ac *sin autem minus* ; tamen cum ea rariora sint, si liberum esset, mallem, deleto *autem*, legere *Sin minus :* pro *ab* vero reponendum *ac*, Schioppii conjectura est, cui adsensi sunt fere alii, vel pro *ac* scribi voluerunt *&*, cum eorum alterum sententia necessario videatur postulare. cetera vero, ni fallor, sana sunt. B. quidem cum videret Heinsium quoque hæc sollicitasse, qui inter alias conjecturas hanc libro suo adscripsit, *Sin autem doctus illis* arguitur *labor*, reponit,

Sin autem ab illis doctus obteritur *labor. Doctus* enim *labor*, inquit, est ipse hic libellus. Quidni igitur *occurrat*, qui publice venum exponitur ? Et ego a viro doctiss. viciissim quæro, quidni *perveniat ad aures ejus*, cui dedicari voluit v. 13. *occurrit* enim idem est ac *pervenit.* Sententia Phædri hæc plane est, Si ad te tuique similes pervenerint hæ Fabulæ, mihi beatus videbor ; sin minus, ac in illorum tantum manus devenerint, Quos —— Sed quid si libellus hic non publice venum exponebatur, sed privatim in plebem spargeretur, ut solent ejusmodi scripta, cum eos tangunt qui rerum sum-

LIB. II. mæ præsident? quis enim nescit Tiberii ministros, imprimis vero Sejanum, in his sæpe Fabulis notari, cum Phædrus ipse id aperte dicat Prol. III. 41?

17. *Nec quicquam possunt nisi meliores carpere.* ad hunc versum nihil alii. B. a mala manu insertum putat; syntaxis vitiosa, cum desideretur *Qui*. Qualis vero sententia? miserum & mirum genus hominum, qui nihil possunt nisi carpere. Numeri denique absoni sunt, nec in senario ferendi: abeat igitur, quo dignus est. Hæc ille. Quidni vero putemus versum, qui præcesserit, excidisse? Qui ad hunc forte modum fuit,

Qui scripta aliorum excipiunt cum fastidio. Sed hoc forte subsidio nihil opus est, neque enim Syntaxis hæc magis videtur vitiosa, quam illa Virgilii Æn. X. 593.

CUI *Remulo cognomen erat; Turnique minorem*
Germanam, nuper thalamis SOCIATUS *habebat.*

alter vero non video cur non ferri possit, cum secunda Ἰαμβικὴ Διποδία constet ex dactylo & anapæsto. si quidem scandatur per Trochaicam Διποδίαν, primus pes secundi Ditrochæi erit proceleusmaticus; sed si *nisi* inter legendum contrahatur in *ni*, vel *i* in *meliores* pronuntietur ut consonans, numeri bene procedunt. quod autem ad illud hominum genus, *nec miserum nec mirum magis*, quam eorum, *Qui, ut putentur sapere,* NIL NON *vituperant.* Sic enim Vir doctiss. versum illum reponi jubet. Quo jure, ad locum dicetur.

18. *Fatale exitium corde durato feram.* Cum *Exitium* nihil sit nisi interitus, vidit Gronov. id locum hic habere non posse; & *vitium* legendum putavit;

vit: ſed id, opinor, non unicum hujus loci men- LIB. II.
dum eſt; re enim altius perpenſa, *Fatale* non magis placet quam *exitium*. *Fatale* enim eſt dirum, lethiferum; nullus igitur dubito quin Phædrus dederit,

Talem exitum etiam *corde durato feram*. *Exit*[a] *etiam* ad *exitium* quam proxime accedit: *Talis* autem vocabulum eſt quod Phædro videtur vehementer placuiſſe. B. cui *Fatale* non diſplicet, pro *exitium*, reponit *eventum*. Reſtituo, inquit, ſuam auctori manum, Fatale eventum *corde durato feram*. Cic. de Aruſp. reſponſis *c.* IV. *P. ille Scipio, qui Carthaginem, quaſi* fatali eventu, *ſolus evertit*. Quid vero? Carthaginis fortunæ huc trahendæ? ad haſce nænias?

Urbem, quam dicunt Romam, Meliböe putavi,
Stultus ego huic noſtræ ſimilem. Sed quid faceret Vir doctiſſ.? Hoc unum locutionis hujus exemplum attulerat in Theſauro ſuo Stephanus; quod apud Ciceronem ſic ſe habet, *Etenim, ut P. ille Scipio natus mihi videtur ad interitum exitiumque Carthaginis, qui illam a multis imperatoribus obſeſſam, oppugnatam, labefactatam, pœne captam aliquando, quaſi* fatali eventu *ſolus evertit*; *ſic T. Annius*, &c. Hic de maxima re agitur, & tamen Cicero non dixit *fatali eventu* abſolute, ſed *quaſi fatali eventu*, id eſt, quaſi ita fatorum legibus ſtatutum eſſet. præterea *eventus* & *eventum* non prorſus idem ſunt, cum *eventum*, ſit ipſa res quæ evenit, *eventus* autem rei quæ evenit, exitus. Vides quam parum hic Ciceronis locus ad Phædrum faciat, & quam temere ſuam interpolationem pro ipſiſſima Phædri manu Vir doctiſſ. reponat.

Mo-

Lib. II. Prol. III. 5. *Momentum ut horæ pereat officii mei.* Legendum esse *officiis meis*, statim vidi, & ad marginem ascripsi; & jam video idem placuisse Heinsio, cui accedit B.

10. *Legesne, quæso, potius viles* nænias? Sic IV. 1. 3.

Sed diligenter intuere has nænias.

Nænias alii rectius *e* simplici scribendum putant: est autem proprie *nænia* carmen lugubre; cum vero illa carmina plerumque inepta essent & inconcita, ad frivola & puerilia significanda vox traducta est; & inde quoque est, quod *nugæ* eodem sensu usurpetur, cum proprie idem sit ac nænia; unde illud Plauti, Asin. IV. 1. 63.

Hæc non sunt nugæ; *non enim mortualia.*

20. *Quamvis in ipsa natus sim pæne schola.* Hanc quidem lectionem defendit Burm. sed rectius, ni fallor, Heins. *pene sim natus schola.* quod reponit B. tacito Heinsii nomine. & sic ipse ad libri marginem annotaram.

22. *Et laude invita in hanc vitam incubuverim.* Ad hæc B. Quid sit *laude invita*, quidve item sit *incumbere in vitam*, fateor me non intelligere. Gronovius *laude nuda.* Gud. *laude multa.* Heins. *Nec laude*——vel *Et laude invita in hanc vitam* haud *incubuerim.* quorum nihil quidem arridet. primo enim pro *invita in hanc*, legendum forte *in vitam hanc*, adeoque *vitam* delendum. *m* enim & *in* literarum ductu nihil differunt. Sic autem versui sua deerit quantitas. sed ipsa, ni fallor, sententia medicinam ostendit, quæ requirit *laudis studio*, aut aliquid ejusmodi, unde legi possit integer versus hoc modo,

Et

Et laudis studio in vitam hanc incubuerim. quam- LIB. III.
vis enim viro doctissimo non immerito displiceat, *incubuverim.* quod *cascum* & *Opicum* vocat, nescio tamen, an non in in voce πνπαυλλάζω licentia ista usi sint recentiores, ut tertiam a fine producerent, licet non scribendo *u* geminarent. Cur vero displiceat etiam ista locutio, *in vitam hanc incumbere*, non intelligo, cum idem sit ac *in hoc vitæ genus*, *in hæc studia*, *in hanc curam.* Incumbe *in eam curam & cogitationem*, *quæ tibi summam dignitatem & gloriam afferet*, dixit Cicero; & alias, *incumbere in studia*, in *rempublicam.* *Incumbe toto animo & studio in eam rationem*, *qua adhuc usus es.* Hæc & plura dabit familiaris ejus R. Stephanus. Sed alia etiam ratione hic versus emendari possit, quo & hæc licentia evitetur, & propius ad codices accedat, hoc modo,

Et solam ob laudem vitam in hanc incubuerim. Ex *m.* sc. in *laudem* & proxime sequentibus, *vitam in hanc*, factum est facili errore *invita in hanc.* Et hæc, nisi plurimum fallor, vera hujus loci emendatio est. Rarum vero in nostro modestiæ exemplum, ut in hisce literis fateatur quicquam esse quod non intelligat, cui simile in ipsius scriptis haud facile invenias, præter unum in Notis ad Nub. Aristophanis, *v.* 703. ubi ad hos versiculos,

Ταχὺς δ' ὅταν εἰς ‖ ἄπορον ἐμπέσῃς,
Ἔπ' ἄλλο πήδα ‖ νόημα φρενός. *De priore equidem*, inquit, *nihil habeo*, *quod dicam*, cum neque metri lex, neque ulla Antistrophæ ratio lucem hic affundat. Sed de posteriore pene constat mihi sinceram esse Suidæ lectionem, siquidem Scholiastes quoque totum firmat, & τὸ φρενός in ipso textu

Aldus

LIB. III. Aldus exhibet. Sinas me hic extra limites evagari paulisper, ut exiguam aliquam a doctiss. viro gratiam ineam, & dicam quales sint hi versus, & quæ metri lex. Sunt igitur ἀσυνάρτητοι, & constant ex Iambico Penthemimeri, sive Iambo & Bacchio, & συζυγίᾳ δοχμίῳ: quæ quidem δόχμιος συζυγία est metrum ex Iambo & Cretico, sive Bacchio & Iambo factum; ita ut alterum membrum alterius sit inversio. In horum autem primo posterior Iambi syllaba in duas breves resolvitur. hos autem versus esse hujus generis miror doctiss. virum non ex ipsa cæsura animadvertisse. alterum hujusmodi versiculum habemus hac ipsa in fabula, *v.* 1212.

Χ'οἱ δημόται ζηλοῦντες ἡ-

Νίκ' ἂν σὺ νικᾷς λέγων τὰς δίκας, quorum prius ἰαμβικὸν δίμετρον ἀκατάληκτον, (Schol. pro ἰαμβικὸν male habet ἰωνικὸν) alterum vero constat ἐξ ἰαμβικοῦ πενθημιμεροῦς, καὶ δοχμίου συζυγίας. quæ scholiastæ verba sunt. In Pluto versiculos duos dedit Aristophanes ex gemina dochmio συζυγίᾳ constantes, in quorum utroque Iambi longa in duas breves resoluta est, quos vir doctiss. non his magis intellexit. sunt vero hi, 639.

Ἀναβοάσομαι τὴν εὔπαιδα, καὶ

Μέγα βροτοῖσι φᾶνος Ἀσκληπιόν. Pro φᾶνος, quod non alias occurrit, alii codices φέγγος. Quod vero facit ut magis mirer, virum doctiss. hæc metra non intellexisse, *v.* 637. versiculus est constans ex puris δοχμίοις συζυγίαις.

Λέγεις μοι χαράν· λέγεις μοι βοάν. In his versibus explicandis cœcutiit plane Scholiastes. Et ut quod sentio

sentio dicam, indicia multa sunt in doctissimi Bentleii scriptis, quæ ostendunt ipsum etiam, at quantum virum! quamvis in re metrica tantum temporis ab ipsa usque pueritia posuerit, parum tamen sapere ultra hæc tria versuum genera, Iambicum dico, trochaicum, & anapæsticum. In rarioribus enim generibus & minus usitatis, quæ nempe constant pedibus plusquam quatuor temporum, gravissime eum falli video, & in iis quæ adduxit ad Tusculanas, & quæ novissime dedit ad Terentium; neque illorum carminum leges aut licentias percepisse. sed de his dicendi non hic locus est. redeo igitur ad Phædrum. Des tantum veniam, ut priusquam a Pluto discedam, mendum in propinquo tollam quod doctissimi viri acumen fugit. *v.* 521. hæc habentur. LIB. III.

Ἔμπορον ἦκον ἐκ Θετταλίας φησὶ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΩΝ ἀνθρακοπλίσων. Pro φησὶ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΩΝ, certissima emendatione reponendum παρ' ἀπίσων. ἀπίσιος nomine infames fuisse Thessalos docet Scholiastes, quod Eruditi tamen non animadverterunt, quia non dicitur in Scholio ad hæc verba φησὶ πλείσων sed in eo quod proxime præcedit.

Servitus obnoxia. Nisi quædam exciderint post *v.* 37. *Servitus* hic est Æsopi *servitus.* 34.

Ego porro illius semita feci viam. Burm. non *semita* sed *semitam*, quæ conjectura est Scheff. MSS. *Ego illius* PO *semita.* unde Gudius, *Ego illius pro semita feci viam.* eo sensu quo Martial. VII. 61. 38.

Et modo quæ fuerat semita, facta via est. Gudium sequitur B. Jac. vero Gronov. *Ego illius* post *semita feci viam* cum PO in MSS. non semper sit

porro,

Lib. III. *porro*, sed etiam *post*. atque hanc lectionem amplexus est Hoogstratanus.

41. *Quod si accusator alius Sejano foret.* Hoc primum loco de Sejano aperte Phædrus loquitur; unde conjicere est hunc tertium librum scriptum esse Sejano jam damnato; duos vero priores, dum ille apud Tiberium gratia floreret. Damnatus autem Sejanus est Tiberii anno decimo octavo, a quo ad tertium Claudii, cum Seneca putatur Consolationem ad Polybium scripsisse, anni sunt duodecim. Quo tamen tempore Seneca videtur Phædri Fabulas neque vidisse, nec de iis quicquam inaudivisse. Sic enim ille c. xxviii. *Non audeo te usque eo producere, ut fabellas quoque & Æsopeos logos, intentatum* Romanis ingeniis *opus, solita tibi venustate connectas.* quomodo enim hæc illi excidere potuerunt, si Phædri fabulas legisset? respondetur quidem ad hoc, quod Phædrus Threx fuerit; quid vero, nonne ille tam *Romanus*, cum Romæ & Latine scriberet, quam Polybius, quem nomen ipsum *Græcum* fuisse satis indicat? nonne Phædrus ipse se pro *Romano* habuit? quid aliud sibi volunt quæ dixit Epil. II. 8? *Quod si labori faverit* Latium *meo, Plures habebit, quos opponat* Græciæ.

51. *Rem me professum dicet fors aliquis gravem.* Codd. *forsan aliquis*. quod cum versui repugnet, Heins. maluit retento *forsan* legere *quis*. cui accedit B. quod melius, ut vitetur accentus in ultima τῶ *aliquis*. quid quod nec *fors* nec *aliquis* alias apud Phædrum occurrunt.

52. *Si Phryx Æsopus potuit, Anacharsis Scytha.* Hic iterum errat B. in citando Burmanni textu. ille enim,

enim, *si Anacharsis.* locus vero est vexatissimus. LIB. III.
MS. *Frigem fuisse Æsopum, si Anacharsæ Scythæ,* Gudius. Neveletus vero (pro lectione Pithœani codicis, opinor) editioni suæ apposuit, *Frige fuisse Æsopus Anacharsæ Schythæ.* quas lectiones prorsus inter se convenire videbis, si pro *Æsopus* legas *Æsopu, si.* excidit utique i. *m* vero post *Frige* & *Æsopu* lineola supra posita notatum fuisse credibile. Quod cum ita sit, miror doctiss. viri negligentiam, qui affirmat codices habere

Phryge fuisse Æsopus POTUIT, *Anacharsæ Scythæ.* Cum *τὸ potuit*, nec vola, nec vestigium sit. unde ille tamen pro vera loci lectione temere prorsus hanc reponit,

PHRYGIBUS *si Æsopus potuit, si Anacharsis* SCHYTHIS. Si unus ex codicum lectione versus constituendus sit, magis ad eam accedit hæc lectio,

Phrygi licuit si Æsopo, si Anacharsi Schythæ. Sed altius, ni fallor, hic mendum latet. Cur enim Phædrus versu præcedente dicit,

Rem me *professum dicit forsan quis gravem*, ubi emphasis est in *me?* cur hoc *illi* præ aliis *grave* fuerit? præterea, qui nexus inter hos duos versus? quomodo ab instituto suo enarrando confestim transit ad barbaros homines, Æsopum & Anacharsin? Ratio, opinor, cur hoc *grave* illi diceretur, fuit, quod ipse *barbarus* esset. Cui objectioni sequentibus optime respondetur. Pauca igitur verba hic excidisse crediderim, quæ forte hæc fuere. *Barbarie in media qui sum natus.* Et totum locum sic reponendum,

Rem me professum dicit forsan quis gravem,

BARBARIE

LIB. III. BARBARIE IN MEDIA QUI SUM NATUS: AT *Phrygi*

Fuit si fas Æsopo, si Anacharsi Scythæ
Æternam famam condere ingenio suo:
Ego, literatæ qui sum proprior Græciæ,
Cur somno inerti.——Si non ipsa Phædri verba assecutus sum, at a sententia ejus ne hilum quidem, opinor, aberravi; nec dubito, quin verissime reposuerim omnia a *Phrygi* ad *Scythæ*. facili enim lapsu *se* pro *si* scriptum est, & *Phrygē* pro *Phrygi*. Exempla ubique obvia, cum sequioribus seculis, *i* & *e* eodem fere sono efferrent. Hac vero occasione liceat mihi utriusque erroris exemplum ex *Patrum* scriptis afferre, & duo in iis nobilissima loca emendare, quorum in altero, *si* pro *se*, in altero vero *i* pro *em* reponendum. Prius est in Tertulliani libro contra Marcion. IV. *c.* 25. "*Omnia* "*sibi tradita dicit a patre.* Credas, si Creatoris est "Christus cujus omnia; [*i. e.* credas omnia "Christo a patre tradi, si filius est creatoris, cujus "sunt omnia] *quia non* MINORI SE *tradidit omnia* "*filio Creator.*" Nullus ex his sensus commodus elici potest, nulla ratio, cur credatur creatorem omnia Christo tradidisse. Pro *minori se* certissime legendum, *non mirum si.* [Credas jam omnia a Creatore Christo tradita fuisse, si quidem ipsius *filius* sit; tum enim nihil est in hac traditione quod cuiquam mirum videatur.] *Credas, si Creatoris est Christus, cujus omnia; quia non* mirum, si *tradidit omnia FILIO Creator, quæ per eum condidit, per sermonem suum scilicet.* alter est Novatiani locus *c.* 31. "Quoniam aliquo pacto antecedat necesse "est eum qui habet originem (sc. Christum) ille,

"qui

" qui originem nescit ; *simul ut hic* (nempe Chris- LIB. III.
" tus) minor *sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens*
" *originem quia nascitur*, & PER PATREM *quo-*
" *dammodo, quamvis originem habet — dum ex eo*
" *patre qui originem solus non habet nascitur.*" Pro *per patrem*, quæ manifeste corrupta sunt, legendum, *Par patri.*

Simul ut MINOR *sit — habens originem*, & PAR PATRI *quodammodo, — dum ex eo patre, qui originem solus non habet, nascitur.* Hæc, ni fallor, verissima loci hujus restitutio est, quam tibi non ingratam fore confido, qui Studia Theologica, quantum officii ratio patitur, humanioribus literis libenter admisces. Est quidem aliud grave mendum in hoc Novatiani loco, quod jam mitto, ne Phædri oblitus videar.

Cur somno inerti deseram patriæ decus ? Ex eo 55.
quod hic dicatur *deseram*, Vir doctiss. contendit se recte reposuisse *v.* 52. *Si Æsopus*, inquit, *Phrygibus, Scythis Anacharsis*, uterque patriæ suæ barbaræ famam & decus contulerunt, cur non & ego patriæ meæ idem facere possim ? Sed hoc, opinor, non id est quod voluit Phædrus. ille non dixit Æsopum & Anacharsin patriis suis, sed sibi, quamvis barbari essent, & nemo suorum adhuc ingenio gloriam aliquam reportasset, *æternam famam* condidisse ; cur igitur ipse, qui non e tam barbara gente, sed ex ea quam Linus & Orpheus nobilitassent, patriæ decus desereret ? Sed pro *deseram* legendum puto *deteram*, ut Horat. 1. 6.

Laudes egregii Cæsaris & tuas,

Culpa ingenii deteram ; & sic video conjecisse Heinsium, & illi videtur accedere Burm.

Lib. III. 58. *Qui saxa cantu movit, & domuit feras.* B. præmera corrigendi libidine, *edomuit.* aliquanto, inquit, est concinnius, id quod ab auctore erat.

61. *Quoniam mihi sollemnis debetur gloria.* B. numeri absoni sunt; nec quid *solemnis gloria* sibi velit, capere possum. Dedit, ut fateberis, auctor, *Quoniam* perennis *mihi debetur gloria.* Notum illud Nasonis,

Carmina quam tribuent, fama perennis erit. Hoccine vero est Phædrum emendare, loco vocis non intellectæ, aliam ponere, quæ nihil ad rem, quod ea usus sit Ovidius? non tam levi brachio locus hic expediendus. MS. *Quoniam mihi solemnis.* Frienſh. putat Phædrum scripsisse, *Quod jam — detur.* Scheffer. pro *debetur*, *dabitur.* non enim gemit *livor deberi* gloriam, sed *dari.* Quid vero sit *solemnis*, nemo facile dixerit. Ego quidem vix dubito quin pro *solemnis*, reponendum sit, *similis illis.* Et totum versum sic legendum,

Quum jam *mihi* similis illis dabitur *gloria. illis* sc. quos primus memorarat; Æsopum puta & Anacharsin, vel forte Linum & Orphea.

I. 2. *Adhuc Falerna fæce e testa nobili.* Burm. *Fece.* prius legebatur *& testa.* Gudius *e testa*, quæ mihi nondum lecto Gudio certissima visa est emendatio. Et sic reposuit Hoogst. Facillimus certe hic Librarii lapsus *et* pro *e* ponere, cum vox sequens a *t* incipiat. Bentleius, *Adhuc Falerna* e *fæce & testa nobili.* sed cur ita corrigat, ne verbo quidem dixit, hoc *iis relinquens, qui post se sua probabunt.*

5. *O suavis anima, quale in te dicam bonum.* Hoc a Gudio est. vetus lectio erat, *qualem te dicam bonam*; quam lectionem retinendam puto, si postrema litera

tera inducatur, & legatur *bona!* Quod & Fabrum velle video. Gallicus Interpres sic, *Et combien chere Cruche, dois je croire, que tu as etè excelente autrefrois, puisque tes restes sont si agreables?* i. e. *Qualem te dicam mea amphora.* Rigalt. ad hæc, *blande compellat Amphoram.* Burm. revera Amphoram alloquitur. His accedens B. quod anus *Amphoram alloquitur*, pro *bonam* reponit *Amphora.* LIB. III.

Panthera imprudens olim in foveam decidit; II. 2.

Videre agrestes; *alii fustes congerunt*; Primo, inquit B. repone *ingerunt. Ictus, plagæ* congeruntur. *Saxa, tela, fustes, pugni* ingeruntur. Et verum quidem est recte dici, *saxa, tela, pugnos* ingeri, quæ exempla viro doctiss. ut solet, suppeditavit R. Stephanus. sed & *saxa* quoque *congeri* dixit Seneca, Oedip. IV. 3. 871.

CONGERITE *cives* SAXA *in infandum caput.* quod exemplum viro doctiss. ante oculos erat a Scheff. allatum. Quidni igitur & *Fustes congerantur?* sed quid Senecam afferimus? ibi quoque, si novi hominem, *Ingerite* legendum dicet. Sed ab hoc loco discedere noluit Vir doctiss. antequam alio quoque modo interpolarat, ingerendo *ut* in primo versu post *foveam.*

Usu peritus hariolo velocior. i. e. ingenio *velocior*, 1. quod mihi quidem durius videtur. ideoque, si per codices liceret, libenter legerem, *solertior*, ut IV. 4. 48.

Ita quod multorum fugit imprudentiam,

Unius hominis repperit solertia. Et sic legi posse visum est Heinsio.

Habenti cuidam pecora peperierunt oves. B. Repone, *alenti:* quamobrem? quia Terent. And. I. 1. dixit, *equos alere.* De quo vero dicit id Terent.? 4.

Lib. III. rent. ? non de homine, cui opes *equi* erant, sed de adolescente, qui non pro aliorum more, canes aut equos sibi *ad venandum* cum cura & studio *aleret*, quod plerique tum solebant.

10. *Et insitivos significari liberos. Significari* forte e margine irrepsit, & legendum *indicari*.

13. *Hominisque curam cura majore adgravant.* B. dedit auctor, *Hominique*. unde id constat?

IV. 1. *Pendere ad lanam quidam vidit simium.* B. pro more suo post *quidam* inserit *ut*, sed hic illi præivit Heinsius, quem tamen non nominat.

5. *Ridicule magis hoc dictum quam vere æstimo.* MS. *Ridicule hoc dictum magis.* quæ lectio si recipiatur, pro *magis* scribendum *mage*, & pro *æstimo*, *existimo*. quod reponit B. cum *æstimo* in hoc sensu inferiorum, inquit, ætatum sit. sed doctiss. Munkerus in dissertatione de Hygino ostendit ex Salustio & Attio veteres etiam, licet rarius, *æstimo* hoc sensu usurpasse. Attii versus apud Festum in *Probrum* hic est.

Qui nisi probrum, omnia alia indelicta ÆSTIMANT.

Sed & Phædrus ipse IV. 17. 15. Turpe *æstimantes*. Cum vero simplicibus pro compositis uti amet, & in codicibus sit *magis*, non *mage*, quod frequens quidem apud Comicos, sed extra eos haud facile invenias; bis nempe occurrit in Lucretio, in Propertio ter, semel in Virgilio, in Ovidio semel, in reliquis poetis, quod sciam, ne semel quidem. hæc faciunt ut putem receptam lectionem servandam, vel legendum,

Ridicule dictum magis hoc, *quam vere æstimo*. B. quidem, ne Phædrus in hac causa sibi testis advocetur, mutavit *æstimantes* in *autumantes*, & eodem modo,

modo, procul dubio, Attii & Saluſtii exempla de- LIB. III.
formari vellet. cum tamen illa voce nullus, quod ſciam, Poeta uſus ſit a Plauto uſque ad Senecam, niſi Horat. ſemel. Serm. II. 3, 45. Sed nec in illis hac forma occurrit, neque eſt vis ejus prorſus eadem. Quo teneas nodo?

Succeſſus ad perniciem *multos devocat.* MS. V. 1.
ſæpe multos. ſæpe veriſſime dixit Heinſ. eſſe variam lectionem. Sed B. pro ſummo ſuo acumine ex *ſæpe multos* extudit *ſtultos*, quod æquo jure ſi verſus pateretur, reponere poterat, I. 20. 2.

Sed ad perniciem *quoque mortales* devocat. Sed *ſtultos* ait vir doctiſſ. factum eſſe ex *ſæpe multos* compendio ſcribendi: utinam dixiſſet quale id compendium eſſet, ego enim tam tardus ſum, ut divinare nequeam.

Æſopo quidam petulans lapidem impegerat: 2.
Tanto, inquit, melior. Hic quoque B. importune *ut* ingerit ante *quidam.*

Quam tarda es? inquit. non vis citius progredi? VI. 2.
Mira profecto ſunt, quæ hic B. *ſi* TARDA ES, *legis, dicis mulam tardigradam, ſive naturaliter inceſſu tardam.* Quid vero, num ille hoc dicit, qui tantum interrogat, aut increpat? ſed pergit Vir doctiſſ. Cur igitur ait, *non vis?* cum *tardam* tarde incedere, non voluntatis ſit, ſed neceſſitatis. reponit igitur, *Quam tarde is?* Et ingratum ſonum efficit *is——vis.* Quid vero Terentio faciemus? Heaut. IV. 5. 28. *vah quam tardus es?* At Romulus in hac fabula, *Quam tarde ambulas?* quid ſi? Anonym. quidem Phædri verba plurimum ſervat; non ita Romulus. Sed pone alteram lectionem meliorem eſſe, num e ſuo penu reponit Vir doctiſſ.? Audi-

Lib. III. amus Gudium. MS. Remense *Quam tarde, inquit,* an, *quam tarde is, inquit.* sed retineo potius vulgatam.

3. *Vide, ne dolone collum compungam tibi.* B. *dolone hoc,* inficete.

6. *Jugum flagello temperat lento meum,*

Et lora frenis continet spumantibus. In secundo versu Codd. *lora*; Praschius, *ora frenis,* idemque vult Grævius, ad Hesiod. *c.* XVII. utrumque eo, opinor, induxit illud Horatii, Od. I. 8. *Gallica nec lupatis Temperat* ora *frenis.* atque hanc lectionem reposuit Burmannus, non & *lora* quam pro *Burmanniana* dedit B. sed, ni fallor, *jugum* in priore versu ostendit *lora* recte se habere. Quam bene Juga & Lora conveniant, ostendunt illa Virgilii Æn. V. 146. *Nec sic immissis aurigæ undantia* Lora *concussere* Jugis, *pronique in verbera pendent.* *Ora* quidem *temperat, coercet, torquet, ligat,* dici Grævius ostendit; sed *ora continet,* nemo, quod sciam, dixit. frequens vero esse, *lora tenere, corripere, remittere, loris uti,* docuit Gudius. Bentleius vero, ut hanc correctionem tueatur, *sic,* inquit, *utrumque versum refingo.*

Tergum *flagello temperat lento meum,*

Et ora *frenis continet spumantibus.* cum dicere debuerat, sic refingendum censuit Burmannus. Sic enim ille, *jugum,* dici, *temperare,* ut Horatio, *ora frenis,* vix posse puto. Quare corruptum locum (puto) & considerandum do, an non forte legendum sit,

Tergum *flagello temperat lento meum.* Quam pudendum hoc & ingenuo homine indignum, tam aperte furta facere, & aliorum emendationes ante omnium oculos positas sibi perfricta fronte arrogare?

Namque

Namque ubi ſtrigandum eſt, & ubi currendum, ſcio. LIB. III. MS. *Nam ubi tricandum, & ubi currendum eſt,* 9. *ſcio.* hoc poſitu *eſt*, ut ex MS. bis citat Gudius, p. 215. & p. 283. & ſic editt. vett. *Tricæ*, teſte Nonio, ſunt impedimenta, a *tricis* autem *tricari*, quod ſignificat λαγγάνειν, ἴχνεῖν in Gloſſ. Philoxeni. & *intricare* eſt *impedire*. Et hanc lectionem reponit B. ſed movet me tot Eruditorum auctoritas, qui Gruteri emendationem amplexi legunt *ſtrigandum*, ut ſaltem de eo dubitem, cum quantum video, *tricari* & *tricæ* in malam tantum partem accipiantur. hæc ipſa vox de *mula* uſurpatur in Catalectis Virgilianis.

Et inde tot per orbitoſa millia
Jugum tuliſſe, læva ſive dextera
Strigare mula, *ſive utrumque cæperat.* Et Senec. Ep. 31.

Ad honeſta nitentes, quanto magis incubuerint, minuſque ſibi vinci, ac ſtrigare *permiſerint, admirabor, & clamabo, tanto melior, ſurge, &* reſtriga (legit Scaliger, codd. *reſpira) & clivum ipſum uno, ſi potes, ſpiritu exſupera.* quem locum attulit Faber. Quod ad cetera hujus verſiculi, cum lectionem MS. duplici mendo laborare putarent eruditi ratione metri, pro *nam* repoſuerunt *namque*, & verborum ordine mutato, *ſtrigandum eſt, &.* cum multo & facilior & melior medicina fiat mutando *eſt* in *ſit.* Sic enim ſecunda in *currendum* acuetur, ut in *ſtrigandum*, quod longe venuſtius, quam ſi accentus duplex in idem verbum cadat, in primam ſc. & tertiam, quod in triſyllabis ſedulo vitandum, niſi media ſyllaba brevis ſit. Hac vero emendatione admiſſa, altera nihil opus eſt: metrum enim con-

Lib. III. stabit secundam in *ubi* producendo. & sic numeri ni fallor, ad rem magis erunt accommodati; tarde nempe procedent, *ubi strigandum*, celeri autem pede, *ubi currendum*. B. quidem reponit, *Nam & ubi tricandum, & ubi currendum* sit, *stio*. Ut *ubi* utrobique accentum habeat in prima, sive, ut ille loqui amat, *Ictum*: (de qua voce mox videbimus.) *hoc enim in repetitione*, inquit, *venustum*, &, ad 1. 29. 7. *hoc in repetitione attendi solet*, & hujus gratia multa Terentii loca pro arbitrio immutavit, cum tamen longissime absit, ut hoc Poetæ constanter fecerint. In omni Poetarum genere in utraque lingua, nullo negotio inveneris in contrariam partem exempla. En unum ex Tibullo II. 3. 27, in UBI, *Delos* ubi *nunc Phœbe tua est?* ubi *Delphica Pytho?* sed non jam vacat congerere exempla. addam tantum e Græcis γνώμην unam, quam si Vir doctiss. in animo habuisset, cum ad Phædrum scriberet, notæ ejus, ut ut nunc breviss imæ, adhuc tamen breviores multo fuissent.

Ἢ λέγε τὸ σῳῦς κρεῖττον, ἢ σγὴν ἔχε. ubi σῳῦς accentum habet in prima, σγὴν in secunda, vel ut cum Bentleio loquar, *Ictum*. Horatius nempe de Trimetro Iamb. dixit, *cum senos redderet* ICTUS. Art. Poetic. 253. Hinc *ictus* viro doctiss. in Schediasmate de metris Ter. est accentus quo longa Iambi syllaba tollitur, sive acuitur, qui inde "Ἄρσις "etiam sive *Elevatio* appellatur, quod in iisdem "syllabis, quibus Tibicen pedem accommodabat, "Actor vocem acuebat ac tollebat. In Thesi autem sunt ceteræ syllabæ, quæ ictu destitutæ minus idcirco audiuntur. Hos ictus sive Ἄρσεις, "magno discentium commodo, nos primi in hac

"Editione

"Editione per accentus acutos expressimus." Hoc vides magnum esse hujus Editionis arcanum: in his tamen nihil non falso & absurde dictum est. *Ictus* enim, sive *Percussio*, qua voce Cicero & Quintilianus hac in re utuntur, non est *accentus*, nedum Ἄρσις, sed dimensio per digiti vel pedis motum totius temporis sive intervalli, quod pedi integro pronunciando insumitur: Ἄρσις vero & Θέσις, i. e. pedis vel digiti *sublatio* & *positio*, sunt duæ percussionis partes. Hinc Diomedi *Pes* est sublatio ac positio (non vocis intentio & remissio) duarum aut plurium syllabarum spatio comprehensa: vel poeticæ dictionis duarum ampliusve syllabarum cum certa temporum observatione modus, recipiens ἄρσιν & θέσιν, id est, qui incipit a sublatione & finitur positione. Et exinde in Iamb. prior syllaba in *Arsi* seu *sublatione* esse dicitur, longa vero in *Thesi* seu *positione*. Ἰαμβος, inquit Aristides, ἐξ ἡμισείας ἄρσεως καὶ διπλασίου θέσεως. Quod si Iambicus, ut trimeter, spectetur, & proinde sex illius pedes tres tantum habeant percussiones, pedes impares in *arsi* sunt, pares in *thesi* Hæc, opinor, latius deducent, qui doctissimi viri Schediasma sibi excutiendum sumserunt. Sed hæc pauca satis ostendunt virum doctiss. de *Ictu*, *Arsi* & *Thesi* ne verbum quidem dixisse, in quo non turpiter erraverit. Usque adeo Lectores suos, pro stupidis & bardis, pro ἀμούσοις & ἀναλφαβήτοις habet, quibus quidvis imponere in his reconditis literis sibi licere, secure confidit. LIB. III.

Quam dulcis sit libertas, paucis proloquar. Anonym. etiam *dulcis*, sed B. dedit auctor *dulce*. Hoc nempe viro doctiss. venustius videtur. cui si oppo- VII.

nas

LIB. III. nas V. 541. *Sed temperatæ* SUAVES *sunt argutiæ*, regeret, ibi legendum *suave*. Quid hoc homine facias?

3. *Forte occurrit. salutantes dein invicem*
Ut restiterunt, unde sic, quæso, nites? Ipsa numerorum inconcinnitas ostendit, priorem versum in mendo esse. MS. *dein salutantes invicem.* Unde facile veram hujus partis lectionem eruas. *dein* SALUTANT SE *invicem*, duabus ultimis literis in *salutantes* inversis. Sed tum versui deest syllaba; facillima emendationis ratio quæ mihi succurrebat, erat ut legamus pro *occurrit*, *occucurrit*. cum enim tot alia composita a *curro* præterito servent augmentum, cur non & *occurro?* Sed si id se tueri exemplis nequeat, legerem *occurrebat*. *Guyetus*, *occurrit forte*, sed *forte* non solet post verbum collocari. B. parum sollicitus de exemplis reponit, *occucurrit*. sed mira est, quam dedit, posterioris partis emendatio.

—— *dein* SALUTANS, *invicem*
Ut restiterunt. Ut invicem restiterunt, uterque se simul: ne cane progrediente, frustra lupus hæc loqueretur nullo audiente. Qualis hæc ratio? nonne *restiterunt* absque *invicem* clare indicat utrosque restitisse? Alterum vero, *se salutant invicem* cuivis se probaverit, qui solet *salutantes* resalutare.

13. *Quanto est facilius mihi sub tecto vivere,*
Et otiosum largo satiari cibo? B. cur quæso, *facilius?* quod tam dura lege conceditur, ut lupus conditionem recuset. Quid autem agebat Vir doctiss. quod non animadverterit, *lupum*, cum hæc diceret, conditionem istam nondum sciviſſe? Ille igitur reponi

poni vult *utilius*; vel si quovis modo *facilius* reti- LIB. III.
nendum sit, hoc modo, inquit, refingas licet.

CUR PATIAR *nives?* pro *nunc patior.*

Quando *est facilius mihi sub tecto vivere?* qua emendatione omnis loci venustas tollitur, quæ a *Quanto* unice pendet. In altero versu Heins. mallet *otiose*; cui accedit B. ne pro dativo accusativum ponas. Sed vanus, opinor, iste metus, cum hæc constructio exemplis non destituatur. Anonym. *Otiosum satiari.*

aspicit

Lupus a catena collum detritum canis. Heins. *cani*, quod reponit etiam B. sed hoc quoque Heinsii esse dissimulat. 15.

Præcepto monitus sæpe te considera. Mallet Scheff. VIII.
Præcepto hoc, quod arripuit B. sed plura exempla apud Phædrum ostendunt articulum recte omitti posse.

Itidemque insigni & pulchra facie filium. B. *Insignis*, si in laude est, majus quid est quam *pulchra*, & male locum priorem occupat, sententia decrescente; ideoque reponit,

Itidemque ingenua *& pulchra facie filium.* At 3.
manifestum est Phædrum voluisse dicere, *faciem* insigniter *pulchram*; minima igitur mutatione rectius legas, *Insignem pulchra facie.* Sic Virgil. IX. 336.

Luserat INSIGNIS FACIE, & iterum 583.

Hi speculum, in cathedra matris ut positum fuit, 4.
Pueriliter ludentes forte inspexerant. Sic Salmas. locum hunc emendavit, cum prius legeretur *His* & *suppositum* (quod etiam pro suo dedit Faber) verissime opinor. error enim utrobique ortus est ex vicinia τῶ s, quod Librarii geminum pro simplici dedere.

Lib. III. dedere. Ut *positum* fuit, videtur dici, ut apud Græcos ὡς ἔχει, & Latine *sicut erat*. B. contra, indignum hoc, inquit, est tanto auctore; & pro *fuit* reponit *fuæ*, ut nempe istud *ut* pro more aliorsum traheret, & cum *inspexerant* conjungeret, quod a Phædri mente, ut sæpe dixi, alienissimum.

8. *Accipiens, quid enim? cuncta in contumeliam. Quid enim* est *quidni* enim? ac si dixisset, *quidni enim ita accipere?* Aliter accipere se non posse existimabat. B. agnoscit *quid enim*, apud Horatium, Virgilium, aliosque reperiri, sensu tamen, cui huic loco non convenit. quis vero sensus ille sit, non dicit; sed pro arbitrio reponit *quippe*, ut I. 28. 7. *tuta* QUIPPE *ipso loco.*

9. *Ergo ad patrem cucurrit læsura invicem.* MS. *decurrit*, quod cur mutaverint in *cucurrit* nescio, cum id melius conveniat cum aliis verbis, *sustinet, criminatur*, quibus interponitur. recte igitur B reposuit.

12. *Amplexus utrumque ille, & carpens oscula.* MS. *Amplexus ille utrumque*, quæ melior collocatio, quia est simplicior & numerosior. merito igitur revocavit B.

15. *Tu formam ne corrumpas nequitiæ malis;*
Tu faciem ut istam moribus vincas bonis. Fab. IV. 5. Phædrus dixit,

——formosos *sæpe inveni pessimos,*

Et turpi facie *multos cognovi optimos.* In hac autem lectione Codices consentiunt, nec eruditorum quemquam hactenus offendit, quod *Tu, Tu* dixerit, non *Te, Te*, quod reposuit B. absque ulla necessitate, ut infra ostendam. Illi etiam displicet *vincas*. *Vincere*, inquit, *faciem*, quid hic faciat, nullus video.

deo. Ejus igitur loco sufficit *penses*. quid enim? nonne Sappho dixit, *Ingenio formæ damna rependo meæ*. At quæ hæc consequentia est? *Penses* dicere potuisset hoc exemplo, igitur *vincas* dicere non potuit. Quod si vitia virtutibus *pensare* liceat dicere, licebit, opinor, & *æquare* dicere, juxta illud Hadriani Junii Epigramma quod huc attulit Hoogstratan. *Per speculum formæ vitium virtutibus* æques. Quod si *æquare*, cur non & *vincere*? Quam locutionem optime explicavit Scheff. his Curtii. Vicit *gratiam meriti sceleris atrocitas*. i. e. plus apud Alexandrum valuit atrocitas facinoris quod perpetrarat Spitamenis Uxor virum obtruncando, *quam gratia, quæ in semet ingens erat, quod transfuga & proditor tantis rebus injecturus moram, interfectus esset, ideoque jussit illi denuntiari, ut castris excederet*. Si ad hoc exemplum *vincas* explices, sensus erit, ut filia mores suos tam sollicite curaret, ut eorum bonitas animis hominum conciliandis plus valeret, quam faciei turpitudo in contrariam partem; nec tantum gratiæ apud eos facie amitteret, quantum moribus lucrifaceret. Sed quid si concedamus hoc paulo durius dici? non alia ejusmodi paucula apud Phædrum occurrunt? ea certe acutissimorum hominum fuit sententia, ut dixi ad I. 17. 8. Græci hac de re dixere, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, ἰᾶσθαι, καλῶς ἐπικαλύπτειν. Huc vero apprime facit locus Senecæ Quæst. Natur. I. 17. *Inventa sunt specula, ut homo ipse se nosceret. multa ex hoc consecuta: primo sui notitia, deinde & ad quædam consilium*. Formosus *ut vitaret infamiam*; deformis *ut sciret redimendum esse virtutibus quicquid corpori deesset*, &c. Plura hujusmodi loca congessit doctissimus

Menagius

Lib. III. Menagius ad Diog. Laert. L. II. S. 33. Hic vero e Seneca locus egregie, ni fallor, facit ad confirmandum *Tu, Tu.* Miror vero, quid sibi velit Vir doctiss. his verbis, *Nequitiæ malis.* perperam mutant. Qui enim sunt, qui mutent? erat quidem cum Schefferus legendum putaret nequitiæ *maclis.* Sed hanc conjecturam ipsi postea displicuisse pluribus dicit, cum oppositio plane postulet *malis*, ut respondeat *bonis* in altero versu. *perperam* igitur observat Vir doctiss. alios hoc *perperam* mutasse.

X. 1. *Periculosum est credere, & non credere.* B. & *credere & non credere*, Sententia, inquit, gratias agente. Sed nec *est* facile abesse potest, nec simile in Phædro est exemplum.

5. *Ergo exploranda est veritas multum, prius Quam stulta prave judicet sententia.* Ad hæc Scheff. conjungunt vulgo, *multum prius*, sed illud *multum* ad *exploranda* referendum; *multum* enim est *diu, bene.* Sed alterum versum nec ille, nec alii tangunt, quod miror; cum sententia non postulet *quam* sed *ne*, nisi *prius* acceperint pro *potius. Veritas* bene *exploranda* est *prius* quam judices, *ne* prave judices. Hoc est quod auctor voluit. Sed Bentleio hæc mutatio non satisfacit, nisi *prius* quoque tollas, & ejus loco reponas *diu*; nullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod *multum* & *diu* sæpe conjuncta sunt. Sed *prius*, ni fallor, longe melius.

7. *Sed fabulosa ne vetustate elevem, Narrabo tibi, memoria quod factum est mea.* Cum hæc non satis sana eruditis viderentur, Pràschius inseruit *hæc* post *ne*, sed contra codices. neque sic sententia recte se habet. *Elevare* est *extenuare, contemnere.* Sic IV. 2. 5. *Qui facere quæ non possunt,*

sunt, verbis elevant. Hic autem pro *elevem*, Guyet. conjicit legendum, *eleves* vel *elevent*, quod posterius ad scripturam propius, sed cum *tibi* versu altero sequatur, malim *eleves*. Pro *vetustate* vero MS. teste Gudio, *vetustatem*, recte certe, cum *eleves* sit *activum*: qua lectione recepta necessario legendum *fabulosam*. nullus in Librariis facilior lapsus, quam additio vel omissio m̃ m, finalis præsertim, cum non plene scribere solerent, sed lineola supra posita notare, ut dixi plus semel. *Fabulosa* etiam cum *vetustate* conjungi nemo non videt. Sic Justin. *fabulosa est antiquitas*. II. 6. & IV. 1. ut ad locum monet Gronovius. legendum igitur LIB. III.

Sed fabulosam ne vetustatem eleves. quod pro suo dedit B. tacito Guyeti nomine.

Seductus in secretum a liberto suo. Cum sententiæ desit *est*, Rittersh. legendum putavit *seductu'st*. Cum vero hunc archaismum non tulerit Phædri ætas, melius inserit B. post *liberto*. Sed nescio, an hæc additio sit prorsus necessaria. deest certe pariter *est* IV. 16. 3. & 24. 8. Sed ista forte loca non satis sana, addam igitur exemplum ex Horatio, Carm. I. 3. 34. 11.

EXPERTUS *vacuum Dædalus aera Pennis non homini datis.*

Qui dum de puero multa mentitus foret. Hic iterum peccat Vir doctiss. in Burmanni textu citando, cum ille, non *Qui dum*, sed *Qui cum*. frustra igitur monet, eruditos jam diu reposuisse *cum*. 13.

Subsedit; deinde noctu subito januam. Nihil certe hic culpandum, B. tamen reponit *dein de nocte*. *Quod*, inquit, *concinnius est*, *ideoque & verum*. Nihil veterum scriptis corrumpendis efficacius tam 20.

paucis

LIB. III. paucis verbis dici potuit. Vide enim, quam absurdis principiis hæc emendandi ratio nitatur. primo supponit Veteres quicquid vellent, tam bene & eleganter dixisse, ut idem melius dici non possit: quasi omnes pari essent ingenio & judicio, & quisque sibi omnibus horis; quorum utrumque falsissimum. Dein, id maxime concinnum esse, quod editori, dormitanti forsan, vel aliud agenti, *homini* certe & proinde erroribus obnoxio ita videbitur. At aliis forte Criticis hanc emendandi rationem non præcipit, sibique uni sequendam censet, ut Criticorum deo, cui TO BEATION semper feliciter investigatur. Sed & ipse *homo*, & vel dormitare, vel festinato & negligenter, ne quid gravius dicam, sæpe agere, palam testantur omnibus paginis hæ in Phædrum Notæ. Sed parum est has ejus notas in testimonium adhibere; hæc veterum scripta corrigendi ratio, seu potius insania, quot errores, quot hallucinationes pepererit, quam fœde interpolarit, omnia viri doctiss. scripta plurimis, iisque clarissimis exemplis indicant. *Quod concinnius est, ideoque & verum.* Cum verba hæc serio mecum recogito, simulque animo obversatur nuperum viri doctiss. propositum de sacro *Novi Fœderis* Codice edendo, textuque ejus de novo ad suum ipsius arbitrium refingendo, non possum non plurimum bonis omnibus, Sanctæque Religioni & Ecclesiæ Christianæ gratulari, quod ab instituto illo jam penitus depulsus videatur. Quid enim a Critico ita animato, & insanum hoc emendandi principium profesSo expectandum erat, nisi *Testamentum* vere *novum?* Qui, in *Specimine* quod in publicum dedit, in uno. eoque brevi capite emendationes

dationes sexaginta ausus est facere. Qua servata correctionum ratione, in toto opere immutata fuissent minimum viginti millia locorum. Hoc illi futurum erat AUDACIAI COLUMEN. Quæ igitur non debentur gratiæ doctissimo & politissimi ingenii viro Con. Middletono, qui Animadversionibus suis, eruditis, nervosis, elegantibus, acutis, quibus istud *Specimen* exagitavit, sacrum Codicem tam temerariis manibus feliciter eripuit; & sibi doctorum omnium plausus meritissimo reportavit? Sed ad Phædrum redeo. LIB. III.

Lucerna adlata. Heins. mallet *illata.* quia sic Ovid. Curt. Apuleius, alii. & hoc reponit B. cum tamen *lucernam afferre* sit certe Latinissimum. 29.

Ut adjuvaret juris-jurandi fidem. i. e. ut ipsorum religioni subveniret, sive ipsis, qui jurati erant judices, & interventu suo provideret, ne per imprudentiam male judicarent, atque ita violarent jusjurandum, quod dederant secundum leges se judicaturos. Sic. Gronov. recte, sententia clara & aperta. Adeo tamen hic cœcutiit B. ut pro his reponeret, nullo prorsus sensu, *Ut* advocarent *jurisjurandi fidem.* Cum & loci sententia, & quod sequitur, IPSOS *quod error implicuisset criminis*, plane ostendant oppositionem hic esse inter *Augustum* & *Judices*, qui cum ipsi impliciti hærerent, orant ut causam ad se advocaret. Quæ autem viro doctiss. causa fuit tam bellæ emendationis? Dixit, inquit, Phædrus in re non dissimili; IV. 4. 20. FIDEM ADVOCAVIT *jure neglecto parens.* cum tamen ibi manifestum sit disjungi *fidem & jus*, quæ hic conjuncta sunt; quid quod non ibi *jusjurandum* sit, sed *jus*, i. e. putavit parens, ut recte explicat Gronov. 40.

Lib. III. sibi ex *æquo & bono* agendum, quando ad literam interpretari commode scriptum non poterat. Quia vero aliquid inter duo loca est similitudinis, ideo Bentleio judice alter ex altero refingendus; atque hæc solennis illi emendandi ratio. Vel auctor ipse fe., vel alius, *ita* scripsit *illic*; *ita* igitur scripsit & *hic*. quasi omne *simile* esset *idem*, aut etiam *idem* non diversis modis efferri potuisset. fœcundus hic pravarum emendationum fons, unde innumeri errores in doctiss. viri scripta Critica profluxerunt.

47. *Quod si damnanda perscrutatus crimina*
Pater familias esset, si mendacium
Subtiliter limasset, a radicibus
Non evertisset scelere funesto domum. In primo versu *damnanda*, cum præcessisset *damnandum*, ingrate & insulse repeti nemo non videt. In corrigendo autem omnes, ni fallor, frustra sunt, dum quærunt vocabulum, quod ad *damnanda* scriptione proxime accedat. Inde alii *clam tanta*, alii *tam infanda*, alii *enodanda*, alii alia. cum enim præcedat, Miserandam *potius*, *quam* damnandam *existimo*: non modo ejusdem vocis, sed ejusdem etiam soni repetitio, eaque trina, ingrata auribus accidat necesse est. *andam and' anda.* Veram lectionem, quæcunque fuerit, intercidisse opinor, & *damnanda* versui supplendo locum ejus nescio quo casu occupasse. Cum igitur non ex affinitate scripturæ, sed ex sensu solo vera lectio eruenda sit, si versus hic cum sequentibus diligenter conferatur, videbitur, opinor, adverbium aliquod ante *perscrutatus* poni debere, ut mox *subtiliter* ante *limasset*, legendumque, *Quod si* penitius *perscrutatus crimina*: sequente autem versu pro *mendacium* rectius forte *mendacia*, ut *crimina*;

sic

sic enim *v.* 13. de puero PLURA *mentitus foret*, LIB. III.
Et plura *de flagitiis castæ mulieris.* In tertio cum Ritterſh. Fabro, Burmanno, aliis, distinctionem puto ponendam post *limasset*, ut *a radicibus* sequentibus adjungatur; cum utrumque & *subtiliter* & *a radicibus* unum verbum odiose oneraret & impediret. adde, quod notiones iis subjectæ nimium quantum inter se differant. Quod autem ad *limasset*, frustra id sollicitatur, cum teste Nonio *limare* sit *exquirere*, a lima dictum. Investigatio sc. accurata tanquam lima, fucum omnem quo mendacium obductum est, deterit, & nudum exhibet. Cum Nonio vero consentiunt Glossæ vett. *limatur* (legendum, opinor, *limat*) *rimatur*, ζητεῖ. Quodque magis firmat hanc lectionem, *subtilis & limatus* arctissima quadam necessitudine sæpissime conjuncta sunt. Guyetus quidem *limare* ductum putat a *linus*, a quo *limo*, *collimo*, i. e. visum dirigo in scopum. Unde *limare*, diligentius intueri, ab iis qui limis ictum sagittæ destinant. Sed rectius, opinor, Nonius a *lima*. Videamus jam, quid ad locum hunc B. Primum pro *damnanda* reponit *cunctando*; quamobrem vero ita reponit? Quia Fabius CUNCTANDO *restituit rem*, i. e. cessando, nihil agendo, a prœliis abstinendo. & *Nulla unquam de morte hominis* cunctatio *longa est.* Juvenal VI. 120. *i. e.* nulla mora. egregia sane argumenta, quasi Phædrus velit *perscrutationem* debere deferri, aut lente peragi. quis unquam sic locutus est? quis *cunctando investigare*, vel *scrutari* dixit? Emendationem infeliciorem non vidi: Dein versu tertio pro *limasset*, *rimatus*, & huc trahit etiam *a radicibus*, nempe, quia Plautus dixit, *Quod si exquiratur* usque ab stirpe *auctoritas*.

LIB. III. Sed ne dicam Gronovium & Burmannum putare, *auctoritati ab stirpe* conjungendum esse, & sumendum pro primo auctore, idem Plautus Aul. II. 2. 72.

Si hercle ego te non elinguandam dedero usque AB RADICIBUS. *Rimatus* autem reponit, quia, ipso judice, *limare mendacium* nihil aliud est, quam ita expolire & refingere, ut fidem mereatur. hæc ille, omnia, opinor, male.

57. *Aut gratiæ subscribit, aut odio suo.* Quod Phædrus *odium*, Seneca *offensam* dixit, de more Claudii, *nihil* offensæ *vel gratiæ dabitur.*

XI. 4. *En, ait, hoc unum est, cur laborem validius.* Heins. *Quin ait,* cui accedit B.

XII. 1. *In Sterquilinio,* (Burm. Sterculinio) *pullus gallinaceus.* Salmas. *Sterquilino,* vel *Sterculino.* cum versus ratio vulgarem lectionem repudiet. sic Gudius; ex quo reponit B. *Sterculino.*

2. *Dum quærit escam, margaritam repperit.*

Faces indigno, quanta res, inquit, loco? Hæc Bentleio videntur laxa & hiantia, quæ veram tamen Phædri manum referunt. Ille igitur pro more *Ut* ingerit post *margaritam.*

4. *Hoc si quis pretii cupidus vidisset tui,*

Olim redisses ad splendorem maximum. Hoc, *te* sc. *hic jacere.* Et sic uterque Cod. Rem. & Pith. pro *maximum* vero in secundo versu, Neveletus ex Rimicio mallet *pristinum,* quod habet & Nilantii Romulus. Hoc igitur reposuit B. tacito Neveleti nomine. in priore autem versu pro *Hoc, Te*; quia sic Romulus. *Si aliquis cupidus invenisset* TE, *gaudens* TE *confestim rapuisset,*

Ego

Ego qui te inveni, potior cui multo est cibus, LIB. III.
Nec tibi prodesse, nec mihi quicquam putes. Hæc 6.
pro Burmannianis dat vir doctiss. At ille versum priorem sic exhibet.

Ego qui te inveni? potior cui multo est cibus? atque hoc, auctore vel Scheffero, vel Gudio, qui dicit, hanc orationem esse hominis cum admiratione interrogantis, & interrogationis notam apponendam in fine versiculi, *Qui* vero esse pro *quomodo*. Sed male procul dubio. vulgata lectio retinenda, nisi quod in secundo versu *tu* reponendum sit ante *mihi*; & sic ad libri marginem annotaram: quod jam video placuisse etiam Ursino, nisi quod ille *tu* post *mihi* collocet. firmant vero hanc lectionem & Anonym. & Romulus, quorum ille, *Nec* TU *mihi, nec ego tibi*; hic, *nec tibi ego prorsum, nec* TU *mihi*. Heins. pro *qui*, *quia*, vel *quod* & *potest*. utrumque, *quod & potest*, arripit B. & in textum reponit, quia oratio illi solœca est, & pro *potes* requiritur *possum*. quod nollem a tanto viro dictum; Cum enim *ego* & *tu* hoc ordine ponuntur, verbum cum cum posteriore debet convenire. Ut apud Plautum,

Tu me, & ego te, qualis sis scio. Aul. II. 2. 40.
quod exemplum attulit Scheffer.

Apes in alta quercu fecerant favos. MS. teste XIII. 1.
Gudio *fecerunt*. quod reponit B. male, opinor; sed & *ut* inserit post *quercu*, quo insigniter versum deturpavit.

Tunc illa talem sustulit sententiam. MS. *sententia.* 13.
cum *tollere sententiam* non alias dici observarent eruditi, varie hunc versum immutarunt. alii *Tunc illata rem*, vel *Tunc lata litem*. alii, *tunc illa litem—*

LIB. III. *sententia.* Scheff. *Tunc illam eis tulit.* sed typographi, opinor, vitio, pro *Tunc illa talem eis tulit,* Heins. *Tunc illa talem lis tulit sententian.* B. lectionem quam tertio loco posui, amplectitur, *Tunc illa litem sustulit sententia.* nisi quod *hac* inferciat post *litem.* Ego cum Rittershusio & Fabro nihil hic mutandum censeo, compositum enim pro simplici adhibitum videtur *tulit* pro *sustulit,* quod malim, quam hic alludi ad ἀνεῖλεν Græcorum, de oraculorum responsis usurpari solitum, quod voluit Faber.

17. *Si pactam fuci non recusassent fidem. Pacta fides* Senecæ, Hippol. *v.* 953, est *promissum*; hic vero *pactum,* quod recusasse dicuntur, quia ad *Vespam* rem deferre mutuo consenserant. Bentleius vero nec, quid sit *pactam fidem recusare,* scit, nec ullum hic pactum invenit. & verbis his ejectis in eorum locum sufficit *legem datam.* Quis insanam hanc licentiam patienter ferat?

XIV. 9. ——*Tum victor sophus.* Sic IV. 16. 8. *Tum gubernator* SOPHUS.

10. *Cito rumpes arcum, semper si tensum habueris.* Sic Amasis apud Herod *l.* II. *c.* 69. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα χρόνον ἐντεταμένα εἴη (τὰ τόξα) ἐνεργείη ἄν. Et Apul. Miles. I. *Formido ne nervus rigoris nimietate* RUMPATUR. quæ loca attulit Rigalt. *cito,* i. e. brevi spatio. *semper si tensum,* id est, nisi per intervalla relaxes. B. vero hæc damnat. Sententia, inquit, perabsurda; *si semper tensus,* quomodo, *cito rumpetur?* egregie. reponit igitur,

Corrumpes *arcum, semper tensum si habueris.* quanto alterum fortius, tanto, opinor, putabis melius.

Sic

Sic ludus animo debet aliquando dari, LIB. III.
Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi. Vett. Editt. 12.
Luſus & *debent*. Sed Ritterſh. metri gratia *debet*. & pro *luſus* Guyetus *ludus*. ut Horat. *animo dare ludum*. in ſecundo verſu, pro *tibi*, Tollius ad Cic. pro Archia *ſibi*, teſte Hoogſtratano. Sed Heinſ. malebat *tibi*. B. Tollio accedit, quia *animus cujuſque is eſt quiſque*. Et ſi ita Phædrus ſcripſiſſet, nemo certe reprehendiſſet; ſed cum Codices habeant *tibi*, nulla eſt idonea ratio cur ab iis diſcedatur. *tibi* enim eſt in *tuos uſus*.

Dein portat onus ignotum certis menſibus. ignotum, XV. 5.
quia ut *v.* 10. diſcitur, neſcivit mater, *niger an albus naſceretur*. At cur ignotum? inquit, B. an quia in utero clauſum, & nondum viſum? Atqui eodem nomine & Cor, pulmones, inteſtina dici poſſunt *Ignota*. Corrige. *Dein portat onus* INGRATUM. quid enim? nonne Catullus dixit,

Ingratum *tremuli tolle parentis onus*. Dixit quidem, ſed de re ab hac alieniſſima. ibi enim *parentis onus* eſt ipſe parens, qui amoribus filiæ importunus intervenit; ut moleſtum igitur, auferri vult. vid. Cat. LXIX. 142. nihil ineptius afferri poterat, nec ineptiore de cauſa: quid enim *moleſtus ſenex* ad parturientis onus, aut quid ſimile *fœtui* eſt & *Inteſtinis?*

Dulcemque ſponte præſtat benevolentiam. Quæ 16.
verborum collocatio magis naturalis, ἐμφατικωτέρα, & numeris melioribus, ne tot breves concurrant, quam ſi legas *præſtat ſponte*, quam tamen pro arbitrio repoſuit B. non parvo, inquit, verſus commodo.

Lib. III. XVI. 5. *Cavoque ramo capere somnum interdiu.* Guyetus maluit *cavo muro*; Heins. *cavo rami*, cum *cavus* substantive accipiatur hac ipsa fabula *v.* 17. *egressa e cavo.* Sed recepta lectio, ni fallor, vera est; *ramus cavus* Latine dici nemo sanus negaverit. Rami vero in arboribus vetustis sæpe cavi sunt ea parte qua trunco committuntur. Sed Bentleio aliter visum est. Ramus arboris, inquit ille, non temere cavus est; dedit auctor *trunco.* Horat.—— TRUNCIS.

Labsa CAVIS *iterare mella.* quod exemplum attulit Stephanus.

6. *Rogata est, ut taceret. Multo validius.* B. Repone, quod hiulca ista connectat, *Rogata* UTI *taceret*; pessimè.

11. *Dormire quia me non sinunt cantus tui,*

Sonare citharæ quos putes Apollinis. In secundo versu ad libri marginem adscripseram *citharam*; quod jam video Guyetum quoque & Praschium voluisse, quibus accedit B. sed tacitis eorum nominibus. Heins. maluit *sonari.* Sed aliud est quod in his versibus observari velim; in utroque nempe quartum pedem dictione unica constare; & quinquaginta ferè hujus generis in Phædro solo exempla sunt. Sed observandum est quartum in his pedem vocem sibi monosyllabam semper præpositam habere, vel quod in Trimetris eodem redit, duas breves. cujus ratio mox apparebit.

I. 1. 8. *ad* meos *haustus liquor.*
3. 12. *quos* prius *dispexerat.*
16. 7. *quum* dies *advenerit.*
23. 4. *an* cibo *possit capi.*

5. *vis*

5. *vis* meam *præcludere.*
7. *me* jubet *benignitas.*
8. *ne* mea *culpa lucrum.*
27. 9. *o* canis *merito jaces.*
II. 1. 10. *pars* tuæ *modeſtiæ.*
2. 6. *dum* volunt *illi pares.*
4. 8. *quod* vides *quotidie.*
5. 5. *ſi* tamen *paſſum, volo.*
5. 7. *cum* petens *Neapolim.*
7. 14. *ſunt* opes *obnoxiæ.*
8. 6. *ad* necem *cucurreris.*
II. 8. 18. *centum* habet, *ſi venerit.*
III. Prol. 11. *Quam* rei *domeſticæ.*
48. *me* velim *nihilominus.*
57. *fit* parens, *muſa Orpheo.*
3. 17. *da* tuis *paſtoribus.*
10. 51. *nec* tamen *credat ſtatim.*
16. 11. *non* ſinunt *cantus tui.*
12. *quos* putes *Apollinis.*
14. 11. *quum* voles *erit utilis.*
18. 14. *quod* tibi *non eſt datum.*
IV. 6. 22. *te* juvant *nec fabulæ.*
24. *ne* tibi *moleſtiam.*
11. 7. *quia* malis *amicus eſt.*
12. 2. *eſt* quidem *ſententia.*
3. *ſolet* agi *ſinceritas.*
IV. 17. 36. *qui* videt, *culum olfacit.*
19. 26. *de* tuo *faciat lucrum.*
23. 3. *tu* potes *te laudibus.*
24. 17. *&* dolens *injuria.*
28. *vix* pedem *triclinio.*
25. 2. *ne* tibi *moleſtior.*
20. *tibi* preces *exiſtimes.*
33. *quam* puer *ſententiam.*

V. Prol.

Lib. III. V. Prol. 15. *si* volet *malignitas.*
Id. Poet. 5. *quam* bonis *præsentibus.*
3. 11. *veniam* ei *dari decet.*
4. 12. *est* bono, *multis malo.*
5. 9. *se* genus *spectaculi.*
23. & statim *professus est.*
25. *jam* favor *mentes tenet.*
7. 6. *non* satis *memini quibus.*
12. *dum* venit *curatio.*
26. *hæc* fuit *sententia.*
32. *homo* meus *se in pulpito.*
10. 7. *cui* senex *contra latrans.*

Hinc videas quam temere vir doctiss. in Schediasmate de metris, de duobus mediis Trimetri pedibus verba faciens dicat *tertium quartumve non posse recte singulis verbis claudi*, cum tot exempla ostendant *quartum* optime sic claudi posse. si animadvertisset quid Faernus de hac re dixerit in libello de versibus comicis, intellexisset de tertio quidem pede (plerumque sane, non tamen semper, hoc verum esse; at de quarto pede idem ineptissime præcipi exempla † ubivis obvia docent. Hujus igitur pedis ratione sæpissime fallit illa *Metricorum* observatio, Gellio memorata, XVIII. 15. in *Senariis* nempe *duos medios pedes haud unquam posse habere singulas integras partes orationis: sed constare eos semper ex verbis aut divisis, aut mixtis atque confusis.* Hanc autem observationem, de veritate ejus parum sollicitus, Vir doctiss. avide am-

† In paucis Trimetris *Horatii* triginta sunt hujus generis exempla; in *Seneca* vero plus sexcenta.

plectitur,

plectitur, quod sententiæ suæ de *ictibus* in secunda Trimetri dipodia vitandis favere putet. eoque ostendit se nec præceptum hoc *Metricorum* intra quos fines coarctandum sit, intellexisse, nec rationem ejus percepisse. Ille enim credidit hoc ideo præcipi, *ne ictus in ultimas syllabas caderent, quod in media dipodia fieri nec solet, & vix unquam licet. Rarissime igitur*, inquit, *semel atque iterum, sed magno sententiæ lucro, admisit hoc in Trimetris Terentius.* Sed si Vir doctiss. animo tranquillo, attento & a præjudicatis opinionibus libero, quæ dixit Gellius expendisset, non potuit fieri, ut hic tam turpiter hallucinaretur. Apud illum enim Metrici docent hoc de *hexametris* versibus non minus quam *Senariis.* Verba sunt, *In longis versibus, qui hexametri dicuntur, item in senariis animadvertunt Metrici duos primos pedes, item extremos duos, habere posse singulos integras partes orationis, medios haud unquam posse.* Quid vero, num ictus in causa sunt, quod in hexametris etiam hoc non liceat? fac periculum, & videbis nihil a vero longius abesse. LIB. III.

Arma virumque ego dico, Trojæ *primus ab oris.* num ictus hic cadit in ultimas *dico* & *Trojæ?* omnis tamen modulatio versui ex eo perit, quod duo medii pedes integris verbis constant. † quartum

† Quartum pedem integra dictione constare posse (præeunte voce monosyllaba) tertius quartusque Bucolicorum Versus pulchre ostendunt.

Nos patriæ fines, & dulcia linquimus arva:
Nos patriam fugimus; tu Tityre lentus in umbra.

quidem

Lib. III. quidem unica dictione constare licet, tertium non item, ideoque non utrosque. Quæ vero hujus ratio? non ictus, quos solos noster somniat, iis enim plane nullus hic locus; ratio vera atque unica est, quod sic versus cæsura legitima carebit, in qua tamen venustas ejus maxime consistit. Cujus vis quanta sit, nihil mirum est si Vir doctiss. non perceperit, cum de ea tam negligenter egerit, ut licet multum dixisse videatur, minus tamen re vera dixerit, quam quivis e trivio Grammaticus. Omnia enim huc redeunt, *eam fere cæsuram Romanis placuisse, quæ in priore tertii pedis syllaba sit.* Hoc est, Cæsura plerumque est penthemimeris; sed sæpe etiam est hepthemimeris, cujus in Phædro solo exempla sunt, opinor, plus centum quinquaginta; de qua ille tamen nihil. Sed ut ad Hexametrum redeam: Cæsura ejus pulcherrima est vel in longa syllaba post duos pedes, id est in quinto semipede, ut in *Sylvestrem tenui*; vel in trochæo post duos pedes, ut *Formosam resonare.* tum vero septimum semipedem, si pauciſſima excipias, integra semper vox claudit. Et hanc ob rationem tertius pes non debet vel unica dictione constare, vel *cum ea finiri*, si monosyllabam excedat; ut, *Arma virumque canebam*, cum non minus hoc etiam pacto cæsuræ gratia pereat, versusque erit omni numero carens, & immodulatus. Atque eadem ratio est in *trimetris*, sive senariis; cæsura enim in iis debet esse vel in quinto vel in septimo semipede; melius autem prius, ideoque ibi plerumque fit. Quod si duo medii pedes, utrique integra orationis parte constent, neutra cæsura in tali versu locum habebit. immo nec tum habebit, si solus

tertius

tertius in voce integra deſinat, niſi vox monoſyl- Lib. III.
laba ſequatur. ut

Noſſe omnia hæc SALUS EST *adoleſcentulis.* Tertius hic pes unico verbo conſtat *ſalus*, cum vero ſequatur monoſyllabum *eſt*, hoc pacto cæſura altera ſervatur. hæc igitur ratio eſt, cur ne prior quidem mediorum pedum, ne dum uterque, debeat parte orationis integra conſtare, non ne ictus in ultimas eorum ſyllabas cadat: quod vera ſi cauſa hujus eſſet præcepti, valeret de quarto pede pariter ac tertio, cum tamen id non ita eſſe tantus e Phædro ſolo exemplorum numerus luculenter oſtendat, apud quem ne unum quidem, quod ſciam, occurrit, ubi pes tertius unico verbo clauditur. in illo enim. IV. 25. 2. *Primum eſſe ne* tibi *videar moleſtior*, mendum eſſe ad locum dicetur. in altero autem III. 9. 5. *E populo ſic neſcio quis, ut fieri ſolet. Neſcio quis* pro unica voce habendum eſt. Idem vero quod in Phædro tam frequens eſſe oſtendi, in Terentio etiam pluribus exemplis facile eſt comprobare. Quod enim Vir doctiſſ. dicat *ſemel atque iterum* Terentium hoc admiſiſſe, in eo quoque graviſſime fallitur. In illo enim reperies exempla plus octoginta, ſi ex tribus primis Fabulis de ceteris judicium fieri poſſit, ubi quartus Trimetri pes integra dictione concluſus eſt; & circiter quadraginta ſunt, in quibus hoc de pede etiam tertio verum eſt. Immo vero nec deſunt apud Terentium exempla, ubi utrique medii pedes ſingulis verbis conſtant ſinguli. Quarti pedis quatuor ſunt exempla vel in prima Eunuchi Scæna,

Verſ. 1. *Quid igitur faciam? non* eam,
ne nunc quidem.

5. *Si*

5. *Si quidem hercle pessis, nihil* prius, *neque fortius :*

32. *Neque præterquam quas ipse* amor *molestias.*

33. *Habet, addas : & illas, quas* habet *recte feras.* quibus addam unum atque alterum exemplum de tertio pede. Et unum quidem statim se offert.

Andr. I. 1. 37. *Eorum obsequi* studiis, *adversus nemini.* Sed, ut hunc locum nobis eriperet, modo prorsus incredibili Vir doctiss. corrupit, delendo sc. quæ proxime sequuntur —— *adversus nemini, Nunquam præponens se illis* : quæ nemini displicere possint, qui non ingenio sit ab his prorsus alieno, utpote *adversus omnibus,*

Semper præponens se illis. sed aliud in propinquo exemplum est, in hac ipsa Scæna v. 89.

Nihil suspicans etiam *mali. hem, quid est ? scies.*

III. 3. 8. *Perque unicam* gnatam *tuam* & *gnatum meum.*

IV. 4. 44. *Quis hic ' loquitur ? o* Chreme, *per tempus advenis.* Et Eun.

III. 1. 28. *Quidni esset ? di* vostram *fidem ! hominem perditum.*

V. 2. 17. *Quid feceras ?* paulum *quid. eho paulum inpudens ?* Sed nec exempla

empla desunt, ut dixi, ubi idem de utroque medio pede verum est. LIB. III.

Eun. I. 2. 109. *In hoc biduum* Thais vale. *mi Phædria.*

Haut. I. 1. 9. *Nam pro deum atque* hominum fidem, *quid vis tibi?*

IV. 5. *Etsi scio hosce* aliquot dies *non sentiet.* Postremo, quod addit Vir doctiss. *Notandum quoque priorem brevem esse,* (cum Terent. tertium pedem ex unica dictione constare faciat) *& ex musicæ rationibus ita oportere*; hic quoque fallit & fallitur, ut exempla allata ostendunt. Cum vero *musicæ rationes* hic & alibi crepet, quasi musicæ quoque veteris arcana ipsi penitus nota & perspecta sint, hæ sunt etiam ad populum phaleræ, & gloriolæ captandæ gratia scientiam jactat, cujus ne prima quidem elementa, quantum video, vel summis labris degustarit. Ex his autem quæ dixi, abunde constat quam parum fidendum sit summo huic rei metricæ magistro, in cujus Schediasmate de metris non modo nihil novum est, quod non & falsum sit, sed & tritissima quæque harum rerum capita, quale hoc est de mediis pedibus, tam perfunctorie & negligenter tractat, ut ne in iis quidem tuto illi fidem adhibeas. Operæ pretium putavi de his accuratius agere, cum non minus ad Phædrum quam ad Terentium spectent. Sed redeo jam in viam.

Minerva admirans, quare steriles sumerent, XVII. 5.
Interrogavit. Causam dixit Jupiter. MS. teste Gudio *ammirans,* pro quo legendum puto *mirans.* id est, cum mirum sibi videretur, ut IV. 17. 14. *Mirati*

LIB. III. *rati sibi legatos non revertier.* vid. quæ diximus ad I. 12. 5. In secundo versu Scheff. distinguendum putavit post *causam.* ut IV. 18. 5.

Hanc alia quum rogaret causam facinoris. Et IV. 11. 6. *Causam quæsivit pater.* atque hanc distinctionem reponit B. tacito Schefferi nomine.

7. *Honore fructum ne videamur vendere. Honorem fructu* Rigalt. & eruditi fere omnes. quibus accedit B.

8. *At mehercule narrabit, quod quis voluerit.* Ursinus, *At hæc mehercule narret.* B. versus claudicat, quem sic emendandum puto,

At mehercule, illa, narret, *quod quis voluerit.* Quis ex his verbis suspicatus esset, idem fere dedisse Ursinum? plures hic conjecturas fecit Heins. ego vero nihil mutandum puto, nisi pro *narrabit* malis cum doctissimo Burmanno *narrarit.* Quod ad versum enim, ultimam in *mehercule* opinor apud veteres ancipitem fuisse. Sin aliter res sit, facilis est medicina scribendo *mehercules,* quod frequens apud Senecam, scriptorem Phædro ætate fere supparem. Cum vero semper alias apud Phædrum *mehercule* versus extremum occupet, legi forte possit,

At oliva nobis propter fructum, mehercule,
Est gratior, narrabit quod quis voluerit. Sed hæc levis & mera est conjectura.

XVIII. 3. *Illum esse cunctis auribus admirabilem.* Burm. in prima editione Schefferum secutus posuit *cunctis avibus,* sed MSS. *auribus,* quod restituit Gudius, probante Heinsio. & hanc lectionem probatam tot doctis viris in secunda Burm. recipit, eam firmante Ovidio Met. IV. 271. *Dixerat, & factum mirabile*

mirabile ceperat aures. nec sane culpanda hæc lectio, si metri gratia pro *ammirabilem* reponatur *mirabilem*, cum dicatur *placere auribus*, & sonum *auribus gratum* vel *ingratum* accedere. multa hujusmodi afferri possint. Sed instar omnium sint hæc Quintiliani *l.* IX. *c.* 4. " Optime autem de illa " (compositione) judicant aures, quæ & plena " sentiunt, & parum expleta desiderant, & fra- " gosis offenduntur, & lenibus mulcentur, & con- " tortis excitantur, & stabilia probant, clauda de- " prehendunt, redundantia & nimia fastidiunt. " Ideoque docti rationem componendi intelligunt, " indocti voluptatem." Quidni igitur sonus *auribus* quoque dicatur *admirabilis?* B. contra, cum Admiratio solius Animi sit, scire velim, inquit, quo pacto, *Aures admirari* possint. ille igitur revocat *avibus*. Sed si hæc lectio recipiatur, cum Scheffero legerem *Illum esse e cunctis.* LIB. III.

Omnes quæ propriis sunt contentæ vocibus. Heins. *dotibus.* quod reposuit Hoogstr. & sic B. pro *quæ* vero legendum forte *que.* 13.

Tum circumeunti fuerat quod iter longius. Cum *um* in *circum* elidatur, nescio an non melius separatim scriberetur, *Circum eunti*, ut LUCRET. IV. 317. CIRCUM AGITUR, *cum venit imago.* XIX 5.

Cœpit redire. Et quidam e turba garrulus. Heins. *Hic quidam*, quod arripuit B. sed citra necessitatem, ut dixi ad I. 6. 2. *Et* melius, ni fallor, quam *Hic*, exprimit hominis garruli promptissimam in jocos linguam, & quam prono animo Æsopo illudendi occasionem captarit. 7.

Galli Cybebes circum quæstus ducere. Heins. *circum in quæstus ducere.* Gronov. *circum cœtus ducere.* XX. 4.

Lib. III. Sed Burm. bene observat *cœtus* non dici pro oppidis & pagis, nisi quando de sociandis primo hominibus agitur. B. vero ex Babriæ versibus quos huc adduxit Neveletus, hæc laudans,

Οὗτοι ἡ κύκλῳ πᾶσαν ἐξ ἕδρας κόμην
Περιόντες ἔλεγον, dedit auctor, inquit, *pagos* vel *vicos*. & prius in textu reponit. Ego vero nescio an non *quæstu* legi possit, i. e. pro quæstu seu quæstus gratia, cum sic *mercede* sæpius usurpari videatur. Ut *accersere mercede*, *mercede militare*, &c. quæ dabit St. Thesaur. In Babria autem legendum ΠΑΡΙΟΝΤΕΣ.

6. *Is cum labore & plagis esset mortuus,*
Detracta pelle, sibi fecerunt tympana. B. reponit, *Huic, cum labore.* quamobrem? nempe quia sic visum est; quæ hæc temeritas?

9. *Quidnam fecissent, hoc locuti sunt modo.* Heins. hoc *jocati:* Et sane hæ voces in MSS. sunt admodum similes. sed *locutus* toties a Phædro usurpatur, ut cum Scheffero putem non temere vocem hanc movendam esse. Sed conjecturam Heinsianam pro more arripit B.

Lib. IV. Prol. I. *Joculare tibi videtur: & sane levi,*
Dum nihil habemus majus, calamo ludimus. Codd. *leve. Levi* est a Scheffero, qui *calamo* adjunxit. Sic Ovidius *leviore lyra*, Horatius *leviore plectro*; & passim *levia studia* dicuntur minoris momenti, ut pluribus ostendit Burm. sed hæc Bentleio nequaquam satisfaciunt, quia *levis* generale *calami* Epitheton est: & probat ex eo quod Virgil. & Martial. dixerint *leves calamos*. Sed hæc ratio mihi quidem parum firma videtur, cum hic singulari numero,

numero, *calamo* dicatur. Sed ut ut hoc sit, ille re- LIB. IV.
ponit pro *leve*, *rei*. REI *Dum nihil habemus*, quo nihil insulsius excogitari poterat. Ter. quidem dixit, *Tibi vero quid istic* rei *fuit?* nihil *mihi quidem*. Ad. IV. 5. & II. 1. *Quid tibi* rei *mecum est?* nihil. Quis vero unquam dixit, *Rei dum nihil majus habemus*, præter unum Bentleium? mihi quidem persuasissimum est, initio hujus libri quædam excidisse, quibus Patronum (i. e. ut ex quinti libri prologo conjicio, Particulonem) alloquitur, sibique conciliat, nomine compellans. Sin nihil aliud desit, at unus certe excidit versiculus, quocum ille, qui nunc primus est, conjungatur; qui forte ad hunc fuit modum.

Fabellis occupari scribendis senem. In fine vero sequentis addendum *est*, *Joculare tibi videtur*; & *sane leve est*. Aut aliquid hujusmodi admittendum, aut duo primi versus transponendi sunt, quod video Meursium voluisse. Sed hoc minus placet, & tum post *Joculare* inserendum *hoc*.

Non semper ea sunt, quæ videntur. Hic turpis- 5.
sime se dedit Vir doctiss. dum saniissima emendare vult. Generalis plane hæc est sententia, id quod ipse mox fatetur; *Res non semper sunt eæ, seu tales, quales videntur*. De hoc enim & duobus qui sequuntur versibus, sic dicit. Hi tres versus non ad Fabulas has spectant, sed γνώμαι sunt & generales sententiæ. & tamen *ea* ad *nænias* referri, inquit, genus neutrum prohibet: nihil autem est aliud, quo referatur. Repone,

Non semper res *sunt* quod *videntur*. Hæccine Bentleius? Sed nihilo meliora, quæ ad versum septimum dedit.

Lib. IV. 7. *Quod interiore condidit cura angulo:* id est, quod cum cura & sollicite in pectore, & animi recessibus condunt & occultant. quo quid intellectu facilius? Burm. *curam* hic capit pro studio quo auctor sub involucris fictarum fabularum veros animi sensus tegit; quod Phædrus certe sub generali sententia contineri voluit. B. tamen, semper correctionem appetens, pro *Quod condidit cura*, reponit, *Quod condat natura.*

8. *Hoc ne locutus sine mercede exiſtimer.* Miror eruditos se torquere explicando *sine mercede*, cum licet paulo affectatior sit locutio, nihil aliud intelligi videatur, quam *gratis*, *frustra*. quod sensit etiam Schefferus.

I. 5. *Adsiluit, & compressus occubuit neci.* Rittersh. *comprensus*, quod Heinsio etiam placuit. quibus accedit B.

6. *Alter similiter, deinde periit tertius.* Codd. *periit & tertius.* unde manifestum est verbis transpositis legendum esse *periit, deinde & tertius.* quod reposuit B. quod firmari etiam ostendit verbis Romuli, qui sic dedit.

Alter similiter capitur, deinde & tertius.

III. 5. *Rediit ad hostem. Jactis hunc telis eques.* Legendum forte vocibus transpositis, *Ad hostem rediit.* V. Cod. inquit Rigalt. *Rediit ad hostem lætus jactis.* Sed cum *lætor* mox sequatur *v.* 7. vix putem *lætus* esse a manu Phædri. & magna illa similitudo, quæ intercedit inter *lætus* & *jactis* facit ut credam prius posterioris esse corruptionem. B. utrumque servandum putat, & ut versus capere possit, pro *rediit*, reponit *it* præsenti tempore, cum locus postulet præteritum, & pro *ad*, *in*, quia *ad hostem it*, etiam

qui

qui in gratiam rediturus est; quasi non ex serie narrationis satis constet, quo animo ad aprum equus rediret. Ita vir doctiss. Lectores semper pro bardis & fungis habet. LIB. IV.

Quo pacto non possideant, quod fuerat datum. Jac. Gronov. *fuerit*, ut *v.* 45. *Sic nulla possidebit, quod* fuerit *datum.* & pariter Hoogstratan. quod reponit B. verbulo tantum dicens, lege, *fuerit.* IV. 15.

——*deinde quæ tulerint nihil.* i. e. *acceperint.* B. *habuerint* ut *v.* 11.—— *tum simul* 16.

Habere *res desierint, quas acceperint.* Quis non videt mutationem hanc ineptam esse & inutilem?

Æsopus media subito in turba constitit: 29.

O si maneret. Hujus loci venustatem vir doctiss. corrumpit inserendo hic etiam *Ut* post *turba.*

Interpretari non potuissent Attici. Scheff. putat Phædrum exemplo Plauti & Terentii scripsisse *potessent*; male, cum isti Archaismi longe ante Phædri ætatem desiissent. nec hac emendatione opus esse quivis facile intelligat, qui meminerit, quanta sit affinitas imperfecti & plusquam perfecti temporis, quamque hæc tempora invicem misceantur. Ne nihil hic B. reponit *potuerint.* 32.

Agros, vites, & pecora cum pastoribus. Jac. Gronov. 38.

Agros, villas, & pecora. cum vero *villa* una tantum videatur fuisse, *v.* 23.

Agellos, pecora, villam; melius. *agros, villam.* unde legendum puto. *At agros villam & pecora. at* enim sententia videtur desiderare. B. *Agros & villam & pecora.* sed unde primum & hauserit nescio. incommode bis ponitur, nec a Phædro esse ostendit *v.* 36. *Vestem, uniones, pediseguos, & cetera.*

Lib. IV. *Deformis cultum vendet, ut vinum paret,*

41. *Agros abjiciet mœcha, ut ornatum paret. Paret* male in utroque versu poni omnes vident, sed nemo recte emendavit. Gronov. *vinum petat*, quod merito improbat Bentleius, cum *vinum petere* sit ex taberna venale subinde petere, non domi in penu possidere, ille igitur *vinum bibat*, quod nihilo melius. Si versus hos attentius expendas, videbis in secundo *paret* opponi τῷ *abjiciet*. & pari ratione in primo quærenda vox est, quæ respondeat τῷ *vendet*; quod plane indicat reponendum esse *emat*; & pro *ut* vinum *emat*, legendum, vetera *ut* vina *emat*. ut *v.* 35. *Et* vina vetera *date lanificæ rusticæ. Vetera* autem cum scriptum esset *veta* apice apposito pro *er*, facile excidere poterat post *vendet* sequente *ut*. atque hæc, ni fallor, hujus loci, qui tot eruditos exercuit, vera emendatio est.

44. *Quacumque summa tradet luxuriæ domum.* Multum sudant interpretes in hac lectione tuenda & explicanda. Bentleius hic nihil. Ego vero nullus dubito, quin vera lectio sit, *luxuriam & domum*. quod facili errore degeneravit in *luxuriæ* domum, omissa vel detrita lineola super *ā* & *e* compendio posito pro *et*. Hujusmodi erroris insigne exemplum est in Tertulliani libro contra Praxeam. VI. *Ut primum deus voluit ea quæ cum* SOPHIÆ RATIONE *& sermone dispositerat intra se, in substantias & species suas edere, ipsum primum protulit sermonem habentem in se individuas suas* RATIONEM & SOPHIAM. Ubi pro *Sophiæ ratione*, certissima emendatione legendum est *Sophia & Ratione*. Hæc mihi scribendi amicus intervenit, qui nescius quid

ipse

ipſe tum agerem, de ſimili mendo apud Horatium monuit, Od. III. 27. 39. LIB. IV.

———*an vitio carentem*
Ludit imago
Vana, quæ *porta fugiens eburna*
Somnium ducit? pro *quæ* enim legendum eſſe *quam*. quo nihil certius; ſed addendum *e*, *quæ* enim proclivi lapſu natum eſt ex *quā e*. Hanc autem Phædri emendationem firmat *v.* 34.

Domum & ornamenta *cum venuſtis hortulis.*

Cum victi mures muſtelarum exercitu, V. 1.
(*Hiſtoria quorum in tabernis pingitur*)
Fugerent, & artos circum trepidarent cavos. In ſecundo verſu alii aliis modis metro ſuccurrere conati ſunt. Heinſ. inſeruit *et* poſt *quorum*, cui accedit B. ſed verſus hominum doctiſſimorum opera, ſi quid video, nequaquam dignus; nequeo enim a me impetrare, quo minus ſpurium putem. margini, opinor, aliquis adſcripſerat, *Quorum Hiſtoria in tabernis pingitur*, & inde in textum irrepſit primis verbis inverſis, ut verſiculi ſpeciem præ ſe ferret; & juvat, quod videam Guyetum idem ſentire, cujus hæc verba ſunt, *Inſitivus verſus videtur*. Hic autem inficetus, opinor, verſus eruditorum oculos ad ſe trahendo, obſtitit, quo minus vitium in priore latens animadverterent. Nemo enim ad illum quicquam annotavit, quo receptam lectionem vel culparet, vel defenderet. Hæc laus Bentleio unice debetur, qui ad hæc *victi exercitu. Quo ſodes exemplo, inquit, ſic loquamur?* Et certe dicendum erat *a* vel *ab exercitu*. ſi a *victi* pendeat, & verbis tranſpoſitis legendum,

LIB. IV. *Cum mures victi a mustelarum exercitu.* Sed, si secundus versus ejiciatur, melior est doctissimi Viri emendatio, ut legamus *exercitum*, cum minima sit mutatio, ne literulæ quidem additio, sed tantum lineolæ, qua *m* finale appingebatur.

5. *Duces eorum.* Heins. *Duces at horum*, cui accedit B. temere.

11. *Quemcumque populum tristis eventus premit. Quemcumque* hic videtur iners, & nihil ad sententiam conferre. pro eo igitur reponendum puto, *Quumcumque*, id est *quandocumque*. sic Lucret. II. 113.

Contemplator enim cum *solis lumina* cumque. Sed cum insolentior vox esset, Librarii mutarunt in *quemcumque*.

VI. 1. *Tu qui nasute scripta destringis mea,*

Parva libellum sustine patientia. Id est, paululum tolera libellum meum. Gronov. Tene, non statim abjice fastidio quodam tam minutæ scriptionis. Scheff. Non molestе feras in manus sumere. Sed hæc Bentleio *nugæ* sunt, quorum tamen loco multo majores nugas ipse dat. pro *libellum* enim *labellum* legi jubet, atque hac emendatione auctoris sibi manum restituit. In fastidio scilicet, contemptu, offensa labium inferius exporrigi solet. Tu, inquit, qui fastidis hoc jocorum genus, sustine parumper labellum, omitte fastidium, & severitatem. Quomodo vero probat Veteres hoc sensu dixisse, *labellum sustinere?* quia sc. Persius de iis qui secum altius meditantes incedunt cum murmure & labiorum motitatione, dixit, III. 81.

Murmura cum secum & rabiosa silentia rodunt,

Atque exporrecto trutinantur verba labello. Hic vero nihil de fastidio aut contemptu, nec quicquam,

quod

quod oſtendat, quid ſit *ſuſtinere labellum.* At Juvenalis de homine triſti atque indignante dixit, LIB. IV.

Hoc quoque ſi rugam trahit, extenditque labellum.

Suſtinere igitur *labellum* eſt faſtidium omittere. Quæ vero hæc Dialectica? num SUSTINERE *labellum, &* EXTENDERE *ſunt oppoſita?* num quis veterum *ſuſtinere labellum* dixit? Præterea, quænam hinc exſurgit Sententia? *Omitte* pauliſper *faſtidium & ſeveritatem,* dum *faſtidium* tuum & *ſeveritatem placo.* ſequitur enim, *Severitatem frontis dum placo tuæ.* Quanto concinnius rogatur Lector, ne *libellum* ſtatim abjiciat, ſed pauliſper ferat, dum paucos verſiculos legat, quos ſperat eum placaturos?

Juſtoque vindicavit exemplo impetum. MS. *imperium,* quod verſus non patitur. Nec dubitandum, opinor, quin recte reponatur *impetum.* Heinſ. quidem legi vellet, *Juſtique vindicavit exemplum imperi.* infelici prorſus conjectura. Quis enim non videt, quantum hæc lectio a codicibus abeat, & quam dure & ſine exemplo dicatur, *vindicare imperii exemplum?* Hæc tamen Bentleio egregia emendatio, qui eam in textum repoſuit. At ſi recepta lectio retineatur, merito aliquid ſententiæ deeſſe videtur. quem enim *impetum vindicavit?* Piratarum, opinor, adeoque excidiſſe verſum, qui fuerit hujuſmodi, 20.

Quem fecerant infeſta prædonum manus. non mihi ſumo ipſa Phædri verba dare, ſed ſenſum me ſpero aſſecutum eſſe. abſque tali adminiculo verſus hic non poſſit non videri præruptus nimis, adeoque vitio aliquo laborare, cui fruſtra alias medicinam quærunt.

Quid ergo poſſum facere tibi Lector Cato? Catonem 21.

LIB. IV. *nem* proverbialiter de morosо dici pluribus ostendit Rittershus. B. vero nec hæc intacta abire patitur, & inserit post Quid *ego*, importune.

25. *Hoc illis dictum est, si qui stulti nauseant,*
Et ut putentur sapere, cœlum vituperant. Codd. pro *stulti stultitiam.* pro quo Ritterſh. *Hoc illis dictum est, qui* stultitia *nauseant.* rectissime, ni fallor. Qui fastidiosi sunt, non quia delicati & subtilis ingenii, sed quia stupidi, & sensum nullum habent. sic Gronov. *si* ex præcedente *st* videtur accreviſſe; & inducendum esse res ipsa ostendit. Phædrus enim nunquam ad hunc morem, *Hoc illis dictum est*, si *qui*, sed *illis*, *qui*. *Cœlum* autem *vituperare*, est naturæ & dei ordinem sapientissimum improbare, vel deo ipsi convitium facere & imprudentiæ accusare. sic Gronov. & Scheff. sic *cœlum* pro deo sumitur, 19. 24. *Cœlum fatiges sordido perjurio.* Nec huic locutioni multum dissimile est id Senecæ de Beata Vita. *c.* 27. "Quis iste furor? "quæ ista inimica diis hominibusque natura est? "infamare virtutes, & malignis sermonibus sancta "violare? Si potestis, bonos laudate; si minus, "transite. Quod si vobis exercere tetram istam "licentiam placet, alter in alterum incursitate. "Nam cum *in cœlum insanitis*, non dico sacrile-"gium facitis, sed operam perditis." Audi jam, quid ad hos versus B. qui neutrum eorum illæsum abire vult. pro *stultitia* reponit *consulto.* Quæ vero hæc licentia, ima summis hoc modo mutare, & *stultos* in *consultos* vertere? In altero autem versu, quia *cœlum vituperare* non satis constat proverbio dici, quod dixerat Ritterſh. *cœlum* mira metamorphosi mutat in *nil non.* Pro phrasi indignationis plena,

plena, & insigniter animata, sufficit id quod lan- LIB. IV.
guet prorsus, iners & sine nervis. Quis crediderit hoc librariorum erratum fuisse ? quid magis contra illorum morem, quam pro claris & usitatis obscura & recondita substituere ?

Hæc cum tentaret, ecqua res esset cibi. Non pla- VII. 4.
cet *Hæc*, inquit Schefferus, quia proxime præcessit *vipera*, scribo, *hic. res cibi* est pleonasmo Græcis familiari *cibus*. Sic Rittersh. Gronov. Faber, alii. Heins. vero legi vellet, *si qua spes esset cibi. res quidem cibi* hic minus arridet, quod non videatur adhibendus iste pleonasmus, nisi ubi de rei copia vel præstantia, vel magnitudine agitur, aut contra, si quid elevandum sit, non vero simpliciter, pro eo cui adjunctus est. B. quoque Hellenismum frustra hic advocari censet, & sic totum versiculum reponit, Schefferi nomine dissimulato, quod ad primam partem ; HIC *cum tentaret, ecqua res esset* cibo. Si quid vero mutandum in extrema parte, propius ad scripturam accedit *cibis*, quam *cibo*. Hanc autem emendationem quam imbelli tibicine fulcit ? dixit nempe Horat. Serm. II. 6. *Hoc juvat*, & melli *est*.

Homo simul ac venit in magnum periculum, VIII. 1.
Effugium reperire alterius quærit malo. MS. Rem. hos versus sic exhibet.

Homo in periclum simul ac venit callidus,
Reperire effugium alterius quærit malo : Et sic repositerunt Jac. Gronov. & Hoogstrat. sed in secundo versu metrum ipsum ostendit inversis verbis legendum esse *quærit alterius*. & sic ipse legendum annotaram. Audiamus jam Bentleium ; quasi nemo hactenus Rem. codicis lectionem dedisset, sed sibi

in

Lib. IV. in solidum deberetur, *Hæc & metro & sententia peccant*, Repone *Homo*, &c. *Ita, teste Gudio, codex Remensis, nisi quod ex* alterius quærit, *mutato ordine fecerim*, quærit alterius. Sed in his scribendis tam mire festinabat Vir doctiss. ut pro Remensi lectione re vera in primo versu aliam dederit. Remensis enim sic. *Homo in periclum simul ac venit.* Bent. vero *Homo, simul ac venit in periclum.*

4. *Et altiore clauderetur margine.* Heins. *legit altiori.* Et sic reposuit B. non admonito lectore.

9. *Voluptas ut satiari non possit mea.* B. lege, numero meliore,

Voluptas ut non possit satiari mea. Sic ille; alii vero, opinor, alteram collocationem meliorem censebunt, qua infinitivus præponitur.

X. 4. *Repente vocem* sancta *misit* Religio. Sic I. 27. 6. *Pœnas ut* sanctæ Religioni *penderet. Religio*, utrobique, ut persona, inducitur, & *sancta* solemne ejus epitheton.

7. *Tamen, sceleste, spiritu culpam lues.* mallet Heins. *scelesto*, quod reponit B. mihi tamen *sceleste* melius videtur, cum aliter *Religio* nullo verbo Furem compellaret, quod fieri tamen oportuit.

10. *Per quem verendos excolit pietas deos.* Nullus, si quid video, in toto Phædro versus est, qui magis auctorem suum referat. *Pietas*, pii homines, perpetuo Phædri more quo *abstracta* pro *concretis* ponit. *excolit* pro simplici *colit.* quod verbi significationem intendit: quod si paulo affectatius videatur, nonnulla apud ipsum talia deprehendi viri eruditissimi jam olim censuerunt. *Verendos* autem epitheton diis maxime proprium. cum deos *vereri* optimis autoribus perpetuum fere sit. Heinsius tamen,

men, quod Pithœi codex pro pro *verendos* habeat *colendos*, forte, inquit, *colendos extulit*. Quid vero ſit *deos per ignem colendos efferre*, explicet, qui poſſit. Bentleius ad Heinſii exemplum, arrepto *colendos*, pro *excolit* reponit *cenſuit*, cum quid ſit *excolere deos*, ſe neſcire fateatur, neque *verendos deos* qui dixerit, meminerit. nullum ſcilicet horum exemplum Stephanus in Theſauro dedit. cum vero dicatur majeſtas *verenda*, patres *verendi*, cur non & *dii verendi?* quod autem ad *excolit*, Burm. exemplum opportunum ex Ovidio adduxit. Ex Ponto I. 7. 59. LIB. IV.

Quæque tua eſt pietas; ut te non excolat *ipſum,*
Jus aliquod tecum fratris amicus habet.

Sed addit vir doctiſſ. Hoc ſaltem ſcire videor, *verendos* deos a ſupremo Jove non ex decoro dici. At cur non mortalibus eos *verendos* dicat, quorum ipſe primus eſt? Neque vero *Jupiter* hæc dicit, ſed *Religio.*

Non explicabit alius, quam qui repperit. Heinſ. mallet, *explicarit*, ſed citra neceſſitatem. id tamen reponit B. 15.

Avertit oculos. Cauſam quæſivit pater. XI. 6.

Odi, inquit, illum. Hæc B. ut ſolet, corrumpit ingerendo *ut* poſt *Cauſam.*

Utilius nihil eſt homini, quam recte loqui. XII. 1.

Probanda cunctis eſt quidem ſententia. Sic I. 5. 1. *Nunquam* eſt *fidelis cum potente ſocietas. Teſtatur hæc fabella*—Et IV. 25. 34. *Palam mutire plebeio piaculum* eſt. Bentleius vero pro vehementi quo tenetur emendandi pruritu, *utilius nihil* eſſe *homini, quam recte loqui.* plane contra auctoris mentem.

Pares

LIB. IV. XV. 6. *Pares dum non sint vestræ fortitudinis.* Ritterſh. *Fortitudini*, cui aſſentitur Heinſius. MS. *fortitudine.* pro quo Gud. quoque reponendum cenſet *fortitudini.* atque his accedit B. Alii vero receptam lectionem tuentur exemplis Ciceronis & Lucani. Ille in Piſonem. *Illum*, cujus *paucos* pares *hæc civitas tulit.* Hic L. V. *Quem metuis*, par hujus *erat.* Et ſane cum præcedentis verſiculi *veſtri muneris*, melius videtur convenire *Fortitudinis.*

XVI. 2. *Æſopus finxit conſolandi gratia.* Guyet. *hoc ſolandi.* Bent. conſolandi *hoc.* Sed magis ex Phædri more eſt, ſi *hoc* omittas. ſic III. 18. 5. *Tunc* conſolandi gratia *dixit deo.*

3. *Vexata ſævis navi tempeſtatibus.* MS. *Navis*, quod forte rectum, *eſt* ſubintellecto, ut III. 10. 11. & IV. 24. 8. cum ex pronuntiantis mora in fine verſus, i. e. ex diſtinctione, conſtet ſententiam non pendere, ſed integram eſſe, & abſolutam. Major igitur diſtinctio hic ponenda eſt ad *tempeſtatibus*; in fine autem ſequentis verſus minima vel nulla, ut cum tertio conjungatur. quod ſi *eſt* in primo verſu neceſſarium putetur, inſeri poſſit poſt *vexata.* Hæc autem narrationis ratio Phædri brevitatem mire exprimit. B. vero, ut hæc connectat, quæ ſibi hiantia videntur, hunc & tres ſequentes verſus in unam periodum concludit inſerendo V. 3. *ut* poſt *ſubito*, ſed in his Gudium ducem habuiſſe ſe fatetur. Heinſ. *Ut ſubito.* Sed ſi quid mutandum, malim cum Ritterſhuſio, pro *ſubito mutatur dies*, *mutato die.*

7. *Nimiaque nautas hilaritate extollere.* ſic Cic. Fam. II. 10. *Poſt comitia iſta præclara: quæ me lætitia extulerunt.* citante Gronovio. Heinſ. vero conjicit legen-

legendum, Nimia *ecce nautas hilaritas extollere.* LIB. IV.
vel, *Nimiaque* nautæ ſe *hilaritate extollere.* quod poſterius arripuit B. ſed *extollere* pro *extollebant* non eſt Phædrini moris, ideoque non temere admittendum, nec facile *cæperunt* ex priore verſu repetas.

Canes legatos olim miſere ad Jovem, XVII. 1.

Melioris vitæ tempus oratum ſuæ. Argumentum hujus Fabulæ tam invenuſtum ac ſpurcum eſt, ut totam a Phædro libenter abjudicarem, aut certe illa facile carerem. Ut vero ipſa eſt inquinatiſſima, ſic corrupta admodum ad nos pervenit, & a capite uſque ad calcem mendis obſeſſa, nec levis Meurſii ſuſpicio eſt plures hinc illinc verſus excidiſſe. Secundum verſum ita corrigit Urſinus, *Meliora vitæ tempora oratum ſuæ.* Et ſic ipſe quoque ad libri marginem. nec aliter Heinſ. niſi quod pro *ſuæ* mallet *ſibi*, quod reponit B.

Ut ſeſe abriperet hominum contumeliis. MS. Rem. 3.
arriperet. unde Gud. *eriperet.* ſic I. 28. 11. *Aquila ut periclo mortis* eriperet *ſuos.* Hoc igitur reponit B.

Citati non reſpondent. Hic quædam deeſſe non 8.
temere conjecit Meurſius.

Propulſi vero fuſtibus vadunt foras. Nihil hic 12.
B. Heinſ. *propulſi* ut *vero fuſtibus.* Sed cum *vero* præceſſerit, v. 10. ſuſpicor *vero* hic in mendo eſſe; quid quod *vadunt* ſegne nimis videtur, ut cum *propulſi* conjungatur. ſic igitur legendum putem,

Propulſi ne ſint *fuſtibus, vadunt foras.*

Mirati ſibi legatos non revertier, 14.

Turpe æſtimantes aliquid commiſſum a ſuis. Hic etiam Meurſ. quædam excidiſſe non immerito putat;

Lib. IV. tat; si minus, vel *mirati* est pro *mirati sunt*, vel legendum *mirari*. Heins. *mirari hi sibi*. sed istud *hi* nequaquam videtur necessarium, cum ex narrationis serie facile intelligatur. In secundo versu, *æstimantes* est pro composito *existimantes*. ut III. 4. 5. Cum vero hanc vocem hoc sensu Phædri ætate usurpari non satis constet, B. pro *æstimantes* reponit *autumantes*. Sed a recepta lectione non temere discedendum, cum eadem vox, ut dixi, eodem sensu iterum nostro adhibeatur: *autumo* vero in *participio*, nusquam quod sciam, apud veteres occurrat.

16. *Post aliquod tempus aliud adscribi jubent.* Codd. *adsciri*, quod reponit B. præeunte Heinsio, de quo tacet.

17. *Rumor legatos superiores prodidit.* Hic etiam Meurs. notat lacunam. *prodidit*, est aperuit, notumque fecit, quam turpiter se gessissent. Scheff. B. *Venter legatos*. quia Plautus dixit, Rud. II. 7. 31.

Itaque alvum prodi *speravit nobis salsis poculis*. Achilleum sane argumentum; *Alvus* seu *venter prodi* dicitur, id est, *solvi*; igitur *venter* hominem *prodidit*. Quæ hæc sequela? Si quid mutandum, mallem *Timor*; sed indubie *Rubor* est vera lectio. ut IV. 4. 3. *Athenas* Rumor *implet*. Et hac voce Phædrus alias libenter utitur.

19. *Odore canibus anum, sed multo, replent.* B. legendum forte, *Sed spurco*, quæ spurca certe emendatio, sed typographi, opinor, culpa accidit, præter ipsius animum, ut hæc elegans lectio in textu reponatur. quid vero, num timuerunt, ne hi quoque legati cacando Jovis Regiam inquinarent, &

ad

ad hoc præcavendum *odorem spurcum* adhibent? LIB. IV.
Odor hic in bonam partem sumitur pro aromatis, ut recte Ritterſh. licet hoc ſenſu plurali quidem numero plerumque veniat. Hic autem ita ſumi liquet ex V. 25. *Odorem mixtum cum merdis cacant.* pro *multo*, veriſſima, ni fallor, emendatione legendum *nimio*. in utroque par ductuum numerus, & ex eo maxima vocum in MSS. ſimilitudo.

Mandata dant, legati mittuntur, ſtatim 20.
Adeunt. Rogantes aditum continuo impetrant. Codd. *Mandant, dimittuntur ſtatim.* Ritterſh. *Mandata dant, dein dimittuntur.* Sed *dein* nuſquam, quod ſciam, eſt diſſyllabum. Urſinus, *Mandant eadem, dein dimittuntur ſtatim.* Heinſ. *Mandata dantur, & dimittuntur ſtatim.* Jac. Gronovius, *Mandant, maturent, ac.* Burm. *Mandata dant legatis, quos mittunt, ſtatim Adeant.* Gud. *Mandantur antro, non dimittuntur ſtatim*, & verſum hunc ante duos ultimos collocari vult, quem ſequitur Hoogſtrat. Horum quod vult Gronov. maxime arridet; cum vero ſequatur *Adeunt. rogantes aditum*, videtur excidiſſe nomen ejus quem adierunt, ideoque legendum putem,

Mandant, dein dimittuntur. MERCURIUM *ſtatim Adeunt.* Sed videamus jam quid B. ille accurate omnibus, ut ſolet in hoc opere, expenſis. Repone, inquit,

Mandant, DENT OPERAS, *ut dimittantur ſtatim.* Et tanquam clara & certa eſſet emendatio, ne verbum quidem addit, cum tamen omnium quas viderim, longe peſſima videatur. Sed iſti occaſionem dedit Salmaſii conjectura, *Mandant,* PRIORES UT DIMITTANTUR *ſtatim.* Quid enim hic *dent*

LIB. IV. *operas* pro *operam?* qualis autem sententia? num hi debebant a Jove poscere, ut vel ipsi, vel *priores*, STATIM *dimittantur*, an tacite potius, & patienter expectare, donec illi dimittere visum fuerit? Infortunium priorum ortum est ex eo, quod non *celeri gradu*, sed lente nimium proficiscerentur, V. 6. nec *statim* recte de reditu ad suos dici videtur, unde nondum discesserant, cum res ipsa aliquam saltem moram poscret. In secundo versu pro *Adeunt*, Scheff. *abeunt*, cum sequatur, *rogantes aditum*. *Adeunt* enim *rogantes aditum*, vix ferri posse putavit; recte quidem, si conjungas; sin post *adeunt* distinguas, emendatio nequaquam videtur necessaria. Mercurium enim adeunt, petentes ab eo aditum ad Jovem. Sed ad hujus exemplum *Abeunt* reposuit B. non admonito lectore se a Burmanniana lectione discedere.

24. *Canes, confusus subito quod fuerat fragor,*

Repente odorem mixtum cum merdis cacant. Canes confusi scribere debuerat B. sic enim in textu Burm. *Confusus* est codicum lectio; sed omnium fere consensu prava. Gud. Heins. Scheff. alii dederant *confusi*, quod tanquam de suo reponit Vir doctiss. Sed & Gud. & Gronov. *subitus*, quod arripuit etiam, eorum nomine tacito: pro *quod fuerat* vero, ille, de suo, *terruerat*; quæ conjectura, opinor, orta est ex I. 2. 14. *missum* quod *subito* — terruit *pavidum genus*. Heins. *ruerat*. Gronov. *Confusos subitus fecerat fragor*. Verius forte, *Effusus subito quod fuerat fragor*, quod parum abit a MSS. *Quod fuerat* vero toties apud Phædrum occurrit, ut in eo ipsius videar manum agnoscere.

26. *Reclamant omnes, vindicandam injuriam.* Heins. *Exclamant,*

Exclamant, & sic ipse ad libri marginem adscrip- LIB. IV.
seram. Ut in Plauti loco laudato ad III. 10. 49. *Exquiratur* eruditi reposuerunt pro *requiratur*. B. pro more, UT *clamant*.

Sed hoc feretis pro judicio præmium. Gudius pro 30.
sed, stet *hoc (feretis pro judicio præmium) Non* cito *dimitti*. quem sequitur Hoogstratanus. Alii retinent *sed*, verum pro *feretis* Meurs. *ferent ii*. quod B. reponit. sed pro *ii*, *hi*, Miror autem cur nihil dixerit ad illa verba *pro judicio*, pro quo Gud. pro *justitia*. quorum ego neutrum intelligo. Heins. pro *delicto*, vel *vindicta*, sed nec ista placent, & a scriptura nimium recedunt. Vera, ni fallor, lectio, pro *immunditia*, quæ vox si duplex *m* & *n* non scribantur, sed supra lineolis notentur, ad *judicio* quam proxime accedit, & rei de qua agitur, optime convenit.

Non veto dimitti, verum cruciari fame. B. *volo*, 31.
quod est a Guyeto, sed tacito ejus nomine. quomodo vero hoc convenit cum eo quod dictum est V. 28. *Non est legatos regis non dimittere?* melius, ni fallor, Gudius, qui pro *veto*, *cito*, quod reposuit Jac. Gronov. & Hoogstratan.

Illi autem qui miserunt vos tam futiles, Gud. & 33.
Heins. *hos*, quibus accedit B. sed tanquam de suo dat. sed fortasse hoc dixit Jupiter, ad legatos conversus; & tum *vos* recte se habet.

Nunquam carebunt hominis contumelia. Scheffer. 34.
legendum censet *hominum*. ut v. 3. *hominum contumeliis*.

Ita nunc legatos expectant & posteri; 35.
Novumque venire qui videt, culum olfacit. Codd.
Ita nunc legatos expectantes posteros.

LIB. IV. *Novum venire cum videt, culum olfacit.* Frustra hæc eruditi corrigere conati sunt, cum ipsi numeri ostendant versum priorem sincerum esse; sed aliquis post eum exciderit, necesse est; qui fuit forte hujusmodi, *Naso sagaci videas in triviis canes.* In secundo vero constructio postulat ut pro *cum* legamus *qui*. Editt. Vett. utrumque versum exhibent ut Codd. Et inter recentiores, Jac. Gronov. & Hoogstrat. secundum servarunt. Ad hæc B. *Reponas*, inquit, *nescio an vere, melius certe quam nunc habetur.*

Ita nunc legatos quisque expectans posterûm,
Novum venire cum videt, culum olfacit.

Neque hanc conjecturam, de qua ipse se nescire an vera sit fatetur, in textu ponere erubuit. addit *Sed forte versus hinc excidit, ut alii plures in hac Fabula.* Quod si hujus postremi versus gratia totam hanc fœdam fabulam confinxit Phædrus, otium suum vix ineptius collocare potuit.

XVIII. 3. *Sinuque fovit contra seipse misericors.* Malim *se-ipsum* ad vitandum tot brevium concursum, sic XIX. 19. *ipsum te fraudas cibo*, licet ibi quidem legendum putem *ipse te.*

XIX. 3. *Pervenit ad draconis speluncam ultimam.* id est in *ultimam* speluncæ partem, ut Ter. *ultima platea. ultimis ædibus*; sic Scheff. Hoogstratanus autem *ultimam* putat pro *prima* dici, ubi incipiebat draconis spelunca; ut *ab ultimo initio, ultimum in amicitia, sanguinis ultimus auctor.* Burmanno *ultima spelunca* est profunda, maxime remota, a terræ superficie, ut *ultimis orbis, ultimæ terræ.* Bentleius, ut solet, nodum solvit mutando *ultimam* in *intimam*, quia sc. dicitur *intimus angulus, intimus sinus,*

nus, intimus receſſus: quæ quidem exempla pro- LIB. IV.
bant *intimus* probum eſſe verbum, & a Phædro adhiberi potuiſſe, ſed præterea nihil. Ego ſane per *ultimam* nihil aliud intelligi puto, niſi quod vulpes *tandem* pervenit ad draconis ſpeluncam, & is ſenſus eſt quem voluit Heinſ. qui mallet *ultimo*. Gud. *ultimum* pro *ultimo*. ſed quomodocunque explices, *ultimam*, opinor, retinendum.

Quem fructum capis 8.

Hoc ex labore, quodve tantum eſt præmium? Schoppius & Heinſ. *tanti*. ſed iſta mutatio nequaquam neceſſaria. B. delet *eſt*. peſſime, ut mihi videtur. Sed *fructum*, inquit, & *præmium* conjungit Cicero. Eſto; an vero Cicero iis in locis verbum poſt primum nomen ponit, quod hic factum eſt, an poſteriori adjungit? præterea Phædrus non dicit, *quem fructum, quod præmium?* ſed *quodve tantum præmium?*

Qui thure ſuperos, ipſum te fraudas cibo. numeri 19.
erunt meliores, ſi legamus *ipſe te*. & ſic repoſuit Hoogſtrat.

Libitina ne quid de tuo faciat lucrum. Guyet. 26.
lucri, vel *quod lucrum*. poſterius repoſuit B. Ritterſh. & Faber. *lucri*.

Quid judicare cogitet livor modo,

Licet diſſimulet, pulchre tamen intelligo. Miror XX. 1.
doctiſſ. virum ſervare diſtinctionem poſt *modo*, cum multo rectius *modo* adjungatur ſequentibus. & ſic Scheff. Jac. Gronov. Hoogſtrat. *judicare* vero eſt de ſcriptis ejus ſententiam proferre; ſed B. pro eo reponit pro arbitrio ſuo *prædicare*.

——*Dignum memoriæ.* Quicquid afferant ad hanc 3.
lectionem tuendam, legendum puto *memoria*. Ut

LIB. IV. Prol. V. 9. *Dignumque longa judicatis memoria.* Optimus enim quisque sui interpres, & Phædrus semper alias ad hanc formam.

XXI. 8. *Erat autem natus, ut aiunt, in Ceo insula.* Non ita Burm. sed *Cea.* olim quidem omnes *Ceo.* sed Guid. & Heinf. *Cea.* quos secutus est Burm. sed pro *natus, ut aiunt,* numerorum gratia scribendum, *ut aiunt, natus.* ut V. 6. 6. *Carbonem, ut aiunt.* atque ita repositi B.

9. *Quam tempestas horrida,*
Simul & vetustas medio dissolvit mari.

Hi zonas—B. ne hiaret oratio, hic etiam *ut* inserit post *medio,* invenuste prorsus.

15. *Quia plures onere degravati perierunt.* Sic Guyet. Heinf. Salmasius, penultima correpta, ut in *abierunt,* 19. 16. & *præbuerunt,* II. 4. 24. & hujus sane licentiæ ignorantia plura Veterum loca depravavit; sed hic *perierant* videtur constructionis etiam ratione melius; hoc igitur merito B. revocavit. *Ideo,* inquit, *pauci enatant, quia plures perierant.*

25. *Quos casu obvius*
Simonides ut vidit: Dixi, inquit, mea
Mecum esse cuncta: vos quod rapuistis, perit. In primo versu Salmasius mallet *obvios.* cui accedit B. In tertio Vir doctiss. reponit *habuistis.* Cur, inquit, quæso, *rapuistis?* an res suas in subsidium vitæ colligere est *rapere?* Quæ vero correctionis hujus necessitas? *rapuistis* est pro composito *eripuistis,* sc. e naufragio. Et hoc Simonidem decuit, qui sibi de suis nihil sumpsit; dum alii trepide concurrarent, nec tam sumerent, quam *raperent.*

XXIII. 9. *Quid horum simile tibi contingit, rustica?* Magnopere vellem, ut hac saltem ab Fabula interpolanda

landa & corrumpenda temperasset Vir doctiss. cum nulla sit in toto Phædro elegantior, venustatisque plenior. Sed ceterarum vicem hæc quoque experta est, & hic etiam versus longe pulcherrimus, quo *musca* urbana jactationem suam egregie claudit, dimidia sui parte mulcatur; & pro *contingit Rustica*, Vir doctiss. reponit *Contra infit Rustica:* absurdissime; num enim Orationem tanta arte factam & tantæ jactantiæ plenam, definere oportuit in verbis & pondere & sono & acumine carentibus? ubi tam abjecti & humiles numeri, & oratio ipsa imperfecta? Quid horum *simile tibi?* Quis unquam periodum numerosam, & vehementer animatam ita clausit? absit ut putemus hoc a Phædri manu esse. Præterea, num credibile est Phædrum *Rusticam* pro *formica* loco nominis dixisse, quasi formicæ uni conveniret, ut *Auritulus* asino, *Barbatus* hirco? quod si *muscæ* id demus, nulla vox illi magis convenire potuit, aut acutius orationem ejus claudere. Nemini, opinor, Vir doctiss. emendationem suam probaverit, cui sit aliquis vel orationis, vel proprietatis, vel decori sensus. timuit scilicet, ne stupidus & insulsus Lector non intelligeret quæ sequuntur, *formicæ* esse verba, nisi iis monitus quæ ipse suffecit. Sed vanus ille metus, cum nemo tam sit fatuus, tam tardus, ut in tam plena via deliraret. vid. simile prorsus orationis initium. I. 30. 7. LIB. IV.

Sed illi, qui invitatur, non qui invisus est. B. dedit Auctor, *invitatus*, & *invisus*. Bis accipitur *est*. Ille nempe venustum putat, ut sint ὁμοιοτέλευτα: ego contra, voluisse Phædrum id evitare; & idem alios omnes sensisse opinor, cum nemo ante eum 11.

Lib. IV. hæc sollicitaret. Quod si ad singula *muscæ* eodem ordine respondisse *Formica* censenda est, hic inserendus est versus decimus quintus; & dum hæc scribo, eo ordine video collocatum in editione Neveleti, qui retinuit, opinor, quod in prioribus editionibus invenit, cum non se hic quicquam immutasse dicat. Idem versus sequentes hoc ordine dat. *Reges commemoras. Superba jactas. Nihil laboras. Ego granum. Te Circa. Æstate.* atque eundem fere ordinem reponendum censuit Guyetus, sed *Aras frequentas* inserit post *superba jactas.* Cui assentitur Gud. excepto quod *Aras frequentas* poni velit ante *Reges commemoras.* B. recepto ordine in aliis servato, *superba jactas* collocat post *Reges commemoras*, & hunc eum locum obtinuisse dicit in Editt. vett. unde putes Editt. illas in reliquorum ordine cum recentioribus convenire, quod vix crediderim, cum tam diversus ab eo abeat Neveletus.

14. *Te circa murum video pasci stercore.* Cum frumenta ex agris in horrea conduntur, *Formicæ* ad ista accedentes, ut grana copiosius congerant, ibi circa muros *muscas* stercore pascentes vident. Quorsum igitur mutat Vir doctiss. *Circa murum* in *circum rura?* Sed αὐτὸς ἔφη, nec verbum addit, quo probet.

17. *Superba jactas, tegere quod debet pudor.* MS. *Super etiam jactas, tegere quod debes pudor.* Quod miror editores mutasse. B. pro *debes* reponit *jubet.* Sed non video cur non retineatur vel *debes* vel *debet.*

XXIV. 5. *Certo condixit pretio, secretum petit.* MS. *conduxit.* brevitatem hanc, quæ adeo Phædro placuit,

pati

pati nequit Vir doctiss. reponit igitur, *Certo con-* LIB. IV.
ductus pretio, dein, *conductus mercede*, quod nemo nescit, recte dici probat exemplis pro more ex Stephano petitis. *Conduxit* pluribus tuetur Burmannus, cum proprie dicatur de iis, qui certo pretio opus aliquod suscipiunt; ut is *locare* dicitur, qui quid faciendum certo pretio alteri mandat. Sed vix persuadet, ex juris formulis hic loqui Phædrum, cum *Condicere* videatur optime hic convenire ex quotidiano usu. Et id Plinius adhibuit Epistola ad Vespasian. dedicatoria, *cum hanc operam condicerem.* ubi videtur idem esse, ac *suscipere.*

Usus poetæ, ut moris est, licentia. Si hæc sana 8.
sunt, *Usus* ponitur pro *usus est*, ut *Seductus* III. 10. 11. & *Vexata* IV. 16. 3. nisi cum Guyeto, versu sequente *atque* mutes in *apte*, quod parum placet. Heins. vero conjecit legendum, *Usus poetici est moris licentia*; sed numeri sic erunt invenusti. melius fuerit, *Poetici usus moris est licentia.* vel *Moris poetici usus est licentia.* B. *Usus Poeta moris est licentia*, hoc est, inquit, *licentia more concessa.* utinam exemplo aliquo Vir doctiss. tam mirum loquendi genus comprobasset.

Auctoritatem similis referens gloriæ. id est, simi- 10.
lem illorum gloriam in eodem certaminis genere narrans, quorum exemplum dignitatem atque auctoritatem insignem illi conciliabat. Nec ullus, opinor, in Phædro versus hoc sanior, aut quod pulchrius rei de qua agitur conveniat. B. vero totum convellit. Quocunque te vertas, inquit, nihil extricabis. Repono,

Auctoritatis

Lib. IV. *Auctoritatis illa referens* gratia. Qua vero hoc auctoritate? Quia alibi Phædrus dixit,

Æsopi nomen sicubi interposuero,
Auctoritatis esse scito gratia. *Gratia* & *Gloria* passim a Librariis confunduntur; & nota illic *interposuero*. Ita venustissimum versum & ad Lyrici carminis dignitatem assurgentem evertit, & omnem illi gratiam ademit.

13. *Illi, inquit, reddent, quorum sunt partes duæ.* Hæc pro Burmannianis dat Vir doctiss. cum nec ille, nec alius quisquam ita versum hunc ediderit. pro *partes* scribendum erat *laudis*. Mirum profecto est, cum sibi conscius esset, quam festinanter & negligenter se in hoc opusculo dedisset, non potuisse ferre exiguam illam moram, quæ relegendo, & erratorum indici contexendo necessaria fuit. Veras tam pudendæ festinationis causas nolim altius investigare, cum ipsa festinatione tetriores eas esse, & venia magis indignas, nemo sit, qui ignoret. In hoc autem versu pro *reddent*, Vir doctiss. *reddant*. id est *reddant illi, si velint, non ego*; quod tamen impietatis in deos speciem præ se fert, ut mihi quidem vehementer hæc emendatio eo nomine displiceat.

14. *Verum ut ne irate dimissum te sentiam.* Unde sit quod Recentiores dederint *dimissum te*, quod numeros corrumpit, pro *te dimissum*, nescio. sic enim Nevelet. pro *sentiam* vero, legendum forte *sentiant*. sc. dii, quorum laudes Simonides celebrasset. Scheff. *sentias*. Heins. *Verum ne ingrate te dimissum sentias*. sed MS. pro *ne*, *ut ne*, unde Burm. *Verum ut ne ingrate dimissum te censeas*. B. tanquam de suo, *Verum ut ne irate te dimissum censeas*. Ne putes me

iratum

iratum te dimittere, ad cenam te invito. Sed nihil opus est cur *sentias* mutetur in *censeas*, qua posteriori voce Scheffer. priorem explicavit. LIB. IV.

Ne male dimissus gratiam corrumperet, 18.

Promisit — Ad hæc nihil B. nec alii quicquam, quod satisfaciat. Potes tuam ipsius gratiam corrumpere; hoc intelligo. alterius, priusquam acceperis, quomodo possis corrumpere, nescio. Re diligenter perpensa opinor hic quædam excidisse, quod sæpe alias in Phædro evenisse manifestum est. fuerint autem ad hunc fere modum, aut saltem in hunc sensum,

Ne male dimissus, se *ægre* id ferre ostenderet,

Negando & initam *gratiam corrumperet.*

Primum esse ne tibi videar molestior. Cod. Rem. XXV.
Primum esse tibi ne. Jac. Gronov. ad versum sustentandum, pro *molestior immodestior.* alii voces transponunt. *Primum esse ne tibi.* Ego mallim, *Primum tibi esse*, vel, quod magis placet, *Primum ne videar esse tibi molestior.* B. hoc modo, trium verborum ordine inverso; *Primum esse videar ne* tibi *molestior. Accentus hic*, inquit, *dignitatem pronomini addit.* Verius fortasse, *videar* ego *molestior.* 2.

Habere ut possit aliquid operis residui. Malim *residuum*, dixeris enim, *aliquid operis relictum*, non *aliquid operis relicti.* 5.

Brevitati nostræ præmium ut reddas, peto. Cod. *Brevitatis* & *nimium.* Salm. & Heins. *brevitati.* pro *nimium*, Salm. *nimirum.* Jac. Gronov. *mutuum.* Sed quæ sequuntur, *Quod es pollicitus*, suadent ut verius putem *præmium*, cum *præ* forte ideo exciderit, quod præcesserit *træ.* Sed aliud, ni fallor, majoris momenti mendum hic latet, quædam 8.

nempe

LIB. IV. nempe ante hunc versum deperdita esse, quibus hic versus cum præcedentibus cohæreret, & quæ Patroni nomen, quicunque fuerit, ad quem hæc scripta sunt, continerent, cum nusquam alias in hac prolixa adlocutione nominetur. forte fuerit hujusmodi versiculus,

At tu, Particulo, si placent quæ scripsimus. Particulonem enim esse, ad quem hæc Phædrus, sequentis libri Prologus videtur non obscure ostendere. vid. *v.* 10.—14.

11. *Et hoc minus perveniet ad me muneris.* MSS. *Veniet.* alii aliis modis labanti versui succurrerunt. Faber *minus & minus.* Gud. *minus usu.* Ursin. & Heins. quibus accedit Burm. *perveniet.* mihi quidem magis arridet *deveniet*, quæ conjectura est Guyeti.

19. *Et mors vicina flagitabit debitum.* B. *flagitarit*, quia præcessit *desierit*, cui nequaquam assentior, cum *desierit* sit futurum exactum, ut loquuntur Grammatici, verba enim sunt, *Quum jam desierit*; *flagitabit* vero tempus proprie futurum significet, oportet.

20. *Stultum admovere tibi præces existima.* Pro *preces existima* in Rem. codice est PRECESEXES, in Pithœano, PRECEPSEXIS unde Pithœus, *præces existima.* Ad quæ Gudius, Quid ineptius, quid stultius, si ita Phædrus scripsisset? quin se ipsum stultissimum declarasset, qui plus una vice Eutycho preces jam admoverat. Scheff. maluit, *existimo*, ut sit formula confitentis importunitatem tot suarum precum. Gud. legendum putat certissima emendatione *Sexcenties*, quod ait hoc modo compendio sæpe scribi. Verum hoc minus placet, quod

quod & Phædrum nimiæ importunitatis, & patro- Lib. IV.
num duritiæ nimiæ argueret, adeoque ſupplicantem parum deceret. Videamus jam quid hic B. *exiſtima*, inquit, a Pithœo eſt. mallem cum celeberrimo Burmanno *exiſtimo*. Quam infeliciter vero benevolentiam celeberr. Burmanni Vir doctiſſ. hic captat, cum *exiſtimo* non ſit Burmanni conjectura, ſed ut dixi, Schefferi? Burm. quid hic eligat neſcit, ſed *exiſtima* corruptum eſſe cenſet. dein vero B. memoratis & codicum lectionibus & conjectura Gudii, ſic ipſe reponit,

Stultum admovere tibi preces eſt Eutyche,
Proclivis ultro cum ſis miſericordiæ.

Is Eutychus eſt, inquit, cui & tertium librum dedicavit. Sane tot preces hic admovere, cum neminem nominaverit, ſtultiſſimum eſſet. Excidit vocabulum ex fine verſus, ut V. Prol. 3. & 4.. Hæc ille. Quis autem non putaret hæc omnia de ſuo eum dediſſe? verſus tamen ſecundi emendationem in ſolidum debet celeberrimo Scheffero. Suſpicor, inquit Scheff. ſcripſiſſe. *Proclivis* (ultro) *quum ſis miſericordiæ.* Silius *l.* 13. *Sceleri proclivis egeſtas.* Quod ipſius Bentleii eſt, habes in iſtis verbis, *eſt Eutyche*, & nemo, opinor, ipſius eſſe invidebit. Excidit, inquit, ex fine verſus vocabulum. Sed unde conſtat id fuiſſe *Eutyche?* verum quidem eſt Gudium putaſſe, hunc librum Eutycho dedicatum eſſe; ſed Particulonem potius fuiſſe, longe veri ſimilius tum ex ſequentis libri Prologo, tum ex *v.* 24. ubi innuere videtur ſe novum jam ſibi patronum acquiſiviſſe. Sed demus Eutychum fuiſſe, ſi hoc igitur vocabulum a fine excidit, tum *exes* vel *exis* nihil aliud eſt quam corruptio τὸ *eſt*. quod tamen in MSS.

LIB. IV. MSS. una ſæpe litera ſcribi ſolet. Quod ſi plene ſcribatur, nulla ratione minutum illud monoſyllabum in *exes* vel *exis* a librariis dilatari potuit. At inquit vir doctiſſ. ſtultiſſimum eſſet non nominari illum cui tot preces admoventur. Concedo, ſed ut par fuit nominari, ita citius id fieri oportuit, & non ad verſum uſque viceſimum deferri; & proinde ipſe verſu octavo, qui caſu quodam excidit, nominatum fuiſſe melius dubito. Sed videamus jam ſententiam, quæ ex bella hac emendatione oritur.

Stultum admovere tibi preces eſt — Quem paulo humaniorem non offendat hæc adlocutio, ſic ſimpliciter & abſolute poſita? Si re vera ſtultum ſit, cur admovet? Emolliantur hæc oportet, antequam homini cultioris ingenii & politis moribus placere poſſint. Quod opinor, fiet, ſi legamus, *exiſtimes*. pro *admovere* vero malim cum Heinſio, *admoveri*.

Stultum ADMOVERI *tibi preces* EXISTIMES,

Proclivis ultro cum ſis. id eſt, Tu fortaſſe ſtultum putes, tibi preces tam importune admoveri, cum in cauſis, ubi miſericordiæ locus eſt, ultro proclivis in eam ſis. Sed ignoſcas, oro, homini ſeni & jam diu malis graviſſime oppreſſo, quamvis innocenti. Hæc, opinor, Phædri mens. *exes* vero vel compendio ſcriptum eſt pro *exiſtimes*; vel *exis* ſolum ex illa voce ſuperfuit, literis ceteris detritis vel deperditis. Ex ſecundo autem verſu iiſque quæ ſequuntur, conſtare mihi liquido videtur illum ad quem hæc ſcripta ſunt, Judicem fuiſſe; Phædrum vero ob neſcio quod crimen bonis exutum & in cuſtodiam forte conjectum, ibique ab ipſis

Sejani

Sejani temporibus detentum ; vid. Prol. III. 41. atque hic obnixe petere, ut malis illis, aut custodia tandem illa liberetur. Hoc aut aliquid hujusmodi filum orationis & color omnis clare indicant. Quorsum enim alias hic, *misericordia, reus, innocens?* præ ceteris vero *v.* 26. 27. LIB. IV.

Decerne, quod religio, quod patitur fides ;
Et gratulari me fac judicio tuo.

Religio & *Fides* sunt jusjurandum, quo is ad quem scribit, ut Judex, tenebatur ; quo sensu utrumque verbum apud Phædrum alias occurrit. ut III. 13. 8. *Sed ne* religio *peccet imprudens mea*, & III. 10. 40.

Ut adjuvaret jurisjurandi fidem,

Tuæ prius sunt partes ; aliorum dein ; 24.
Similique gyro venient aliorum vices. Cod. Pithœi, sic, ut Nevelet. ad marginem adnotavit,

Tuæ sunt partes, fuerunt aliorum, dein
Simili gyro venient aliorum prius vices. Unde luce clarius est, quod ipse prius ex conjectura ad marginem adscripseram, legendum esse,

Tuæ sunt partes ; fuerunt aliorum prius :
Dein simili gyro venient aliorum vices. Heins. in primo versu, pro *sunt sint.* temere. B. *fuerant*, ideo, opinor, ne penultima præteriti corriperetur ; sed cum alias hoc Phædrus fecerit, cujus duo certissima exempla dedi ad 21. 15. frustra eo nomine hic locus sollicitatur. Quod si constructionem spectes, procul dubio *sunt*, FUERUNT, *erunt*, (vel *venient*) multo rectius dicitur quam *sunt*, FUERANT, *erant.* nec idonea ulla ratio videtur, cur Vir doctiss. *aliorum* mutaret in *illorum.*

Decerne quod religio, quod patitur fides. B. ma- 26.
lim,

Lib. IV. lim, inquit, *poscit*. Quid vero, nonne hoc est patronum injustitiæ postulare? Si fides enim poscit, cur veniam differt? alterum certe longe modestius, ideoque supplicanti aptius.

30. *Integritatis qui sinceræ conscius*. Scheff. *sincere*, Heins. *Integritatis qui sibi veræ conscius*.

32. *Qui sint, requires*. B. *requiris*. sed citra necessitatem.

34. *Palam mutire plebeio piaculum est*. Codd. *periculum*. Sed cum versus sit Ennii a Festo laudatus, ibique sit *piaculum*, hic quoque eam vocem reponendam eruditi censuerunt.

Lib. V. Prol. I. *Cum destinassem operis habere terminum*. Editt. vett. *terminum operis habere*. pro *habere*, Gronov. *statuere*. sic etiam Scheff. & Gudius. Servatis verbis, at inverso ordine, legi possit,

Operis cum destinassem habere terminum. B. reponit tanquam de suo *statuere*. sic enim ille; Cod. habent (quod tamen non constat nisi ex eo, quod sic Editt. vett.) *terminum operis habere*. Unde recte, & sententia & metro meliore,

Cum destinassem terminum operi statuere. Sic ille; sed excidit fortasse post *recte* Gronovii nomen.

3. *Consilium tacito corde damnavi* MEUM. *meum* quod abest a codicibus, Gudius dicit esse a Salmasio; Jac. Gronov. *prius*, B. *statim*; quod posterius ideo displicet, quod auctorem minus quam par erat sibi constantem repræsentet: in *meum* vero nihil est quod reprehendas.

4. *Nam si quis talis etiam est tituli artifex*. Cum ex fine ultima vox in MSS. exciderit, multis conjecturis locum fecit. *artifex*, *appetens*, *avidus*, *diligens*, *locus*:

locus: Gud. pro *tituli, studii diligens,* quod operose tuetur. Jac. Gronov, *æmulus,* ut II. Epil. 7. *Nec hæc Invidia, verum est* ÆMULATIO. In versu præcedente dixerat, *Ne solus esset studii.* quod me aliquantum movet, ut cum Gudio pro *tituli* malim *studii.* sed aliud, opinor, in hoc loco mendum est, pro *est* sc. legendum *sit.* LIB. V.

Quod si quis talis etiam sit tituli æmulus. B. Gronovii conjecturam arripit, & pro sua venditat. Credo, inquit, me in rem ipsam incidisse; & ut versum fulciat, *est* post *tituli* invitis codicibus reponit.

Ut illud ipsum cupiat famæ tradere, Codd. videntur habuisse, 6.

Ut illum ipsum cupiam, quæ manifesto corrupta sunt; statim igitur ad marginem adscripsi, *Ut ille id ipsum cupiat.* atque id vero propius opinor, quam *illud ipsum,* quod a Fabro est.

Sua cuique cum sit animi cogitatio, 7.

Colorque proprius. Vett. edit. habuere *prior* pro *proprior* uno sc. *p.* omisso, ex quo Ritterus. recte *proprius.* Faber *privus.* Bentleius vero hæc pro mendosissimis habet. Quid est enim, inquit, *animi cogitatio?* quidve, *Cuique color proprius?* apage istas labes ab opere elegantissimo. Repono.

Sua cuique cum sit animi conscientia,

Dolorque *proprius. Animi conscientia,* quod sic & alii, & ipse Phædrus locuti sint. III. Prol. 47. *Stulte nudabit* animi conscientiam. & ex eodem prologo probat recte hic reponi *dolor. Affectus proprios,——In calamitatem diligens quædam meam; Nec his* dolorem *delenirem.* Quæ vero ipsi mendosissima visa sunt, alii omnes pro integerrimis habuerunt; nec ulla certe immutandi necessitas. prima emendatio adeo non necessaria est, ut improban-

Lib. V. dam potius putem, cum nulla fere parte ad scripturam codicum accedat. *Cogitatio* vero huic loco tam apta, ut nihil magis, cum ipse III. Prol. 39. de se & Æsopo verba faciens dixerit,

Et cogitavi *plura quam reliquerat*. Et verbo isto *cogito* alias libenter utitur. præcipue vero huc faciunt ultima Fab. XIV. L. III.

Sic ludus animo debet aliquando dari,

Ad cogitandum *redeat ut melior tibi.* Nec quicquam opus est, ut *Color* vertatur in *Dolor.* cum *color*, quod a pictoribus translatum videtur, sit agendi ratio, optimis scriptoribus usitatum, Senecæ vero frequens. *Color*, inquit eruditiss. Gronov. est *habitus, genius, indoles.* Quod si *calamitas* & *dolor*, primam fabulis scribendis occasionem dedere, (quod de Æsopo quidem ejusque fabulis, potius quam de hoc scribendi genere in universum voluisse Phædrum opinor. III. Prol. 33.) aliæ certe causæ erant, quæ ad fabulas fingendas homines allicere potuerint; & compertum est *Fabulas* antiquissimum fuisse docendi genus, ut ad primi libri Prol. dixi; & ampliss*i*ma iis materies convenit, cui *dolor* nullus immiscetur. Receptas igitur Lectiones locum suum tueri nihil vetat. Heins. vero pro *animi, animo.*

12. *Quasi paucas ostenderit, ego plures differo.* MS. Rem. *Quasi paucas ille ostendit*; alterum Pithœi, *Quasi paucas tale ostendit.* Unde statim legendum putavi, si *paucas* sanum sit, *Quia paucas ille ostendit, ego plures fero.* Sed Gudius putat *Quasi*, cum versus præcedens a *Quas* incipiat, delendum esse & legendum, *Paucas ostendit ille, ego* plures *differam.* quod forte rectius, si pro *differam* retinuisset *differo*, quod cur mutet, nescio. Quod si id verbum retineatur, & initio versus *Quia*, necesse est

lega-

legamus, *Quia pauca ostendit ille, ego plura dissero.* LIB. V.
ut III. Prol. 39. *Et cogitavi* PLURA, *quam reliquerat.* B. eandem, in quam ipse incidi, conjecturam reponit.

Quartum libellum dum tu varie (Burm. vacive) *perleges,*

Hunc obtrectare si volet malignitas. Pendere ora- 14.
tionem nemo non videt. mihi quidem persuasum est excidisse versiculum inter hos duos; quod cum mirarer neminem advertisse, video tandem ex Gudii notis idem quoque sensisse Meursium. Qui vero exciderit, ad hunc forte se modum habuit.

Quintum exarabo, studiis ne desim tuis. Quintum exarabo, ut III. Prol. 29. *Librum* exarabo *tertium Æsopi stylo. Studiis ne desim tuis*, quia præcessit v. 10 — *quoniam caperis fabulis*, & mox v. 17. — *quod tu, quod similes tui Vestras in chartas verba transfertis mea.* Sic autem omnia bene cohærent. In priore autem versu Codd. *dum varie*, absque *tu. varie* Pith. mutavit in *vacive*, ut laboranti versui succurreret; quod, cum *vacivus* nusquam post Plauti & Terentii tempora, quod sciam, occurrat. non temere in Phædro admittendum. nec alii tamen hic quicquam melius. Cum autem nec *tu* facile abesse possit, nec *varie* sanum sit, ego quidem legendum arbitror, *dum tu valide*, id est, *strenue, diligenter.* magno enim studio Particulonem Phædri fabulas legisse ostendunt versus v. 17. 18. quos modo adduxi. Quod vero mox *Quartum* Gudio molestiam creat, id ex eo est, quod non animadvertisset vir eruditiss. veteres libellos suos seorsum edere solere, non omnes simul in unum conjunctos. Frustra igitur mutavit *Quartum* in *Quarum*, quod tamen amplexus est Hoogstratanus, &

LIB. V. ex illo Burmannus. Videamus jam quid ad hæc B. *repone* inquit (pro Quartum) *Quintum libellum cum vacarit perleges.* sine dubio hunc quintum, quem Particuloni nunc mittit. Illud vero *Quintum* ab Ursino est, quem non nominat. Sed quis ex hac lectione sensus? *Quare Particulo, quoniam caperis fabulis, Quintum libellum perleges, cum vacarit.* Hoccine voluit Phædrus? minime. Sed quoniam *caperis fabulis*, ad laborem pristinum in tui gratiam redibo, & dum tu quartum libellum, quem nuper ad te dedi, *attente* perleges, ad quintum scribendum me accingam. *Hunc* enim, quod sequitur, manifesto oppositе dicitur ad *quartum* librum. B. vero pro *hunc* in textu posuit *huic*, nescio an dedita opera, an per incuriam. sed aliud est quod pene oblitus sum dicere, distinctionem scilicet pleniorem ponendam esse ad V. 12. ut decimus tertius sequenti annectatur.

II. PROL. 4. *Ut quidam artifices nostro faciunt seculo,*
Qui pretium operibus majus inveniunt, novo
Si marmori adscripserunt Praxitelem suo,
Trito Myronem argento. Fabulæ exaudiant
Adeo fugatæ. Plus vetustis nam favet
Invidia mordax, quam bonis præsentibus. Hæc omnium consensu a *trito* ad *fugatæ* corruptissima sunt. In quarto versu Codd. *Detrito.* hoc autem vocabulum & *Fab. exaud.* ad *fugatæ* nonnulli prorsus omittere maluerunt, quam tam depravata servare. In corrigendo omnes hactenus frustra se exercuerunt, & piget tot tamque infelices conjecturas referre. Ceteris igitur missis veniamus ad ea quæ huic deplorato loco restituendo excogitavit noster, qui primus dedit, quod aliquam veri speciem habeat. Sic igitur Ille.

Qui

Qui pretium operibus majus inveniunt novis, LIB. V.
Si marmori adscripsere *Praxitelen*, Scopan
Aeri, *Myronem argento*, tabulæ Zeuxidem.
Adeo fucatæ *plus* vetustati *favet*

Invidia mordax, quam bonis præsentibus. Et de his mirum quantum sibi plaudit Vir doctiss. Dum sententiam, inquit, auctoris, neglectis literarum ductibus, cogitatione verso; in ipsam *veram* casu nescio an sagacitate incidi. — Et facilis & egregia jam sententia est; cumque emendationes tam longa serie altera succedant alteri, non possunt in lingua emortua *non esse veræ*. Egregia sane emendatio, quam tamen *veram* præstare nolim ex ulla parte, ne dum ex omni, si excipias *tabulæ* quam reposuit loco *fabulæ*, certissima, opinor, correctione, cum & a scriptura minimum recedat, & eo ipsi etiam numeri ducant Casune an sagacitate in emendationes has inciderit, ego quidem nescio, sed video ab *Hoogstratano*, & a *Junio* ad Myronem, Epigramma ex Martiale IV. 39. adductum, quod ante oculos cum in emendationem inciderit, opinor, habuit,

Argenti genus omne comparasti,
Et solus veteres MYRONIS *artes,*

Solus PRAXITELIS *manus* SCOPÆQUE. His addas illa Horatii, Epist. II. 1. 96. MARMORIS *aut eboris fabros aut* ÆRIS *amavit: Suspendit picta vultum mentemque* TABELLA. Cur vero dicat in *lingua emortua non posse non esse veras*, non intelligo; vera enim emendatio vera erit in quavis lingua, *emortua* sit necne. Sed ad rem, si cetera hujus correctionis sana sint, at in extrema certe parte peccat, dum justos extra limites licentius evagatur.

LIB. V. Fines enim intra quos contineri oportebat, terminantur τῷ *fugatæ*. Sequentia enim integerrima esse, adeoque non vexanda quivis viderit. Hæc dico, *Plus vetustis nam favet*

Invidia mordax, quam bonis præsentibus. pro quibus Vir doctiss. reponit, Adeo fucatæ *plus vetustati favet.* In hoc igitur hæc peccat emendatio, quod ad ea, quæ sana sunt, se extendit, & tentando corrumpit; sed aliis etiam nominibus hac in parte peccat, quod & sententia absurda sit, & pariter locutio. Quid enim? num *Invidia vetustati* favet, sciens videnſque eam *fucatam* esse? Is tamen verborum unicus sensus est. Emphasis tota in eo est, quod Invidia *fucatæ etiam vetustati* plus favet. Si enim nesciat *fucatam* esse, pro non *fucata*, pro vera & sincera habet. Qualis vero hæc locutio, *fucata vetustas? fucata* est *fuco obducta*, ut *mulier* vel *species fucata.* id vero quod fuco obductum est, est id quod est; adeoque *vetustas*, licet fuco obducta, est tamen *vetustas. simulata* quidem vel *ficta* vetustas id diceret, quod vult Vir doctiss. *Novitas* sc. speciem *vetustatis* præ se ferens; sed ex *fucata vetustate* sensum istum nunquam exsculpes. Nihil igitur in Viri doctiss. emendatione sani est post *fucatæ.* & proinde ipsa illa *adeo fucatæ* cum iis quæ præcedunt, stare non possunt. Emendatio igitur, si in altera parte peccat, in altera deficit, cum *adeo fucatæ* adhuc erunt pro corruptis habenda. Si quidem cetera ad *Zeuxidem* usque recte restituta sunt, pro *adeo fucatæ*, statim mihi succurrebat legendum *Aut Phidiam ebori.*

—— Scopan

Æri, Myronem *argento*, tabulæ ZEUXIDEM,

Aut

Aut PHIDIAM *ebori.* quod tamen librarii scribere solebant *Fidiā.* Quam vero ille operibus ex *ebore* factis nobilis fuerit, vel pueri norunt. Mihi vero & hoc elegantius quam si in *Zeuxidem* desinas, & constructio postulare videtur ut *Aut* ultimo nomini præponatur. In Epigrammate Martialis modo laudato versibus supra positis proximus est, LIB. V.

Solus Phidiaci *toreuma cæli.* Sed nec Martialem, nec alium quemvis scriptorem inspexeram, cum in hæc incidi. Jam vero ad reliquas emendationis partes accedamus. Prima & ultima sunt a Gronovio, *novis* dico, & *fucatæ.* Sequentia *Scopan Æri, Myronem argento,* hoc incommodo premuntur, quod non in ære sed marmore præstans fuerit Scopas, in ære vero nobilissimus *Myron,* non in argento; unde Heinsio *Myronis nomen merito* suspectum fuit: adde quod *Scopan æri* a *suo detrito* nimium recedant, & *detrito* vix videatur esse ab errantibus Librariis. Quod quidem ad *Zeuxidem,* si reliqua vera essent, hoc necessario admittendum, cum nullum præter hoc Pictoris nomen Dactyli vel Cretici vicem implere possit, licet id quoque ab *exaudiant* pernimium abeat. Jacobus Gronov. eandem, quam noster, emendandi viam, quod ad *suo Detrito,* ingressus est, sed pessimo successu; ille enim reponi velit *luto Boethum,* quasi *Boethus,* quod Græcis Βοηθὸς, in dissyllabum contrahi potuisset, quod is non Græcus esset, sed Carthaginensis; quod etsi verum sit, a Græcis tamen Romani nomen, opinor, ut aliorum fere artificum, acceperunt. Ne nos ab hoc loco asymboli discedamus, dabo jam quod mihi quoque in mentem venerit. Sic igitur hæc refingi forte non incommode possunt.

Lib. V. *Qui pretium operibus majus inveniunt, novo & marmori adscripserunt Praxitelem,* Myos Nomen *detrito argento :* tabulæque hoc juvant Pacto fucatæ. *Antiquis nominibus artificum argentum nobile.* dixit Senec. ad Helviam c. xi. *Mys* vero argenti cælandi laude post *Mentorem* primus fuit. Hinc Martial. VIII. 34. *Archetypum* Myos argentum. & 51.

Quis labor in phiala? docti Myos, *anne Myronis? Mentoris hæc manus est, an, Polyclete, tua?* & XIV. 55.

Glorior arte magis ; nam Myos *iste labor.* quæ loca adduxit Junius de Pictura Veterum, Catalogi p. 130. sic autem servabitur *detrito*, & evitabitur incommodum quod ex altera emendandi ratione oritur, quæ artificibus antiquis materias non suas assignat : neque *Myos nomen* a *Myronem* multum abit ; idque in memoriam revocandum, Librarios nusquam sæpius aut turpius errare quam in nominibus propriis. Quod ad reliqua nostræ emendationis, eruditorum judicio lubens relinquo, & hæc & illa, non ut emendationes, *quæ non possunt non esse veræ*, sed ut conjecturas tantum afferens, libere ab aliis expendendas. sed ad alia pergendum.

I. 2. *Athenas occupavit imperio improbo.* Hæc interpolat Vir doctiss. inserendo *cum* post *Athenas*, eandem ob rationem, propter quam tot loca corrupit, invitis inferciendo *ut*, ne hiaret sc. oratio.

3. *Ut mos est vulgi, passim & certatim ruunt, Feliciter subclamant.* Sic VII. 13. *Ut spectatorum mos est.* Repone, inquit B.

Ut mos est, vulgus passim & certatim ruit, *Feliciter*, subclamat. Codices habent *ruit.* Hæc-

cine

cine vero de suo? nihil minus. Sic enim Meur- LIB. V.
sius,

——*certatim ruit,*

Feliciter, subclamat. B. quidem *vulgi* in *vulgus* mutavit pro suo arbitrio, sed temere. *Vulgus* quidem & *Principes* inquit opponi: quid vero, num minus opponuntur, si legamus *vulgi?*

Ne defuisse noceat, repunt ultimi. Codd. *repetunt,* 8.
pro quo Ritterſh. *reptant,* quod post Fabrum reposuit Hoogstrat. & sic B.

Quisnam Cinædus ille in conspectu meo 15.
Audet venire? Licet probe sciam viros doctissimos hanc lectionem exemplo non uno tueri, cum tamen Phædrus dixerit VII. 22.

Quidam in conspectum proditurum sine mora.

Suspicor hic legendum in *conspectus meos,* ne dicam merito dubitari posse in plerisque quæ offeruntur exemplis, an non *m* finale exciderit. Licet alias fere omiserim notare loca, in quibus Textus Bentleianus a Burmanniano discedit non admonito lectore, hic tamen non prætereundum bis id in tribus versiculis factum esse, idque cum secunda mutatio gravior sit: Hoc sc. in versu pro *Quinam* ille *Quisnam,* quod quidem leve est; in ultimo vero, pro *mutatus* lacunæ appositis indiciis, Vir doctiss. *mutatur* cum plena distinctione, quasi nihil deesset.

Scio, quod virtuti non sit credendum tuæ. B. ac- II. 11.
cedit Gronovio, qui *Scio quam* reponendum contendit, cum *Scio quod* Latine dici neget. alteram tamen lectionem probant Vossius, Schoppius, Faber, & *Scio quod* recte dici pluribus docet doctiss. Perizon. ad Sanctii Minervam, p. 546. edit tert.

——*mecum*

LIB. V. ——*mecum facile redeo in gratiam,*

III. 7. *Quia non fuisse mentem lædendi scio.* Quis non miretur virum doctiss. ne hæc quidem intacta præterire? reponit ille pro *Quia Cui.* Ad libros utique emendandos accedere videtur vir doctiss. animo ab aliis editoribus quantum possit maxime diverso. Illi enim vellent omnia sana esse, ut sit minimus corrigendi locus; & codicum lectiones, si qua possunt, lubentes tuentur: Ille vero ab hoc animo tantum abest, ut leviss. immutandi occasiones avidissime captet, & magnopere vellet, ingenii ostentandi gratia, ut in singulis versibus aliquid vel vere vel specie saltem mendosum sit, ut conjecturis locum faciat: & si ne species vel umbra vitii sit, tamen si idem aliter æque bene, vel, ipso judice, melius dici potuisset, hinc quoque interpolandi occasionem insane arripit. Si non hoc animo ad Phædrum emendate edendum accessisset, quot inanibus conjecturis careremus, quibus libellus hic jam obrutus & omnibus paginis deturpatus est, ne parum scilicet Criticus videatur?

11. *Hoc argumentum veniam mage dari docet,*

Qui casu peccat, quam qui consilio est nocens. Cod. Rem. *Hoc argumento veniam dari docet.* & sic dedit Neveletus, ex cod. opinor, Pithœi. pro *docet* vero Gud. *decet.* veriss. opinor; & sic edidit Jac. Gronovius, & Hoogstrat. cum vero versus laboret, inserendum puto *ei* post *veniam,* quod & sententia flagitat. In versu autem secundo pro *quam,* statim vidi sententiam postulare *nam,* totumque adeo locum sic reponendum.

Hoc argumento veniam ei dari decet,

Qui

Qui casu peccat. Nam *qui consilio est nocens*, & LIB. V.
secundum versum jam video ita emendasse Rigaltium. cui accedit etiam B. sed ille in primo *dandam illi*, & sic totum versum reponit.

Hoc argumentum veniam dandam illi docet. Et *dandam* quidem *Docet* requirit. sed *Decet*, *dari*, quæ codicum lectio est. miror vero cur non potius *docet* in *decet* mutandum putarunt quam *argumento* in *argumentum*, cum *dari* & *docet* simul consistere non possunt: quid quod *argumentum docet*, nusquam alias occurrat. Cum vero *debet dari* Phædrus dixerat, III. 14. 12. & IV. 25. 23. suspiceris legendum, Hoc argumento *venia debet huic dari*, meliore numero; sed nimium abit a codicibus.

Tuum libenter prorsus adpeterem cibum. MS. *Libenter tuum.* unde B. *Libenter istum.* sed, num ita uterque codex, non dicitur; & si ita sit, pro Librarii errore habendum putem, cum & *tuum* multo hic aptius sit, & *prorsus* a *libenter* non facile divelli queat. certe in membranis frequentes sunt hujusmodi trajectiones. IV. 5.

Periculosum semper vitavi lucrum. Vitavi, excerpta Rigaltii; (ex codice Remensi, opinor, quo ille usus est) *periculosum* est cum periculo conjunctum. Sic, I. 8. 9. PERICULOSAM *fecit medicinam lupo.* in altero vero Codice videtur fuisse *reputavi*, cum sic Rittersh. & Nevelet. atque id reposuit B. Utraque probabilis lectio, sed prior fabulæ potius convenit, & *reputavi* pro *vitavi* forte positum est errore librarii, cum tres primæ ejus litteræ sint eædem ac tres ultimæ in *semper*, sed ordine inverso. *reputavi* tamen favere videatur, quod dixit, II. 7. 14. 8.

Magnæ

LIB. V. *Magnæ periclo sunt opes obnoxiæ.* Utrique lectioni convenit, quod de seipso, III. Prol. 21.

Curamque habendi penitus corde eraserim.

9. *Sed dicis, qui rapuere divitias, habent.* Heins. *dices,* quod dat B. tanquam de suo. *rapuere,* id est, quibuscunque poterant modis, sibi divitias *arripuere*; *habent, possident,* divites sunt. quid in his culpes? B. tamen, pro *rapuere, latuere.* Quid vero, num omnes qui *latent,* divites sunt? inane acumen hic captat vir doctiss. In versu proximo Heins. pro *qui, quot.* sed *qui* valet eos, qui; nihil igitur ista emendatione opus. præter tamen morem est viri doctiss. quod non arripuerit, cum sit satis speciosa.

12. *Paucis temeritas est bono, multis malo.* miror *temeritas* eruditis non displicuisse, cum argumentum fabulæ plane postulet *aviditas, cupiditas, improbitas,* quorum primum malim, cum ipse dixerit, II. 1. 14. *Verum est aviditas dives.*

V. 4. *Facturus ludos quidam dives nobiles.* Sic 7. 16. *Erat facturus ludos quidam nobiles.*

18. *Verum ut subesse pallio contenderent.* Hic & *v.* 32. pro *verum* & *vero* Heins. vellet *verrem* & *verri,* cui nemo assensit. B. ne ad hanc fabulam nihil dicat, utroque loco dixit se hanc conjecturam improbare. *non placet. non assentior.* sed aliud non minus malum dedit Heins. quod cum nostri palato arrideret, omittere non potuit. ad versum 22.

22. *Hoc vidit fieri Rusticus.* Heins. *Hoc* videt ut *fieri.* recte, inquit B.

33. *Quæ possim loqui.* B. *Eloqui* reposuit, quæ Heinsii conjectura est, non admonito lectore sese a textu Burm. recessisse, vel hoc ab Heinsio mutuasse.

Sed

Sed temperatæ suaves sunt argutiæ. hic Vir doctiss. reponit *suave*, eodem jure, quo III. 7. 1. pro *dulcis sit libertas, dulce*, id est prorsus nullo, cum hoc sit argutum nimis, & a Phædri more alienum. LIB. V. 41.

Quare Vir Sanctissime, 42.

Particulo, chartis nomen victurum meis. Ex hac Particulonis laude conjicio Phædrum id quod petierat, jam tandem ab eo impetrasse.

Accessit alter æque defectus pilis. VI. 2.

Eia, inquit. Cum *ut* nullis modis ingeri poterat, ut propositum idem alia ratione obtineret, Vir doctiss *accessit* mutavit in *accedens.*

Quem spes delusit, huic querela convenit. Hic quoque B. articulum inserit, ut sæpe alias solet, &, invito Phædro, reponit *querela hæc.* 7.

Nec opinans, & sinistram fregit tibiam. Cod. *Opia sed.* quibus explicandis se frustra torquet Gudius, & ex iis extundit instrumenta quædam ὀπῶα dicta. *Opia sed* est *opinans et* compendio scriptum, utroque *n* superne notato, & *s* ad sequentem syllabam adjuncto, quod fecit, ut *t* mutarent in *d.* quod miror Bentleium saltem non animadvertisse, tam sagacem tantique acuminis virum; qui ad hæc, Recte Neveletus *necopinus:* ut supra I. 9. 6. *necopinum rapit.* Codices hic, *Nec opia sed.* Quale vero hoc argumentum? Phædrus dixit alibi, *necopinum*, quia versus *necopinantem* non ferret, ideo non hic dixit *nec opinans*, quod æque recte dici poterat. ut Ter. And. I. 2. 9. *necopinantes duci falso gaudio.* vid. etiam Heaut. I. 2. 11. & Hec. III. 3. 2. Nec VII. 8.

Duas cum dextras maluisset perdere. Ludit hic Phædrus in voce *tibia* non ineleganter, cum tibia ambigua vox sit, qua significatur & pars cruris, & 9.

illa,

Lib. V. illa, qua canitur. Cum vero viderem virum doctissimum tam bellam occasionem de Tibiis veterum differendi pro infinita sua eruditione non arripuisse, adii ad Terentii Didascalias, nihil dubitans quin ibi vexatissimam illam quæstionem ab eo copiose & dilucide explicatam invenirem: sed nescio quo fato evenit, ut illic quoque tacere mallet, idque cum toties spem feciisset, se hic egregia præstiturum; quod facit ut vehementer suspicer nihil illum hac in causa posse dicere, quod non dictum sit prius.

13. *Ut spectatorum mos est, & lepidum genus.* Gron. legendum putat *ad lepidum genus.* id est, ut spectatores solent esse affecti erga suave illud genus. Heins. pro *lepidum*, *cupidum.* B. ad hæc nihil.

17. *Et incipiebat Princeps ingredier. eum*
Adducit pretio, precibus. Editiones vett. habent,
Et incipiebat Princeps abduci reum, ingredi a se reducit pretio. Ex quo Ursinus,
Et incipiebat ingredi Princeps, eum
Reducit pretio. Hæc Scheffer. Heins.
Ut incipiebat Princeps ingredier, eum
Inducit pretio. Propius ad codices hoc modo restituas,
Et incipiebat Princeps ingredi. Ad se eum
Adducit. Ad hæc Gudius affert locum ex Cic. Epist. Fam. X. 17. *Cum primum posse ingredi cœpit.* Hoc arrepto B. tacito Gudii nomine reponit,
Et ut incipiebat POSSE *Princeps ingredi,*
Inducit. Ut atque *inducit* sunt ab Heinsio, de quo pariter tacet. Sed præterquam quod hæc a codicibus nimium recedant, & *eum* temere omittatur, corrumpit emendationem Heinsii, dum *et* quoque

quoque retineri vult; quæ enim hæc constructio? LIB. V.
erat facturus, & *inducit.*

Chorus reducto tunc, & notum canticum 25.

Imposuit, cujus hæc fuit sententia. MS. *Tunc chorus ignotum more ducto canticum Imposuit.* In quibus verbis necesse est ut aliquid immutetur, cum subesse mendum omnes sentiant. Pro *more ducto* Salm. *mox reducto.* quod Freinshemius probavit, & sic locum legendum censuit,

Tunc chorus ignotum mox reducto canticum

Insonuit. Insonuit arripuit B. tacito Freinshemii nomine, & pro *more ducto,* MORE DOCTO. Hoc est, inquit ille, novum de more canticum chorus insonuit. Quis vero *more docto* dixit? quis *ignotum more docto* conjunxit? quis, chorum canticum insonare? quis denique credat Phædrum hoc versu voluisse *more* ponere, cum in versu præcedente eadem voce usus sit? præterea *Imposuit* hic eam habet proprietatem, ut abesse nequeat, cum totius fabulæ lepos in eo consistat, quod chorus homini vano & inepto, hoc cantico imposuerit. Ego igitur pro *more ducto,* cum Gudio legendum puto, *modo reducto*; *mo* enim pro *modo* compendium solemne est librariorum; & distinctione post *chorus* locum adjuvandum. Præcessit, *Dii sunt locuti more tranlatitio.*

Tunc chorus; (sc. locutus est, id est, cecinit) *ignotum* (tibicini) *modo reducto canticum Imposuit.*

In plausus consurrectum est. Jactant basia. 28.

Tibicen gratulari fautores putat. Cod. *jactat.* & sic omnes editt. quas vidi præter Burmann. *jactant* est a Petro Scriverio, quod miror probasse Heinsium. Tibicen enim jactabat basia, quod spectatores

Lib. V. tores sibi gratulari putaret. Hic B. restitue quod Codices exhibent, *Jactat*, quasi ipse primus ita restituisset. In secundo autem versu pro *putat* mallem *putans*.

32. *Iteratur illud. Homo meus se in pulpito.* Venuste admodum nova sententia incipit ad *Homo meus*; & quod ad versum, distinctio optime fit in cæsura. Heins. tamen pro *illud, illico*. quo indicio B. reponit *illic*. *Hic* & *illic* eleganter, inquit, pro *tunc*; quod nemo, opinor, nescit. sed nullus illi hic locus.

VIII. I. *Cursu volucri pendens in novacula.* B. *Cursu illa volucri*. hoc opinor illi *concinnius* visum est, *ideoque & verum*.

IX. 3. *Monstrabat vitulus, quo se pacto plecteret.* Eruditi jam diu monuerunt reponendum *flecteret*. & sic B.

X. 1. *Adversus omnes fortis veloces feras.* MS. *Fortes & veloces*. unde Heins. *Fortis & velox*. quod in textu posuit Hoogst. & sic B. *fortis*, inquit, adversus apros, leones; *velox* contra lepores & cervos.

3. *Languere cæpit annis ingravantibus.* B. *Languere* UT *cæpit*, pro more.

5. *Adripuit aurem.* Heins. *aure*. quod reponit B. temere prorsus, cum, ut observat Burmannus, utrumque æque Latine dici possit; & *aurem* numeros hic meliores efficit.

7. *Canem objurgabat; cui latrans contra senex.* Cod. *Cui senex contra latrans*. & sic olim dedit Burmannus, sed in secunda editione verborum ordinem immutavit obsecutus Hoogstratano, qui pluribus contendit primam in *latrans* corripi non posse; quod si verum sit, ordinem verborum invertisse parum

parum juvat, cum vix ferendum ſit, ut ultima in *latrans* acuatur, cum ſyllaba præcedens longa ſit. Ego vero nequaquam certum puto, priorem in *latrans* non poſſe corripi. Voſſii verba hæc ſunt de Arte Gram. *p.* 210. " Nec dubium, quin Claſſi- " ci potius ſequendi ſint, ſi conſentiunt. Ut in " *migro*, ubi nemo priorem, quod ſciam, corripit " præter Manilium Theodoſiani ævi poetam. Ac " fortaſſe par ratio in *Latrare*. Quanquam prio- " rem non Guntherus modo corripiat, ſed etiam " Sidonius, cum ait, Lib. V.

——— *circum* latrat *ingens*
" *Turba canum :* Idem Claudius Mamertus Victor " commentario in Geneſim." Vides hic Voſſium putaſſe certius eſſe priorem in *migro* produci, quam in *latro*, & tamen certis exemplis Plauti & Terentii conſtat plerumque corripi. Sed, cum non obſervaſſent exempla iſtiuſmodi in Heroicis & Elegiacis Poetis, inde propere nimis ſententiam eruditi in alteram partem pronuntiarunt. Illos utique fugerat Lucretianum illud, II. 965.

Inque locum quando REMIGRANT, *fit blanda voluptas.*

De *latro* quidem nihil affirmare auſim ; apud Plautum quidem occurrunt *latrant* & *latranti*, & primam in utroque loco per verſum brevem eſſe licet ; apud Terentium vero nuſquam. Sed fieri poteſt ut quantitatis notitia ab unico interdum exemplo pendeat ; cujus exemplum eſt verbum FLAGRO, quod licet optimis Scriptoribus frequentiſſimo in uſu ſit, cum *latro* contra raro occurrat, nemo tamen quod ſciam, priorem corripuit præter Virgilium, Æneid. II. 685.

LIB. V. *Nos pavidi trepidare metu, crinemque* FLAGRANTEM
Excutere, & sanctos restinguere fontibus ignes. Sed ut dicam quod sentio, ipsa vox *latrans* mihi minus loco videtur convenire; cum non hic pro *canis* simpliciter poni videatur, quod nec exemplis defendi potest, nec res ipsa patitur. Ut enim de domino dicitur, *Hic tum venator* dolens *Canem objurgabat*; sic videtur desiderari *ingemens*, aut aliquid ejusmodi, quod canem indignantem & ægre ferentem tam iniquam objurgationem exhiberet. *Ingemens* vero ideo minus placet, quod nulla sit ratio, quæ induceret librarios *latrans* ejus loco ponere. Quærenda igitur vox quædam rarior & obscurior, cujus *latrans* glossa esset. ea vero fortasse fuit *hirriens*, quod proprium canum est, indigne aliquid ferentium. *Hirrire*, ut dicit Scaliger ad Festum, est vox ad imitationem efficta ob literam R. quam canes irritatæ sonant; quæ & ideo *canina* dicitur. Sidon. *Prodat* hirritu *rabiem canino*. B. ut versui consulat, alio confugit, & ad notum exitum se recipit. Illi certum est primum in *latrans* corripi non posse, cum a gravi vastoque sono verbum ipsum primo factum sit (quasi nullus latratus sit acutus) neque tamen hilo melior erit versus, si *latrans* a pede sexto ad quartum reduxeris. Dedit auctor,

Cui senex contra Lacon. Horat. Epod. VI.
Nam qualis aut Molossus, aut fulvus Lacon.

Eleganter autem, cum prius dixisset *canis*, postea intulit *Lacon.* ut Virg. Æneid. XII. 750.

Venator cursu canis, *& latratibus instat.*
Ille (cervus) *autem insidiis, ac ripa territus alta,*

Mille

Mille fugit refugitque vias: at vividus UMBER LIB. V.
Hæret hians. His exemplis Vir doctiſſ. putat ſe rem confeciſſe, & egregie locum emendaſſe. Mihi contra nihil certius videtur, quam hanc emendationem ineptam eſſe & abſurdam. primo enim *Lacon* hic eſt plane otioſum, cum locus, ut dixi, poſtulet epithetum proprium, & rei de qua agitur accommodatum, quodque canem ad domini objurgationem indignantem exprimat. dein tantum abeſt ut *Lacon* ſit hic elegans, ut hoc humile dicendi genus, tales elegantias in univerſum reſpuat; quod enim in Tragico, Epico aut Lyrico carmine cum laude dicitur, in Fabulis poni tenuitas argumenti nequaquam patitur. Nec quid magis contra decorum, magiſve vitioſum in uno dicendi genere, quam quod in altero eſſet inſigniter eximium. Hoc verum eſſe & ipſa dicendi ratio, & natura docent, & Phædri ipſius conſuetudo. Cur enim, ſi hoc ſit re vera elegans, nuſquam in tot aliis Fabulis idem fecerit? Hoc autem non tantum elegantia omni carere, ſed & abſurdiſſimum eſſe quivis facile alio ab exemplo ſentiet. Pone enim in fabula quadam de *equo* deſiderari vocem quæ ſpondei vicem ſuppleat, cum *equus* ſit prima brevi; num elegans putabitur ſi pro *equo* inſeratur *Rhœbus* aut *Æthon?* quia Virgilius dixit, Æneid. X. 861. RHOEBE *diu, res ſi qua diu mortalibus ulla eſt, Viximus.* & XI. 89.

Poſt bellator equus poſitis inſignibus Æthon
It lacrimans.

Operam, opinor, luderet, qui hoc ridiculum fore operoſe probaret, cum primo ſtatim conſpectu ineptiam ſuam ultro omnibus prodat. Quod vero

Lib. V. Vir doctiss. dicit, *eleganter, cum prius* Canis *dixisset, intulit* Lacon, idque Virgilii exemplo firmet, hic quoque fallitur, & elegantiam ibi captat, ubi plane nulla est: Umber enim in Virgilio non minus elegans foret, etsi *Canis* non præcessisset, ut liquet ex his Senecæ, Thy. *v.* 497.

Sic cum feras vestigat, & longo sagax
Loro tenetur Umber, *ac presso vias*
Scrutatur ore; dum procul lento suem
Odore sentit, paret, & tacito locum
Rostro pererrat: præda cum propior fuit,
Cervice tota pugnat, & gemitu vocat
Dominum morantem, seque retinenti eripit.

Abeat igitur Viri doctissimi Lacon, unde pedem huc malum intulit.

8. *Non te destituit animus, sed vires meæ.* Ad hæc Hoogstrat. Vir celeberrimus, mihique amicissimus, Petrus Francius reponebat *non* me *destituit:* quod non displicet. —— eodemque modo reddidit Interpres Gallicus. Atque hoc tanquam de suo reponit B. *primus ad extremum similis sibi*, nisi quod una adhuc emendatio supersit, quem Gudii esse non diffitetur.

9. *Quod fuimus laudas, jam damnas quod non fumus.* Codd.

Quod fuimus laudas, jam damnas quod fumus. Scribe, inquit Gudius, meo periculo,

Quod fuimus lauda, si *jam damnas quod fumus.* Sic non tantum versui numerus, sed verbis fides, & veritati ratio constabit. cui calculum apponit B. *Recte* Gudius. Est sane non recta modo emendatio, sed & admodum ingeniosa. Olim Phædri codices videntur habuisse pro *lauda, si, laudasti.* sic enim

enim Anonym. Laudasti, *quod fui, mibi jam dam-* LIB. V.
nas quod fum. Remicius, laudasti *quod fuimus, jam damnas quod fumus.*

Atque hæc dicta sint ad hanc Phædri editionem, de qua tantam spem conceperam ; quibus me fidem liberasse, & quod receperam, abunde præstitisse confido, ut non verear pronuntiare, omnium, quotquot viderim, nullam esse, quæ veram auctoris manum minus referat. Num in Terentio, opere per triginta fere annos promisso, sed jam tandem *festinantius, ut evenit, deproperato*, melius viro doctissimo successerit, viderint quibus plus otii atque ingenii est ; ego quidem pauca tantum & leviter inspexi, in iis vero paucis ubique video hominem supra modum gloriæ appetentem, & alieni laboris malignum obtrectatorem ; ubique festinationis temerariæ magis nescio an superbæ indicia, & in optimi auctoris textu interpolando licentiam non ferendam. In his vero quæ ad Phædrum dedit, quot ineptiæ ? quot hallucinationes ? quot *operæ nimium celeris, curaque carentis* argumenta ? quot φιλαυτίας & αὐθαδείας, quot plagii, quamque aperta exempla ? quam multa denique mali commatis, cum quæ bona & sua, sint perquam pauca ? Hæc sane cogunt invitum tandem discedere ab existimatione illa quam hactenus habueram de summa viri doctissimi in his literis præstantia. In aliis quidem eruditionis partibus dudum liquet nihil illum egregie præter ceteros posse, immo in nonnullis vix etiam mediocriter. In re ANTIQUARIA hospitem esse luculenter probavit Doctiss. CHISHULLUS præclara sua Defensione Commentarii ad INSCRIPTIONEM SIGEAM ; quo

nihil

Lib. V. nihil in illo genere lectu jucundius, nihil utiliu
aut reconditæ eruditionis plenius. Idem in Pa
TRUM scriptis evidentissime ostendit ingeniosissimu
MIDDLETONUS in Animadversionibus in Nov
TESTAMENTI specimen prius memoratis. In stu
diis vero THEOLOGICIS, SACRISQUE Literis, u
alia mittam quæ plura habeo, quam parum sit ex
ercitatus, aperte nimis indicant & PRÆLECTIONE
perpetuo, proh pudor! intermissæ per omne illu
tempus, ex quo ad primariam Theologiæ Cathe
dram evectus est, & DISPUTATIONUM vix melic
conditio; in quibus Regius Professor partes su
quam strenue sustineat, quam raro quamque inv
tus deserat, dicant Academici. Hic certe in URB
commoratur Vir doctiss. tum maxime, cum pr
muneris ratione id minime faciendum erat. Se
in humanioribus studiis, in Poetarum scriptis, i
Veteribus Comicis, in re metrica, in his eum fa
cile Principem credidi. Et est profecto, sed no
eo quo hactenus putaram sensu; nondum enir
summum in hisce studiis fastigium assecutus est, u
non etiamnum quo crescat habeat; nec ideo i
re metrica principatum obtinet, quod in eoder
stadio certatim magnoque numero currentes long
post se reliquerit; hic enim solus secum certavi
cum alii fere hanc eruditionis partem vel prorsu
neglexerint, vel leviter attigerint. Neglexerun
autem quam adolescentes non didicerant, quia ill
se facillime carere posse jam viri facti probe sci
rent. In dimetiendis enim pedibus, ac perpen
dendis syllabis consenescere, id, inquit Quintilianus
tum miseri, tum in minimis occupati est. Nequ
enim, qui se totum in hac cura consumpserit, po
tioribu

oribus vacabit. Quanto autem cum fructu, quan- LIB. V.
que rei literariæ commodo, aliis ſtudiis tempus
um impenderint, qui levioribus hiſce nullum dari
oluerunt, teſtantur præclara in omni literarum &
ientiarum genere monumenta, quæ Eximii illi
iri elaborarunt, quos Vir doctiſſ. tanta ſolet cum
ontemptione ſpernere, quod in verborum ſyllabis,
rſuumque Comicorum pedibus & numeris per-
rutandis & ad digitos exigendis noluerint adul-
oris jam ætatis tempus ſibi miſere perire. Quaſi
ortunæ Græciæ in eo verterentur, ut hæc erudi-
onis pars in qua ipſe primas tenet, unica eſſet,
i veræ doctrinæ laus & nomen merito compe-
rent; aliæ vero omnes præ ea plane ſorderent,
rumque pretium æſtimandum eſſet ex incuria
a qua ipſe eas tractavit; cum re vera ſit omnium
inime utilis, nedum neceſſaria; utpote quæ nec
onum civem nec prudentem virum faciat, nec ad
rum vel divinarum vel humanarum cognitionem
iicquam conferat. Ex eo enim tantum, quod a
eriſque vix inſpecta ſit, reconditum quid & μυστι-
ες eſſe exiſtimatur, cum in ſe tamen nihil illa
facilius, ſi ſuo tempore, primiſque in annis ad-
catur. Unus certe *Theologiæ* locus, unum *ſacræ*
ipturæ caput, una in *Hiſtoricis* aut *Chronologicis*
æſtio, ut de Scientiis vel de Juris prudentia nihil
am, plus ſibi temporis & ſtudii ſæpe poſtulat,
am tota de Trimetris & Tetrametris Doctrina,
a primis uſque elementis in abditiſſima ejus my-
ria penetres. Quod in eorum gratiam dicen-
m putavi, quos ob rei metricæ ignorantiam, etſi
o fere omni doctrinæ genere præſtantes, vir
ſſimus tam inhumaniter tamque indignis mo-
dis

Lib. V. dis laceravit. In hoc igitur uno genere, in quo alii operam suam ponere detrectarunt, Ipse primas habeat, & Principatus nomen non tam amet habere, quam mereri, bonas literas quantum possit, potest autem egregie, promovendo, & hanc Spartam, quam sibi sine rivali nactus est, non jactando, sed ornando; sententiæ illius memor. *vero Jove* dignæ, quam Phædrus suo tribuit, III. 12. 18.

Nisi UTILE *est quod facimus, stulta est gloria.* Et quod idem dixit, I. 12. 1.

Laudatis UTILIORA, *quæ contempseris,*

Sæpe esse. — Vale Vir eruditissime, & me ex animo tuum vicissim ama.

Dabam Londini
tertio Kal. Febr.

The End of the Second Volume.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
Los Angeles

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.

Form L9–Series 4939

3 1158 01025 0933

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

A 000 007 359 3